BM Brain Theory vs. Neuroscience

[GrahamH]

BMI is the imaginings or ideas of big mind. I don't see the difference.

Okay. So BM imagines or ideas what? Every atom, particle, force in Oak1 and lays it out in space/time? Or does BM just imagine all of the possible experiences all IM's could ever have?

The atoms etc are our experiences - can we discuss a single object in any way other than as the content of our experience? We simply do not know anything of 'the thing itself' which some of us like to talk about - Its pure speculation to say we know anything about the thing itself outside our experience of the thing, and this includes saying its really a physical or material thing. All we really know about the tree is our experience of the tree. And we know the experience is mental because we know it as a result of our mind's construction of a representation within our mind; we only know this representation.

So now you are an empiricist again? What about 'other ways of knowing' that go beyond the experience?

No need to reply here, that's for the other topic. Sorry for the interruption.

[SpeedOfSound]

Can you demonstrate this or is this your assumption, belief, prejudice, bald-ass claim?

The fact that I can be so confident about what neroscience can and can not demonstrate is suporting evidence for my model of 'absolute reality'.

Despite my lack of neuroscience, I am sure that this simply can not be demonstrated,

The physical model can not explain the change over from physical brain activity into subjective mental experience.
This is refered to as the thing to thought gap.

The mental model does explain the thing to thought gap with ease, which the physical model can never do.

A physical model can only assert that the brain causes awareness 'somehow' and can never establish how or why certain configurations of matter (brains) produce subjective experience.

We simply can not show how 'simple organic chemicals can produce life' nor can we show how 'complex structures produce subjective experience'

Remember the other day when I kept asking what problem you were trying to solve? This thing-to-thought gap is the problem I think. Or at least it's the one you guys like to bandy about lately like a picture of a kid riding a dinosaur.

But you cannot 'demonstrate' these absolute statements that you're making.

[Little Idiot]

BMI is the imaginings or ideas of big mind. I don't see the difference.

Okay. So BM imagines or ideas what? Every atom, particle, force in Oak1 and lays it out in space/time? Or does BM just imagine all of the possible experiences all IM's could ever have?

The atoms etc are our experiences - can we discuss a single object in any way other than as the content of our experience? We simply do not know EDIT= experience anything of 'the thing itself' which some of us like to talk about - Its pure speculation to say we know anything about the thing itself outside our experience of the thing, and this includes saying its really a physical or material thing. All we really know about the tree is our experience of the tree. And we know the experience is mental because we know it as a result of our mind's construction of a representation within our mind; we only know this representation.

So now you are an empiricist again? What about 'other ways of knowing' that go beyond the experience?

No need to reply here, that's for the other topic. Sorry for the interruption.

No, I am not an empiricist, I just accept that we only know experiences of the environment as mental, subjective experiences. We dont experience (I should maybe have said experience not know) the things in themselves, and have no basis to claim we do experiennce them.

[Little Idiot]

Can you demonstrate this or is this your assumption, belief, prejudice, bald-ass claim?

The fact that I can be so confident about what neroscience can and can not demonstrate is suporting evidence for my model of 'absolute reality'.

Despite my lack of neuroscience, I am sure that this simply can not be demonstrated,

The physical model can not explain the change over from physical brain activity into subjective mental experience.
This is refered to as the thing to thought gap.

The mental model does explain the thing to thought gap with ease, which the physical model can never do.

A physical model can only assert that the brain causes awareness 'somehow' and can never establish how or why certain configurations of matter (brains) produce subjective experience.

We simply can not show how 'simple organic chemicals can produce life' nor can we show how 'complex structures produce subjective experience'

Remember the other day when I kept asking what problem you were trying to solve? This thing-to-thought gap is the problem I think. Or at least it's the one you guys like to bandy about lately like a picture of a kid riding a dinosaur.

But you cannot 'demonstrate' these absolute statements that you're making.

I am making the statements based on my metaphysical position. How, other than by establishing the metaphysical position, could I demonstrate that "there is no way for neuroscience to demonstrate <its erroneous claim>"
It can be shown as a fact upto the current time, if no demonstration has been presented; I think there is no such demonstration.

It's a metaphysical claim about the limits on neuroscience. Its not a claim made from within science about the validity of a model.

[SpeedOfSound]

I would say my understanding of giant pink space bunnies is my imagination.

But the bunnies must be in the BM too. How do you account for the sense error and the space bunnies and the dreams and different perspectives?

[SpeedOfSound]

Can you demonstrate this or is this your assumption, belief, prejudice, bald-ass claim?

The fact that I can be so confident about what neroscience can and can not demonstrate is suporting evidence for my model of 'absolute reality'.

Despite my lack of neuroscience, I am sure that this simply can not be demonstrated,

The physical model can not explain the change over from physical brain activity into subjective mental experience.
This is refered to as the thing to thought gap.

The mental model does explain the thing to thought gap with ease, which the physical model can never do.

A physical model can only assert that the brain causes awareness 'somehow' and can never establish how or why certain configurations of matter (brains) produce subjective experience.

We simply can not show how 'simple organic chemicals can produce life' nor can we show how 'complex structures produce subjective experience'

Remember the other day when I kept asking what problem you were trying to solve? This thing-to-thought gap is the problem I think. Or at least it's the one you guys like to bandy about lately like a picture of a kid riding a dinosaur.

But you cannot 'demonstrate' these absolute statements that you're making.

I am making the statements based on my metaphysical position. How, other than by establishing the metaphysical position, could I demonstrate that "there is no way for neuroscience to demonstrate <its erroneous claim>"
It can be shown as a fact upto the current time, if no demonstration has been presented; I think there is no such demonstration.

It's a metaphysical claim about the limits on neuroscience. Its not a claim made from within science about the validity of a model.

So you flat out admit that the problem you think your metaphysics solves so well is a result of your metaphysics.

More than a problem to solve you use it as your 'evidence'.

So your conclusion is your initial assumption.

Nice job.

[Little Idiot]

I would say my understanding of giant pink space bunnies is my imagination.

But the bunnies must be in the BM too. How do you account for the sense error and the space bunnies and the dreams and different perspectives?

The IM is in the BM, the imagination of the IM is in the BM, everything in in BM.
But that doesnt mean my dreams and imagination have any reality outside my own mind.

A sense error is when my representation is not an accurate representation of the WI.

Different perspectives are individual and different representations of WI.

[Little Idiot]

Can you demonstrate this or is this your assumption, belief, prejudice, bald-ass claim?

The fact that I can be so confident about what neroscience can and can not demonstrate is suporting evidence for my model of 'absolute reality'.

Despite my lack of neuroscience, I am sure that this simply can not be demonstrated,

The physical model can not explain the change over from physical brain activity into subjective mental experience.
This is refered to as the thing to thought gap.

The mental model does explain the thing to thought gap with ease, which the physical model can never do.

A physical model can only assert that the brain causes awareness 'somehow' and can never establish how or why certain configurations of matter (brains) produce subjective experience.

We simply can not show how 'simple organic chemicals can produce life' nor can we show how 'complex structures produce subjective experience'

Remember the other day when I kept asking what problem you were trying to solve? This thing-to-thought gap is the problem I think. Or at least it's the one you guys like to bandy about lately like a picture of a kid riding a dinosaur.

But you cannot 'demonstrate' these absolute statements that you're making.

I am making the statements based on my metaphysical position. How, other than by establishing the metaphysical position, could I demonstrate that "there is no way for neuroscience to demonstrate <its erroneous claim>"
It can be shown as a fact upto the current time, if no demonstration has been presented; I think there is no such demonstration.

It's a metaphysical claim about the limits on neuroscience. Its not a claim made from within science about the validity of a model.

So you flat out admit that the problem you think your metaphysics solves so well is a result of your metaphysics.

More than a problem to solve you use it as your 'evidence'.

So your conclusion is your initial assumption.

Nice job.

No, the problem is a problem caused by the erroneous assumptions giving rise to the hypothesis that there is a physical cause for consciousness or that brain activity (object) can be subjective experience.

The fact that this problem has been predicted for many years as a critical flaw in the physicalist model, and that here we are today, still stuck on the same problem, does show evidence in favour of an alternative model.

[SpeedOfSound]

I don't think Little idiot is going to get much out of Penrose's work, at least nothing scientific.

I was hoping he would at least understand Godel and Tarski. That all happens in the first 20 minutes. I am having a great deal of trouble listening to where Penrose goes next with the result.

[SpeedOfSound]

Can you demonstrate this or is this your assumption, belief, prejudice, bald-ass claim?

The fact that I can be so confident about what neroscience can and can not demonstrate is suporting evidence for my model of 'absolute reality'.

Despite my lack of neuroscience, I am sure that this simply can not be demonstrated,

The physical model can not explain the change over from physical brain activity into subjective mental experience.
This is refered to as the thing to thought gap.

The mental model does explain the thing to thought gap with ease, which the physical model can never do.

A physical model can only assert that the brain causes awareness 'somehow' and can never establish how or why certain configurations of matter (brains) produce subjective experience.

We simply can not show how 'simple organic chemicals can produce life' nor can we show how 'complex structures produce subjective experience'

Remember the other day when I kept asking what problem you were trying to solve? This thing-to-thought gap is the problem I think. Or at least it's the one you guys like to bandy about lately like a picture of a kid riding a dinosaur.

But you cannot 'demonstrate' these absolute statements that you're making.

I am making the statements based on my metaphysical position. How, other than by establishing the metaphysical position, could I demonstrate that "there is no way for neuroscience to demonstrate <its erroneous claim>"
It can be shown as a fact upto the current time, if no demonstration has been presented; I think there is no such demonstration.

It's a metaphysical claim about the limits on neuroscience. Its not a claim made from within science about the validity of a model.

So you flat out admit that the problem you think your metaphysics solves so well is a result of your metaphysics.

More than a problem to solve you use it as your 'evidence'.

So your conclusion is your initial assumption.

Nice job.

No, the problem is a problem caused by the erroneous assumptions giving rise to the hypothesis that there is a physical cause for consciousness or that brain activity (object) can be subjective experience.

The fact that this problem has been predicted for many years as a critical flaw in the physicalist model, and that here we are today, still stuck on the same problem, does show evidence in favour of an alternative model.

What are those erroneous assumptions and how can you show them to be so?

Who exactly is still stuck on this problem and what do a bunch of philosophers from the days when we believed in vital life forces and solid matter have to do with our thinking today?

Let's not appeal to authoritI here. Particularly those assholes.

[GrahamH]

Can you demonstrate this or is this your assumption, belief, prejudice, bald-ass claim?

The fact that I can be so confident about what neroscience can and can not demonstrate is suporting evidence for my model of 'absolute reality'.

Despite my lack of neuroscience, I am sure that this simply can not be demonstrated,

The physical model can not explain the change over from physical brain activity into subjective mental experience.
This is refered to as the thing to thought gap.

The mental model does explain the thing to thought gap with ease, which the physical model can never do.

A physical model can only assert that the brain causes awareness 'somehow' and can never establish how or why certain configurations of matter (brains) produce subjective experience.

We simply can not show how 'simple organic chemicals can produce life' nor can we show how 'complex structures produce subjective experience'

Remember the other day when I kept asking what problem you were trying to solve? This thing-to-thought gap is the problem I think. Or at least it's the one you guys like to bandy about lately like a picture of a kid riding a dinosaur.

But you cannot 'demonstrate' these absolute statements that you're making.

I am making the statements based on my metaphysical position. How, other than by establishing the metaphysical position, could I demonstrate that "there is no way for neuroscience to demonstrate <its erroneous claim>"
It can be shown as a fact upto the current time, if no demonstration has been presented; I think there is no such demonstration.

It's a metaphysical claim about the limits on neuroscience. Its not a claim made from within science about the validity of a model.

So you flat out admit that the problem you think your metaphysics solves so well is a result of your metaphysics.

More than a problem to solve you use it as your 'evidence'.

So your conclusion is your initial assumption.

Nice job.

No, the problem is a problem caused by the erroneous assumptions giving rise to the hypothesis that there is a physical cause for consciousness or that brain activity (object) can be subjective experience.

The fact that this problem has been predicted for many years as a critical flaw in the physicalist model, and that here we are today, still stuck on the same problem, does show evidence in favour of an alternative model.

Sos is right, you are guilty as charged. You assume ontological significance for subjectivity and then go on to argue that, because it has a different ontology, it can't be physical. There is no cast-iron argument that shows consciousness must be non-physical. If there were I think you would be using it now, not merely pointing out that neuroscience hasn't account for the whole thing yet.

Does your 'model' account for all the evidence of neurology? Or do you claim it doesn't need to, because "it's all mental"?

[SpeedOfSound]

...
The mental model does explain the thing to thought gap with ease, which the physical model can never do.

But you cannot 'demonstrate' these absolute statements that you're making.

I am making the statements based on my metaphysical position.
How, other than by establishing the metaphysical position, could I demonstrate that "there is no way for neuroscience to demonstrate <its erroneous claim>"
It can be shown as a fact upto the current time, if no demonstration has been presented; I think there is no such demonstration.

It's a metaphysical claim about the limits on neuroscience. Its not a claim made from within science about the validity of a model.

So you flat out admit that the problem you think your metaphysics solves so well is a result of your metaphysics.

More than a problem to solve you use it as your 'evidence'.

So your conclusion is your initial assumption.

Nice job.

No, the problem is a problem caused by the erroneous assumptions giving rise to the hypothesis that there is a physical cause for consciousness or that brain activity (object) can be subjective experience.

The fact that this problem has been predicted for many years as a critical flaw in the physicalist model, and that here we are today, still stuck on the same problem, does show evidence in favour of an alternative model.

Read the large print. You have a metaphysical position. That concludes that 'science can never'. The fact you so derive is what you are calling evidence for your BM-metaphysics.

Circular.

But your metaphysics has no basis. Unless you can show that 'science can never' then you can hardly claim this as evidence.

Most of your mentalism model uses this bit of so called evidence.

[Little Idiot]

...
The mental model does explain the thing to thought gap with ease, which the physical model can never do.

But you cannot 'demonstrate' these absolute statements that you're making.

I am making the statements based on my metaphysical position.
How, other than by establishing the metaphysical position, could I demonstrate that "there is no way for neuroscience to demonstrate <its erroneous claim>"
It can be shown as a fact upto the current time, if no demonstration has been presented; I think there is no such demonstration.

It's a metaphysical claim about the limits on neuroscience. Its not a claim made from within science about the validity of a model.

So you flat out admit that the problem you think your metaphysics solves so well is a result of your metaphysics.

More than a problem to solve you use it as your 'evidence'.

So your conclusion is your initial assumption.

Nice job.

No, the problem is a problem caused by the erroneous assumptions giving rise to the hypothesis that there is a physical cause for consciousness or that brain activity (object) can be subjective experience.

The fact that this problem has been predicted for many years as a critical flaw in the physicalist model, and that here we are today, still stuck on the same problem, does show evidence in favour of an alternative model.

Read the large print. You have a metaphysical position. That concludes that 'science can never'. The fact you so derive is what you are calling evidence for your BM-metaphysics.

Circular.

But your metaphysics has no basis. Unless you can show that 'science can never' then you can hardly claim this as evidence.

Most of your mentalism model uses this bit of so called evidence.

I am not suggesting that it is conclusive evidence, just evidence, exhibit A.

Exhibit A;
For many years idealist thought has suggested that we will never find a phyical cause for consciousness, based on a metaphysical position.
Science has developed far beyond the expectations of the original claimants.
The claim still holds good.

One possible reasonable explaination is that the claim is based on sound metaphysical position.

[SpeedOfSound]

The problem of subjective experience is not a neuroscience problem. NS can and is showing us how we think, feel, enact and use consciousness. How we imagine, how we dream, how we remember. How all those things can go wrong. It is doing a damned good job of demonstrating how neurons do all of this.

The problem of SE is a philosopher's problem. Not a metaphysics problem, a philosopher's.

What philosophy must do is search out the problem's domain. It's assumptions must be looked at. They hardly ever are. The assumptions are always in the opening volley.

NS can however teach us about our assumptions. They are in the way we think and this IS a science problem.

So science CAN inform philosophy. LittleIdiot does it every time he mentions that everything we know about things OUTSIDE our minds are representations.

I offer the same evidence to show that everything we know ABOUT our minds are representations.

Subject to the same skepticism. Though I can show you, I believe, that they we should be even more skeptical about what we think about our minds from introspection.

[SpeedOfSound]

...
The mental model does explain the thing to thought gap with ease, which the physical model can never do.

But you cannot 'demonstrate' these absolute statements that you're making.

I am making the statements based on my metaphysical position.
How, other than by establishing the metaphysical position, could I demonstrate that "there is no way for neuroscience to demonstrate <its erroneous claim>"
It can be shown as a fact upto the current time, if no demonstration has been presented; I think there is no such demonstration.

It's a metaphysical claim about the limits on neuroscience. Its not a claim made from within science about the validity of a model.

So you flat out admit that the problem you think your metaphysics solves so well is a result of your metaphysics.

More than a problem to solve you use it as your 'evidence'.

So your conclusion is your initial assumption.

Nice job.

No, the problem is a problem caused by the erroneous assumptions giving rise to the hypothesis that there is a physical cause for consciousness or that brain activity (object) can be subjective experience.

The fact that this problem has been predicted for many years as a critical flaw in the physicalist model, and that here we are today, still stuck on the same problem, does show evidence in favour of an alternative model.

Read the large print. You have a metaphysical position. That concludes that 'science can never'. The fact you so derive is what you are calling evidence for your BM-metaphysics.

Circular.

But your metaphysics has no basis. Unless you can show that 'science can never' then you can hardly claim this as evidence.

Most of your mentalism model uses this bit of so called evidence.

I am not suggesting that it is conclusive evidence, just evidence, exhibit A.

Exhibit A;
For many years idealist thought has suggested that we will never find a phyical cause for consciousness, based on a metaphysical position.
Science has developed far beyond the expectations of the original claimants.
The claim still holds good.

One possible reasonable explaination is that the claim is based on sound metaphysical position.

Idealist thought is a metaphysical position that has no support. It arose as a result of the mind/body problem. It also uses the mind/body problem as evidence for it's metaphysics.

I toss Exhibit A in the trash as hearsay.

Listen to yourself in the above quote! You are offering the metaphysical position as a reasonable explanation for the metaphysical position!

There is no metaphysical position!