Metaphysics as an Error

[Little Idiot]

...and all ye need to know.

But is it all that can be known?
How can you establish that it is all that can be known? Presumably if emperical method is the only way to know things, this question must be answered emperical method.

I suggest you cant, therefore this is a bald assertion without basis in fact; it looks very close to a blind belief to me!

[Little Idiot]

SOS, 'fish in buckets' = E.

Anything else of relevance, you will find in my two previous posts.

E is all we know.

E is all we know emperically. How do you establish (emperically) there are no other ways of knowing?

[SpeedOfSound]

SOS, 'fish in buckets' = E.

Anything else of relevance, you will find in my two previous posts.

E is all we know.

E is all we know emperically. How do you establish (emperically) there are no other ways of knowing?

You don't. It could be wrong. All you have to do is show us why metaphysics is justified.

[Little Idiot]

SOS, 'fish in buckets' = E.

Anything else of relevance, you will find in my two previous posts.

E is all we know.

E is all we know emperically. How do you establish (emperically) there are no other ways of knowing?

You don't. It could be wrong. All you have to do is show us why metaphysics is justified.

Well done, thanks for agreeing that you dont establish that there are no other ways of knowing.
This shows the likes of SD who assert 'the emperical is all you have got' are making an assertion which is not established.

Therefore it is reasonable to assume the theoretical possibility of another way of knowing, and of another thing to be known. One does not have to assert the positive existence of this 'other' only the possibility of it in order to justify the enquiry into its posible existence.
This enquiry is called 'metaphysics'.
QED

I gave a full answer/explaination to the point hereand here.

[Little Idiot]

Regarding the OP, in which an attack on the existence was launched;

"What does it mean to say "Metaphysics is an error"? It means to ask the question "What do we mean when we say this or that exists?" and to find the answers we find in philosophy and outside unsatisfactory."

I have shown that physical existence can not be known to be the only possible existence, and that reality may be different to physical existence therefore there is a theoretically possible ‘other’ reality apart from existence and thus justified metaphysics as the enquiry into the theoretically possible ‘other.’

I suggest that the OP misses the essential value and nature of metaphysics which is not only to study the merely apparent, (i.e. not to study only existence) but to also study, the possibility of a reality distinct from existence.

I further suggest that because of the initial target of the dismissal being 'answers to the question of existence' rather than ‘metaphysics’ which concerns both questions of existence and reality, the argument in the OP is critically flawed. Having failed to even address the possibility of reality distinct from existence the argument in the OP is invalid, and here with dismissed.

[Little Idiot]

What do we end up with? We end up with the four great problems of Metaphysics. One, that metaphysical content - the concept of thing-in-itself - has no argument or evidence going for it. We have no way of measuring 'reliability' within metaphysics, or what that would mean. Within the empirical world, science is the most reliable tool for measurement. Reliable simply means that it (often) makes accurate predictions. However, the empirical world is a construct of predictions, so even the world 'reliable' CAN NOT be used in reference to metaphysics. We'll get to that later.

The term reliability is an analogue term with a range of values. The term reality is a digital term; it is or it is not.
Metaphysics of reality does not need a guide for reliability, only a guide for reality.
The thing-in-itself is one way, not the only way, of talking about the reality of the thing as opposed to the apearance of the thing.

The second great problem of metaphysics is the problem of the possibility of Metaphysics. It is conceivable (leaving alone possible) that we have evidence and arguments that metaphysics is possible, but that we simply have none for specific content. Meaning that there is something ineffable that we ineptly express with 'existence' when used metaphysically, but that it still denotes something. For this, no evidence or argument has ever been posited. No philosopher hitherto has seen fit to explore this issue.

The statement that reality must be ‘something’ would be an error, if reality were the source of all things including space and time, it may be beyond the very possibility of being a ‘thing’ which is only a concept defined in terms of other things or thing and not-thing.
To say "No philosopher hitherto has seen fit to explore this issue." is simply an error. Huge sections of some philosophies are dedicated to this very topic.

Third, there are very great doubts whether it is possible to mount an argument or evidence for either of the above problems. This means, the third great problem of metaphysics is that there is no reason to believe that we are able to ever do metaphysics. This means, put simply, that there is no basis on which to assume that either arguments or evidence, respectively, ratio or senses, are capable of providing the sort of information that would qualify as evidence of the possibility of metaphysics. Quite clearly, metaphysical content is not empirical, and we have no evidence or argument to believe that our minds are capable of anything beyond rudimentary problem solving.

Metaphysical content need not be empirical, although it may draw from empirical evidence its enquiry is not limited to empirical. However, this does not suggest the metaphysics is in error, it simply shows it is not empirical. As SoS has agreed, we don’t know that empirical is the only way of knowing. In fact we do know that it is not the only way of knowing, therefore to say metaphysics is not emperical does not mean metaphysics is not a way of knowing.

Fourth is a problem of linguistics. Earlier the observation was made that 'reliable' is a concept rooted in empiricism. There's no reason to believe that in metaphysics, concepts/words from empiricism will still work. Take, per example, the term 'causality'. Within empiricism, it denotes a relationship between two events. Namely, that the occurrence of one event necessitates the other. If event A, then event B. There's no reason to believe that this idea applies to metaphysics. The idea that 'the empirical world must be caused', per example, is assuming that causality applies outside of the empirical world. There is no argument or evidence for this. Put short, it is assumed that a domain-specific concept can be used as domain-general. Again, sans evidence, and sans argument.

Linguistics issues are simply that; issues of the limitations of language. This does not mean metaphysics is limited because some every day concepts may not be metaphysically valid.
As per example, 'the emperical world must be caused' is not a correct statement, cause and effect simply do not apply 'outside of space-time'. This is not an argument against metaphysics, rather an argument for metaphysics; the need to understand what can be understood about 'outside space and time' - obviously, any attempt to work mentally on the subject 'outside space and time' can not be limited to emperical measurements within space and time. It is therefore only an argument against using language wrongly, since 'outside' is a spacial term it can not be used to correctly describe 'outside space and time'. This can only be done through metaphysics.

[SpeedOfSound]

SOS, 'fish in buckets' = E.

Anything else of relevance, you will find in my two previous posts.

E is all we know.

E is all we know emperically. How do you establish (emperically) there are no other ways of knowing?

You don't. It could be wrong. All you have to do is show us why metaphysics is justified.

Well done, thanks for agreeing that you dont establish that there are no other ways of knowing.
This shows the likes of SD who assert 'the emperical is all you have got' are making an assertion which is not established.

Therefore it is reasonable to assume the theoretical possibility of another way of knowing, and of another thing to be known. One does not have to assert the positive existence of this 'other' only the possibility of it in order to justify the enquiry into its posible existence.
This enquiry is called 'metaphysics'.
QED

I don't think it's reasonable at all to assume the theoretical possibility of another way of knowing. You have exactly the same problem with that as I have with proving there isn't one. There is no basis for proof or even for assuming such a thing might exist.

I was too tired to protest last night but I don't like the injection of the word knowing here. Knowing is a neurology subject with me not a philosophical question.

I'm pretty sure that sometime soon you will be claiming that I agreed that you have proven that there is this other way of knowing. Let's be real clear that I have weakly suggested that there is no way of proving that there ain't one. I think attempting to prove this would be doing metaphysics also. If there is no basis for metaphysics then this endeavor would be just plain silly.

There is a subtle distinction in the OP between proving metaphysics is impossible and just plain admitting that there is no basis for any of it.

[SpeedOfSound]

The second great problem of metaphysics is the problem of the possibility of Metaphysics. It is conceivable (leaving alone possible) that we have evidence and arguments that metaphysics is possible, but that we simply have none for specific content. Meaning that there is something ineffable that we ineptly express with 'existence' when used metaphysically, but that it still denotes something. For this, no evidence or argument has ever been posited. No philosopher hitherto has seen fit to explore this issue.

The statement that reality must be ‘something’ would be an error, if reality were the source of all things including space and time, it may be beyond the very possibility of being a ‘thing’ which is only a concept defined in terms of other things or thing and not-thing.
To say "No philosopher hitherto has seen fit to explore this issue." is simply an error. Huge sections of some philosophies are dedicated to this very topic.

I think you completely missed the point of what you quoted here and went off on a big strange tangent.

[SpeedOfSound]

Fourth is a problem of linguistics. Earlier the observation was made that 'reliable' is a concept rooted in empiricism. There's no reason to believe that in metaphysics, concepts/words from empiricism will still work. Take, per example, the term 'causality'. Within empiricism, it denotes a relationship between two events. Namely, that the occurrence of one event necessitates the other. If event A, then event B. There's no reason to believe that this idea applies to metaphysics. The idea that 'the empirical world must be caused', per example, is assuming that causality applies outside of the empirical world. There is no argument or evidence for this. Put short, it is assumed that a domain-specific concept can be used as domain-general. Again, sans evidence, and sans argument.

Linguistics issues are simply that; issues of the limitations of language. This does not mean metaphysics is limited because some every day concepts may not be metaphysically valid.
As per example, 'the emperical world must be caused' is not a correct statement, cause and effect simply do not apply 'outside of space-time'. This is not an argument against metaphysics, rather an argument for metaphysics; the need to understand what can be understood about 'outside space and time' - obviously, any attempt to work mentally on the subject 'outside space and time' can not be limited to emperical measurements within space and time. It is therefore only an argument against using language wrongly, since 'outside' is a spacial term it can not be used to correctly describe 'outside space and time'. This can only be done through metaphysics.

Again you sadly miss the point and go tangential on the subject. Causality was just an example thrown out, not the point. The point is the language being taken from the empirical and used in some metaphysical garbage land is not grounded in reason.

Same is true with internal/external as an example. If you are going to be transcending space and time and bodies and such then you can't pack these words up and take them with you on the trip.

[SpeedOfSound]

Metaphysical content need not be empirical, although it may draw from empirical evidence its enquiry is not limited to empirical. However, this does not suggest the metaphysics is in error, it simply shows it is not empirical.

As SoS has agreed, we don’t know that empirical is the only way of knowing.
In fact we do know that it is not the only way of knowing,
therefore to say metaphysics is not emperical does not mean metaphysics is not a way of knowing.

Sooner than I thought. NO! We do not KNOW that it is not the only way of knowing!!!!

For the same reason that we don't know that it IS the only way of knowing. You sure like to leap from extreme skepticism to absolute truth when it serves your theology.

[jamest]

Simply because you attributed causality of 'seeing causality in the world' to the wiring of the brain.

Sure. No idea why this is important. I've used this sort of empirical causality many times in this thread. The point is that there's nothing metaphysical about this sort of causality, and you haven't shown that it is.

Because what you say infers a specific stance within the philosophy of the mind. In this case, 'identity theory', which is a materialistic outlook that reduces mind states to brain states.

You have no idea what 'causality' means? Yet find it useful for doing science?

No, 'it' - your question. I don't understand your question. I don't understand what is metaphysical about empirical casaulity. You haven't shown it.

The concept of causality has a meaning that does not necessitate the inclusion of empirical objects within that meaning.

What's there to respond to? It's all very nice and well, but you haven't provided any basis or argument that you are capable of metaphysics. You haven't answered the question of this thread. You have simply assumed it - making yourself superfluous.

What I did was to explain how one could initiate a metaphysical enquiry. I said that there must only be three possible metaphysical directions one can take in association with E, and then I introduced significant truisms that could be associated with each possibility.
In other words, I have formulated a basic approach to metaphysics.

What I need to know, is exactly what it is that you want me to do before you will accept that I have answered the question of this thread?

[SpeedOfSound]

Because what you say infers a specific stance within the philosophy of the mind. In this case, 'identity theory', which is a materialistic outlook that reduces mind states to brain states.

You miss the point. Causality was an example. Obviously one that was too complicated to make the point. Brain/mind can be dealt with very soon in another thread. I know you two can't wait to get there because after all that is the real reason you want to save your precious search for metaphysical essences.

[Comte de Saint-Germain]

Simply because you attributed causality of 'seeing causality in the world' to the wiring of the brain.

Sure. No idea why this is important. I've used this sort of empirical causality many times in this thread. The point is that there's nothing metaphysical about this sort of causality, and you haven't shown that it is.

Because what you say infers a specific stance within the philosophy of the mind. In this case, 'identity theory', which is a materialistic outlook that reduces mind states to brain states.

Talking about the brain as an empirical construct has nothing to do with 'inferring a specific stance within the philosophy of mind'. I know this, because I studied philosophy of mind and psychology academically. What I've said has no direct metaphysical implications, although it is certainly compatible with various metaphysical doctrines.

You have no idea what 'causality' means? Yet find it useful for doing science?

No, 'it' - your question. I don't understand your question. I don't understand what is metaphysical about empirical casaulity. You haven't shown it.

The concept of causality has a meaning that does not necessitate the inclusion of empirical objects within that meaning.

What's there to respond to? It's all very nice and well, but you haven't provided any basis or argument that you are capable of metaphysics. You haven't answered the question of this thread. You have simply assumed it - making yourself superfluous.

What I did was to explain how one could initiate a metaphysical enquiry. I said that there must only be three possible metaphysical directions one can take in association with E, and then I introduced significant truisms that could be associated with each possibility.
In other words, I have formulated a basic approach to metaphysics.

Exactly, but you've offered no basis for the possibility of an approach to metaphysics.

What I need to know, is exactly what it is that you want me to do before you will accept that I have answered the question of this thread?

Addressing the actual question would be nice..

What do we end up with? We end up with the four great problems of Metaphysics. One, that metaphysical content - the concept of thing-in-itself - has no argument or evidence going for it. We have no way of measuring 'reliability' within metaphysics, or what that would mean. Within the empirical world, science is the most reliable tool for measurement. Reliable simply means that it (often) makes accurate predictions. However, the empirical world is a construct of predictions, so even the world 'reliable' CAN NOT be used in reference to metaphysics. We'll get to that later.

The term reliability is an analogue term with a range of values. The term reality is a digital term; it is or it is not.

How do you know this? Science defines the term reliability and it is within science that the term is used. Where does the definition from reality come from? Why is it dichotomous? More importantly, the question of this thread: "Why do you believe you have access to this information, and why do you believe your intuitions correspond with anything metaphysical?"

Metaphysics of reality does not need a guide for reliability, only a guide for reality.
The thing-in-itself is one way, not the only way, of talking about the reality of the thing as opposed to the apearance of the thing.

Sure, but what does this have to do with the thread?

The second great problem of metaphysics is the problem of the possibility of Metaphysics. It is conceivable (leaving alone possible) that we have evidence and arguments that metaphysics is possible, but that we simply have none for specific content. Meaning that there is something ineffable that we ineptly express with 'existence' when used metaphysically, but that it still denotes something. For this, no evidence or argument has ever been posited. No philosopher hitherto has seen fit to explore this issue.

The statement that reality must be ‘something’ would be an error, if reality were the source of all things including space and time, it may be beyond the very possibility of being a ‘thing’ which is only a concept defined in terms of other things or thing and not-thing.
To say "No philosopher hitherto has seen fit to explore this issue." is simply an error. Huge sections of some philosophies are dedicated to this very topic.

I'm genuinely surprised.. What do you think the topic of this thread is?

Third, there are very great doubts whether it is possible to mount an argument or evidence for either of the above problems. This means, the third great problem of metaphysics is that there is no reason to believe that we are able to ever do metaphysics. This means, put simply, that there is no basis on which to assume that either arguments or evidence, respectively, ratio or senses, are capable of providing the sort of information that would qualify as evidence of the possibility of metaphysics. Quite clearly, metaphysical content is not empirical, and we have no evidence or argument to believe that our minds are capable of anything beyond rudimentary problem solving.

Metaphysical content need not be empirical, although it may draw from empirical evidence its enquiry is not limited to empirical. However, this does not suggest the metaphysics is in error, it simply shows it is not empirical. As SoS has agreed, we don’t know that empirical is the only way of knowing. In fact we do know that it is not the only way of knowing, therefore to say metaphysics is not emperical does not mean metaphysics is not a way of knowing.

I don't know what any of this means, and I don't know how you think you can make these claims without any evidence or argument.

Fourth is a problem of linguistics. Earlier the observation was made that 'reliable' is a concept rooted in empiricism. There's no reason to believe that in metaphysics, concepts/words from empiricism will still work. Take, per example, the term 'causality'. Within empiricism, it denotes a relationship between two events. Namely, that the occurrence of one event necessitates the other. If event A, then event B. There's no reason to believe that this idea applies to metaphysics. The idea that 'the empirical world must be caused', per example, is assuming that causality applies outside of the empirical world. There is no argument or evidence for this. Put short, it is assumed that a domain-specific concept can be used as domain-general. Again, sans evidence, and sans argument.

Linguistics issues are simply that; issues of the limitations of language. This does not mean metaphysics is limited because some every day concepts may not be metaphysically valid.
As per example, 'the emperical world must be caused' is not a correct statement, cause and effect simply do not apply 'outside of space-time'. This is not an argument against metaphysics, rather an argument for metaphysics; the need to understand what can be understood about 'outside space and time' - obviously, any attempt to work mentally on the subject 'outside space and time' can not be limited to emperical measurements within space and time. It is therefore only an argument against using language wrongly, since 'outside' is a spacial term it can not be used to correctly describe 'outside space and time'. This can only be done through metaphysics.

You couldn't have missed the point more. This is about a category error, about the unbased assumption of deploying concepts outside of their normal domain. You haven't understood a single point I've made. Now, I've had actual discussions with people on this issue - some people understand what I'm saying. You do not understand what I am saying. My saying that you don't understand what I'm saying is not some tactic I use to shake off criticism. You just simply don't understand what I'm saying. You don't understand any of it. Why don't you ask people here whether they believe you understand what I'm saying or whether you're just going off on strawman after strawman..

Here's a second opinion:

The second great problem of metaphysics is the problem of the possibility of Metaphysics. It is conceivable (leaving alone possible) that we have evidence and arguments that metaphysics is possible, but that we simply have none for specific content. Meaning that there is something ineffable that we ineptly express with 'existence' when used metaphysically, but that it still denotes something. For this, no evidence or argument has ever been posited. No philosopher hitherto has seen fit to explore this issue.

The statement that reality must be ‘something’ would be an error, if reality were the source of all things including space and time, it may be beyond the very possibility of being a ‘thing’ which is only a concept defined in terms of other things or thing and not-thing.
To say "No philosopher hitherto has seen fit to explore this issue." is simply an error. Huge sections of some philosophies are dedicated to this very topic.

I think you completely missed the point of what you quoted here and went off on a big strange tangent.

[Little Idiot]

Metaphysical content need not be empirical, although it may draw from empirical evidence its enquiry is not limited to empirical. However, this does not suggest the metaphysics is in error, it simply shows it is not empirical.

As SoS has agreed, we don’t know that empirical is the only way of knowing.
In fact we do know that it is not the only way of knowing,
therefore to say metaphysics is not emperical does not mean metaphysics is not a way of knowing.

Sooner than I thought. NO! We do not KNOW that it is not the only way of knowing!!!!

I gave examples before, which unless you can refute have already shown other ways of knowing. I refer to mathematical knowledge which is impossible to prove emperically such as (a simple and obviously true example) any odd plus any even will always give an odd. This is correct for all odds and evens, but cant be verified emperically for all odds and evens without an infinite number of trials.
I refere to logic, such as 'If a is a P and all Ps are Q, then a is Q'. (Can this be shown for all P's and Q's)

For the same reason that we don't know that it IS the only way of knowing. You sure like to leap from extreme skepticism to absolute truth when it serves your theology.

So we agree that we do not know it is the only way of knowing.
I have shown other ways of knowing, which are not only knowable in ways other than emperically (thus proving my point that there are other ways of knowing) but also are impossible or hard to verify emperically; thus proving that we can NOT rely only on emperical verification.

Should you wish to show we can rely on emperical verification alone, you need to prove my examples can be verified emperically, and CAN NOT be known by any other method. So far you have not done this.

[SpeedOfSound]

I gave examples before, which unless you can refute have already shown other ways of knowing. I refer to mathematical knowledge which is impossible to prove emperically such as (a simple and obviously true example) any odd plus any even will always give an odd. This is correct for all odds and evens, but cant be verified emperically for all odds and evens without an infinite number of trials.
I refere to logic, such as 'If a is a P and all Ps are Q, then a is Q'. (Can this be shown for all P's and Q's)

So your whole proof is that math and logic is metaphysics?