On treeness of Oak1, and other things

[Little Idiot]

This thread is a follow on from some of the ideas in the metaphysics as an error thread. Now, my intention is not to argue exclusively a single point, referring back to the OP as the central theme of the thread, rather to throw in a few ideas and let it roll in what ever way works. There were a few good points got washed over due to the unpleasentaries, and so we can pick up again any questions unanswered, but not I hope pick up the agro. There are three opening points, but first an overview of my point.
SoS and other physicalists have presented views based on scepticism, and claimed to be sceptics not physicalists.
However, this leads me to think along these lines; shouldn’t scepticism, if applied fully should include scepticism of the sensory data itself? The appearance of a physical, external world has been shown scientifically to be only an appearance, a mental construction based on their 'data' – then the nature if this data must be mental if it is to be known by the mind? Doesn’t the sceptical view point more towards some form of idealism, since empiricism is based on sensory data, which is ultimately unreliable, and probably the nearest thing to a certainty we have regarding this data is that it must be able to interact with the mind of we humans, i.e. is mental.

1. A sceptical position should not be a physicalist position that ‘the physical world is a reality, and therefore we should seek an empirical or physical explanation first and primarily.’ Rather a sceptical view would be that the physical is only an appearance, scientific understanding of perception shows how the mind plays an important role in perception, past association and assembly of different senses into a single experience of the physical world.
2. The purely sceptical view may be that nothing, even the physical, even the validity of experience can be known for sure. However I would suggest this is no more than a dogma unless all possible enquiry is investigated prior to the assertion.
3. A reasonable balanced scepticism probably ( I don’t intend to try to prove idealism in the OP) leads to the conclusion that if the world is only known as a mental experience, if it is to have any significance, it must be at least partly on this basis. If we wish to suggest the physical world is data-based, then this data is mental in nature.

On treeness, if I experience a tree, Oak1, I seem to have an experience of the tree (thats restating the conditions - its a given), this seems to involve three things;
I (the subject)
Oak 1 (the object)
and an interaction between the subject and object, in this case experience, or seeing (which is simpler to consider).

But these three are only distinguished in an analysis; you cant get 'seeing' without both a subject and object, nor can you get a subject who doesnt see an object, nor an object that is not seen by a subject.
This is because the essential feature that makes 'a' a subject is the act of seeing an object, the esential feature that makes 'a' an object is being known by a subject, and the essential interaction of seeing requires an interaction between subject and object.
The three stand or fall together.
The question from SoS 'is there treeness?'
The answer, only if there is a subject objects and interaction; I see the tree; there is treeness of the tree which is my label I can put on the experience.

[Feck]

It is ALL subjective ... my mind makes it all up now I will leave the thread never to dabble in the subject again

[FBM]

I hope you're able to distinguish between Academic Skepticism and Pyrrhonist Skepticism, unlike someone else on the previous thread. If you're unable/unwilling to comprehend the distinction, I don't think I'll be up for this discussion. Academic Skepticism falls prey to your analysis, but not Pyrrhonist Skepticism.

[Little Idiot]

It is ALL subjective ... my mind makes it all up now I will leave the thread never to dabble in the subject again

I agree, 'it' is all subjective, where 'it' is all I ever experience.
So called objective experience is nothing more than inter-subjective-agrement, and if two experiences are never identical, no 'objective experience' can ever be composed of two identical experiences.

See, we dont bite, feel free to dive in

[Little Idiot]

It is ALL subjective ... my mind makes it all up now I will leave the thread never to dabble in the subject again

EDIT TO SLIP IN the right quote by FBM;

I hope you're able to distinguish between Academic Skepticism and Pyrrhonist Skepticism, unlike someone else on the previous thread. If you're unable/unwilling to comprehend the distinction, I don't think I'll be up for this discussion. Academic Skepticism falls prey to your analysis, but not Pyrrhonist Skepticism.

Wiki says
"Whereas academic skepticism, with as its most famous adherent Carneades, claims that "Nothing can be known, not even this", Pyrrhonian skeptics withhold any assent with regard to non-evident propositions and remain in a state of perpetual inquiry. They disputed the possibility of attaining truth by sensory apprehension, reason, or the two combined, and thence inferred the need for total suspension of judgment (epoché) on things.[1] According to them, even the statement that nothing can be known is dogmatic. They thus attempted to make their skepticism universal, and to escape the reproach of basing it upon a fresh dogmatism."

Is that a reasonable distinction?
So you mean the physical, the reliability of empericism and sense experience is not 'non-evident'? (i.e is evident?)

EDIT fixed link

[FBM]

It is ALL subjective ... my mind makes it all up now I will leave the thread never to dabble in the subject again

Wiki says
"Whereas academic skepticism, with as its most famous adherent Carneades, claims that "Nothing can be known, not even this", Pyrrhonian skeptics withhold any assent with regard to non-evident propositions and remain in a state of perpetual inquiry. They disputed the possibility of attaining truth by sensory apprehension, reason, or the two combined, and thence inferred the need for total suspension of judgment (epoché) on things.[1] According to them, even the statement that nothing can be known is dogmatic. They thus attempted to make their skepticism universal, and to escape the reproach of basing it upon a fresh dogmatism."

Is that a reasonable distinction?
So you mean the physical, the reliability of empericism and sense experience is not 'non-evident'? (i.e is evident?)

EDIT fixed link

I'll assume you're talking to me, since Feck gives fuck-all about Pyrrhonism.

Sense experience, for Pyrrhonists, was self-evident, and there are some necessary inferences that can be made based on them. Smoke <= fire, scar <wound, etc. Metaphysical dogma about physicality and reliability aren't necessary inferences. They're groundless assumptions until they've been shown to be otherwise. Please correct me if I'm wrong on this. I readily admit to being a student on the matter and don't claim complete understanding or absolute certainty.

[Surendra Darathy]

However, this leads me to think along these lines; shouldn’t scepticism, if applied fully should include scepticism of the sensory data itself?

I have no doubt (i.e., potentially insufficient scepticism) that it can lead one to think along those lines. Scepticism needs to be imbibed in moderation. The only problem of the strawman of scepticism unbound, is it ends up being a restatement of the following:

Why do atheists trust science?

As far as I can see, there is no rational reason for the atheist to trust that science will make accurate predictions about the future. Why assuming that the future will be like the past? If atheism is true, then the universe is not rational; it is not sustained by a Person.

The answer, "it works so far" is not a rational answer. For example, we could have an infinite list of numbers generated by a formula and assume that all numbers generated are prime, but as long as we haven't proved that it only generates prime numbers, we can't assume that all numbers are prime just because the first 1000, or 100 000 numbers are prime.

In short, atheists are irrational to trust science, for there is no good reason to assume the future will be like the past. Atheism is based on blind faith. Atheism is irrational.

If we doubt that we can know anything, what's the point of inquiring into whether and how we can know anything?

The appearance of a physical, external world has been shown scientifically to be only an appearance, a mental construction based on their 'data' – then the nature if this data must be mental if it is to be known by the mind?

Dunno about you, but if I see an apparently speeding apparent bus apparently bearing down on me as I cross the apparent street, apparently I am going to step apparently out of its way with apparent alacrity.

I say this only in loco apparentis. Parsimony begs me not to over-use the word "apparent".

[Surendra Darathy]

But these three are only distinguished in an analysis; you cant get 'seeing' without both a subject and object, nor can you get a subject who doesnt see an object, nor an object that is not seen by a subject.
This is because the essential feature that makes 'a' a subject is the act of seeing an object, the esential feature that makes 'a' an object is being known by a subject, and the essential interaction of seeing requires an interaction between subject and object.

Well, "seeing" is not a word coined by an empiricist. It can be restricted to talking about the interaction of eyespots with the rest of the nervous system, or it can be imbued with metaphysical overtones and turned into some grab-bag of apparentness.

[Little Idiot]

It is ALL subjective ... my mind makes it all up now I will leave the thread never to dabble in the subject again

Wiki says
"Whereas academic skepticism, with as its most famous adherent Carneades, claims that "Nothing can be known, not even this", Pyrrhonian skeptics withhold any assent with regard to non-evident propositions and remain in a state of perpetual inquiry. They disputed the possibility of attaining truth by sensory apprehension, reason, or the two combined, and thence inferred the need for total suspension of judgment (epoché) on things.[1] According to them, even the statement that nothing can be known is dogmatic. They thus attempted to make their skepticism universal, and to escape the reproach of basing it upon a fresh dogmatism."

Is that a reasonable distinction?
So you mean the physical, the reliability of empericism and sense experience is not 'non-evident'? (i.e is evident?)

EDIT fixed link

I'll assume you're talking to me, since Feck gives fuck-all about Pyrrhonism.

Yes, I was speaking to you and I made a mistake by quoting Feck and its part of the mod training program; you need the powers of telepathy and future prediction or omnipotence to have any chance as a mod.

Sense experience, for Pyrrhonists, was self-evident, and there are some necessary inferences that can be made based on them. Smoke <= fire, scar <wound, etc. Metaphysical dogma about physicality and reliability aren't necessary inferences. They're groundless assumptions until they've been shown to be otherwise. Please correct me if I'm wrong on this. I readily admit to being a student on the matter and don't claim complete understanding or absolute certainty.

Thats my (limited) understanding of the position, and what I was refering to in the OP; that there is experience of something is self-evident. That 'I' am real or 'the nature of the experienced object' are open to different interpretations, but the basic self-evident fact that there is (i)experience (II) of something (iii) by something must be granted, it we are to accept existence of any kind. And if you dont allow for some existence, then you wouldnt be posting in a thread

So in summary, I suggest a sceptical position should be sense experience is self evident, but the nature of the experience-er and experience-ed is open to question.
I think I said (at least tried to say) that in the OP.

I would go on to add, that our current theory of perception puts the perception of experience (is that the right wording - I mean the subjective knowing of it) as a mental event, we cant deny the involvement of the mind - at least as far as constructiong a singular experience from the separate sense-inputs, and the component played by memory, i.e. past experience.

[Surendra Darathy]

That 'I' am real or 'the nature of the experienced object' are open to different interpretations, but the basic self-evident fact that there is (i)experience (II) of something (iii) by something must be granted, it we are to accept existence of any kind. And if you dont allow for some existence, then you wouldnt be posting in a thread

Unfortunately, the equivocation is between the apparentness of an internet thread and the apparentness of a speeding bus. Inquiring minds want to know about the differences. Some varieties of "experience" have the attribute of being "urgent". People who make to-do lists classify items on the list into urgent and important, urgent and not important, not-urgent and important, and not-urgent and not important. I put metaphysics in the "not urgent and unimportant" category. For the record. I put apparently-speeding apparent buses in the "urgent and important" category. The possibilities are endless.

[Little Idiot]

However, this leads me to think along these lines; shouldn’t scepticism, if applied fully should include scepticism of the sensory data itself?

I have no doubt (i.e., potentially insufficient scepticism) that it can lead one to think along those lines. Scepticism needs to be imbibed in moderation. The only problem of the strawman of scepticism unbound, is it ends up being a restatement of the following:

Why do atheists trust science?

As far as I can see, there is no rational reason for the atheist to trust that science will make accurate predictions about the future. Why assuming that the future will be like the past? If atheism is true, then the universe is not rational; it is not sustained by a Person.

The answer, "it works so far" is not a rational answer. For example, we could have an infinite list of numbers generated by a formula and assume that all numbers generated are prime, but as long as we haven't proved that it only generates prime numbers, we can't assume that all numbers are prime just because the first 1000, or 100 000 numbers are prime.

In short, atheists are irrational to trust science, for there is no good reason to assume the future will be like the past. Atheism is based on blind faith. Atheism is irrational.

If we doubt that we can know anything, what's the point of inquiring into whether and how we can know anything?

Its silly comments like that which give us theists a bad name...
Thats a load of Rubbish, would a reasonable summary of the posters position be; 'There is a problem of induction, therefore God is and the bible is the one-true-book' or is my anti religion hysteria jumping to conclusions again...

The appearance of a physical, external world has been shown scientifically to be only an appearance, a mental construction based on their 'data' – then the nature if this data must be mental if it is to be known by the mind?

Dunno about you, but if I see an apparently speeding apparent bus apparently bearing down on me as I cross the apparent street, apparently I am going to step apparently out of its way with apparent alacrity.

I say this only in loco apparentis. Parsimony begs me not to over-use the word "apparent".

I too would suggest imediate evasive action. In (sane) idealism the physical world is just as physical, and people just as squishy, and busses just as hard to stop because of their considerable momentum. Its just known to be a mentaly-known-experience of a bus hitting a mentally caused body splashing mentally caused brains onto the mentally caused sidewalk. The net result is just as messy in each case.

The 'idealists think we can fly/bend spoons/control the world by "mind power''/etc. arguments are strawmen not really worth spending too much time on.

[Surendra Darathy]

I too would suggest imediate evasive action. In (sane) idealism the physical world is just as physical, and people just as squishy, and busses just as hard to stop because of their considerable momentum. Its just known to be a mentaly-known-experience of a bus hitting a mentally caused body splashing mentally caused brains onto the mentally caused sidewalk. The net result is just as messy in each case.

The 'idealists think we can fly/bend spoons/control the world by "mind power''/etc. arguments are strawmen not really worth spending too much time on.

Of course they are. The train of mentalism begins to run off the rails when we ask whether extinction is only apparent extinction. To what end, we ask. To what end? Personal extinction, species extinction. That's what the word "messy" is all about. The whole trick is to work out how it is that "messy consequences" are "apparently avoided".

If there is Something More™ to the occasion, and that the "mentally-known experience" is not the end of the inquiry, fitting the "avoidance of the messy" into the Grand Scheme of Things and Experiences needs some elaboration. Sooner, rather than later. This is not Scheherezade.

Our points of view are not really far apart. We both affirm that there's not much point in doing anything other than getting out of the way of the bus. Or do we? I'm only concerned that mentalism claims to see a bus coming that only the very wise can see. Or some nonsense that the codger in the crosswalk and the bus are part of the same Holistic Wholesome Wholeness. The first thing to do when you find yourself in a Whole is to stop Digging the Hole-istic Grooviness.

[Little Idiot]

That 'I' am real or 'the nature of the experienced object' are open to different interpretations, but the basic self-evident fact that there is (i)experience (II) of something (iii) by something must be granted, it we are to accept existence of any kind. And if you dont allow for some existence, then you wouldnt be posting in a thread

Unfortunately, the equivocation is between the apparentness of an internet thread and the apparentness of a speeding bus. Inquiring minds want to know about the differences. Some varieties of "experience" have the attribute of being "urgent". People who make to-do lists classify items on the list into urgent and important, urgent and not important, not-urgent and important, and not-urgent and not important. I put metaphysics in the "not urgent and unimportant" category. For the record. I put apparently-speeding apparent buses in the "urgent and important" category. The possibilities are endless.

I have no problem with the equivocation being between the apparentness of an internet thread and the apparentness of a speeding bus.
I dont bend spoons with my mind, nor do I stand my ground when faced with an impact with a bus. I too, despite being an idealist, dislike pain and wish to cling onto life for as long as it has quality for me.

Indeed, dodging the bus would class as a prioity for me, at the time. I do not need to emperically confirm that impact would cause undesirable effects, such as pain and death. My reasoning is enough to inform me that immdiate evasive action is a good and indeed an urgent plan.

Afterwards it would become a different type of experience; a memory. This memory would be used for a different type of lerning (i.e different to empericism) called reflection. I would relive the event in imagination, recalling honestly my inner reactions and feelings as well as the outer events. Each time I have been in a potentially lethal situation I have applied this, and the gains therefrom are tangable to me.

<forgive my long stories, which are honest recounts, I do have a point at the end which you may choose to skip to if you wish>

Case in point, when I was in a potentially lethal boat crashing into a bridge (I was on a 60foot 2 ton or more wooden boat drifting in a strong tide, had I been swept between boat and bridge I would surely be dead) I can recall in full colour inner-vision the shock wave bending the 2-inch planking at impact, snakeing along the boat towards me, recall the cracking of wood as cross beams parted from side planks, acompanied by the 'snap!' as eight inch boat nails sheared off. I recall calmly assessing that as long as I jumped perpendicular to the boat with a decent dive and clung to the bridge I was perfectly safe, if I didnt get clear with the dive I was dead, the tide was far too strong to swim against. I was more alive, due to the close-ness of death, than I was in my classroom this morning. And I know that even in a situation of potential death I can think clearly, and stay calm therby being able to think and act effectively, possibly saving my life or others. This is a tangable gain over the first time I nearly died - in a high speed car crash, where panic and fear paralized me into inaction and luckily I was a passenger not the driver, the drivers calm calculated deliberate semi-glancing impact on another moving car reduced out momentum enough to make the ultimate final, and inevitable impact serious but not fatal. Had I been the driver then, I would have probably died, along with any pasengers, were I in charge today I would honestly have a much better chance of saving a life.
And I have saved lives by calm reactions in the face of death, (when I was captain on a 22 footer in a tropical storm with an inexperienced crewman and paying tourist) and the experience it brings, (to actually know for sure that your capacity for action in a critical situation is the sole reason that these people are alive), is non-comparable to most experiences.

<My point is>
Had I not had the earlier potentially lethal situations, and reflected upon the internal reactions within me, imagined creatively how I should like to have reacted, visualized how I intend to react next time, so that each time it occurs I recognize and control the panic we instinctively feel in these situations, I honestly believe I would not be here today telling you that reflection is a valid method of learning with tangable results, and that positive creative vizualization can contribute to our future behaviour and inner reactions.

[Little Idiot]

I too would suggest imediate evasive action. In (sane) idealism the physical world is just as physical, and people just as squishy, and busses just as hard to stop because of their considerable momentum. Its just known to be a mentaly-known-experience of a bus hitting a mentally caused body splashing mentally caused brains onto the mentally caused sidewalk. The net result is just as messy in each case.

The 'idealists think we can fly/bend spoons/control the world by "mind power''/etc. arguments are strawmen not really worth spending too much time on.

Of course they are.

OK. but let it be stated for the record that I do not claim to bend spoons by mind power, nor fly, astral project, control the physical world directly by the mind etc.
What I do claim, is; that we can be in control of our inner reaction to events, that our inner reaction becomes more significant than the outer physical reaction, both for determining our 'happiness' and the outcome of situations, and that the outer experiences we undergo can be changed in ways which a physicalist world view will not allow to be credible, but which are predictable and reasonable in an idealist frame work. This is because I do claim that we each have an individual set of life experiences, some of which we can contribute towards and partially determine by our physical and mental activities.

The train of mentalism begins to run off the rails when we ask whether extinction is only apparent extinction. To what end, we ask. To what end? Personal extinction, species extinction. That's what the word "messy" is all about. The whole trick is to work out how it is that "messy consequences" are "apparently avoided".

Can you clarify the question; do you want the 'mentalism' answer?
If so, evolution of consciousness of entities. If an entitiy lived for say, 10000 years its evolution becomes stuck or slows down - we dont reform ideas and so on easily, experience becomes repeatative, reactions to current experience and new situations predetermined by the past. A period for reasessment and re-boot makes sense, coupled with the physical degeneration of physical bodies.

If there is Something More™ to the occasion, and that the "mentally-known experience" is not the end of the inquiry, fitting the "avoidance of the messy" into the Grand Scheme of Things and Experiences needs some elaboration. Sooner, rather than later. This is not Scheherezade.

Our points of view are not really far apart. We both affirm that there's not much point in doing anything other than getting out of the way of the bus. Or do we? I'm only concerned that mentalism claims to see a bus coming that only the very wise can see. Or some nonsense that the codger in the crosswalk and the bus are part of the same Holistic Wholesome Wholeness. The first thing to do when you find yourself in a Whole is to stop Digging the Hole-istic Grooviness.

We do agree that moving from the bus is a good plan, for quick action.

I think there may be a 'holistic wholeness effect' going on, but its appearance in experience is as many different things, and our intellect works at its best dealing with the many things, even when presented with a field-of-view size pattern, we look for things and categorize, we cant help ourselves. The practical level is right down here among the things n stuff. But that does not rule out the possibility of a second way of looking, a 'big picture view' where we may be able to stop working with things for a moment, step back and contemplate the rest of the picture. Doing so does not attempt to invalidate the practical level; when the whistle goes we stub out our cig's and get back to work, but equally so accepting the practical level should not rule out the big picture view either.

[Little Idiot]

But these three are only distinguished in an analysis; you cant get 'seeing' without both a subject and object, nor can you get a subject who doesnt see an object, nor an object that is not seen by a subject.
This is because the essential feature that makes 'a' a subject is the act of seeing an object, the esential feature that makes 'a' an object is being known by a subject, and the essential interaction of seeing requires an interaction between subject and object.

Well, "seeing" is not a word coined by an empiricist. It can be restricted to talking about the interaction of eyespots with the rest of the nervous system, or it can be imbued with metaphysical overtones and turned into some grab-bag of apparentness.

You mean you dont agree that I am seeing my monitor?
I presume this is not what you mean, so can you spell it out for me what you do mean?

My guess; you agree that the laptop interacts with my CNS via my eyes and the light photons. But you deny the actual event is experienced.
But that sounds almost as whacky as saying 'I am not seeing my laptop' to me....
So I await your clarification with interest.