The subjective observer is a fictional character

[SpeedOfSound]

And you have been provided with the scientific answers and you reject them because they aren't metaphysics. I'm confused. You want the scientific explanation of the brain to be metaphysical?

Any utilisation of 'science' to explain human experience without the need for an immaterial essence, essentially harbours an ontological/metaphysical basis upon which this science is constructed. It's logically impossible to fully explain/reduce 'human experience' to processes of a material brain, without that explanation/reduction being essentially metaphysical.

That's one of the finest pieces of circular logic combined with begging the question I have seen in a while. You suggested that Bruce has a naive view of philosophy?

Your thinking here is a mess and I am going to let you sort this one out for now.

[Bruce Burleson]

And, pray tell, what evidence do you have of 'brain', other than that forthcoming by 'consciousness'?

There are various organs in the body that give rise to various functions - for example:
1) hearts give rise to blood being pumped through the arteries;
2) lungs give rise to oxygen being introduced and carbon dioxide being eliminated from the blood stream;
3) kidneys give rise to the blood being filtered of impurities;
4) brains (especially cerebral cortices) give rise to conscious thoughts.

They all do something, give rise to something, cause something. Consciousness allows us to be aware of these activities, but the consciousness itself is caused by something. It is as ridiculous to say that consciousness has an existence independent of the causal connection with the brain as it is to say that feces has an existence independent of the causal connection with the lower digestive tract. While consciousness allows us to contemplate the brain, it is caused by the brain. It functions in a manner similar to that of a satellite, sent from the earth, which is capable of taking photographs of the origin of its own existence.

[LaMont Cranston]

GrahamH, Can I account for exactly why I typed what I did? Yes, I think I can. I deliberately decided those words were the words I wanted to type. It's a decision I consciously made. I'm a writer, and I spend time every day of my life to become a better writer.

I think that your brain, my brain and the brains of everybody else are extremely clever. While I'm consciously selecting words to send your way, my brain is operating/controlling/regulating all of my bodily functions. It lets me know when I'm hungry or when it's time to take a piss. Nobody is saying that our brains aren't wonderful, complicated things, but you seem to want to reduce how we think, decide, emote, etc. to something that is somehow not our responsibility.

In a sense, we are a consciousness walking around in a flesh and blood suit. Yes, it's true that if we put a bullet into our brains, we are no longer conscious that we are walking around in that flesh and blood suit. However, I like what jamest said about how you can't demonstrate a brain exists separately from consciousness. (By the way, james, If you want to show you ass to the masses, I suppose you can do that. Please give me a little warning it's about to happen so that I can avoid that experience.)

As for perceiving a tree to be a hippopotamus, that would fit the commonly held definition of crazy, but you do have the capacity to consciously perceive the tree more than one way. Is the tree made of solid stuff, or is it a mass of tiny particles with mostly space in between? As far as I know, it's both, and most of us manage to go through our lives without having those two levels of awareness (for lack of a better term) to be in conflict. More than that, we have the capacity to have other thoughts about the tree (i.e. the tree is beautiful or it isn't, etc.).

I tell you what...I've got a bunch of things to do, and there are other points of yours I'd like to address in the morning. I do want to get much more about that thing about time (here and now) because I think it's one of the holes in your set of arguments. Experiences don't just happen in a "where," they alsoo happen in a "when." It's kind of like time and space...in fact, it's exactly like time and space. Your attempts to discount the role that our perception of time plays in our set of experiences is kind of like that "little problem" Einstein had with gravity. In your case, trying to ignore it will not make it go away; it's with you every moment of your life...

[SpeedOfSound]

GrahamH, Can I account for exactly why I typed what I did? Yes, I think I can. I deliberately decided those words were the words I wanted to type. It's a decision I consciously made. I'm a writer, and I spend time every day of my life to become a better writer.

I think that your brain, my brain and the brains of everybody else are extremely clever. While I'm consciously selecting words to send your way, my brain is operating/controlling/regulating all of my bodily functions. It lets me know when I'm hungry or when it's time to take a piss. Nobody is saying that our brains aren't wonderful, complicated things, but you seem to want to reduce how we think, decide, emote, etc. to something that is somehow not our responsibility.

why would you not be responsible for an unconscious action?

If you think your writing is completely deliberate and conscious then try writing backwards and upside down. Start at the end of the sentence you want to write and write both the letters and the words backwards.

Something easier that you can try is to turn a book upside down and read it.

This stuff has been tested under scanners and with hundreds of experiments and what has been found is that most of our syntax, semantics, spelling, and creative crafting is not conscious at all. There is a seamless interplay between unconscious to barely conscious to conscious in everything we do.

When you write backwards you will find out why. Our consciousness is very limited and slow. We could not survive if it were not for 98% of what our brain does being automatic.

[GrahamH]

Alas, no agreement then.

However, you did write

The experienced self is the identity discerned from the totality of its experiences.

Okay, I made a mistake there. My apologies. I should have said that the experienced self is the identity discerned from the totality of experiences. (I've omitted the 'its').

So do you mean that the 'experienced self', that 'nearly everyone identifies' as 'I who experience' does not in fact have experiences? At least we might agree there.

Yes, we can agree there.

I think I see your subtle distinction. The experiencer is unable to know anything about itself. It knows itself only as this fictional character 'The Self who experiences'.

I don't agree that the experiencER is [absolutely] unable to know anything about itself. Indeed, you're telling me that 'you' are the brain doing this and that... and I am an idealist with my own thoughts about what the experiencer is. We both recognise that the experience of identity is 'fictional'. And we both should recognise that there is 'something' that harbours this fiction.

We can agree 'something harbours this fiction', but what access do we have to this something? We can study brains, so we might learn a lot about it if it is the brain. What route of enquiry do you have?

The distance between us on this point then is that I suggest that knowing this character accounts for S.O., but you say that Experiencing what is mistakenly attributed to this character is necessary in addition to any information held about it.

Imo, the only difference between us concerns what harbours the subjective beliefs about itself and the world in relation to it. Mind you, that's quite a significant difference!

The distance is greater that 'what harbours the subjective beliefs' if by that your mean beliefs held by a subjective entity. This topic questions the reality of a subjective entity. The question is 'What harbours beliefs?' because one of those beliefs is about a subjective entity being real and 'me'.

[GrahamH]

Talking about the internal functioning of a brain does not prove anything, then, unless such models avoid the problems associated with assumption; consideration; causality; purpose; meaning; etc., required as a basis for formulating these models.

Please tell me in more detail what this sentence is on about.

Maybe break these things out.

My opinion is that any credible materialistic model of the brain would have to come up with a mechanism to explain the finer intricacies of human behaviour. Clearly, mechanisms cannot be endowed with 'assumption'; 'consideration'; 'purpose'; 'meaning'; etc. - not unless they have been 'programmed' to act as if they are endowed thus. So, another prerequisite for any credible brain-model, would have to be that it wasn't acting as if it were 'programmed' (effected) by something external to itself to behave in such a manner.
From my own perspective, a credible [materialistic] brain model has to be about something that explains human behaviour entirely in terms of blind mechanistic processes. This is what my statement amounts to.

My further opinion, is that models of the brain do not satisfy this need to be formulated in terms of blind mechanistic processes. In fact, I don't think that it's possible to account for human behaviour without endowing the brain with the capability to 'assume'; 'consider'; 'assign self-meaning'; and to have 'self-purpose'. In a nutshell, that's the nitty gritty of my own perspective and objections, here.

Perhaps you can give us definitions of these things and point out specifics of them that cannot be accounted for by brains. I think brain functions do account for them all although I conceded there are many details yet to be worked out.

[GrahamH]

I'm hoping to have more time tomorrow - especially in the evening - to deal with previous posts from the past couple of days. But I have a nagging question and wondered if there were any reasonable answers:

If brains states (NNs) are responses to the external environment, then how does the brain distinguish between those NNs that refer to its own body and those that refer to the environment beyond that body? That is, how does the brain distinguish between 'the self' (body) and the non-self (world)?

In answering the question, we have to remember that 'the body' is actually external to the brain. So, there will be NNs associated with the body in which the brain is housed and NNs associated with the environment beyond that body. The question is, how does the brain know which NNs refer to which?

By the connections, James. NN that are in a functional chain from neurons in the retina are responding to things 'seen in the world'.

But, one's body is "seen in the world", also. It's part of what is external to the brain.

So? One's body is seen at the centre of the perceptual POV. That makes it distinct from other objects that are not always present. I think your question has been answered. The differences in perceptual pathways define distinct classes <my body> and <the world around me>.

Relative location of objects can be inferred from an image,

Here's another problem: if the brain is privy to nothing other than its own brain states, then how does the brain know that specific NNs refer to 'an image'? To use the lego analogy again (of being aware of nothing other than complex lego structures - commensurate with NNs), how would you know that specific groups of lego structures referred to 'an image'? You couldn't ever possibly know that unless you had been told that they were.

James, give up on this Lego analogy. It is a major failure of thinking. The brain is fundamentally not a processor of abstract symbols. Since you like toy analogies try a different one. A child's peg board with various shapes.

The board 'recognises' certain shapes in certain locations. There is no need for the board to assign meaning, the peg fits or it doesn't. In fitting we might suppose it activates some mechanism. If such a system could form new holes when it encounters new shapes of pegs, and those shapes were produced by, say, sensory input from a tree, then it would learn to respond to trees without needing to 'know what a tree is'. When the tree is present the peg fits and activates the mechanisms that respond in ways appropriate to trees.

NNs form in response to input (learning) and their activation drives output (decision/action). The presence of the stimulus pattern causes the response. There is no need of a knowing homunculus interpreting the patterns. The patterns drive the mechanism.

Another interesting problem that arises, here, is about 'space'. That is, how could NNs accurately account for the space between objects? You say that NNs are responses to objects and events external to the brain. But, how can NNs ever account for the void [of space] between objects? Can there be an NN that accurately represents a void of material influence? Moreover, how can the brain respond to 'a void'?

Show me 'void'.
'Space between objects' is perception of objects correlated with relative position of the observer. This positional information is not mysterious. I look to the left I see a lamp. I look to the right, I see a door. The 'separation' is the angle I must move my head, and the binocular convergence of my eyes, to see one or the other. NNs can respond to such triangulating information. We don't perceive a void, we perceive objects.

Of course, I'm of the opinion that space (and time) are [absolutely] constructed by the self. But your model cannot embrace this idea, for obvious reasons. Therefore, I'd like to hear your responses to my questions about 'space', here.

Relative location of objects can be inferred from an image

Sure, if you are looking directly at that image. But please remember that the brain is privy to nothing other than [relatively] static neurons. That is, there are no images of motion, per se, just change [of states of those neurons]. At the very least, this implies that the change of states of neurons just gives the impression of motion - something that is discerned, rather than is actual. Again, concepts such as 'consideration' and 'meaning' rear their ugly heads.

There are responses to objects at differing positions relative to short term memory, that is perceiving motion. Flick books tube TVs and movies on film demonstrate that we perceieve motion from instants of perception of objects at different locations. Object recognition, location recognition and short term memory account for motion perception.

NNs receiving input from tactile and pain neurons in the body 'feel the body'.

Again, my point is that the brain shouldn't be aware of the fact that it is receiving "input from tactile and pain neurons in the body". In fact, the brain shouldn't be aware of anything, other than its own internal states. Upon this realisation, should all brain models be constructed.

The brain isn;t 'aware of own internal states'. The 'awareness' is those states. The states are what causes the responses. If I shout 'BOO!' in your ear it is your brain states that propagate from that event that make you jump. It isn't because you become aware of the noise and choose to jump. There is no homunculus inside hearing what you hear and deciding to tell the brain to make the body jump.

Whenever I address the details of your model, as here, I see your failure to realise the limitations that your endeavour places upon you. I'm hoping, eventually, that you actually understand the purpose behind my posts. Then, you might see the value of them.

It would be a great help to this discussion if you could try to think constructive about the model and try to answer some of your own questions. Is that something you would conseder, or are you only here to attempt to destroy an idea you don't like.

[GrahamH]

GrahamH, Can I account for exactly why I typed what I did? Yes, I think I can. I deliberately decided those words were the words I wanted to type. It's a decision I consciously made. I'm a writer, and I spend time every day of my life to become a better writer.

That is an interesting claim. Could you write an account of how you do this? How do you decide the words? I just typed 'How do you decide the words' with the sense that 'I was writing them deliberately'. But I didn't pre-select the words. It was more as if I was nodding agreement that the words were good. I can't identify how those words came up. O f course I can review the words and choose to change them, but where do the alternate words come from? I am not aware of a semantic search, or consulting a list of syntactic rules as I write, although I can direct my attention to that and see if I recognise good syntax or not.

I would be very interested in your account of how you consciously generate what you write.

I think that your brain, my brain and the brains of everybody else are extremely clever. While I'm consciously selecting words to send your way, my brain is operating/controlling/regulating all of my bodily functions. It lets me know when I'm hungry or when it's time to take a piss. Nobody is saying that our brains aren't wonderful, complicated things, but you seem to want to reduce how we think, decide, emote, etc. to something that is somehow not our responsibility.

My brain makes decisions. How is that not my responsibility? Of course I, a person, am accountable for the actions of my person as a whole. It would be absurd to say 'don't blame me, my brain made me do it', just as 'don't blame me, my mind made me do it' is absurd.

In a sense, we are a consciousness walking around in a flesh and blood suit. Yes, it's true that if we put a bullet into our brains, we are no longer conscious that we are walking around in that flesh and blood suit. However, I like what jamest said about how you can't demonstrate a brain exists separately from consciousness. (By the way, james, If you want to show you ass to the masses, I suppose you can do that. Please give me a little warning it's about to happen so that I can avoid that experience.)

Why are you so keen to separate 'self' from your whole person? Why do you seek to disown your flesh and blood?

'consciousness' is a concept for gaining and responding to information about the world. By definition then, we can't gain information about the world without this ability to gain information about the world. That tells us nothing about the separable or integral nature of consciousness.

[LaMont Cranston]

GrahamH, OK, it's a new morning, and I've just had my coffee...

Let's start with your words "Perhaps there really is a present where change occurs, in which case 'experience' could only happen 'now.' Bingo! That is what I'm asking you to consider. There is no "perhaps" about present time. You are in it right 'now,' and wherever you are, it is 'here.' As you have other experiences, this present time will become the past, 'there' and 'then,' and you are in a new 'here' and 'now.' If you can demonstrate that experience happens any other time than present time, please do so. I might point out to our if you are considering the past or the future, you are doing it from present time.

At the risk of being considered 'wooish' by some, I might point out to you that this idea is hardly new. It has it's foundations in such things as the Greek philosophers, Buddhism, gestalt psychology and a lot of other things.

I've got to do a few things, but I'll be back shortly...

[GrahamH]

GrahamH, OK, it's a new morning, and I've just had my coffee...

Let's start with your words "Perhaps there really is a present where change occurs, in which case 'experience' could only happen 'now.' Bingo! That is what I'm asking you to consider. There is no "perhaps" about present time. You are in it right 'now,' and wherever you are, it is 'here.' As you have other experiences, this present time will become the past, 'there' and 'then,' and you are in a new 'here' and 'now.' If you can demonstrate that experience happens any other time than present time, please do so. I might point out to our if you are considering the past or the future, you are doing it from present time.

At the risk of being considered 'wooish' by some, I might point out to you that this idea is hardly new. It has it's foundations in such things as the Greek philosophers, Buddhism, gestalt psychology and a lot of other things.

I've got to do a few things, but I'll be back shortly...

That seems like a complete derail. What relevance does it have to the topic?

[LaMont Cranston]

GrahamH, I don't think it's a derail at all. What we are considering is how we actually experience our lives. You seem to think that there's this entity (or is it part of an entity?) called the subjective observer that's a fictional character. You also seem to think that there's another entity (or is it part of an entity?) called the thinker that has us have thoughts.

From what I can tell, you have quite a few problems with your set of arguments. For starters, you can't actually demonstrate where thoughts come from. If it's any comfort to you, I don't know either, but I am suggesting to you that, in your life, it's not a thought until you think it. When we become aware of a thought, it becomes a real experience in our lives. If we were not aware of it until we were aware of it, it's like it didn't exist. Fortunately, our brains are wonderful enough that I don't have to send a message to my kidneys or other body parts so that they will function. We've already agreed that the brain takes care of that.

Yes, I think I can account for the words I write. The way it works is that I recognize a thought, idea, concept, theory, viewpoint, belief or whatever. In this case, it came from you. As somebody who has developed whatever usage of the English language that I have, I don't 'pre-select the words,' I 'select' the words, and I do it in present time. The idea that I pre-select' the words implies that I made certain choices in the past, and I did. (I was even an English major for awhile in college.) However, I am 'selecting' the words now, based on what I have in my memory banks. As you've pointed out, our brains truly are wonderful things, and we under-estimate or don't know the limits of what they can do.

You make several huge leaps about what I'm saying. I don't 'separate' self from whole person. I think that we are complete, functional entities, and it's very cool the way the entire unit works. The idea that I seek to 'disown' my flesh and blood is absurd. Even if I had the goal of doing that, and I don't, I think it's completely impossible to do that. I actually think the flesh and blood should be glorified with good food and drink, music, exercise and lots of other things. I also think that the consciousness that is walking around in the flesh and blood suit should be glorified with creative pursuits, truly rational decisions that enhance my life and the lives of others, etc. I think you are making this much tougher than it has to be.

In closing, yes, I agree that "consciousness is concept for gaining and responding to information about the world." What is obvious is that we have the capacity to do that, and we do it all the time. That is merely a description of the way things are; it says nothing about the separable or integral nature of consciousness.

[LaMont Cranston]

SOS, First of all, I think I am responsible for those actions I consider to be unconscious, although part of the problem is recognizing it was an unconscious action. Just how do you go about doing that? If it was unconscious, you didn't know it was unconscious until, sometime after the act, you are conscious enough to decide that a past action was unconscious. You have to be conscious in the present to decide you did something unconsciously in the past.

Can an act in the future be unconscious? If we are contemplating the act in present time, doesn't that imply deliberation? If we are considering future actions, whether we are do them or not, doesn't that imply consciousness, especially if we are weighing the ramifications of those actions?

So far, I have no problem with the idea that 98% of what our brain does is automatic, but you also say that there is a seamless interplay between unconscious to barely conscious to conscious. If it is seamless, how do we know when we are going from one to the other unless we are conscious?

As far as writing backwards, etc., I have never said that our brains/awareness/consciousness or whatever don't come with limitations. They do. We all come with a bunch of limitations, but that's just part of the description of who we are as beings. I am under the impression that there are some people who are able to write backwards, read upside down, etc. For some reasons, they don't come with those particular limitations.

Could I learn to write backwards and do those other things? Maybe, but why the fuck would I want to do that? I've played enough tennis and fooled around with the guitar to have them as fun things to do, but, as a rational thinker, it's easy to come to the conclusion that I am never going to be the likes of Federer, Sampras, Segovia, Clapton, etc. While I can admire the level of excellence that those guys and others have achieved, I can't say that I ever had the goal of getting to that level, even if it was a possibility.

Nobody is saying that we couldn't survive without our brains automatically taking care of that 98%. Fortunately, for most of us, most of the time, our brains do that, and, as we go through life, we are subject to breakdowns that have us going to see doctors, dentists, etc. Ultimately, one of those breakdowns, or a combination of them, is going to result in death. In the meantime, if it should be true that we are only using the remaining 2% for consciousness/awareness/decision making or whatever we want to call it, that 2% is a very real, powerful and important part of our lives.

For most of my life, I heard that thing about how we only use 10% of our brains. One day, I picked up a copy of Scientific American, and I read that 10% thing was a crock of shit, that researchers found that we use 100% of our brains. If we only use that 2%, and the rest is automatic, maybe all that we need is that 2%.

[GrahamH]

GrahamH, I don't think it's a derail at all. What we are considering is how we actually experience our lives. You seem to think that there's this entity (or is it part of an entity?) called the subjective observer that's a fictional character. You also seem to think that there's another entity (or is it part of an entity?) called the thinker that has us have thoughts.

From what I can tell, you have quite a few problems with your set of arguments. For starters, you can't actually demonstrate where thoughts come from. If it's any comfort to you, I don't know either, but I am suggesting to you that, in your life, it's not a thought until you think it. When we become aware of a thought, it becomes a real experience in our lives. If we were not aware of it until we were aware of it, it's like it didn't exist. Fortunately, our brains are wonderful enough that I don't have to send a message to my kidneys or other body parts so that they will function. We've already agreed that the brain takes care of that.

Yes, I think I can account for the words I write. The way it works is that I recognize a thought, idea, concept, theory, viewpoint, belief or whatever. In this case, it came from you. As somebody who has developed whatever usage of the English language that I have, I don't 'pre-select the words,' I 'select' the words, and I do it in present time. The idea that I pre-select' the words implies that I made certain choices in the past, and I did. (I was even an English major for awhile in college.) However, I am 'selecting' the words now, based on what I have in my memory banks. As you've pointed out, our brains truly are wonderful things, and we under-estimate or don't know the limits of what they can do.

You make several huge leaps about what I'm saying. I don't 'separate' self from whole person. I think that we are complete, functional entities, and it's very cool the way the entire unit works. The idea that I seek to 'disown' my flesh and blood is absurd. Even if I had the goal of doing that, and I don't, I think it's completely impossible to do that. I actually think the flesh and blood should be glorified with good food and drink, music, exercise and lots of other things. I also think that the consciousness that is walking around in the flesh and blood suit should be glorified with creative pursuits, truly rational decisions that enhance my life and the lives of others, etc. I think you are making this much tougher than it has to be.

In closing, yes, I agree that "consciousness is concept for gaining and responding to information about the world." What is obvious is that we have the capacity to do that, and we do it all the time. That is merely a description of the way things are; it says nothing about the separable or integral nature of consciousness.

Well, that was a truly strange 'experience' reading your post!
1. You failed to explain any relevance of the 'here and now' stuff. No surprise as I didn't think it was relevant. Let's forget about that.

2. I pointed out to you that we don't subjective construct thoughts. There is not point in you parroting it back to me as if I hadn't even thought of it.

3. The model under discussion does account for 'where thoughts come from' and it isn't a subjective mind, it is a physical brain.

4. The problem this presents is a problem for the idealists and believers in metaphysical subjectivity, such as James, and perhaps you.

5. I asked you to back up your claim, that your conscious mind writes your words, by giving an account of how you do that. All you offer is that you "recognize a thought, idea, concept, theory, viewpoint, belief or whatever." and "select words". Recognising and selecting are what NNs a good at, and what I have suggested is the whole basis of 'creative thought' so I count your reply as support for my position. Thank you.

6. I may have misinterpreted your remarks about a 'flesh and blood suit'. The very phrase suggests a distinct separation between mind and body. In particular it is the sort of thinking we see from people who believe in immortal souls who can supposedly shed the suit of flesh and continue to exist. Do I have you wrong? The position argued in this topic is that the flesh and blood is doing the thinking.

[LaMont Cranston]

GrahamH, OK, for you it was a truly strange experience because you decided it was strange. From what I can tell, you are trying to support a set of ideas, and you are getting increasingly annoyed because at least some of us are not buying that case. The reason we aren't buying it is that it's full of holes.

Now then, let's do it by the numbers...
1-Yes, I have failed with you, so far, to get you to admit how you experience time, and you "didn't think" it was relevant. From what I can tell, if you are aware of something you "didn't think," it is still thinking. Was that a conscious thought, or did it come from your "automatic pilot?" I have no intention of forgetting it, and let's be open minded enough to see if others think it might be relevant.
2 & 3-Yes, we all agree we have a physical brain; nobody is denying that. You pointed out that you'd like to believe that we don't subjectively construct thoughts, but that's all you've done...pointed out that it fits into your set of arguments. You have proven nothing, and you cannot demonstrate when a thought becomes a thought. At the very minimum, if we recognize we are thinking it, it is a thought.
4-At the risk of you considering me to be an idealist, you are welcome to lump me in that group with jamest if it subjectively suits you. I am also a lover of the sciences, rational thought and a lot of other subject areas.
5- Yes, you have "suggested" that something is the whole basis of creative thought. That's all you have done...suggested it. Can I prove to you when I have a conscious thought? Gee, Graham, I don't know any way to do that. I tell you what...think of a lemon. I'm more than willing to bet your week's salary that you just thought of a lemon when you read those words, and you were conscious when you did it. More than that, I'm willing to bet another of your week's salary that your salivary glands started salivating when you consciously had that thought. Please understand, I'm not about to catch a plane to the UK to examine your salivary glands, but I think we can know that happened to you and others who conceptualized the lemon. That's an example of consciousness predicating a physical response in our bodies. It happens all the time.
6-Yes, you misinterpreted my remarks about the flesh and blood suit. Do you get it that I think the mind and body are a complete and whole unit, and they function that way quite well? For the record, I have made it clear from my first post that I am a theist, a writer and a seeker of information, among other things. Do I think that part of our consciousness exists after the F&B suit dies? Yes. I base that consideration on real life experiences, including a "visit" from my mother about three days after passing in 2001. Can I prove it to you? No, but it was and still is very real for me.

Correction, you have argued in this topic that the F&B is doing the thinking, but you don't own the thread, and you have no way to put a cap on the set of arguments we can consider. Have a nice day...

[SpeedOfSound]

GrahamH, OK, it's a new morning, and I've just had my coffee...

Let's start with your words "Perhaps there really is a present where change occurs, in which case 'experience' could only happen 'now.' Bingo! That is what I'm asking you to consider. There is no "perhaps" about present time. You are in it right 'now,' and wherever you are, it is 'here.' As you have other experiences, this present time will become the past, 'there' and 'then,' and you are in a new 'here' and 'now.' If you can demonstrate that experience happens any other time than present time, please do so. I might point out to our if you are considering the past or the future, you are doing it from present time.

At the risk of being considered 'wooish' by some, I might point out to you that this idea is hardly new. It has it's foundations in such things as the Greek philosophers, Buddhism, gestalt psychology and a lot of other things.

I've got to do a few things, but I'll be back shortly...

The only problem with that is it isn't possible. Please try to grasp because this is the hook upon which all misunderstandings about consciousness swings. You can not experience the infinitesimal cusp point of time. Your experience is made of a stuff that smears time. Both physically and conceptually. It requires a certain small persistence (1/5 second) but it also requires change. How much water pumps around the eddy of a stream when you freeze time?