On treeness of Oak1, and other things

[SpeedOfSound]

But I'm not sure how you have eliminated the observer, or how you can reconcile that with necessarily having a subjective viewpoint, unless I've missed something?

It is a deeper discussion to eliminate the observer. We should get to it soon. Maybe I'll wind this post around to it.

I am hoping that the idea of R1 is taking on a little meaning. It's like a set of blocks piled up just so. Or a house of cards. As long as a wind does not come along it looks pretty solid. (FUWF-you be a fucking wind)

But let me boringly bore further into it. Say the idea of free will is an R1 truth. We all know it is. All of us have been willing freely since birth. But if we take a look under the hood with R2 we can't find anything except bad news about free will. Philosophers can have at it and load garbage trucks with good and bad news about it. But no one seems to be able to agree about what the damned thing is.

In R1 we all agree. 'Shucks, I know what that thang is'. But if we ask too many questions we are in trouble.

So in what ways are we warranted to look under the hood at R1 concepts? What is our basis?

[SpeedOfSound]

SO. Mr Idiot. Here is where I mount my attack. I crouch. I wait. I am feeling pure evil silkily course my veins...

[Little Idiot]

I don't have all day so I'm cross-posting from another forum with edits.

Science doesn't imply materialism.

Phew! Finally. I seem to recall saying that like, for ever...

At least not the dogmatic kind that insists on deep substance realities. Neuroscience going after the mind and consciousness does not require that we have some belief about what the result will be. Not even a belief that mind is brain is needed. It took me two years on RDF to begin to straighten some of this out with myself.

Would you agree, its the dominant view of neuroscience?
I agree it is not an essential view, and as I have said previously I expect neuroscience will eventually change its position on this.

But I'm not going to replace a die hard naive materialism with some other imaginings about mind. If I need a model I have one in the science. As soon as something about my mind or others fails to make sense in the biochemical model I will be apologizing to y'all and Chalmers and Penrose and Hammerhead.

I see what I call R1 as the default position of humans. Common sense materialism. We all believe it but we don't all necessarily believe in it.We live our lives according to this model. I call R2 and extension into science of that model.

In R1, the common sense, there is a lot of belief about mind. It's a working belief, like with the material. Things like free will and intent and even ideas about belief. If you keep these things in their common cloth they are highly reliable.

But they have a dualism about them. I insist that this is a convenience and not a problem. Unless we make it one. Anything in R1 can become a problem if you ask too many questions. If you start using it's common cloth to make premise for reasoning about the True nature of things you get trouble. The words start to melt and evaporate by heat of effort to define them.

Thats true, we have our basic ideas of mind in our common sense understanding (R1) and would have a dualistic concpt of 'mind and matter.' But just as common sense ideas of matter dont stand as evidence against physicalism, I dont think its fair to suggest common sense ideas of mind can stand as evidence against idealism, do you?

What I have seen of mentalism and idealism is that it is a rather naive effort to make sense out of the issues we get to when we try and make common sense of consciousness. I call it all into question.

I presume you agree that there is a physical world which we experience.
This means we have some kind of existence, and that there is experience, and that we partake in the experience; i.e we are the experiencer, or observer.
To say there is no observer, seem to me to run counter to "there is a physical world which we experience." This really does need explaining.

Basically idealism just accepts that there is experience, but does not accept the content of the experience is as it appeard to be, since I think we cant accept direct realism this is a very solid starting point. We need, from this premise to consider the nature of the oberver, and the nature of the observed.
But where do you start from, if there is no observer, then there is no observed, there is no observation, what is there?

[SpeedOfSound]

Science doesn't imply materialism. At least not the dogmatic kind that insists on deep substance realities.

Phew! Finally. I seem to recall saying that like, for ever...

At least not the dogmatic kind that insists on deep substance realities. Neuroscience going after the mind and consciousness does not require that we have some belief about what the result will be. Not even a belief that mind is brain is needed. It took me two years on RDF to begin to straighten some of this out with myself.

Would you agree, its the dominant view of neuroscience?
I agree it is not an essential view, and as I have said previously I expect neuroscience will eventually change its position on this.

There I fixed that for you. Quoting me out of context will get us nowhere.

The dominant view of neuroscience is not metaphysical. We are accused of it because most of us think that we will explain everything there is about our minds though science at the biochemical level. Explain, not prove absolute truths.

We are accused of a backing of metaphysical materialism just because we refuse to entertain any woo when we have not yet exhausted R2 methodology. The other reason for the refusal is that as of this time no other methodology has been found to have any basis.

I go one further and tell you that for my own personal beeleef system that I have explained, to myself, everything I need to explain about my mind and consciousness. I have solved my personal hard problem.

But that ain't science either. It does however make me highly skeptical of anyone offering ideas from outside biochemical neuroscience. Skeptical but not close minded. I look closely at people like JackHammeroff. Looking for clues....

[SpeedOfSound]

Thats true, we have our basic ideas of mind in our common sense understanding (R1) and would have a dualistic concpt of 'mind and matter.' But just as common sense ideas of matter dont stand as evidence against physicalism,

I dont think its fair to suggest common sense ideas of mind can stand as evidence against idealism, do you?

I agree. It is not evidence against idealism, But the common sense idea certainly IS NOT idealism. If you graph the number of idealists against age you will get a graph with very few idealists at the lower age intervals.

Come to think of it the graph may correlate idealism to senility with some accuracy.

[SpeedOfSound]

I presume you agree that there is a physical world which we experience.
This means we have some kind of existence, and that there is experience, and that we partake in the experience; i.e we are the experiencer, or observer.
To say there is no observer, seem to me to run counter to "there is a physical world which we experience." This really does need explaining.

Basically idealism just accepts that there is experience, but does not accept the content of the experience is as it appeard to be, since I think we cant accept direct realism this is a very solid starting point. We need, from this premise to consider the nature of the oberver, and the nature of the observed.
But where do you start from, if there is no observer, then there is no observed, there is no observation, what is there?

In R1 I will talk of observers. It make common sense for humans to talk like this.

In R2 we can't find one. Don't require one. It's talking like a sausage to say that there is one.

[SpeedOfSound]

as I have said previously I expect neuroscience will eventually change its position on this.

what do you think are the things that are going to change their minds?

What problem are you solving here?

[Little Idiot]

as I have said previously I expect neuroscience will eventually change its position on this.

what do you think are the things that are going to change their minds?

What problem are you solving here?

(Working backwards though the posts, I didnt miss the early ones)

I dont say I am solving any problem; I am making a prediction.
I say it is correct for neuroscience to delve deep into the questions, because thats what science does. It would only become wrong when all avenues are explored, still no solution is found, but if other models are still rejected.

[Little Idiot]

I presume you agree that there is a physical world which we experience.
This means we have some kind of existence, and that there is experience, and that we partake in the experience; i.e we are the experiencer, or observer.
To say there is no observer, seem to me to run counter to "there is a physical world which we experience." This really does need explaining.

Basically idealism just accepts that there is experience, but does not accept the content of the experience is as it appeard to be, since I think we cant accept direct realism this is a very solid starting point. We need, from this premise to consider the nature of the oberver, and the nature of the observed.
But where do you start from, if there is no observer, then there is no observed, there is no observation, what is there?

In R1 I will talk of observers. It make common sense for humans to talk like this.

In R2 we can't find one. Don't require one. It's talking like a sausage to say that there is one.

In R1 we each are the observer of our experience.
In R2, we cant find an observer simply because the observer is not an object that can be found. Simply because you cant make the observer (which is a subject) into an object proves only that its not an object, it does not prove it is not a subject. Do you agree?
The very deep basis of the self is impermanent, and on the level of 'ultimate reality' it is illusion, but only on that level. On the level of experience, at the time of the experience it has the same level of reality as the experience. It is impossible to ascribe reality to the experienced, but not experience or experience-er. If you dismiss one, you dismiss all. I can work with either case (all are existent, or all are illusion) but I fail to understand how you can dismiss the observer but not the observed; on a fundamental first principle level, if there is no observer, there is no observation therefore no observed to ascribe reality to.

In summary;
As I said, the inability to make the subject an object (required to 'find it') proves only that it is not an object, but does not prove it is not a subject.
Without a subject to know our experiences, how can we know of the objects and grant that we know of their existence?

[Little Idiot]

Thats true, we have our basic ideas of mind in our common sense understanding (R1) and would have a dualistic concpt of 'mind and matter.' But just as common sense ideas of matter dont stand as evidence against physicalism,

I dont think its fair to suggest common sense ideas of mind can stand as evidence against idealism, do you?

I agree. It is not evidence against idealism, But the common sense idea certainly IS NOT idealism. If you graph the number of idealists against age you will get a graph with very few idealists at the lower age intervals.

Come to think of it the graph may correlate idealism to senility with some accuracy.

There are very few young idealists because we all start off an naeive materialists. Some of us stay at that level, others move into a more considered view of materialism or physicalism. But isnt it fair to say the physicalism premise - that there is a physical world and all things can be explained by science in terms of the physical world - is still an assumption based on the naeive materialism?
Some of us move past the sophisticated materialism view, and end up with various views which we may call for sake of argument 'im-materialism' The physical world we experience is only apparent, and is not actually 'real' - Oh its real enough in our experience; we (most of us, the ones who live more than a few hours after this realization) still move away from speeding busses and walk on the ground not the clouds. But we sense, experience, or reason our way past the experience of the world and deduce the physical experience does not resemble the actual nature of the origin of our experience. We may conclude 'its all mental' or 'its all dream' or 'its all data' but we know for sure things are not what they seem to be.

Such a position takes more than copying your parents to figure out, and is not seen amongst the young because it is a product of widsom, not of experience.

[Little Idiot]

Science doesn't imply materialism. At least not the dogmatic kind that insists on deep substance realities.

Phew! Finally. I seem to recall saying that like, for ever...

At least not the dogmatic kind that insists on deep substance realities. Neuroscience going after the mind and consciousness does not require that we have some belief about what the result will be. Not even a belief that mind is brain is needed. It took me two years on RDF to begin to straighten some of this out with myself.

Would you agree, its the dominant view of neuroscience?
I agree it is not an essential view, and as I have said previously I expect neuroscience will eventually change its position on this.

There I fixed that for you. Quoting me out of context will get us nowhere.

Ah, silly me there I go assuming a full stop is the end of a sentence again
Science, IMHO, doesnt imply or demonstrate or prove any kind of materialism.

The dominant view of neuroscience is not metaphysical. We are accused of it because most of us think that we will explain everything there is about our minds though science at the biochemical level. Explain, not prove absolute truths.

This is exactly why you are accused of it, because you believe it; its a metaphysical position, even if its not consciously adopted by metaphysical method. Metaphysics is the study of other things beside absolutes.

We are accused of a backing of metaphysical materialism just because we refuse to entertain any woo when we have not yet exhausted R2 methodology. The other reason for the refusal is that as of this time no other methodology has been found to have any basis.

One thing I would add, most neuroscientists possibly are (assuming they are scienists alone, and not philosophers too - and not withstanding generalzation is a terible thing) assuming a mind body dualism; would that be fair?

I go one further and tell you that for my own personal beeleef system that I have explained, to myself, everything I need to explain about my mind and consciousness. I have solved my personal hard problem.

But that ain't science either. It does however make me highly skeptical of anyone offering ideas from outside biochemical neuroscience. Skeptical but not close minded. I look closely at people like JackHammeroff. Looking for clues....

The only trouble we find with explaining to ourself, other people never quite understand

[Little Idiot]

But I'm not sure how you have eliminated the observer, or how you can reconcile that with necessarily having a subjective viewpoint, unless I've missed something?

It is a deeper discussion to eliminate the observer. We should get to it soon. Maybe I'll wind this post around to it.

It is a discussion we should definatly follow through.
I have no tricks up my sleeve on this one; I simply dont see how we can get rid of the observer and keep the observed (ie physical world). I am willing to learn though.

I am hoping that the idea of R1 is taking on a little meaning. It's like a set of blocks piled up just so. Or a house of cards. As long as a wind does come along it looks pretty solid. (FUWF-you be a fucking wind)

But let me boringly bore further into it. Say the idea of free will is an R1 truth. We all know it is. All of us have been willing freely since birth. But if we take a look under the hood with R2 we can't find anything except bad news about free will. Philosophers can have at it and load garbage trucks with good and bad news about it. But no one seems to be able to agree about what the damned things is.

In R1 we all agree. 'Shucks, I know what that thang is'. But if we ask too many questions we are in trouble.

So in what ways are we warranted to look under the hood at R1 concepts? What is our basis?

As I understand your R1, the point is we dont look under the hood, doing so moves us into R2.
When we start to investigate our world deeply, we are starting to do science, or philosophy.

[Little Idiot]

SO. Mr Idiot. Here is where I mount my attack. I crouch. I wait. I am feeling pure evil silkily course my veins...

My high, ivory walls are proof against your attack.
Come! Tire yourself with beating on my walls, then, as you look up - blinded by sunlight - I will throw down a rope of clear understanding which will calm the fire in your blood, and put peace in your heart. I will lift you from the swap of ignorance into the light of understanding!

[SpeedOfSound]

We may conclude 'its all mental' or 'its all dream' or 'its all data' but we know for sure things are not what they seem to be.

Such a position takes more than copying your parents to figure out, and is not seen amongst the young because it is a product of widsom, not of experience.

God fucking forbid that my children should end up catching a case of this wisdom thing. 29 years and so far they are still healthy. Knock on wood.

[SpeedOfSound]

The dominant view of neuroscience is not metaphysical. We are accused of it because most of us think that we will explain everything there is about our minds though science at the biochemical level. Explain, not prove absolute truths.

This is exactly why you are accused of it, because you believe it; its a metaphysical position, even if its not consciously adopted by metaphysical method. Metaphysics is the study of other things beside absolutes.

We are accused of a backing of metaphysical materialism just because we refuse to entertain any woo when we have not yet exhausted R2 methodology. The other reason for the refusal is that as of this time no other methodology has been found to have any basis.

I don't quite see where I am 'doing metaphysics' because I have an opinion that R2 will or does adequately explain everything we need to know about mind. Having an opinion is not metaphysics unless 7 billion people are metaphysicians.

So you must be accusing me of being an unconscious metaphysics practitioner? I just calling it being skeptical about woo and looking at the evidence.

One thing I would add, most neuroscientists possibly are ...assuming a mind body dualism; would that be fair?

No! Never! Why would they need to? It's your own inability to understand your own mind that makes you such a dualist. You project it onto everyone else who doesn't accept your R1 ideas about the mind and your metaphysical solution with idealism. Which of course is your proposed escape from dualism.

YOU have a dualistic way of looking at mind and body.
YOU have come up with an intuitive solution to solve YOUR problem.

I am reading about evidence and finding solutions to the nature of the mind. I simply have the opinion that we know most of what we need to know already. My additional opinion is that further evidence will illuminate the entire nature of mind.