Do you NEED an explanation for "everything"?

[hiyymer]

Much of what you say comes across as internally contradictory. I'll leave you with it.

That's because it is. It's hard to talk about and not use pronouns.

"The evidence is that, like color, agency only exists in our experience. It is very much more than a "notion". Like color, agency is very transparently real to us."

It's not "our" experience. It not real to "us". Those are the agents that don't exist. Agency is such an integral part of the mechanism that we never really leave it. "I" can't talk to "you" without agency. Consciousness can't happen without agency.

Hawking/Mlodinow use the example of awake brain surgery experiments. Stimulate a specific part of the brain and produce the conscious experience in the patient of "I want to" do some specific thing like move a limb or open the mouth and talk. The stimulation doesn't move the limb. It creates the experience of the self agent wanting to move the limb.

Perhaps the stimulation moves the limb and other brain activity 'explains' the action as a want.

The limb never moved.

[laklak]

Except at night when there be no Sun (where's it go?).

California.

[GrahamH]

Much of what you say comes across as internally contradictory. I'll leave you with it.

That's because it is. It's hard to talk about and not use pronouns.

"The evidence is that, like color, agency only exists in our experience. It is very much more than a "notion". Like color, agency is very transparently real to us."

It's not "our" experience. It not real to "us". Those are the agents that don't exist. Agency is such an integral part of the mechanism that we never really leave it. "I" can't talk to "you" without agency. Consciousness can't happen without agency.

Hawking/Mlodinow use the example of awake brain surgery experiments. Stimulate a specific part of the brain and produce the conscious experience in the patient of "I want to" do some specific thing like move a limb or open the mouth and talk. The stimulation doesn't move the limb. It creates the experience of the self agent wanting to move the limb.

Perhaps the stimulation moves the limb and other brain activity 'explains' the action as a want.

The limb never moved.

Same difference. Motor cortex preparedness to move or whatever. The interesting question is whether the subjective experience is an initiator or a model.

[amused]

Except at night when there be no Sun (where's it go?).

California.

fuckin' magnets...

[hiyymer]

Same difference. Motor cortex preparedness to move or whatever. The interesting question is whether the subjective experience is an initiator or a model.

I kind of like Hawking/Mlodinow's way of saying it. The evidence supports the view that our actions are determined by the brain following the known laws of science, and not by some agent acting outside of those laws. They then give the example. "Determined by the brain" is probably an oversimplification, but if you buy the gist of it, then the answer has to be "model" between your two choices. I look at it more as a distorted and embellished window on what is really happening, than as a model. Consciousness is what it is because it is useful for the life intentionality of the organism, and not because it is an accurate rendition of what is happening. A model would be a full specification of the states of all the molecules in the body and the mathematical relationships that determine their states in the next instant of time as a causal web. It would take a billion years to solve the equations on a the biggest supercomputer to just figure out what is going to happen in the next instant, so it wouldn't be much use for survival. Agency is much more useful. It's just not scientific and it doesn't exist as the un-caused cause.

[GrahamH]

Same difference. Motor cortex preparedness to move or whatever. The interesting question is whether the subjective experience is an initiator or a model.

I kind of like Hawking/Mlodinow's way of saying it. The evidence supports the view that our actions are determined by the brain following the known laws of science, and not by some agent acting outside of those laws. They then give the example. "Determined by the brain" is probably an oversimplification, but if you buy the gist of it, then the answer has to be "model" between your two choices. I look at it more as a distorted and embellished window on what is really happening, than as a model. Consciousness is what it is because it is useful for the life intentionality of the organism, and not because it is an accurate rendition of what is happening. A model would be a full specification of the states of all the molecules in the body and the mathematical relationships that determine their states in the next instant of time as a causal web. It would take a billion years to solve the equations on a the biggest supercomputer to just figure out what is going to happen in the next instant, so it wouldn't be much use for survival. Agency is much more useful. It's just not scientific and it doesn't exist as the un-caused cause.

Models are expensive and generally employ gross simplifications of the thing they are modelling. Consider finite element analysis. There is no modelling of atoms i that because it would make the simulation system far, far more complex than the thing being modelled. Model simple idealised elements and you get a good enough result for a tiny fraction of the complexity.

A model of what a brain is doing is necessarily much simpler than the brain itself. A model of brain behaviour can be framed in terms of simple elements such as wants, emotions, sensations etc. and do a good enough job.

The sort of model mentioned is not a mathematical / analytical model, obviously.

[hiyymer]

A model of what a brain is doing is necessarily much simpler than the brain itself. A model of brain behaviour can be framed in terms of simple elements such as wants, emotions, sensations etc. and do a good enough job.

That sounds like a model of our experience; like psychology.

[apophenia]

(include pictures. lots of them. and big words. lots of them.)

What the fuck bullshit is this?

I think you are perhaps conflating the notion of inexplicability with that of incoherence.

I'm not, and if you think I am, then you haven't understood my post.

Fine. Then I haven't understood your point. Please provide a better explanation, preferably using a better, less controversial, example. (And yes, I have taken time to review Santa's OP, so perhaps I wasn't viewing things in the appropriate context. I'll await your exposition.)

In the meantime, I'd like to analyze the example given to see how it relates. Free will does not exist. That which does not exist needs no explanation (unless, on account of surrounding facts, it should exist (and I do not count "morality" or "choice" as supporting facts)). This is analogous to a recent example from one of the skeptical boards, in which a poster put forward the idea that the occurrence of mathematical series like the fibonacci sequence in nature required explanation. It was pointed out to them that such examples of mathematical order in nature were largely the result of cherry-picking the examples and outright distortion of the evidence. Mathematical sequences as examples of pure mathematics in nature need no explanation as the notion is largely chimerical, and the kind of taxophyillic patterns that do present, do so for rather simple causes that are blind to the type of order supposedly demonstrated. Looking for mystical explanations for a phenomena which only exists in the distorted presentations of woo peddlers indeed needs no explanation. The behavior of both the purveyor, and that of the person who eagerly attends to all manner of new age woo because it provides them some sort of psychological payoff is indeed an interesting human phenomena. Indeed, enormous theological energy has been devoted to attempting to explain the actions of a God that does not exist. If your point was that mankind has a tendency to seek explanations where none exist or where none are likely to be found, I can readily embrace that point. If it was something more, I'd like that too. I am most interested in questions such as epistemological holism and how it relates to the deductive-nomological method, and how that relates to such matters as constructivist and coherentist conceptions of truth, Kuhnian semantic incommensurability as it relates to Quines Indeterminacy of translation thesis, and also the question of Gettier Problems as they relate to man's quest for understanding.

(Taking a peek ahead, I see the question of color perception has been introduced, so I don't believe these take us outside the purview of current discussion, though if Santa wants to refocus the thread elsewise, I will abide.)

Humbly awaiting for the clouds to break and the sun to beat down.

[Bella Fortuna]

Except at night when there be no Sun (where's it go?).

California.

fuckin' magnets...

We have them in our shoes here. It's the law.

[apophenia]

The notion of "god" is implanted by memetic suggestion, unlike the physical (sensory/neurological) experience of light upon the retina that brings colours literally to mind.

The notion of 'free will' is an interesting thing ... it's a perception many seem to have, based on neither meme, nor physical experience. I suppose the notion is either a survival trait, or a side effect of same.

I hate to disappoint you but memes are just a silly idea that Dawkins had because he wanted a rationalization for his anti-religious crusade. It's not science and has no scientific standing. Some scientists have tried to do something with it, but to little avail. The trouble is that it can't be defined in a scientifically useful way. Meme is a story, an interpretation, and not something that exists.

While I'm not sure I agree with everything Charlou has to say on the point -- in this example I would say that there's more than memes going on -- I think you're guilty of the fallacy of the beard here. The fact that something cannot be rigorously defined (or more appropriately, has not been rigorously defined -- God of the Gaps, nom nom nom) does not necessarily entail that it isn't real. I can understand your concern though. A local meeting of philosophers here discussed memes, and the organizer of the discussion maintained the idea that a meme was any sort of behavior which replicated itself -- including viewing genes as a type of physical meme. I protested that generalizing the concept to that extent effectively robbed it of any useful explanatory role as a concept. And while I don't think my point was effectively dispatched, neither was it given much heed. For some people in memetics, memes have become simply another example of the adage that, "If your only tool is a hammer, every problem begins to look like a nail." (Not speaking of you specifically, Charlou.)

[Ronja]

hlyymer, have you read Dennett's "Consciousness Explained"? I'm not awake enough to check now, but I have a distinct memory that it discussed the relationship between sensory input, brain activity, muscle activity and the subjective perception of all three in detail, and also used awake brain surgery experiments as examples.

[apophenia]

Forgive me for not tying this to specific poster's comments, but I found the following on a blog (Here) and thought it relevant, in line with Hiyymer's point. I'm not familiar with Libet's and Wegner's work, but perhaps I'll try to find a more substantial reference after I get done masturbating. (Intellectually I mean; what on earth did you think I meant?)

Is there some confusion around 'sensing the choice being made' and 'thinking you made the choice?' ...

...
Well I guess that's something that comes up in the different interpretations of the famous Libet experiments. Libet was trying to get the subjects to sense the moment at which they made the choice to flick their wrists. Of course, Libet found that this moment occurred after the set of brain events that triggered the wrist flick were set in motion. So you don't actually sense the moment at which you made the decision and merely think you were in control after the fact.

The distinction you are talking about also comes up in Daniel Wegner's work on conscious will. He seems to suggest that psychological ownership over our actions always occurs after the decisions to act have been made. If I recall correctly, his hypothesis is that the psychological processes and the behaviour-inducing processes share a common origin (somewhere within the nervous system) but ultimately branch into different systems.

I think I agree with Dennett's interpretation of the Libet-style experiments. He argued that there is a fallacy in assuming the self would be located at a specific moment in space and time and would be capable of sensing itself acting. A truly naturalistic conception of selfhood would have to acknowledge that the self is something that is distributed over space and time.

[ughaibu]

I'd like to analyze the example given to see how it relates. Free will does not exist. That which does not exist needs no explanation. . . .

However, this isn't how it goes. The claim is that free will cannot exist because if it did, it could not be explained.

[ughaibu]

Libet found that this moment occurred after the set of brain events that triggered the wrist flick were set in motion.

This is incorrect, the action potential is registered even if no movement is made.

[apophenia]

I'd like to analyze the example given to see how it relates. Free will does not exist. That which does not exist needs no explanation. . . .

However, this isn't how it goes. The claim is that free will cannot exist because if it did, it could not be explained.

Again however, the question is why it cannot be explained, not simply that it cannot be explained. Two positions on the matter are that free will as advocated by some proponents will not yield to explanation because the idea as posed is incoherent; and, that the facts asserted by free will proponents are not in truth facts, and that explanatory insufficiency is simply a result of trying to explain nonsensical "facts". I need not tremor at my inability to explain furiously blue ideas, nor explain my failure to account for the properties of square circles. Now I'm perfectly willing to accept argument from dialetheism or non-traditional logics, but I don't think that is the bone of your contention. Yes, we generally look suspiciously upon assertions that seem incoherent, that lead to contradiction or are in disagreement with the received understanding of science. If your argument is to encourage people to "think outside the box," I'll join in that chorus with you. If you are attempting to assert that received scientific dogma on the subject of determinism is in error -- philosophically, substantially or otherwise -- then I humbly suggest that that is expanding the scope of the discussion unprofitably (not that such issues aren't meritorious, but that they are perhaps better discussed in their own context).

Moreover, I would suggest a rephrasing along Bayesian lines that, free will, if it exists does so in the epistemic shadow of more probabilistic explanations; not that free will cannot exist, so much as it is highly unlikely that it exists. While there is a problem of closure relating to Humean skepticism of inductive inference, I think that reliance on inductive inferences in the main have justified their use by their fruitfulness (but note that this is an inductive inference upon inductive inference, so likely compounds the error, rather than removes it; however in such compositions as Kripke's theory of truth and other set theoretic constructs which attempt to reach epistemic closure through appeal to convergent properties of transfinite structures it appears that while viewed as independent cases, the problems of induction are intractable, perhaps viewed as part of a series, they yield to analysis).

Btw, you still have yet to introduce free will as a fact to be explained. While such is a digression, true, I'd be interested in what you see as the fact which determinists feel cannot be explained. That would go a long way to clearing up my confusion about which aspects of your example you were trying to show.

Anyway, I neglected to do so earlier, so let me apologize for my rather uncharitable reading of your point. (And before I start to give justifying excuses, I'll stop, and simply say I'm sorry.)