Faith as a way of knowing

[FBM]

I'm only hypothesizing here, but... Say only religious people could fully understand Bach's music, because without a complete openness to the concept of a supreme divine being, you will never fully understand or appreciate what Bach is trying to convey through is music.

I may have had a relevant experience recently. Last Saturday was Buddha's Birthday. I went to a small, poor, fairly remote temple to take some photos of what the real country people do for the holiday, rather than hit the parades and hyped-up venues. They had a traditional Korean musical group. I could feel the power and emotion in the performances and was very moved by them, but I didn't know what they were singing about. Also, not being a native, it didn't have the deep cultural significance for me that it had for them. I was rapt, and so was everyone else, but for different reasons. While I didn't fully appreciate what they were trying to convey, for language and cultural reasons, I did deeply appreciate the quality of what was going on. But not fully. I can only assume that the performance was related to Buddhism, but for all I know, they could have been singing about the beauty of Korea in the spring or, for that matter, extolling the merits of a brand of oil filter.

[AshtonBlack]

In answer to the OP may I introduce Karl Popper.

That's the difference between "trusting" science knowledge and "believing" in faith derived knowledge.

As to the "Would a religious artist still produce an equally as splendid art if he or she were not a believer?"

Would they still have the same skills that allowed them to create the art, if not religious?. In most cases, I would suggest, yes. For example, imagination, curiosity, creativity, and flair would be not effected, perhaps even boosted a non-religious artist.

[Xamonas Chegwé]

I'm only hypothesizing here, but... Say only religious people could fully understand Bach's music, because without a complete openness to the concept of a supreme divine being, you will never fully understand or appreciate what Bach is trying to convey through is music.

I may have had a relevant experience recently. Last Saturday was Buddha's Birthday. I went to a small, poor, fairly remote temple to take some photos of what the real country people do for the holiday, rather than hit the parades and hyped-up venues. They had a traditional Korean musical group. I could feel the power and emotion in the performances and was very moved by them, but I didn't know what they were singing about. Also, not being a native, it didn't have the deep cultural significance for me that it had for them. I was rapt, and so was everyone else, but for different reasons. While I didn't fully appreciate what they were trying to convey, for language and cultural reasons, I did deeply appreciate the quality of what was going on. But not fully. I can only assume that the performance was related to Buddhism, but for all I know, they could have been singing about the beauty of Korea in the spring or, for that matter, extolling the merits of a brand of oil filter.

But the beauty of the music would be the same in any case. I have a couple of CDs by Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan, a sufi muslim singer with an incredible voice. I have no idea what is being sung in any of the tracks (apart from the fact that they are all religious) but I am still carried away by the emotion and the splendour of the music.

I also have albums by Malian, Gambian, Spanish and Indian artists (among others) that are not religious in content (at least I don't think so) and where I also have no clue as to the content of the lyrics. So, while I adore the music and the feelings that it evokes, and admire the proficiency and the nuances of the vocals, I cannot be said to 'understand' the music as completely as a native speaker. It is the language that is the barrier here - not the faith element.

When someone is transported in their music by the emotions they are feeling, I can relate to that. I can do so because I am human and I have felt every one of those emotions. We all have. Whether the transport is triggered by faith and its associated delusions, by feelings for another human being, (or a pile of other human beings ) by a feeling of oneness with nature, or by hearing the music itself, is irrelevant. The fact is that any kind of art is an attempt by one human being to share their feelings with others, and if that sharing is done well, the universality of human experience is enough for it to be understood at an emotional level by anyone, whatever its stimulus.

[MrFungus420]

What if having faith were necessary to fully understand a certain piece of writing, or art?

Writings and art are subject to opinion.

Opinion is irrelevent to knowledge.

[Mysturji]

No, I'm writing a series of pieces on Ways of Knowing, and faith is one of the possibilities, along with math, science, logic, emotion, etc. It's basically a comparative evaluation of each.

Being sure about something is not the same as knowing (though it can appear very similar from the inside).

"Believing something that ain't so don't make it so."

[FBM]

This is a (the?) deep question in epistemology. The following flirts with the ambiguity between faith and belief, but it may be relevant:
(TK= traditional knowledge)

According to TK, knowledge that p is, at least approximately, justified true belief (JTB). False propositions cannot be known. Therefore, knowledge requires truth. A proposition S doesn't even believe can't be a proposition that S knows. Therefore, knowledge requires belief. Finally, S's being correct in believing that p might merely be a matter of luck.[2] Therefore, knowledge requires a third element, traditionally identified as justification. Thus we arrive at a tripartite analysis of knowledge as JTB: S knows that p if and only if p is true and S is justified in believing that p. According to this analysis, the three conditions — truth, belief, and justification — are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for knowledge.[3]

(emphasis mine)

Source: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/#DND

[Xamonas Chegwé]

This is a (the?) deep question in epistemology. The following flirts with the ambiguity between faith and belief, but it may be relevant:
(TK= traditional knowledge)

According to TK, knowledge that p is, at least approximately, justified true belief (JTB). False propositions cannot be known. Therefore, knowledge requires truth. A proposition S doesn't even believe can't be a proposition that S knows. Therefore, knowledge requires belief. Finally, S's being correct in believing that p might merely be a matter of luck.[2] Therefore, knowledge requires a third element, traditionally identified as justification. Thus we arrive at a tripartite analysis of knowledge as JTB: S knows that p if and only if p is true and S is justified in believing that p. According to this analysis, the three conditions — truth, belief, and justification — are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for knowledge.[3]

(emphasis mine)

Source: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/#DND

I accept such concepts as evolution, the non-existence of god, the laws of thermodynamics as almost certainly true based on evidence but I do not believe in them. I also have no way of testing their truth with any certainty. This is true of any scientific theory, or indeed any 'fact' about the world.

I know Newton's second law of motion. Had I lived in pre-Einstein times, I would have known that it was universally true and unalterable. As I don't live in such times, I know that it is only an excellent approximation and that it breaks down as one approaches the speed of light. Given a few more centuries of scientific research, who knows what my equivalent might know about such things.

My point is that scientific knowledge is not subject to the three conditions above, instead it is recognised as being an approximation based upon empirical evidence and ever-refinable theories. It neither requires belief, nor recognises ultimate truth; instead it is only as true or as believable as its justification allows and that justification includes the twin pillars of theory and evidence.

[FBM]

This is a (the?) deep question in epistemology. The following flirts with the ambiguity between faith and belief, but it may be relevant:
(TK= traditional knowledge)

According to TK, knowledge that p is, at least approximately, justified true belief (JTB). False propositions cannot be known. Therefore, knowledge requires truth. A proposition S doesn't even believe can't be a proposition that S knows. Therefore, knowledge requires belief. Finally, S's being correct in believing that p might merely be a matter of luck.[2] Therefore, knowledge requires a third element, traditionally identified as justification. Thus we arrive at a tripartite analysis of knowledge as JTB: S knows that p if and only if p is true and S is justified in believing that p. According to this analysis, the three conditions — truth, belief, and justification — are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for knowledge.[3]

(emphasis mine)

Source: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/#DND

I accept such concepts as evolution, the non-existence of god, the laws of thermodynamics as almost certainly true based on evidence but I do not believe in them. I also have no way of testing their truth with any certainty. This is true of any scientific theory, or indeed any 'fact' about the world.

I know Newton's second law of motion. Had I lived in pre-Einstein times, I would have known that it was universally true and unalterable. As I don't live in such times, I know that it is only an excellent approximation and that it breaks down as one approaches the speed of light. Given a few more centuries of scientific research, who knows what my equivalent might know about such things.

My point is that scientific knowledge is not subject to the three conditions above, instead it is recognised as being an approximation based upon empirical evidence and ever-refinable theories. It neither requires belief, nor recognises ultimate truth; instead it is only as true or as believable as its justification allows and that justification includes the twin pillars of theory and evidence.

We share the same perspective, then. The only thing left for honorable gentlemen such as ourselves to do is to quibble over semantics! When you say on the one hand, "I accept such concepts as..." and then "I know Newton's...", are these qualitatively equivalent expressions, or did you choose those words to highlight a significant nuance? IOW, could you switch and say, 'I accept Newton's...' and 'I know such concepts as evolution...'?

FS, if this is a derail, just say the word. I'm not sure how far afield we've wandered from your question about faith as a way of knowing.

[Chinaski]

Nah, this is fine, the purpose of these threads is to encourage discussions of whatever kind. My only problem now is writing a 1000 word essay in a few hours. And it has to be good.

[Xamonas Chegwé]

This is a (the?) deep question in epistemology. The following flirts with the ambiguity between faith and belief, but it may be relevant:
(TK= traditional knowledge)

According to TK, knowledge that p is, at least approximately, justified true belief (JTB). False propositions cannot be known. Therefore, knowledge requires truth. A proposition S doesn't even believe can't be a proposition that S knows. Therefore, knowledge requires belief. Finally, S's being correct in believing that p might merely be a matter of luck.[2] Therefore, knowledge requires a third element, traditionally identified as justification. Thus we arrive at a tripartite analysis of knowledge as JTB: S knows that p if and only if p is true and S is justified in believing that p. According to this analysis, the three conditions — truth, belief, and justification — are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for knowledge.[3]

(emphasis mine)

Source: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/#DND

I accept such concepts as evolution, the non-existence of god, the laws of thermodynamics as almost certainly true based on evidence but I do not believe in them. I also have no way of testing their truth with any certainty. This is true of any scientific theory, or indeed any 'fact' about the world.

I know Newton's second law of motion. Had I lived in pre-Einstein times, I would have known that it was universally true and unalterable. As I don't live in such times, I know that it is only an excellent approximation and that it breaks down as one approaches the speed of light. Given a few more centuries of scientific research, who knows what my equivalent might know about such things.

My point is that scientific knowledge is not subject to the three conditions above, instead it is recognised as being an approximation based upon empirical evidence and ever-refinable theories. It neither requires belief, nor recognises ultimate truth; instead it is only as true or as believable as its justification allows and that justification includes the twin pillars of theory and evidence.

We share the same perspective, then. The only thing left for honorable gentlemen such as ourselves to do is to quibble over semantics! When you say on the one hand, "I accept such concepts as..." and then "I know Newton's...", are these qualitatively equivalent expressions, or did you choose those words to highlight a significant nuance? IOW, could you switch and say, 'I accept Newton's...' and 'I know such concepts as evolution...'?

FS, if this is a derail, just say the word. I'm not sure how far afield we've wandered from your question about faith as a way of knowing.

Not really semantics at all. I dispute the idea that truth and belief are necessary for knowledge. I think I was clear in that. In fact, I dispute the idea of absolute knowledge entirely, except possibly in the realm of mathematics. What we refer to as knowledge is in fact a working hypothesis based on previous experience and extrapolation of that experience into a theory.

I was very precise in my choice of words in the first paragraph (although I did slip up and use the word 'true' in the final sentence.)

I then used 'know' in italics several times in the Newton paragraph, I was emphasising it in order to point out how that 'knowledge' had changed and was subject to further change. A point that I expanded on in the following paragraph, where I specifically defined my concept of 'scientific knowledge'. It is this concept that I was referring to as 'knowing' earlier.

[Trolldor]

Faith is the acceptance inspite contrary of or without any evidence - in short, it is assumption.

If I have faith 2+2=4 it is not the same as knowledge that 2+2=4.
The end result is the same, the conclusion is the same, but faith skips the progression of "2+2" and jumps to straight to the "4". It is not knowledge because there is no logical path of evidence to follow.

[FBM]

Nah, this is fine, the purpose of these threads is to encourage discussions of whatever kind. My only problem now is writing a 1000 word essay in a few hours. And it has to be good.

It has to be good? Shit. I don't have much experience with that sort of thing...all I can say is that faith sucks ass as a way to knowledge.

[FBM]

Not really semantics at all. I dispute the idea that truth and belief are necessary for knowledge. I think I was clear in that. In fact, I dispute the idea of absolute knowledge entirely, except possibly in the realm of mathematics. What we refer to as knowledge is in fact a working hypothesis based on previous experience and extrapolation of that experience into a theory.

I was very precise in my choice of words in the first paragraph (although I did slip up and use the word 'true' in the final sentence.)

I then used 'know' in italics several times in the Newton paragraph, I was emphasising it in order to point out how that 'knowledge' had changed and was subject to further change. A point that I expanded on in the following paragraph, where I specifically defined my concept of 'scientific knowledge'. It is this concept that I was referring to as 'knowing' earlier.

That was the way I read it first. I just wanted to rule out the possibility that you were pointing at something else with your word choices.