Human, All-Too-Human

[Comte de Saint-Germain]

A continuation and departure from - perhaps a synthesis of - the metaphysics as an error thread. I won't object to discussion of what has been problematically described the 'impossibility of metaphysics' (it should be 'the impossibility of a satisfactory substantiation of metaphysical theory' - it's not that theology is impossible (rather, that it is impossible to provide argumentation for its key assumptions). Admittedly, in a certain sense one may say that theology is impossible, since there is no established subject to discuss, and in the same sense metaphysics may be called impossible - but these are largely semantic issues.

The largest part of history saw philosophy separated into two groups. Rationalists and Empiricists. The basic disagreement concerned about the reliability of different categories of information. Although philosophy has become more complex since then, science itself is a sort of synthesis, my main point in this thread is that both are right and wrong. They are right in their scepticism towards the other side, but wrong in their trust in their own.

I have claimed and defended the relativity of human knowledge, arguing that all statements - including moral statements - are made within the context of a human, all-too-human ratio. Included is a defence of what I call Metaphysics as an error. Included below that are two excerpts from Nietzsche, which states much the same as I do.

Now, synthesising these two we arrive at what I think of as a highly parsimonious view of the epistemic possibilities of mankind. That should not suggest, however, that I have made man impotent. First and foremost, the project of science is possible and meaningful. It seeks to explore not some temporary realm that speaks to the mind of God, nor does it describe some absolute 'Reality' behind the veil, ineptly and only with verisimilitude, rather it provides a reliable framework that structures, constructs and predicts empirical reality. The reality we live in, the world we live in, it is constructed most reliably by science.
It is not possible to say that science is true - but where science is done, journals, no one makes this assertion anyway. Yes, there are alternatives, but these will be weighed according to their 'discursive requirements', roughly 'what it takes to be part of this system of knowledge'. In the case of theology, largely some claims made from authority and circular reasoning. When matched with science, they get vastly different results, and theology is no contest for the reliability of science.
This is to say, the absence of absolute criteria does not mean that criteria are not possible, or that this won't have consequences for consistency. Realistically speaking, no one argues against science or evolutionary theory consistently, meaning they can be pretty much written off as philosophically uninteresting.
What remains are artistic perspectives, which do not so much offer a competitive as an alternative or interpretative mode of understanding to science.

What we are left with is a world we can understand with highly reliable tools, interpret using the whole breadth of artistic imagination. Admittedly, we can't say that 'this world exists', but one I've spoken to has been able to prose any means by which we are supposed to understand what that words means in its metaphysical, philosophical setting.

It is therefore my contention that in this philosophy - that I have taken for myself - it is possible to live life, quite comfortably, and that any seeming restrictions in practical or theoretical application are non-restrictions - similar to those that supposedly happen when rejecting God. A discarding of moral truth, in essence, a discarding of black and white thinking does not lead to moral doubt in action, it leads to nuance, subtlety and commitment to reality.

Metaphysics as an error

What does it mean to say "Metaphysics is an error"? It means to ask the question "What do we mean when we say this or that exists?" and to find the answers we find in philosophy and outside unsatisfactory. It is not a profession of faith that metaphysics is impossible, but rather a profound scepticism, a lack of affiliation with any one claim that states it holds the answer to the question what 'existence' means.
Why is this scepticism? Why is this criticism? Because it surpasses being a simple contrarian. One must first understand metaphysics, what has been proposed under the banner of metaphysics before one can find it unsatisfactory, and it is criticism, because it demolishes an important concept, whilst providing a new, more subtle, more elevated value.

Beside this, it is important to note that not existence is an error, but metaphysics. The critique, and the scepticism, is not directed at the word existence, which in the human language can fluctuate from denoting the problematic metaphysical keystone to some precisely defined scientific state. We could easily imagine that 'existence' is defined as 'measurable'. In that case, the word escapes the critique, but metaphysics does not. One is immediately warned, however, that such business of defining often is committed in the area of equivocation, where on one side, existence has a metaphysical face, and on the other side, it is this highly defined scientific state of measurability.
This, clearly can not stand. Unless there is some evidence or argument to demonstrate that measurability has any metaphysical implications, then clearly, such an equivocation is unwarranted and can not - as of yet - be accepted. One observes, this criticism and the scepticism is dipped in knowledge, not ignorance of metaphysical theories.

It should immediately become clear that the essential problem here is 'satisfactory'. Some people might argue that the evidence and argument has been satisfactorily provided for the existence of God. Similarly, we can expect people to state that evidence and arguments have been satisfactorily provided that existence itself makes any sense. The question of God is related to that of existence, of course, and to be sceptical of existence means to be sceptical of God specifically as well.
What does this mean? It means that if metaphysics is removed, one is only left with the 'apparent' world, the empirical world - what may now be called the real world. It means that if there is to be any room for God, it is as an empirical concept, not as some supra-empirical concept.

The argument here enters its most difficult stage. Not that it is difficult in itself, but because people seem unwilling to keep to the argument. It seems so obvious to many people that all things must be caused (even though a causal relationship is used with reliability in the empirical world, and there's no reason to believe that its usage in metaphysics is valid) that empirical reality must be caused by 'something else', and that this something else must be of some quality that is metaphysical. The idea that one should refrain from speaking of such things is seen to be as cowardice, precisely because it is assumed that 'there is something out there'. The extension, the implication is that there is something to be described, even when it might be unknowable.
The point is, however, that the methods not of getting to metaphysics, but the methods of coming to the idea of metaphysics, the methods by which one makes the assumption that there is something that can be covered by the term existence are suspect. This, of course, is highly problematic, not in the least because it is apparently assumed that denying the existence of the sun would mean to deny the sun as an empirical phenomenon, when nothing like that is intended. The sun is empirical and can be measured, but the idea that it is caused by some 'metaphysical sun', some 'thing-in-itself', this idea comes with suspect methods. That is to say, methods that have never been successfully argued for or provided evidence for.

What do we end up with? We end up with the four great problems of Metaphysics. One, that metaphysical content - the concept of thing-in-itself - has no argument or evidence going for it. We have no way of measuring 'reliability' within metaphysics, or what that would mean. Within the empirical world, science is the most reliable tool for measurement. Reliable simply means that it (often) makes accurate predictions. However, the empirical world is a construct of predictions, so even the world 'reliable' CAN NOT be used in reference to metaphysics. We'll get to that later.
The second great problem of metaphysics is the problem of the possibility of Metaphysics. It is conceivable (leaving alone possible) that we have evidence and arguments that metaphysics is possible, but that we simply have none for specific content. Meaning that there is something ineffable that we ineptly express with 'existence' when used metaphysically, but that it still denotes something. For this, no evidence or argument has ever been posited. No philosopher hitherto has seen fit to explore this issue.
Third, there are very great doubts whether it is possible to mount an argument or evidence for either of the above problems. This means, the third great problem of metaphysics is that there is no reason to believe that we are able to ever do metaphysics. This means, put simply, that there is no basis on which to assume that either arguments or evidence, respectively, ratio or senses, are capable of providing the sort of information that would qualify as evidence of the possibility of metaphysics. Quite clearly, metaphysical content is not empirical, and we have no evidence or argument to believe that our minds are capable of anything beyond rudimentary problem solving.
Fourth is a problem of linguistics. Earlier the observation was made that 'reliable' is a concept rooted in empiricism. There's no reason to believe that in metaphysics, concepts/words from empiricism will still work. Take, per example, the term 'causality'. Within empiricism, it denotes a relationship between two events. Namely, that the occurrence of one event necessitates the other. If event A, then event B. There's no reason to believe that this idea applies to metaphysics. The idea that 'the empirical world must be caused', per example, is assuming that causality applies outside of the empirical world. There is no argument or evidence for this. Put short, it is assumed that a domain-specific concept can be used as domain-general. Again, sans evidence, and sans argument.

Two excerpts from Nietzsche

There are still harmless self-observers who believe that there are “immediate certainties”; for example, “I think,” or as the superstition of Schopenhauer put it, “I will”; as though knowledge here got hold of its object purely and nakedly as “the thing in it self,” without any falsification on the part of either the subject or the object. But that “immediate certainty,” as well as “absolute knowledge” and the “thing in itself,” involve a contradictio in adjecto. I shall repeat a hundred times; we really ought to free ourselves from the seduction of words! Let the people suppose that knowledge means knowing things entirely; the philosopher must say to himself: “When I analyze the process that is expressed in this sentence, ‘I think,’ I find a whole series of daring assertions that would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to prove—for example, that it is I who think, that there must necessarily be something that thinks, that thinking is an activity and operation on the part of a being who is thought of as a cause, that there is an ‘ego,’ and, finally, that it is already determined what is to be designated by thinking—that I know what thinking is. For if I had not already decided within myself what it is, by what standard could I determine whether that which is just happening is not perhaps ‘willing’ or ‘feeling’? In short, the assertion ‘I think’ assumes that I compare my state at the present moment with other states of myself which I know, in order to determine what it is; on account of this retrospective connection with further ‘knowledge,’ it has, at any rate, no immediate certainty for me.”— In place of the “immediate certainty” in which the people may believe in the case at hand, the philosopher thus finds a series of metaphysical questions presented to him, truly searching questions of the intellect; to wit: “From where do I get the concept of thinking? Why do I believe in cause and effect? What gives me the right to speak of an ego, and even of an ego as cause, and finally of an ego as the cause of thought?” Whoever ventures to answer these metaphysical questions at once by an appeal to a sort of intuitive perception, like the person who says, “I think, and know that this, at least, is true, actual, and certain”—will encounter a smile and two question marks from a philosopher nowadays. “Sir,” the philosopher will perhaps give him to understand, “it is improbable that you are not mistaken; but why insist on the truth?”

History of an error

1. The true world -- unattainable but for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man; he lives in it, he is it.

(The oldest form of the idea, relatively sensible, simple and persuasive. A circumlocution for the sentence, "I, Plato, am the truth.")

2. The true world -- unattainable for now, but promised for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man ("for the sinner who repents").

(Progress of the idea: it becomes more subtle, insidious, incomprehensible -- it becomes female, it becomes Christian.)

3. The true world -- unattainable, indemonstrable, unpromisable; but the very thought of it -- a consolidation, an obligation, an imperative.

(At bottom, the old sun, but seen through mist and skepticism. The idea has become elusive, pale, Nordic, Konigsbergian)

4. The true world -- unattainable? At any rate, unattained, and being unattained, also unknown. Consequently, not consoling, redeeming, or obligating: how could something unknown obligate us?

(Gray morning, The first yawn of reason. The cockcrow of positivism)

5. The "true" world -- an idea which is no longer good for anything, not even obligating -- an idea which has become useless and superfluous -- consequently a refuted idea: let us abolish it!

(Bright day; breakfast: return of bon sens and cheer-fulness; Plato's embarrassed blush; pandemonium of all free spirits.)

6. The true world -- we have abolished. What world has remained? The apparent one perhaps? But no! With the true world we also have abolished the apparent one.

(Noon: moment of the briefest shadow; end of the longest error; high point of humanity; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.')

[Animavore]

Well written post and nothing there I can find to disagree with.
Just wondering which books the quotes are from. I'm thinking Twilight of the Idols for the second one, the first too perhaps (that reminds me I must get my Neitzsche books back, I gave them out to people and no one seems to appreciate them).

[Comte de Saint-Germain]

The first is from beyond good and evil, section 16 - you are correct about the second, yes.

[Surendra Darathy]

As expected, a well-written and incisive exposition. On initial reading, I found nothing that prompted a response, which is only an indication either of deficiencies in my own thinking (better: reading) or of how great minds think alike.

The best part is that it reads like an invitation instead of like a prescription.

[jamest]

it's not that theology is impossible (rather, that it is impossible to provide argumentation for its key assumptions). Admittedly, in a certain sense one may say that theology is impossible, since there is no established subject to discuss, and in the same sense metaphysics may be called impossible - but these are largely semantic issues.

Well, that is the crux of the debate - whether one can establish 'a subject' upon which metaphysics can be grounded. That is, whether one can establish there being 'something' that itself is distinct to any thing within the empirical realm.

I have claimed and defended the relativity of human knowledge, arguing that all statements - including moral statements - are made within the context of a human, all-too-human ratio.

Implicit in this claim is that 'we' ARE essentially 'human'. That is, you impose an ontology upon us, about 'us', in order to expose the limitations of our reasoning. Of course, this ontology is unfounded. Notwithstanding that, your position forbids you from having an ontology.
The claim about 'us' being "all too human", is begging the question and cannot be used in defence of your own philosophical position... nor as a basis for being sceptical about the possibility of metaphysics.

Now, synthesising these two we arrive at what I think of as a highly parsimonious view of the epistemic possibilities of mankind. That should not suggest, however, that I have made man impotent. First and foremost, the project of science is possible and meaningful. It seeks to explore not some temporary realm that speaks to the mind of God, nor does it describe some absolute 'Reality' behind the veil, ineptly and only with verisimilitude, rather it provides a reliable framework that structures, constructs and predicts empirical reality. The reality we live in, the world we live in, it is constructed most reliably by science.

I only object to the highlighted part of this statement. Again, an ontology about 'us' is implied, because you place us solely within empirical reality - you have us down, solely, as nought but empirical beings. Another case of begging the question, of course, since what we are is clearly open to debate. And, again, your position entails that you cannot employ an ontology in defence of your position... nor as a reason to be sceptical about [other] ontologies.

It is not possible to say that science is true - but where science is done, journals, no one makes this assertion anyway. Yes, there are alternatives, but these will be weighed according to their 'discursive requirements', roughly 'what it takes to be part of this system of knowledge'. In the case of theology, largely some claims made from authority and circular reasoning. When matched with science, they get vastly different results, and theology is no contest for the reliability of science.

It should be noted that if 'theology' is established upon God ("that it is impossible to provide argumentation for its key assumptions", as you say in the first paragraph) then theology should be distinguished from philosophical arguments for God, since God is established within the argument. That is, the former is established upon God, whilst the latter establishes God. Please bear that in mind.

What we are left with is a world we can understand with highly reliable tools, interpret using the whole breadth of artistic imagination. Admittedly, we can't say that 'this world exists', but one I've spoken to has been able to prose any means by which we are supposed to understand what that words means in its metaphysical, philosophical setting.

Ask yourself why we cannot say that the world exists. The only possible answer, is that the world might not be what it appears to be. What other reason to doubt its existence, could there be?
The word 'existence' would relate to a subject that has attributes that are more than apparent. That is, we cannot say for sure whether the world exists, because we do not know for sure whether the attributes of the 'things' that we see are definite, or mere products of appearance. Thus, the word 'existence' can have a definite meaning, metaphysically.

It is therefore my contention that in this philosophy - that I have taken for myself - it is possible to live life, quite comfortably, and that any seeming restrictions in practical or theoretical application are non-restrictions - similar to those that supposedly happen when rejecting God. A discarding of moral truth, in essence, a discarding of black and white thinking does not lead to moral doubt in action, it leads to nuance, subtlety and commitment to reality.

One can live amidst the world, comfortably, without ever having had any interest in philosophy. What you say isn't really relevant.

Metaphysics as an error

What does it mean to say "Metaphysics is an error"? It means to ask the question "What do we mean when we say this or that exists?" and to find the answers we find in philosophy and outside unsatisfactory. It is not a profession of faith that metaphysics is impossible, but rather a profound scepticism, a lack of affiliation with any one claim that states it holds the answer to the question what 'existence' means.

Again, my own perspective facilitates a significance and a meaning for 'existence'. That significance and meaning hinges upon the distinction between the apparency of attributes [of being], as opposed to definite attributes of being.

We could easily imagine that 'existence' is defined as 'measurable'. In that case, the word escapes the critique, but metaphysics does not. One is immediately warned, however, that such business of defining often is committed in the area of equivocation, where on one side, existence has a metaphysical face, and on the other side, it is this highly defined scientific state of measurability.
This, clearly can not stand. Unless there is some evidence or argument to demonstrate that measurability has any metaphysical implications, then clearly, such an equivocation is unwarranted and can not - as of yet - be accepted.

What is 'it' to measure, other than to assign attributes to something? Whether it is possible to assign attributes to 'existence' has yet to be established. But note that such an endeavour would entail providing metaphysical conclusions, as opposed to providing a grounds for metaphysics. That is, one should distinguish between proving a grounds for metaphysics, and actually doing metaphysics (and providing metaphysical facts).

The argument here enters its most difficult stage. Not that it is difficult in itself, but because people seem unwilling to keep to the argument. It seems so obvious to many people that all things must be caused (even though a causal relationship is used with reliability in the empirical world, and there's no reason to believe that its usage in metaphysics is valid)

That all depends upon whether the appearance of the world reduces to 'a subject' that exists and CAUSES those appearances. As I have said, the existence of the world can only be in doubt if that world is reducible to mere appearance. And since all merely apparent objects have to be causally impotent (cartoon characters don't really cause any event to happen in a cartoon, for example - it just appears that they do), then any causality associated with said domain would have to emanate from beyond that domain.
In other words, your claim that 'causality' is a concept entirely grounded within the world, is very much in doubt.

The sun is empirical and can be measured, but the idea that it is caused by some 'metaphysical sun', some 'thing-in-itself', this idea comes with suspect methods. That is to say, methods that have never been successfully argued for or provided evidence for.

I shall focus more upon this in a future post. It's getting late here, now.

[FBM]

I have to stop reading the OP at "Metaphysics as an Error" because, sooner or later, I have to do some actual work. However, I'm enthusiastic about everything I've read so far. I just wrote a grad school paper on Science and Epistemology, and much of what's in the OP is referred to in the paper. I spent more time on Hume's problem of induction and Sextus Empiricus' problem of the criterion, but with pretty much the same outcome.

I'll be back to finish reading it ASAP.

[Comte de Saint-Germain]

it's not that theology is impossible (rather, that it is impossible to provide argumentation for its key assumptions). Admittedly, in a certain sense one may say that theology is impossible, since there is no established subject to discuss, and in the same sense metaphysics may be called impossible - but these are largely semantic issues.

Well, that is the crux of the debate - whether one can establish 'a subject' upon which metaphysics can be grounded. That is, whether one can establish there being 'something' that itself is distinct to any thing within the empirical realm.

You're free to try.

I have claimed and defended the relativity of human knowledge, arguing that all statements - including moral statements - are made within the context of a human, all-too-human ratio.

Implicit in this claim is that 'we' ARE essentially 'human'. That is, you impose an ontology upon us, about 'us', in order to expose the limitations of our reasoning. Of course, this ontology is unfounded. Notwithstanding that, your position forbids you from having an ontology.
The claim about 'us' being "all too human", is begging the question and cannot be used in defence of your own philosophical position... nor as a basis for being sceptical about the possibility of metaphysics.[/quote]

Not really. 'Are' is a claim of identity, identity is a set of properties, whereas existence is not a property - Kant. When I say I am human, that does not mean I exist, anymore than saying "Harry Potter is really cool" means Harry Potter exists.

I have commented on this in the Relativism is self-refuting thread. The English language is not tight enough to be able to create philosophical statements that are readily understandable that can't be interested metaphysically. Yes, I don't deny that my statements can't be interpreted to mean metaphysical things. However, I'm able to substantiate them with apt parsimony, where they are not metaphysical.

Now, synthesising these two we arrive at what I think of as a highly parsimonious view of the epistemic possibilities of mankind. That should not suggest, however, that I have made man impotent. First and foremost, the project of science is possible and meaningful. It seeks to explore not some temporary realm that speaks to the mind of God, nor does it describe some absolute 'Reality' behind the veil, ineptly and only with verisimilitude, rather it provides a reliable framework that structures, constructs and predicts empirical reality. The reality we live in, the world we live in, it is constructed most reliably by science.

I only object to the highlighted part of this statement. Again, an ontology about 'us' is implied, because you place us solely within empirical reality - you have us down, solely, as nought but empirical beings. Another case of begging the question, of course, since what we are is clearly open to debate. And, again, your position entails that you cannot employ an ontology in defence of your position... nor as a reason to be sceptical about [other] ontologies.

See the above, really. I'm differentiating between what you would call the apparent reality and what you would call the 'real reality'. The latter never offers itself to us. We live in the apparent reality. More importantly, and this is the point I'm making, this reality is constructed - the extent to which this is up to our human all too human stamp is, I think, unknowable. Not that I am very interested in that question anyway. Our cognition works, pretty well.

It is not possible to say that science is true - but where science is done, journals, no one makes this assertion anyway. Yes, there are alternatives, but these will be weighed according to their 'discursive requirements', roughly 'what it takes to be part of this system of knowledge'. In the case of theology, largely some claims made from authority and circular reasoning. When matched with science, they get vastly different results, and theology is no contest for the reliability of science.

It should be noted that if 'theology' is established upon God ("that it is impossible to provide argumentation for its key assumptions", as you say in the first paragraph) then theology should be distinguished from philosophical arguments for God, since God is established within the argument. That is, the former is established upon God, whilst the latter establishes God. Please bear that in mind.

Actually, I have shown in the past that God's existence is assumed in arguments for his existence. They only ever 'work' when they do.

What we are left with is a world we can understand with highly reliable tools, interpret using the whole breadth of artistic imagination. Admittedly, we can't say that 'this world exists', but one I've spoken to has been able to prose any means by which we are supposed to understand what that words means in its metaphysical, philosophical setting.

Ask yourself why we cannot say that the world exists. The only possible answer, is that the world might not be what it appears to be. What other reason to doubt its existence, could there be?

Because we don't know what the word existence is supposed to mean? I have no problem with someone saying 'the table exists'. I know what he means. He means to say, this specific concept represents factual information.. the table exists, the unicorn does not. Existence, I mean to say, used to be an empirical term. Everything used to be empirical at some point, but over the last 3000 years, it's all gone to shit.

The word 'existence' would relate to a subject that has attributes that are more than apparent. That is, we cannot say for sure whether the world exists, because we do not know for sure whether the attributes of the 'things' that we see are definite, or mere products of appearance. Thus, the word 'existence' can have a definite meaning, metaphysically.

How do you know any of this? What do you base this knowledge on? You're doing metaphysics, but you are not offering a basis of evidence or argument for it.

It is therefore my contention that in this philosophy - that I have taken for myself - it is possible to live life, quite comfortably, and that any seeming restrictions in practical or theoretical application are non-restrictions - similar to those that supposedly happen when rejecting God. A discarding of moral truth, in essence, a discarding of black and white thinking does not lead to moral doubt in action, it leads to nuance, subtlety and commitment to reality.

One can live amidst the world, comfortably, without ever having had any interest in philosophy. What you say isn't really relevant.

Of course it is. In fact, people living comfortable without philosophy supports my point, since they have no need of metaphysics. But I'm glad we are agreed on this point.

Metaphysics as an error

What does it mean to say "Metaphysics is an error"? It means to ask the question "What do we mean when we say this or that exists?" and to find the answers we find in philosophy and outside unsatisfactory. It is not a profession of faith that metaphysics is impossible, but rather a profound scepticism, a lack of affiliation with any one claim that states it holds the answer to the question what 'existence' means.

Again, my own perspective facilitates a significance and a meaning for 'existence'. That significance and meaning hinges upon the distinction between the apparency of attributes [of being], as opposed to definite attributes of being.

Yes, but you have no basis for any of this. You are making it up.

We could easily imagine that 'existence' is defined as 'measurable'. In that case, the word escapes the critique, but metaphysics does not. One is immediately warned, however, that such business of defining often is committed in the area of equivocation, where on one side, existence has a metaphysical face, and on the other side, it is this highly defined scientific state of measurability.
This, clearly can not stand. Unless there is some evidence or argument to demonstrate that measurability has any metaphysical implications, then clearly, such an equivocation is unwarranted and can not - as of yet - be accepted.

What is 'it' to measure, other than to assign attributes to something? Whether it is possible to assign attributes to 'existence' has yet to be established. But note that such an endeavour would entail providing metaphysical conclusions, as opposed to providing a grounds for metaphysics. That is, one should distinguish between proving a grounds for metaphysics, and actually doing metaphysics (and providing metaphysical facts).

I don't understand how what you are saying pertains to what you quoted.

The argument here enters its most difficult stage. Not that it is difficult in itself, but because people seem unwilling to keep to the argument. It seems so obvious to many people that all things must be caused (even though a causal relationship is used with reliability in the empirical world, and there's no reason to believe that its usage in metaphysics is valid)

That all depends upon whether the appearance of the world reduces to 'a subject' that exists and CAUSES those appearances. As I have said, the existence of the world can only be in doubt if that world is reducible to mere appearance. And since all merely apparent objects have to be causally impotent (cartoon characters don't really cause any event to happen in a cartoon, for example - it just appears that they do), then any causality associated with said domain would have to emanate from beyond that domain.
In other words, your claim that 'causality' is a concept entirely grounded within the world, is very much in doubt.

In doubt to whom? To people who have no evidence or argument to substantiate their doubt? Yeah, I'm going to take their scepticism very seriously.

The sun is empirical and can be measured, but the idea that it is caused by some 'metaphysical sun', some 'thing-in-itself', this idea comes with suspect methods. That is to say, methods that have never been successfully argued for or provided evidence for.

I shall focus more upon this in a future post. It's getting late here, now.

Sure.

[jamest]

Implicit in this claim is that 'we' ARE essentially 'human'. That is, you impose an ontology upon us, about 'us', in order to expose the limitations of our reasoning. Of course, this ontology is unfounded. Notwithstanding that, your position forbids you from having an ontology.
The claim about 'us' being "all too human", is begging the question and cannot be used in defence of your own philosophical position... nor as a basis for being sceptical about the possibility of metaphysics.

Not really. 'Are' is a claim of identity, identity is a set of properties, whereas existence is not a property - Kant. When I say I am human, that does not mean I exist, anymore than saying "Harry Potter is really cool" means Harry Potter exists.

The point is that you are using your perceived notion of our limited reasoning capacity as the basis for your primary claim, yet that notion is constructed upon the idea that we ARE human. If we are NOT essentially "all too human", then you have no reason to associate limited reasoning capacity with what we are. Either way, the claim flounders at this juncture. Likewise, when you make statements about "the reality we live in", you are essentially making a claim about what we are, because you limit the sphere of our existence to that specific realm.

I have commented on this in the Relativism is self-refuting thread. The English language is not tight enough to be able to create philosophical statements that are readily understandable that can't be interested metaphysically.

Actually, this is a point of logic. You are making significant claims about the limitations of metaphysics and you are doing so upon the back on an implied ontology. You'll find that if you subtract this ontology from this particular argument, that you have no where to go with the argument.

I'll address other concerns later.

[Surendra Darathy]

The point is that you are using your perceived notion of our limited reasoning capacity as the basis for your primary claim, yet that notion is constructed upon the idea that we ARE human.

Actually, no, if you understand the way the question has been posed is not as an assertion. It is an invitation, rather, for those who assert an unlimited reasoning capacity to present evidence or argument for it. A sceptic, as I am sure FBM will agree, is expressing scepticism of claims to unlimited reasoning capacities that have never been demonstrated. For my part, I express the potential for this kind of demonstration as an invitation to a spoon-bending, though I would never insist that such a demonstration is impossible. The OP does not claim that unlimited reasoning capacities are impossible, only that they are impossible to demonstrate.

If we are NOT essentially "all too human", then you have no reason to associate limited reasoning capacity with what we are.

Speculation. One can always start a non-argument as a hypothetical. A hypothetical is not an argument until it is completed. Until that point, it is a speculation. The way to demonstrate your hypothetical as expressed is to show that it leads to a contradiction, that is, that being all too human is, in fact, associated with an unlimited reasoning capacity.

Likewise, when you make statements about "the reality we live in", you are essentially making a claim about what we are, because you limit the sphere of our existence to that specific realm.

Or, you could regard it as an invitation to expose the infinitude of a sphere that is not limited. Until you do so, no claim of unlimited reasoning capacity really need be considered seriously. This is all the OP is arguing, and attacking strawmen again and again is not going to cut it here.

You are making significant claims about the limitations of metaphysics and you are doing so upon the back on an implied ontology.

Or you could see it as an invitation to demonstrate the infinitude of human reasoning to reveal metaphysics in all its glory. It's how I would express it, anyway. The OP is stated in rather provocative terms, but that does not mean that it is not expressed as an invitation to putative metaphysicians to do more than speculate.

I'll address other concerns later.

Before you address "other concerns" you must at least address some concerns. Expressing your concerns is not the same as addressing them. The invitation to provide evidence or argument that your concerns are valid still stands.

[Comte de Saint-Germain]

Actually, no, if you understand the way the question has been posed is not as an assertion. It is an invitation, rather, for those who assert an unlimited reasoning capacity to present evidence or argument for it. A sceptic, as I am sure FBM will agree, is expressing scepticism of claims to unlimited reasoning capacities that have never been demonstrated. For my part, I express the potential for this kind of demonstration as an invitation to a spoon-bending, though I would never insist that such a demonstration is impossible. The OP does not claim that unlimited reasoning capacities are impossible, only that they are impossible to demonstrate.

Yes, precisely.

Before you address "other concerns" you must at least address some concerns. Expressing your concerns is not the same as addressing them. The invitation to provide evidence or argument that your concerns are valid still stands.

Quite.

[jamest]

The point is that you are using your perceived notion of our limited reasoning capacity as the basis for your primary claim, yet that notion is constructed upon the idea that we ARE human.

Actually, no, if you understand the way the question has been posed is not as an assertion.

Actually, as is evident, I was addressing direct claims about what we are and our sphere of existence. There wasn't a question mark in sight.

It is an invitation, rather, for those who assert an unlimited reasoning capacity to present evidence or argument for it.

But the point is that our capacity to reason has not been established by either party, yet. And only one of those parties has made assertions about that capacity. And, as is also evident, these claims imply an ontology, anyway.
I wouldn't be harping-on about this so much if it wasn't being used as the basis for metaphysical scepticism - but it has been. Therefore, it's not something which should be swept under the rug and avoided. Sure, I'll get onto providing some evidence for metaphysics soon enough; but right now, we have to confront these reasons that have been presented as a basis for scepticism. If they are not valid, then one has to ask whether there are any credible reasons to be sceptical.

A sceptic, as I am sure FBM will agree, is expressing scepticism of claims to unlimited reasoning capacities that have never been demonstrated.

A sceptic of FBM's calibre would have to be sceptical about any claims - including those asserting our limited capacity to reason. Also, claims made about the limited sphere of our existence.
The point of such scepticism is not just to doubt any claims made by myself or like-minded individuals. So, if FBM is being true to his word, he would actually have to support me on this issue, I think.

[Comte de Saint-Germain]

A sceptic of FBM's calibre would have to be sceptical about any claims - including those asserting our limited capacity to reason. Also, claims made about the limited sphere of our existence.
The point of such scepticism is not just to doubt any claims made by myself or like-minded individuals. So, if FBM is being true to his word, he would actually have to support me on this issue, I think.

Only if you abstract it completely from the empirical. Any psychologist would laugh at you for the mere suggestion that this is not empirical and that the evidence is not out on it.

[Surendra Darathy]

A sceptic of FBM's calibre would have to be sceptical about any claims - including those asserting our limited capacity to reason. Also, claims made about the limited sphere of our existence.
The point of such scepticism is not just to doubt any claims made by myself or like-minded individuals. So, if FBM is being true to his word, he would actually have to support me on this issue, I think.

Only if you abstract it completely from the empirical. Any psychologist would laugh at you for the mere suggestion that this is not empirical and that the evidence is not out on it.

Precisely, once again. It's not as if each new post we make is on a tabula rasa.

If jamest has an argument, I don't see what difference it makes whether or not his audience is skeptical of any other claims besides his own, unless his claim is that we are only talking about belief systems. Until his own claims are somehow substantiated, I don't think we need to do this. Skepticism is a belief system like bald is a hair color. Infinities are mathematical abstractions introduced in the context of mathematical endeavours. I have never seen infinities employed outside mathematical discourse in such a way that they could be given any context.

If T.S. Eliot makes a claim that we shall never cease from exploration, and we try to take it literally, then it is clear that we are not talking about a "we" that could become extinct. I've got nothing against metaphor, but it ain't metaphysics.

[jamest]

The point of such scepticism is not just to doubt any claims made by myself or like-minded individuals. So, if FBM is being true to his word, he would actually have to support me on this issue, I think.

Only if you abstract it completely from the empirical. Any psychologist would laugh at you for the mere suggestion that this is not empirical and that the evidence is not out on it.

Firstly, I do understand the philosophical stance of metaphysical scepticism, or absolute scepticism. That is, I can sympathise with the position that we cannot know anything more than can be discerned from empirical study. Which is not to say that I agree with that position.
Secondly, there's a significant point here that has to be made apparent. That point being that scepticism about 'us' being 'human'; and our 'limited sphere of our existence'; and 'the innate potential of our capacity to reason', should also be subject to such supreme scepticism, from the onset. Consequently, there's no room here for you (your philosophical stance) to manoeuvre. That is, you cannot make any absolute claims about what we are; nor to the extent of our sphere of existence; nor (consequently) about our [limited] capacity to reason.

To be frank, you were guilty of making all three claims in the OP. Moreover, you used these claims as the basis of your scepticism. Further, the implied allegiance to an ontology is self-evident.
Psychologists might laugh at me. But that's hardly relevant, is it? After all, what does a psychologist know about metaphysics?

It is clear to me that your metaphysical scepticism requires refinement, since there are obvious flaws in its conception. Of course, this critique doesn't suffice as providing a grounds for metaphysics, but it was a necessary step towards doing so.
The bottom-line is that the basis for your scepticism has been pulled from under you, which renders [metaphysical] scepticism itself as dubious - are there really any reasons to harbour such a perspective? Therefore, if I have a requirement to provide grounds for metaphysics, you certainly have a requirement to provide [new] grounds for doubting that my own requirement is beyond 'my' means.

[SpeedOfSound]

That point being that scepticism
about 'us' being 'human';
and our 'limited sphere of our existence';
and 'the innate potential of our capacity to reason',
should also be subject to such supreme scepticism, from the onset.

First, this is not the main impetus of his argument. The main point is that you haven't come up with a basis for metaphysics.

Now. There is a lot of evidence that we are not super-human, form our ideas in a limited sphere, and do not have an unlimited capacity to reason.

Skepticism of course should be applied everywhere but in this case you suggest getting the big brush out of 'supreme skepticism'. I don't see how that is warranted.

A couple of wooTards in lotus position are not going to drive me to extremes on this.

I'm guessing about the wooTards. Do you have a real argument or some evidence for this skepticism about our limits?