On treeness of Oak1, and other things

[SpeedOfSound]

there is a common element, but no evidence of a non-mental element.

You are such a funny guy! You refute yourself within a clause.

[Surendra Darathy]

Objective experience provides no evidence of an experience beyond mental.

I have suggested we do not, and can not have evidence for anything other than a mental world.

As you know from general relativity, an accelerated reference frame is indistinguishable from a gravitational field. You are in a windowless room in what is either an accelerated reference frame like an elevator, or you are experiencing a gravitational field. What is the correct "mental representation", given knowledge of these different varieties of mental experience?

The entire idea of this equivalence is an assertion of something other than a mental world. Unless you can explain what is "accelerated" in your mental world. It's like an optical illusion, except that you have to be a body with mass. It's the only way you can "experience" the mass of your body. E = mc2.

To me, Little Idiot, you're just a bloke without a nose, and I think that's the reason you're not looking beyond the end of your nose. In your mental world, there's nothing on which you can focus.

Well, OK. I suppose drowning face down in an inch of water is another way to experience a reality beyond the mental. The bigger your nose, the deeper you need the water to be in order to drown in it.

Somebody kicks you so hard in the cojones that you find yourself chewing on them. Tell me it's all mental. In an all-mental universe, why would someone kick you in the cojones, unless it was to get your attention?

[GrahamH]

Little Idiot,

or invite me to continue and tell you what I think you are if you prefer.

Of course, and as simply as is possible please.

My question 'what am I?' is a more modern version of the classic 'who am I?'
It does not pre-suppose an individual personality, however.

The answer;
Am I the body - no; If I sever large pieces of body, my sense of individual identity, individuality, 'self' is not reduced.
Am I the thoughts, feelings and emotions - no; all these things come and go while 'I' am the same.
Am I the mind - yes! I am that awareness which 'has' the thoughts, feelings and emotions, I am the knower of them, but I am not them.

If you sever some parts of the body you do indeed reduce your identity or mental capacity, to the extent that you may cease to be conscious, cease to know who you are, cease to be aware of various senses, and various other mental effect.

Defining 'I am the same' is an issue if identity, which relies on memory. You could say that while you are conscious there is an 'I', but you can;t say it is the same 'I' unless you can connect it to previous instants of consciousness with memory. Subjectivity is not continuous, but is blind to the discontinuities.

That which 'has the thoughts' is the thing which constructs thoughts, stores and retrieves information etc. Plainly that is not the subjective 'I', since you have no awareness of the processes. If the processes of thought, emotion etc are 'the mind' then 'I' am not the mind!

The mind knows of an 'I' but is not the 'I'. The mind thinks but the 'I' does not.

The mind is what the brain does.

'I' is a representation, made by the brain, to make the brain comprehensible to itself, by drastic simplification.

So 'I' am the mind.

You have failed to offer a convincing case. Introspection and reason suggest you are wrong. You need to unpack things a bit more.

What ever I experience or know, be it as thought, feeling, emotion, knowledge or experience I know as content of the mind.

It isn't 'content of mind, so much as what the concept/label 'mind' refers to.
'mind' isn't a thing with stuff in it, it is a broad class of disparate processes known by their behavioural effects. 'The mind' is not unified and doesn't know itself in any detail.

Even the experience of the physical world can, by analysis, be considered as mental experience. There is no knowledge or experience available other than as content of the mind.

Since 'knowledge and experience' are part of the definition of the set 'mental' you are spouting tautologies.

How about - thought is information processing in the brain. There in no thought available other than as a brain process.

Few would argue against the case that what we experience of the physical is experienced as mental content, we can not claim knowledge of the outside world, only of 'our mental copy of it.'

Bollocks. Our 'knowledge of the world' grows in our brains, like plant roots seek fertile soil. There is no evidence of a separate 'mental'.
We don;t experience mental content, our brains respond to stimuli from the physical world. Firing those same response circuits in the absence of actual sense data produces similar effects to the actual sense data. There is no world in our minds, there is only responses to a world.

Experience is response.

Some would argue that we experience a mental copy of a physical world, based on parsomony and objective experience.

That is not parsimonious. You have added an unnecessary copy of a world. We don't need that. We only need one physical world in which brains grow recognisers to respond to physical stimuli. No need for a 'mental copy of a physical world'. That is un-parsimonious.

If we each experience our own mental representation of the objective world, then a group sharing an objective experience are doing nothing of the sort, they are each experiencing a subjective experience, with a large degree of agreement between them; so-called 'objective experience' is only inter-subjective agreement.

The details of the neural recognisers in the brain will differ, as tree roots differ, but they explore the same space, respond to the same stimuli, mean the same thing.

In a group, no-one member knows other than his or her own subjective experience, each of which is a mental experience; a group sharing a so-called objective experience of a tree are only experiencing a collection of subjective experiences, no one member, nor all members together experience anything beyond the mental.

They all respond to the tree. There is only a response to a tree, no 'experience of a mental copy of a physical/mentical tree'

Objective experience provides no evidence of an experience beyond mental. However it does show agreement between the subjective mental experiences, there is a common element, but no evidence of a non-mental element.

That is just tautological babble.

There is some common source of the experience (say a 'real tree') which we each form a subjective representation of.
However this 'real tree' must interact with the minds of each individual in order to be experienced by each individual.

Yes!

Since either
1 only the mental can interact with the mind
or
2 we have duality of mental and non-mental which can interact.

If duality is a flawed metaphysic, then only the mental can interact with mind, this ''real tree' is a mental object.

More bollocks.
3. Only the physical can interact with the physical. There is no 'mental'. It is no more that a classification for a collection of physical responses that some have mistaken for a thing in itself, even though they only know it via 'experience', just like the tree or the Sun, all of which are physical.

All we ever experience of the world is a mental representation. We have a foundation (above) to show how all physical objects (as opposed to the experience of the objects) are mental.

No you don't. All you have is a neurological label grown in a physical brain that inappropriately groups 'i' and 'mental' with perceived physical objects in a class of R1 real things. Ah well, meat brains make mistakes.

Have we any foundation to show the world is not mental, to show why there needs to be any thing of any other nature there to cause our mental experience?
Do we have any evidence to suggest the physical world we experience is not infact mental in its real nature, and is mental appearing in our experience as physical?

This is just category errors. 'Mind' is not a thing, it is a descriptive label, written in our neurons, for some things brains do.

I have suggested we do not, and can not have evidence for anything other than a mental world. I asked for such evidence many times, but never recieved any.

What you really asked was for us to validate the metaphysics of what matter Really Is, but how can anyone do that? How could anyone say what 'mental Really Is, even assuming it to be more than brain activity? You are merely projecting a naive R1 concept of things brains do, formed in ignorance of the existence of brains, beyond the bounds of knowledge.

You are supposing that an entirely different sort of 'mind' is doing things you have no reason to suppose can be done. That is no foundation for anything, certainly not a sure route to the truth of Reality.

Just count the contradictions and negatives in your philoslopy!

Do you, Sean, know of any compelling reason to suppose a non-mental 'real tree' that causes out mental experience, or do you wish to dispute that our experience is a mental representation?

Maybe you agree that we do not and can not know that there is a non-mental world causing our experience.

Maybe you can see how many errors you made in your argument.

[Surendra Darathy]

Subjectivity is not continuous, but is blind to the discontinuities.

Not so. Imagine waking up from surgery to find that some succubus has removed your liver and replaced it with a nudibranch.

'The mind' is not unified and doesn't know itself in any detail.

That's why many reasonable people have stopped talking about it. How can you talk about something that is not unified? Right! By talking about its parts.

No need for a 'mental copy of a physical world'. That is un-parsimonious.

If you needed it, you could experiment with lacking it.

If we each experience our own mental representation of the objective world, then a group sharing an objective experience are doing nothing of the sort, they are each experiencing a subjective experience, with a large degree of agreement between them; so-called 'objective experience' is only inter-subjective agreement.

The fact of agreement is not so easily glossed over. Certainly it is possible to tell when inter-subjective agreement is not happening. Usually it is over a bunch of "mental" shit.

Objective experience provides no evidence of an experience beyond mental. However it does show agreement between the subjective mental experiences, there is a common element, but no evidence of a non-mental element.

That is just tautological babble.

It's worse than that. It is a blatant attempt to refer to intersubjective experience and then gloss it away.

3. Only the physical can interact with the physical. There is no 'mental'. It is no more that a classification for a collection of physical responses that some have mistaken for a thing in itself, even though they only know it via 'experience', just like the tree or the Sun, all of which are physical.

There isn't any "mental". Unless, of course, it can bend some spoons for me without using a pair of hands. Bend the spoon, LI! Do or do not, there is no try! Spoon bending without spoons is a lot like wanking.

Ah well, meat brains make mistakes.

Ah, mistakes! The mark of an intersubjective protocol! What LI thinks is a mistake is relying on intersubjectivity.

I have suggested we do not, and can not have evidence for anything other than a mental world. I asked for such evidence many times, but never recieved any.

Equally as difficult: Showing that there exists a mental world. You pays your money and takes your choice, when the circus of metaphysics comes to town.

[GrahamH]

Subjectivity is not continuous, but is blind to the discontinuities.

Not so. Imagine waking up from surgery to find that some succubus has removed your liver and replaced it with a nudibranch.

Ah yes, we do notice the glitches at scene changes, of course. I think LI was straying into the peculiar realm where the idea that not experiencing unconsciousness means something (subjectivity never dies!).

Of course, if we turn a tape recorder off, then on again, there will be no recording of the off period, no gaps in the playback. But there will be discontinuity glitches, like waking to find a nidibranch where your liver used to be (according to your memory, the actual detailed functioning of which is not something you experience)

No need for a 'mental copy of a physical world'. That is un-parsimonious.

If you needed it, you could experiment with lacking it.

How?

[Surendra Darathy]

No need for a 'mental copy of a physical world'. That is un-parsimonious.

If you needed it, you could experiment with lacking it.

How?

Exactly. Blow out your brains with a .44 revolver.

[Little Idiot]

there is a common element, but no evidence of a non-mental element.

You are such a funny guy! You refute yourself within a clause.

I do no such thing.
There is no contradiction in the statement you quote.

Intersubjective agreement between mental experiences does NOT suggest a non-mental element, only a shared element causing the mental experiences.

Show me why there is any suggestion said element should be other than mental.

[Little Idiot]

Objective experience provides no evidence of an experience beyond mental.

I have suggested we do not, and can not have evidence for anything other than a mental world.

As you know from general relativity, an accelerated reference frame is indistinguishable from a gravitational field. You are in a windowless room in what is either an accelerated reference frame like an elevator, or you are experiencing a gravitational field. What is the correct "mental representation", given knowledge of these different varieties of mental experience?

Both are mental experiences of the physical environment (reminder the physical is mental).
It is quite common for different situations to produce similar experiences. Why do you believe the mathematical similarity between accelerated frame of reference and gravitational field should not produce an experience of similarity in a mental world? I would find more of a problem if you could tell the difference by experience while mathematically they are similar.

Essentially, inertal mass and gravitational mass are to be expected as simlar experiences, are they not?

The entire idea of this equivalence is an assertion of something other than a mental world. Unless you can explain what is "accelerated" in your mental world. It's like an optical illusion, except that you have to be a body with mass. It's the only way you can "experience" the mass of your body. E = mc2.

Maybe you will understand more easily if you think that I am suggesting a material world exept that matter is made of mind-stuff.
Of course I am not suggesting its mind-matter. I am suggesting its mind appearing as physical, but you seem to struggle with that idea.

The 'mental-appearing-as-physical' has a property of acting as if it has mass. In a dream, if I dream I kick a ball it will curve perfectly into the top corner of the goals just as if it has mass, angular momentum, drag and so on - yet it has no physical properties at all - its a dream! Its an imagination.

Just so, the mental world we experience is made of ideas, abd we experience it as having mass. Thats simple - right?

To me, Little Idiot, you're just a bloke without a nose, and I think that's the reason you're not looking beyond the end of your nose. In your mental world, there's nothing on which you can focus.

Well, OK. I suppose drowning face down in an inch of water is another way to experience a reality beyond the mental. The bigger your nose, the deeper you need the water to be in order to drown in it.

Somebody kicks you so hard in the cojones that you find yourself chewing on them. Tell me it's all mental. In an all-mental universe, why would someone kick you in the cojones, unless it was to get your attention?

Being kicked causes pain in my mental world just as in yours.
For a skeptic who should be prepared to doubt all things, you are very unwilling to doubt the fact that the world may be other than it appears to be; why?

[SpeedOfSound]

there is a common element, but no evidence of a non-mental element.

You are such a funny guy! You refute yourself within a clause.

I do no such thing.
There is no contradiction in the statement you quote.

Intersubjective agreement between mental experiences does NOT suggest a non-mental element, only a shared element causing the mental experiences.

Show me why there is any suggestion said element should be other than mental.

oHH! I never showed you before?

Watch the birdie!! There's a common element ..watch the little Birdie boys-n-girls! I respect the science... flapping little birdie..neuroscience does a lot of good things...

Whoa!! What's that? Big Mind X-God just popped otta my butt to explain the common element/physical world/orchestrated sensations. Ain't magical thinking something? I must of used Logic and Reason boys-n-girls!!

Every time you guys say appearances, god is close to follow. This is getting ridiculous. You and jamest both.

I'm working on a little something for you but if you don't get honest enough to see that the snippet from you above has a contradiction in it that only a external reality or god assumption can fix then I'm just going to continue making fun of you.

[Little Idiot]

Little Idiot,

or invite me to continue and tell you what I think you are if you prefer.

Of course, and as simply as is possible please.

My question 'what am I?' is a more modern version of the classic 'who am I?'
It does not pre-suppose an individual personality, however.

The answer;
Am I the body - no; If I sever large pieces of body, my sense of individual identity, individuality, 'self' is not reduced.
Am I the thoughts, feelings and emotions - no; all these things come and go while 'I' am the same.
Am I the mind - yes! I am that awareness which 'has' the thoughts, feelings and emotions, I am the knower of them, but I am not them.

If you sever some parts of the body you do indeed reduce your identity or mental capacity, to the extent that you may cease to be conscious, cease to know who you are, cease to be aware of various senses, and various other mental effect.

Even if I loose all sesation of, say; touch, smell, taste and hearing....Then this is a reduction in sensory input, not a reduction in 'I'. I am not the sensory input, I am that which knows the sensory input, and that is unchanged. I would still say 'I am me'.

Defining 'I am the same' is an issue if identity, which relies on memory. You could say that while you are conscious there is an 'I', but you can;t say it is the same 'I' unless you can connect it to previous instants of consciousness with memory. Subjectivity is not continuous, but is blind to the discontinuities.

No, the personality depends on its memory for this, not the 'me' we are thinking of; 'this' is the observer who remains unchanged when we decide to behave differently. Its not the personality, its the awareness which animates the personality. Its not the 'I' but the awareness of the 'I'. It is not the 'I' who feels happy, but the awareness that is aware of 'I feel happy' The ego feels happy, this knows that the ego is feeling happy - this is the observer of the ego-self.

Remember the context; we are talking about 'what am I?'
The ego feels happy, but I am not the ego, this 'I' observes the ego.

That which 'has the thoughts' is the thing which constructs thoughts, stores and retrieves information etc. Plainly that is not the subjective 'I', since you have no awareness of the processes. If the processes of thought, emotion etc are 'the mind' then 'I' am not the mind!

Well spotted.
The intellect and the memory, imagination and all the tools of the mind are not the 'I' who knows and observes the result of these things. These tools of the mind, and pieces or functions of the mind are not the 'I' we are looking for. The I we seek is the awareness that allows these things to happen, to be known, to be observer; this I is the observer in the mind, it is not the tools or products of the mind.

The mind knows of an 'I' but is not the 'I'. The mind thinks but the 'I' does not.

The mind knows of an 'I' called the ego. But the 'I' who observes the mind is the 'I' we seek.

The mind is what the brain does.

Damn. You were doing so well.
At least say 'I think' before that, maybe?

'I' is a representation, made by the brain, to make the brain comprehensible to itself, by drastic simplification.

So 'I' am the mind.

You have failed to offer a convincing case. Introspection and reason suggest you are wrong. You need to unpack things a bit more.

The 'I am the mind' is the start, not the end of the trail for the 'I' that is of interest to me. First, establish what 'I' am not (body, thoughts, ego, etc) then follow the interest inside the mind to find out what exactly in this strange thing called 'mind' am I really.
This I that knows 'I am' is the observer, that which observes; the awareness.

What ever I experience or know, be it as thought, feeling, emotion, knowledge or experience I know as content of the mind.

It isn't 'content of mind, so much as what the concept/label 'mind' refers to.
'mind' isn't a thing with stuff in it, it is a broad class of disparate processes known by their behavioural effects. 'The mind' is not unified and doesn't know itself in any detail.

Well on that point we can agree. However, it is possible for the mind to come to know itself in a lot more detail than is common.
When we establish what the 'real I' is, as opposed to what most of us think the 'I' is. When we trace that which observes thought and feeling, not that which 'genarates' thought or feelimg (loosly called the 'mind') or that has the thought or feeling (the personality) or that which senses (the body) rather that which observes the thought or feeling or sensation (the awareness).
When we know what to look out for, we humans can become other than we normally are.
We can become 'aware of awareness' This is the first step to becoming really conscious.

WAKE UP!

Even the experience of the physical world can, by analysis, be considered as mental experience. There is no knowledge or experience available other than as content of the mind.

Since 'knowledge and experience' are part of the definition of the set 'mental' you are spouting tautologies.

How about - thought is information processing in the brain. There in no thought available other than as a brain process.

Are you not aware of the result of the activity in the brain?
I dont (to be honest) care if you call it mind or brain that causes the thought, but do you see that there is still another level; awareness of the thought is different to the thought (regardless of if we think of thought as movement of mind or as brain activity)

Few would argue against the case that what we experience of the physical is experienced as mental content, we can not claim knowledge of the outside world, only of 'our mental copy of it.'

Bollocks. Our 'knowledge of the world' grows in our brains, like plant roots seek fertile soil. There is no evidence of a separate 'mental'.
We don;t experience mental content, our brains respond to stimuli from the physical world. Firing those same response circuits in the absence of actual sense data produces similar effects to the actual sense data. There is no world in our minds, there is only responses to a world.

Experience is response.

And what's tucked away under that statement...
Yes, there it is; awareness of the experience.

Some would argue that we experience a mental copy of a physical world, based on parsomony and objective experience.

That is not parsimonious. You have added an unnecessary copy of a world. We don't need that. We only need one physical world in which brains grow recognisers to respond to physical stimuli. No need for a 'mental copy of a physical world'. That is un-parsimonious.

Thats not what I meant, I meant some will conceed the experience is mental, but say its a mental copy of a mind-independent physical world.

They say this is parsimonious.

I say, no its not. There is no need for this additional thing you assume; the mind-independent world

I will finish responding tomorrow, need sleep now.

[Little Idiot]

there is a common element, but no evidence of a non-mental element.

You are such a funny guy! You refute yourself within a clause.

I do no such thing.
There is no contradiction in the statement you quote.

Intersubjective agreement between mental experiences does NOT suggest a non-mental element, only a shared element causing the mental experiences.

Show me why there is any suggestion said element should be other than mental.

oHH! I never showed you before?

Watch the birdie!! There's a common element ..watch the little Birdie boys-n-girls! I respect the science... flapping little birdie..neuroscience does a lot of good things...

Whoa!! What's that? Big Mind X-God just popped otta my butt to explain the common element/physical world/orchestrated sensations. Ain't magical thinking something? I must of used Logic and Reason boys-n-girls!!

Every time you guys say appearances, god is close to follow. This is getting ridiculous. You and jamest both.

I'm working on a little something for you but if you don't get honest enough to see that the snippet from you above has a contradiction in it that only a external reality or god assumption can fix then I'm just going to continue making fun of you.

Lets not go down that road, the 'if you dont agree with my point I will stop asking and answering questions but just make fun of you' road is only a buss pass short of fuck off town central.

You said "LI thats self contradictory."
I say "I am? then show me, cos I dont see it."
we were involved in a sensible exchange; no need to threaten each other or resort to mockery.

[SpeedOfSound]

You said "LI thats self contradictory."
I say "I am? then show me, cos I dont see it."
we were involved in a sensible exchange; no need to threaten each other or resort to mockery.

If it's this obvious and you can't see it then you have gone down hopeless street. Anything I post will just give you an opportunity to cherry pick and distract from the point.

there is a common element, but no evidence of a non-mental element.

look again.

[Surendra Darathy]

It is quite common for different situations to produce similar experiences.

Can you think of any examples where completely disparate physical causes produce identical experiences? We're talking about using instrumentation, like a pendulum, or other type of clock, rather than some stupid subjective report about "how arm-waving feels to me". The equations prove that the dynamics is not only indistinguishable, but identical. Only the physical cause varies. The observations of the pendulum prove that the dynamics is identical. The experience is of the time-keeping of the pendulum. But the causes are not identical, because the experience also incorporates the difference between a static gravitational field and an accelerated spaceship. The causes are rooted in different physics and different analysis. Surely you are not going to say that the relevant experience (of the behavior of the pendulum), though identical, is accompanied by the same physical cause.

You do? It's all orchestrated by the Big X-Thingy? You are such a comedian, Little Idiot! Why are you here doing this? Why debase the practice of discourse in this manner? Is your commitment to your X-thingy so intense? Then you're a faith-head.

Is there any way to say that one experience is really the same as another? That's what the pendulum clock is for. To make an intersubjective assessment of the "experience". This is really the basic problem with your woo-riddled nonsense. It doesn't matter if the dynamics is identical in both cases. The fact is, the physics does not talk about experiences at all. Only you talk about "experiences", mainly because you seem to want to wibble on about your experience of god, or some other sort of woo. Bend a spoon with it, Little Idiot. Then we'll know that your experience is actually about anything.

Both are mental experiences of the physical environment (reminder the physical is mental).

And your explanation of the common result of the intersubjective measurement of the behavior of pendulum clocks is what, exactly? That it is all orchestrated by the Big X-thingy God in the woo-o-sphere? Why? Because there just has to be an X-god-thingy-summat so you can talk a bunch more bollocks about it? What a great rationale, Little Idiot. Your desire to talk bollocks is superseding physics.

Why do you believe the mathematical similarity between accelerated frame of reference and gravitational field should not produce an experience of similarity in a mental world?

It's not similar, Little Idiot. It's fucking identical, according to the pendulum clocks, unless you want to wibble about the universe of measurements from which the results of two separate experiments come. That would seem to be your hope, here: That every experiment is unique, and statistical measures are bullshit. And if you add in knowledge of the gravitational frame and the accelerated frame, something is not identical. That would be the conditions for each experiment. Riding aboard an accelerated spaceship and sitting in a gravitational field are not identical. But the clocks behave in just the same way. Unless you want to say, as you apparently do, that everything is everything. Whassamatta? Did you find all this too much work, and tired-tired seepy-seepy? Poor bebby. Have nice nappy-poo, and then get up to make more woo. And more poo.

I would find more of a problem if you could tell the difference by experience while mathematically they are similar.

Physically, their causes are different. If you deny it, then we see that you don't care about the conversation. Cute bebby! Make a poo for us.

Essentially, inertal mass and gravitational mass are to be expected as simlar experiences, are they not?

You're talking pure bollocks. The behavior of the pendulum clocks is identical, but one clock is in an accelerated spaceship, and one is in the gravitational field of a large mass. It's not about the mass, but about the behavior of the same fucking rest mass installed in a pendulum clock. You figure it out.

Maybe you will understand more easily if you think that I am suggesting a material world exept that matter is made of mind-stuff.

Explain how matter-mind-stuff generates a gravitational field, and imaginary mind-stuff generates woo and food-mind-stuff generates poo. Such different outcomes, all from nothing but a bunch of fucking mind-stuff.

Of course I am not suggesting its mind-matter. I am suggesting its mind appearing as physical, but you seem to struggle with that idea.

Yeah? Well your idea is full of crap, because you have to manufacture a bunch of unsubstantiated woo in order to get something to orchestrate the X-perience of ap-perience. That's the X-widget-God-o-thingy doodad. It's a Rube Goldberg machine, LI. There's no idea with which to struggle.

The 'mental-appearing-as-physical' has a property of acting as if it has mass.

Well, yes, LI. Everything acts in such a way as to generate the appearances, because it's all being orchestrated by the doodad-in-the-sky, or doodad-up-your-arse, or whatever it is that is making you feel so good today.

In a dream, if I dream I kick a ball it will curve perfectly into the top corner of the goals just as if it has mass, angular momentum, drag and so on - yet it has no physical properties at all - its a dream! Its an imagination.

Everything you're presenting here, LI, is a work of imagination. There is nothing in your claim that "everything is acting in such a way" as to make me think physics is going on. Everything is acting in such a way as to convince me that you are extracting your Little Story from between your buttocks. Change your trou once in while, LI. Things are getting rank.

Just so, the mental world we experience is made of ideas, abd we experience it as having mass. Thats simple - right?

If you like the explanation that is simple, glib, and wrong, it's your funeral. You say everything is acting in such a way as to make your explanation correct. Do you have some sort of hot line to the god-thingy-X-doodad-up-the-arse? Is it your thumb?

For a skeptic who should be prepared to doubt all things, you are very unwilling to doubt the fact that the world may be other than it appears to be; why?

Because imagining that the universe is being orchestrated just so as to make my ex recto assertions valid is something I would be ashamed to announce. Keep telling your "just-so" story, LI. It's exactly why one person's subjective experience (i.e., holy testimony) no longer suffices. Keep talking the talk, LI. We'll all keep making fun of you.

[SpeedOfSound]

orchestrate the X-perience of ap-perience.

O Boy! New words! Can I capitalize them so I seem all phlosofurry?

[Surendra Darathy]

orchestrate the X-perience of ap-perience.

O Boy! New words! Can I capitalize them so I seem all phlosofurry?

Phlop-softy? Syphilisyphical? Happy-erience? Wiggligence?