On treeness of Oak1, and other things

[Little Idiot]

This is the traditional position on 'non-duality.'
This is 'that which can not be spoken of.'
This is why Jesus answered Poilots question 'what is reality' with the only answer Pilot could have understood; silence. It was not that Jesus did not know, only that language can not express.

It seems to have been a rhetorical question.
But, supposing truth cannot be expressed in language, what are you attempting to do here, with all these symbols?

Again you validate 'Metaphysics is an error'.

As I pointed out in the rest of the post from which you quote, its the traditional view that language can not fully express absolute reality in positive terms.
But even traditionally we can say what its not. As I said 'neti neti' ' or not this, not this'

[SpeedOfSound]

I dont say we have a new way of knowing.
I do say we have at least one way of knowing which is not based on empirical observation.
I do say Axioms may be true without empirical observations.

Are we OK with that?

Nope. I like when you said it differently above.

I say the knowledge is new, because if that which is not known is made known, then its new knowledge.
Another example of 'new knowledge'; If what is known only implicitly (say as a pile of unproceessed data) then processing and concluding from the data and confirmation of a hypothesis has produced new knowledge that the hypothesis is known to be accurate model rather than thought to be an accurate model.

Not a way of knowing but new knowledge accepted to be correct from data and logic and reason.

[GrahamH]

wiki says
"The first four statements are general statements about equality; in modern treatments these are often considered axioms of pure logic."

Wiki isn't saying that Peno's axioms are the product of pure logic. It is saying that those axioms also serve as axioms for pure logic. I.e. law of identity A=A etc.

[Little Idiot]

Alternative axiom 1. Absolute truth is that everything, including absolute truth, changes
Alternative axiom 2. Existence is change

your axiom 1 is self contradictory, even if we express it as absolute reality.
If axiom 1 does not change, it does not obay axiom 1. Therefore axiom 1 is untrue because the example (axiom 1) contradicts axiom 1 by not changing.
If axiom 1 changes, it is not an axiom. therefore axiom 1 is untrue because it is not a 'true axiom which holds true'.

By the way, welcome to metaphysics.
Enjoy doing metaphysics and establishing knowledge with out empirircal evidence.

We are not 'establishing knowledge', we are 'making up shit'. It is inventing a fantasy world. We define some rules and then write about the world in light of those rules. We can make the rules more or less formal. We can have precise or approximate results. All of it remains fantasy.

If you want to call expertise in the lore of Middle Earth, or Klingon mythology, or the mathematics of 42-dimensional hyper-space-time-spin-oompah, 'knowledge' related to 'absolute reality' that is your affair, but it seems entirely unjustified to me.

Mere consistency of reasoning with a set of arbitrary axioms is not a route to knowledge of reality.

If we apprehend our axioms from observation, such as A=A and 1+1 = 2, then we stand on the rock of empiricism, not metaphysics.

If we can use our powers for gaining knowledge to show what reality can not be, as I did show your alternative axiom 1 to be self contradictory, we can deduce from what is left what reality can be.

Remember, the 'goal' here is only to formulate the highest possible statement about absolute reality possible in human language.
Knowing what it is not is an early step on the way.
If it turns out to be
"absolute reality is not X, Y, Z but it either A or B" then thats it.

However, given this goal, it is an achieveable goal.

[SpeedOfSound]

Alternative axiom 1. Absolute truth is that everything, including absolute truth, changes
Alternative axiom 2. Existence is change

your axiom 1 is self contradictory, even if we express it as absolute reality.
If axiom 1 does not change, it does not obay axiom 1. Therefore axiom 1 is untrue because the example (axiom 1) contradicts axiom 1 by not changing.
If axiom 1 changes, it is not an axiom. therefore axiom 1 is untrue because it is not a 'true axiom which holds true'.

By the way, welcome to metaphysics.
Enjoy doing metaphysics and establishing knowledge with out empirircal evidence.

We are not 'establishing knowledge', we are 'making up shit'. It is inventing a fantasy world. We define some rules and then write about the world in light of those rules. We can make the rules more or less formal. We can have precise or approximate results. All of it remains fantasy.

If you want to call expertise in the lore of Middle Earth, or Klingon mythology, or the mathematics of 42-dimensional hyper-space-time-spin-oompah, 'knowledge' related to 'absolute reality' that is your affair, but it seems entirely unjustified to me.

Mere consistency of reasoning with a set of arbitrary axioms is not a route to knowledge of reality.

If we apprehend our axioms from observation, such as A=A and 1+1 = 2, then we stand on the rock of empiricism, not metaphysics.

If we can use our powers for gaining knowledge to show what reality can not be, as I did show your alternative axiom 1 to be self contradictory, we can deduce from what is left what reality can be.

Remember, the 'goal' here is only to formulate the highest possible statement about absolute reality possible in human language.
Knowing what it is not is an early step on the way.
If it turns out to be
"absolute reality is not X, Y, Z but it either A or B" then thats it.

However, given this goal, it is an achieveable goal.

That would all be good but absolute reality is a bullshit idea. Can't imagine what that would even begin to mean.

[Xamonas Chegwé]

in modern treatments these are often considered axioms of pure logic.

Note the phrase 'often considered'. To me this implies that there are other ways of viewing them, or even that this definition is in dispute. Wiki does not cite provenance for this view or identify these 'modern treatments', so how can you say that this is generally accepted and not a hotly disputed and controversial stance?

Further, do you understand correctly what the article means by 'axioms of pure logic'? It is not made clear in the text. Graham has interpreted it in a completely different way that is also in keeping with the phrase as presented.

Latching onto a phrase in wikipedia that might be read as confirming your POV does not constitute sound reasoning. It should be treated as a stepping off point for deeper investigation.

[SpeedOfSound]

LI.

Check out 19:51 on this video.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f477FnTe1M0

Penrose I suspect is going to make an argument for extra special sauce based on understanding of mathematical truths. But I thought this slide he has up is illustative of our disagreement here.

Goes to Tarski also.

We have R which we accept. The axioms. We must just accept them as true. The new knowledge is G(R) which is deduced. But G(R) cannot be proved using R alone.

You must have reasons outside of R for accepting R. This in our argument would be empirical evidence.

???

[jamest]

Zeno's argument - if correct - would explain 'the paradox', so that it no longer is a paradox - that is correct. Basically, Zeno saw motion as a paradox because he didn't think that it should be mathematically possible, and yet he 'observed' it to be happening. If his reasoning was sound, then the conclusion must be that motion is something beheld by the mind alone - paradox explained.

But, as we now know, his reasoning was unsound.

How do we know that? As I said, I think that the counter has confused conceptual infinities with tangible infinities - considering that any mathematical counter must apply to something definite in order to counter Zeno. There's not much more to be said on this issue, short of starting a new thread about the validity of the paradox itself. I'm not averse to the idea, if anyone's interested.

The thing perceived (a valid logical argument) was not as it appeared. That is the definition of an illusion. The logic was illusory.

Correction: the argument was [arguably] judged to be erroneous. Nevertheless, the argument itself was a real event occuring within the mind that beheld it. The argument can only be right or wrong, but not 'illusionary'. Talking about something as though it were an illusion implies that it isn't really there and never really happended - but the argument is really here and did really happen.

Your certainty that you are right, and thinking rationally, might also be an illusion.

Correction: my thoughts might be wrong. But they are real thoughts nevertheless.

It is the same with your perception of a tree. The processes are happening, whatever they may be. You experience, but the object of that experience, be it a tree or an idea, may be quite different to the way it appears.

Yes - the experience of there being a tree is a real event. The only thing that we cannot be certain of, is whether trees happen outside the mind. Likewise, my thoughts are real events, but it is questionable whether those thoughts apply to 'reality':

1) The experience of the world is not an illusion - that experience is a real event. But we do not know whether our observations apply to 'reality'. (whether trees exist beyond the mind).
2) My thoughts are not illusions - they too are real events. But we do not know whether these thoughts apply to 'reality'.

The only thing to add about 1 & 2, above, is that we know that 'observation' cannot transcend the mind, since all observation is within the mind. However, thoughts have the capacity to transcend what is observed (to speak of 'reality') and are only verifiable if they are sound - observation as a counter is futile.

... That is, Zeno's reasoning - which transcends observation because it speaks of 'reality' (i.e., motion is something that cannot occur in reality beyond the mind) - is something that cannot be refuted with observation. Since it is an argument constructed from reason, only reason can be utilised to deconstruct it.
Back to square one.

[Surendra Darathy]

...establishing knowledge with out empirircal evidence.

Decrypted: Rationalisation for non-falsifiable religious belief. The above statement brings nothing (else) to the table.

This is 'that which can not be spoken of.'

Decrypted: Rationalisation for non-falsifiable religious belief. Nothing more to see here, folks.

It is possible to speak of non-duality in two ways.

A. By not saying anything B. By speaking nonsense. I'm writing this one off to "insensitivity to bullshit".

First, by saying what it is not; the classic 'neti neti' meaning "not this not this".

You're talking a lot, but you're not saying anything. Psycho killer, qu'est-ce que c'est.

Second in limited and very precise positive descriptions.

Coming to a theatre near you. Real soon now.

I do say Axioms may be true without empirical observations.

Thereby encrypting a rationalisation for non-falsifiable religious belief. Done with you real soon now.

...it's the traditional view that language can not fully express absolute reality in positive terms.

Not only that, LI: Language cannot even be used to argue coherently for conceptions of absolute reality. Give it the fuck up.

To recap: Encrypting a rationalisation for non-falsifiable religious belief. Done with you now.

[Surendra Darathy]

Nevertheless, the argument itself was a real event occuring within the mind that beheld it.

Is that it then, James? Why can't you just call a mistake a mistake? This has nothing to do with Zeno's mistake. The only point to be made here is that Zeno's argument was a mistake, and even Zeno knew that it was a mistake. He just didn't know how to fix it. That condition is called "ignorance". We see it on display every day here.

That is, Zeno's reasoning - which transcends observation because it speaks of 'reality' (i.e., motion is something that cannot occur in reality beyond the mind) - is something that cannot be refuted with observation.

Oh, you mean really-o, truly-o "motion". In other words, not only do you postulate really-o, truly-o objects, but that there exist really-o, truly-o relations between them, kind of in the sense of "absolute relativity". Nice one, James. It's a keeper.

[GrahamH]

Alternative axiom 1. Absolute truth is that everything, including absolute truth, changes
Alternative axiom 2. Existence is change

your axiom 1 is self contradictory, even if we express it as absolute reality.
If axiom 1 does not change, it does not obay axiom 1. Therefore axiom 1 is untrue because the example (axiom 1) contradicts axiom 1 by not changing.
If axiom 1 changes, it is not an axiom. therefore axiom 1 is untrue because it is not a 'true axiom which holds true'.

By the way, welcome to metaphysics.
Enjoy doing metaphysics and establishing knowledge with out empirircal evidence.

We are not 'establishing knowledge', we are 'making up shit'. It is inventing a fantasy world. We define some rules and then write about the world in light of those rules. We can make the rules more or less formal. We can have precise or approximate results. All of it remains fantasy.

If you want to call expertise in the lore of Middle Earth, or Klingon mythology, or the mathematics of 42-dimensional hyper-space-time-spin-oompah, 'knowledge' related to 'absolute reality' that is your affair, but it seems entirely unjustified to me.

Mere consistency of reasoning with a set of arbitrary axioms is not a route to knowledge of reality.

If we apprehend our axioms from observation, such as A=A and 1+1 = 2, then we stand on the rock of empiricism, not metaphysics.

If we can use our powers for gaining knowledge to show what reality can not be, as I did show your alternative axiom 1 to be self contradictory, we can deduce from what is left what reality can be.

Remember, the 'goal' here is only to formulate the highest possible statement about absolute reality possible in human language.
Knowing what it is not is an early step on the way.
If it turns out to be
"absolute reality is not X, Y, Z but it either A or B" then thats it.

However, given this goal, it is an achieveable goal.

You have already said you don't consider that logic applies to reality and the logic which does apply within existence. Since you exist and apply logic (sometimes erroneously) you are not making any reference to reality in doing so, by your own axioms!

Saying what something is not could play a role in finding out what it is, if what remains is known. I could say 'An oglifrack is not as small as a mouse'. Since that leaves known possible sizes larger than a mouse I may have said something about oglifracks. If also say 'oglifracks have no size' then the two statements together, while being logically consistent, say nothing about oglifracks.[edit]If also say 'oglifracks have no size' then the two statements are logically consistent but the first stamenent says nothing about oglifracks[/edit].

[Surendra Darathy]

I could say 'An oglifrack is not as small as a mouse'. Since that leaves known possible sizes larger than a mouse I may have said something about oglifracks. If also say 'oglifracks have no size' then the two statements together, while being logically consistent, say nothing about oglifracks.

Nonsense. Oglifracks are not as spooberous as phrasto-mycelitic bronads.

Phrasto-mycelitic bronads glepulate sleeningly.

All you can really say about oglifracks vis-a-vis mice is that an oglifrack is not the same size as a mouse. It's about like saying "size matters".

[GrahamH]

I could say 'An oglifrack is not as small as a mouse'. Since that leaves known possible sizes larger than a mouse I may have said something about oglifracks. If also say 'oglifracks have no size' then the two statements together, while being logically consistent, say nothing about oglifracks.

Nonsense. Oglifracks are not as spooberous as phrasto-mycelitic bronads.

Phrasto-mycelitic bronads glepulate sleeningly.

Is that an axiom?
A1. Phrasto-mycelitic bronads glepulate sleeningly.

Then you must have great knowledge of phrasto-mycelitic bronads.

[Surendra Darathy]

I could say 'An oglifrack is not as small as a mouse'. Since that leaves known possible sizes larger than a mouse I may have said something about oglifracks. If also say 'oglifracks have no size' then the two statements together, while being logically consistent, say nothing about oglifracks.

Nonsense. Oglifracks are not as spooberous as phrasto-mycelitic bronads.

Phrasto-mycelitic bronads glepulate sleeningly.

Is that an axiom?
A1. Phrasto-mycelitic bronads glepulate sleeningly.

Then you must have great knowledge of phrasto-mycelitic bronads.

A2: No entity that glepulates sleeningly can blurnify.

C: Phrasto-mycelitic bronads can not blurnify.

Wrong! How many times to I have to say this? Phrasto-mycelitic bronads are not entities.

It's difficult to say what they are. Metaphysically, I mean.

cf., "Thunderstorms dissipate." So does consciousnessness.

[jamest]

The only point to be made here is that Zeno's argument was a mistake

The point I have made - which was a valid one - you ignored. You're quite adept at ignoring my relevant points, aren't you?

Also, in the post you cite, I threw down the gauntlet to anyone who thinks that Zeno has been refuted. Feel free to start a thread about it and I'll bring over my knife and fork.