The subjective observer is a fictional character

[SpeedOfSound]

I'll show him fucking grumpy. Empirically.

[Surendra Darathy]

I'll show him fucking grumpy. Empirically.

[jamest]

He wants me to give up on science? On modeling? On what basis? I'll show him fucking grumpy. Empirically.

The problems arise when science jams its foot in a metaphysical door. Move that fuggin foot!

[Surendra Darathy]

However, your model too will be one of the brain being unable to access nothing other than its own internal states. This is important to acknowledge - the brain has no access to anything, other than its own internal states.

So, now it comes to the crunch: can you explain all human behaviour in terms of that behaviour being nought other than automatic responses to NNs? If you can't, then your model faces the exact same problems that I've recently mentioned. However, if you think that you can explain human behaviour without the need to 'process' NNs prior to responding to them, then this time I will give your explanation a fair hearing. If you think that you've already explained-away this problem, then cut and paste the relevant material into your next post, and I will respond to that post.

This is just nonsense, James. The model includes interactions the brain makes with objects that are distinguished empirically from the brain in the model. The model includes brain activity when the brain is not interacting with objects distinct from it in the model. The model does not purport ontology for either the brain or the objects distinct from the brain. They are just distinct components of a model.

He wants me to give up on science? On modeling? On what basis? I'll show him fucking grumpy. Empirically.

The problems arise when science jams its foot in a metaphysical door. Move that fuggin foot!

We poke the foot in the metaphysical door here to catch a glimpse of the metaphysician who is so busy extracting his foot from his mouth that he has nothing with which to try to open the door in the opposite direction. Your problem, not ours.

Try really hard to understand this, James: Modeling the problem of human cognition this way is actually more interesting to some people than throwing up one's hands and shouting "Woo! Woo!" and "Ugga bugga!" Wanna make metaphysics interesting? Do it in your own thread, and we will see how long it takes for you to make some foolish statements there.

The only reason that metaphysics is not being completely ignored here is because of the internet phenomenon of "Chew toys". You could mitigate that by trying to do something besides metaphysics, even if just for a minute. Start with contemplating the phrase "components of a model". We are most definitely not considering the ontology of models, the better to get on with developing the models. We could always have a "philosloppy of science" thread on the status of scientific models, ontologically-speaking.

[Matthew Shute]

A flashback to Intelligent Design: "Stop trying to explain how things work scientifically, you're killing all the mystery! We need that mystery - we can weave those dark clouds of fog into magic that'll make you say 'wooooooo...' - but you're filling those precious gaps and breaking our spells and leaving us nothing to work with!"

Now, metaphysics. How great to have magic that does nothing, makes no predictions, and purports to describe the very nature of an absolute reality in its entirety! The only problem is that people keep crying "bullshit!" every ten seconds. Worse, everyone seems more interested in the science, the empirical data, and how things work. Poor old metaphysics - the only time any credible person deals with the topic is when he or she wants to indulge in some easy "pwnage" for stress relief.

[jamest]

The model includes interactions the brain makes with objects that are distinguished empirically from the brain in the model. The model includes brain activity when the brain is not interacting with objects distinct from it in the model. The model does not purport ontology for either the brain or the objects distinct from the brain. They are just distinct components of a model.

Models of how the world interacts with the brain to effect human behaviour are internal assessments, constructed by the brain, of a reality beyond the brain's sphere of existence. Such models assume an ontology! (Again, remove that fuggin foot from the door! And don't dare tell me that no ontology is assumed in such models, or I'll get my rope out too.)

Again, for the umpteenth time, the brain only has access to its own internal states. Nothing else. The brain is not privy to external events - it's only privy to internal events.

[SpeedOfSound]

The model includes interactions the brain makes with objects that are distinguished empirically from the brain in the model. The model includes brain activity when the brain is not interacting with objects distinct from it in the model. The model does not purport ontology for either the brain or the objects distinct from the brain. They are just distinct components of a model.

Models of how the world interacts with the brain to effect human behaviour are internal assessments, constructed by the brain, of a reality beyond the brain's sphere of existence. Such models assume an ontology! (Again, remove that fuggin foot from the door! And don't dare tell me that no ontology is assumed in such models, or I'll get my rope out too.)

Again, for the umpteenth time, the brain only has access to its own internal states. Nothing else. The brain is not privy to external events - it's only privy to internal events.

Oh fucking bullshit james. I already responded to this crap. It's our fucking model and the tree is external in our fucking model. Yours too unless you think you can bend a tree or show us how you walk through them.

[SpeedOfSound]

I think we need to further develop our model. There seems to be some wibbling and misunderstanding from the woo-section.

The question of human behavior is as old as behaviorism and we have gone a step into the cognitive model.

[jamest]

The model includes interactions the brain makes with objects that are distinguished empirically from the brain in the model. The model includes brain activity when the brain is not interacting with objects distinct from it in the model. The model does not purport ontology for either the brain or the objects distinct from the brain. They are just distinct components of a model.

Models of how the world interacts with the brain to effect human behaviour are internal assessments, constructed by the brain, of a reality beyond the brain's sphere of existence. Such models assume an ontology! (Again, remove that fuggin foot from the door! And don't dare tell me that no ontology is assumed in such models, or I'll get my rope out too.)

Again, for the umpteenth time, the brain only has access to its own internal states. Nothing else. The brain is not privy to external events - it's only privy to internal events.

It's our fucking model and the tree is external in our fucking model.

Yes, your tree is indeed 'external'. Nevertheless, an external tree is different to its corresponding NNs within the brain. Furthermore, as explained, the brain only has access to internal events. What this means, is that the brain is privy to specific NNs that it has labelled as 'tree'. Nothing else has labelled its own internal events as 'tree' - so the brain itself must assign this tag... must assign external meaning to internal events.

The empirical model entails an ontology because it speaks of a reality where brains interact with empirical objects. But the reality of the situation, is that the brain is just responding to its own internal states. Clearly, any model which claims that the brain's internal states are consequences of external events, has to be of a materialistic bent, by logical default. So, if you see any so-called sceptics claiming to be metaphysically-neutral on this issue, that try to account for human behaviour in terms of realities that are distinct to the reality beheld by the brain, then point them in the direction of my noose.

[Surendra Darathy]

Models of how the world interacts with the brain to effect human behaviour are internal assessments, constructed by the brain, of a reality beyond the brain's sphere of existence. Such models assume an ontology! (Again, remove that fuggin foot from the door! And don't dare tell me that no ontology is assumed in such models, or I'll get my rope out too.)

Again, for the umpteenth time, the brain only has access to its own internal states. Nothing else. The brain is not privy to external events - it's only privy to internal events.

In the model, the brain has access to other stuff via sensory inputs. Don't forget them. What are sensory inputs, James?

You're doing the same thing that Little Idiot does, now.

In LI's case, the universe is being orchestrated moment by moment by an undetectable agent, or an agent only detectable by "ancient wisdom".

In your case, your single assertion is that "the brain only has access to its internal states", as if you'd somehow built a foundation under that, or inherited it from Descartes, and as if Cartesian dualism was somehow secure.

Just whining to have metaphysics included so you will have something you suppose is relevant to say is useless, James.

If you want to show us your metaphysics now, complet, start your own thread and let people take pot shots at it. Your thinking is incoherent, so it should be lots of fun.

But the reality of the situation, is that the brain is just responding to its own internal states.

So, no place for sensory inputs, eyes and ears and noses and such. We're just imagining that we have sensory inputs, and something else is running the show. Come to think of it, you and Little Idiot are kissing cousins. You're both committed to your woo.

And don't dare tell me that no ontology is assumed in such models, or I'll get my rope out too.

And we'll ever-so-politely sod this one off, too, because we haven't gotten to the ontologic status of models, yet. Can you resist the urge to derail?

[Kenny Login]

The empirical model entails an ontology because it speaks of a reality where brains interact with empirical objects. But the reality of the situation, is that the brain is just responding to its own internal states.

You're right about an ontology being entailed. (NB: Scientists please note - entailed rather than stated axiomatically). But I would say if you're persuing this line, then talk of 'external' becomes redundant. One thing that would help clear things up for me is to say something about how higher cognitive function differs from either cognitive or neuro processing that at least gives the illusion of representing things that are readily communicable and interpretable by others, like tigers and moustaches. Because these do persist in making us all believe they have some different ontological status to thought and mind stuff itself.

This could be rephrased as a question of whether there is any significant difference between R1, and those bits of R1 that make themselves accessible to R2 programmes. It's a demand consistent with R2 that evidence be communicated and then offered up for review and evaluation. R1 does not place these demands, but then to lump everything under R1 is a bit unsatisfying since it renders most psychological and neuro research meaningless.

In which case you seem to be hinting at some way for mind to know directly? I'm waiting for the main course.....!

[Surendra Darathy]

The empirical model entails an ontology because it speaks of a reality where brains interact with empirical objects. But the reality of the situation, is that the brain is just responding to its own internal states.

You're right about an ontology being entailed.

No, Kenny. A question of ontology is brought up by metaphysicians, while metaphysicians have yet to show that ontologic questions lead anywhere except up the poop chute of wibbling.

You can have another thread about ontology if you want, Kenny, but don't piss metaphysics all over a brain model thread.

Ontology basically consists of declaring that you've won the war, without defining the territory gained.

Scientists please note - entailed rather than stated axiomatically.

You do not have the faintest notion of what "entailed" entails, Kenny. You have to write syllogisms to do that, and all you are producing is jism. Oddly enough, you're blowing the stuff out of your ass. You may have a leak somewhere.

[colubridae]

SOS if I read correctly, roughly

1 There are 10^11 neurons.

2 There are 10^15 synaptic connections

3 Therefore 10^26 different brain structures.

Is each synapse different depending on its Long Term Potentiation state?

If so do you have a figure on the range of LTP states per synapse or is it virtually continuous?

Do you think that a brains response to stimuli (including ‘no stimuli’*) is affected by its.:-

1 structure as in 3 above.

2 The LTP ‘state’ of each synapse

3 The electrical/synapse firing just prior to stimulus.


* no stimuli in the sense ‘no preset test condition’. There being no such thing as no inbound electrical firing.


If this is the case a given response to a give stimuli from a given brain could be very similar or wildly different as in


‘Tree’

And

‘That’s enough trees ed.’


edit spelling

[Kenny Login]

No, Kenny. A question of ontology is brought up by metaphysicians, while metaphysicians have yet to show that ontologic questions lead anywhere except up the poop chute of wibbling.

No. You may consciously find the thought of spending a Sunday afternoon discussing ontology repugnant, but sub- and pre-conscious processing does in fact operate to determine real from non-real, and all of the messy bits inbetween.

You do not have the faintest notion of what "entailed" entails, Kenny. You have to write syllogisms to do that, and all you are producing is jism. Oddly enough, you're blowing the stuff out of your ass. You may have a leak somewhere.

No. You only have to do that in formalised logical programmes which lend themselves to certain modes of further enquiry. Funnily enough, that's not the sum total of what the brain or the mind does, yours included.

[Surendra Darathy]

No, Kenny. A question of ontology is brought up by metaphysicians, while metaphysicians have yet to show that ontologic questions lead anywhere except up the poop chute of wibbling.

No. You may consciously find the thought of spending a Sunday afternoon discussing ontology repugnant, but sub- and pre-conscious processing does in fact operate to determine real from non-real, and all of the messy bits inbetween.

Please take this crap to another thread, Kenny. Ontology stands or falls on its own, not in relation to science.

You do not have the faintest notion of what "entailed" entails, Kenny. You have to write syllogisms to do that, and all you are producing is jism. Oddly enough, you're blowing the stuff out of your ass. You may have a leak somewhere.

No. You only have to do that in formalised logical programmes which lend themselves to certain modes of further enquiry. Funnily enough, that's not the sum total of what the brain or the mind does, yours included.

That's funny, Kenny. It was you who used the word "entail" first, not I. Want me to quote you on it?

You're right about an ontology being entailed.

So quit acting like you just fell off the back of the turnip truck for the practice of philosophy.