If the experience is mental, then if there is an observer of 'the mental' the observer must also be mental, unless you wish to accept a duality between the mental experience and the supposed non-mental observer.GrahamH wrote:1. You can't show 'the observer' to be 'mental. It is merely one of your axioms.Little Idiot wrote:When I say "we experience our mental experience", what I mean is that all our experience is mental. The content; mental, the observer; mental, the observed, mental. Its all mental. We have no experience of anything not mental.
So yes; we have our experience which we call mental.
How do you understand experience? (I am rewording the question 'do you agree all experience is mental, which you are seemingly reluctant to answer).
2. We can define 'experience' to be mental, but what the experience is of is not shown to be mental.
I do not suggest there is an observer independent of the experience, but at the time of the experience it is experienced by an 'apparent experiencer' and in this sense there is a mental observer.
If the experience is mental, the either
1. the source of the experinces is also mental,
or
2. You have to accept duality between mental experience and non-mental (and unexperienced) 'something' which causes the world. You are basically asserting without foundation that the 'neuoma' are non-mental, and accepting a duality into the bargain - just to say there is a non-mental cause of our mental experience!
I have not suggested the absolute reality is "a <insert any word>" and certainally not "a being"I mean that we experience change, substance, confusion, ignorance etc. We can use those experiences to define an abstract concept of a being that is changeless, immaterial, omniscient etc. We aren't identifying real attributes of a real being, we are merely defining what this being would not be. Such thinking doesn't transcend experience, it is a fiction based on experience.Little Idiot wrote:Well I did what I think to be a clear explaination of fiction and knowledge when I said in the last post
Some 'knowledge' can be a special class of knowledge; fictional knowledge. If I speak 'klingon'A fictional language is not something you can converse with. If you can do that it musty be a real language. If I invent a fictional language Poplosian, without creating a real functional language, it is a fiction. If I design the thing as a functional language then it is a language.from star trek, its not a 'real' language spoken by real klingons, but I could comunicate in written or verbal form with another speaker showing some real knowledge content.
As you say, it's the Klingons that are fictional. The language Klingon is a real language. The history told about the language might be fiction.
Indeed you could, but it would have absolutely no metaphysical significance, would it? You could write reams of prose about Klingons or Hobbits and the only link between that knowledge and 'reality' would be the fact that the ideas involved would all be rehashing and recombining of ideas acquired from experience.Little Idiot wrote:If I study the works of fiction, I could write reviews, earn money, and debate with others concerning my knowledge of a fictional subject.
It is clear enough. If you define a lexicon and grammar and thus define what Xak ikit tikle means then it might indeed be 'true'.Little Idiot wrote:To try make it more clear;
I dont speak klingon, but lets assume 'Xak ikit tikle' was klingon for 'I speak klingon', then I could say
'Xak ikit tikle' is true.
As it is I suspect you just made up some meaningless character strings, in which case it is not 'true'. If you do define the language you can trace the roots of the semantics. Where would that take you, to the world of experience?
Little Idiot wrote:I am not sure what you mean. can you rephrase for me?GrahamH wrote:We might define an entity lacking all attributes that we experience and understand as faults in ourselves
Infact "absolute reality is a <insert any word>" and "absolute reality is a being" are both false.
As I have shown earlier, and shown again with the klingon example there is a distinction between 1. the linguistic content (regardless of if it's attempting to describe 'absolute reality' or existence or fiction), and 2. the logical true or false statement.
To describe absolute reality it must be linguistically accurate and logically true.
I showed earlier why the statement "reality is a ..." is wrong linguistically, and this also applies to "reality is a being" so we need not bother to try prove then wrong logically as well, they can be dismissed on linguistic grounds.