Coito ergo sum wrote:Moody’s Reiterates U.S. Spending Risks Credit Rating (Update1)
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= ... 1YD_O3PXz4 The U.S. government’s Aaa bond rating will come under pressure in the future unless additional measures are taken to reduce projected record budget deficits, according to Moody’s Investors Service Inc.
You realise of course that Moodys and other rating agencies are a core part of why the global market tanked?
It works like this:
Bank A wants to lend, let us say, mortgages.
Bank A has no spare Capital to lend, but it has, say 8 million on the books. Under Basel II, they may be able to borrow up to 200 million against that 8 million.
Moodys gives Bank A a credit rating, based on the risk profiles provided to Moodys, in addition to supporting detail (these risk measures are the same as those criticised by Taleb).
Bank B relies on Bank A's credit rating, and duly lends them 200 million.
Bank A (whose CEO is calculated on "profits" earned), turns to the bank branches and broker networks, and kicks off a big mortgage campaign.
Bank A may sell ordinary mortgages (in which case the average default rate is less than 4% - a cost built into the model, and spread across all mortgage buyers) or
Bank A may sell sub-prime mortgages (in which case the average default rate is less than 10% - a cost built into themodel, and spread across all sub-prime mortgage buyers - which iswhy they are more expensive).
Brokers and Branches are incentivised on volume of throughput - the more they sell, the more they get in commission/bonus
Bank A underwriters sit behind a screen, using a checklist and an automated risk calculator to approve/reject applications. (Very little human knowledge applied).
Bank A begins to get a rapid stream of mortgages through.
Bank A CEO is incentivised on profit, and wants to use the 200 million again. So, he takes all the mortgages sold in a month, and bundles them up as a Securitised (aka Collateralised) Mortgage Book Think of it like this: A large loan, spread across hundreds of individual people, all on the hook to pay 2 or 3% per year for 20-40 years. Very attractive to pension funds.
Bank A CEO wants to sell it, but needs to get a credit rating on it before he can do so. So he turns around to Moodys, who gave him the rating to borrow the money in the first instance.
Moodys give a top rating to the security. They have to, because they gave Bank A a stop rating in the first instance. If they drop the rating, they call their own credibility into question.
Bank A CEO now has another 200 million (plus substantial profit from the sale of the Securitisation) to relend into the market. His bonus is looking good.
Cycle continues:
Theoretically, this is perfectly fine. It is good for the public, theoretically.
A mortgage security should be incredibly secure:
1. It is based on a physical asset, of which, in general, there is an overall shortage. (Saving World Wars, famines, and catastrophic epidemics and local oversupply from time to time)
2. A person or two people are contractually bound to repay the entire sum, plus an equivalent sum over about 20-40 years.
3. The mortgagors (borrowers) earn more than enough to cover the repayments, even if there is an interest rate increase.
3. The mortgage must be covered by a life assurance policy
So, for this tripartate security to fail:
1. The property market must collapse, putting the mortgages into negative equity, for an extended period of time.
2. The Mortgagors (borrowers) must lose their jobs or experience substantial income reduction
3. The Mortgagors must fail to die/be incapacitated.
This is as strong a security you can get. Surely all of these things couldn't happen together?
But they did.
It started with the manner in which the chain was motivated - volume above all. The temptation for brokers to falsify application forms and supplementary documents was huge - particularly for sub-prime mortgages. There was fraud on a wide scale, right on the high street. The CEO was incentivised to ignore this - he or she didn't care, because by the end of the month, it would be the problem of some pension fund - the bank will have fresh money to lend then and the pension will be stuck with dud securities of indeterminate value/risk. The ratings agency was incentivised by keeping their nose clean.
They filled up the market with securities, the true risk profile of which was unknown. Therefore, the stopped buying and selling them from each other. What was worse, because they didn't know who had gaping holes in their Capital, they didn't know to whom they could lend "safely". Interbank loans crawled to a halt. Without inter-bank loans, there is no liquidity. Without liquidity, there is no lending. Without lending, very few people can buy property. Without lending, business cashflow is decimated. Without cash flow, jobs are lost.
Therefore the sub-prime property market slumped. People lost their jobs, and their incomes faltered. Therefore, at a time when the banks would have liked to repossess and sell to recover some badly needed capital, they could not do so.
This was a vicious and contagious circle. That lending behaviour was not just confined to mortgages.
The consequence of all of that hit the wider world, and created the chaos that we see today.