
One person there stated something alone these lines (I did remove a small bit of text aimed directly at posters in the thread from which I copied and pasted):
That's one point that has been raised, that science is based fundamentally on flawed reasoning and is therefore useless as a method of experience, I'll get back to that in a second, but the other thing being brought up is that basically, there seems to be a general complaint from them that science cannot enhance our appreciation of the natural world because it relegates other forms of experience (which I deny) and that eventually this relegation of other experiences will leave science as the only arbiter of experience. In particular, they make mention of Heidegger (whose works I've admittedly not read). To me, what they're saying amounts to a serious slippery slope fallacy with very shaky foundations. I'm not sure is Heidegger himself argues that point better, but they don't seem to be able to. It seems to originate from a "well what if one day, overnight, the human race turns into a bubbling mass of pragmatists without any appreciation of the world outside their practical concerns." line of thought, from which they just take the idea that science will take over the entire spectrum of human experience and start sprinting for the finish line without stopping to think that it might be a tiny bit absurd.Science is just as subject to the epistemological uncertainties as any other method of gaining knowledge. Saying things like, "Well, okay, it's not absolute truth, just highly probable and practically useful knowledge" doesn't really change the situation -- Science claims to be making truth statements about the external world -- not about our perceptions, or about guidelines that are generally but not necessarily true -- and ignores the massive leaps of faith that it must take to arrive at those truth statements.
Regardless, apparently this voracious destruction of alternative experience by science apparently means that it can't help us appreciate other experiences more fully.

But, coming back off that tangent a bit and going back to what is quoted above, do some viewpoints require us to make greater leaps of faith than others in order to reach them and accept them as potentially or probably valid? For example, they've been nattering a lot about the problem of induction, and yet - it seems to me to be reasonable to assume that as casual relations accumulate and correlate, that the leap of faith needed between each conclusion decreases, again I've not read Hume's work (my budget for book buying is limited until my student loan comes in, and something that's worded in the way most philosophy is needs a real hard copy book not an E-resource!), so maybe he puts it differently or better to them. I can see how basing a conclusion fro ma single casual relationship might be problematic, but science tends to work over vast interconnected lines of evidence, which I'd think mitigates that problem somewhat, even if only to a certain degree.
I'm not all that well versed in philosophy, but again it's something that I find interesting, and I do delve into it (albeit superficially) from time to time - but it seems to me to be quite remarkable that things involving this kind of wild speculation would be considered a great insight.
Still, tired, crazy ramblings aside - do you agree that some conclusions and viewpoints require smaller leaps of faith than others? Or is human reasoning, despite being practically successful, theoretically flawed such that every leap of faith is of equal magnitude?