Metaphysics as an Error

[Surendra Darathy]

The validity of those abstractions is what is in question.

The value of those abstractions lies in their capacity to generate new observations by design. Dunno about "validity".

[SpeedOfSound]

The validity of those abstractions is what is in question.

The value of those abstractions lies in their capacity to generate new observations by design. Dunno about "validity".

Validity may be too hard a word given the context here. I'll go with value.

[jamest]

My claim is that everything that we know about internal and external is from these simple empirical 'realities'. That is the same claim as the OP. But we can take these two words and make further abstractions. The validity of those abstractions is what is in question.

Consider:

E (where E = empirical world).

Now, there are only three possible metaphysics to associate with E:

(i) E is the totality of all that is.
(ii) E is reducible to something else that is different to E. That is, something else is the essence of E.
(iii) E is not the totality of all that is, so that 'something' different to E also exists.

This is a matter of logic. Please don't come back with the usual counter that "human logic is limited and may be flawed", since it implies an ontology: that we are human... and that E is the totality of all that is. (You cannot use an ontology/metaphysic to refute the potential for doing metaphysics).

Logic can now add something definite regarding each of the three possibilities, above:

(i) Nothing [else] exists internally or externally to E.
(ii) E is an apparent event happening internally to whatever E reduces to. (E appears to exist but in fact reduces to something that is not E. Therefore, the appearance of E is an event happening within and to something else that is not E).
(iii) Something else exists externally to E.

For each potential metaphysic, these are just necessary truisms - simple logic.

It may be true that our first use of the concepts 'internal' and 'external' were as consequences of observing E, but this does not mean that those concepts cannot be used in metaphysical logic associated with E - you have no reason whatsoever to encage those concepts within E, forever. Indeed, as demonstrated above, those concepts must be integral to any of the three metaphysical outcomes that are possible in relation to E.

You simply cannot brush-off my earlier argument (or LI's, if he's using those concepts too), with the statement that you use here. In all seriousness, the talk about buckets and fish is simply unwarranted, irrelevant, and off the mark.

I should of course point out that the reasoning outlined above represents the basic approach to metaphysics. This is significant, given that we've been asked to show how one can even approach doing metaphysics. Perhaps now the relevance of my post that discussed the internal or external nature of 'the world' (E), should be noted - and finally addressed with more than derision and rhetoric.

[SpeedOfSound]

In all seriousness, the talk about buckets and fish is simply unwarranted, irrelevant, and off the mark.

No no! If I had not gone through that painful but simple exercise you never would have posted this:

It may be true that our first use of the concepts 'internal' and 'external' were as consequences of observing E, but this does not mean that those concepts cannot be used in metaphysical logic associated with E - you have no reason whatsoever to encage those concepts within E, forever. Indeed, as demonstrated above, those concepts must be integral to any of the three metaphysical outcomes that are possible in relation to E.

I don't think you could of posted any of it without the fish. So I consider this some progress. You have actually put forth some firm possibilities for metaphysics and it is clear how these three possible ideas about internal and external are related to their empirical words of origin. It should also be crystal clear to you how these words have become quite another kind of thing with your application of them.

I hope. If it isn't then we are going to have to keep working on it.

[jamest]

I've mentioned causality erroneously extrapolated to metaphysics from empiricism but I also think that this can be seen as a cognitive illusion. We see causal relationships in our daily lives, and we are so used to recognising and using causation, that we believe that we believe that all of this must be caused as well. That is to say, our brains are wired to recognise causality even when there is no basis for it.

Another implied ontology, Jerome. Your basis for dispusting metaphysics cannot be based upon an assumed metaphysic - surely you can/will acknowledge this? That is, here, your comment about what brains do has ontological implications for brains - not to mention everything external to them.

Further, your comment is illogical anyway, because you say that there is no basis for 'causality', whilst simultaneously attributing causality to the brain (its 'wiring' is the cause of us seeing cause).

The cause of seeing causality in the world? You cannot answer that question - your stance prevents it!

I don't need any particular evidence for this claim,

What you do need - given your stance on metaphysics - is to stop using a metaphysic to substantiate that stance.

You're not in a position to discuss the essence of causality, then. But the 'basic approach to metaphysics' that I outlined in my previous post, does facilitate consideration of 'causality'.
Again, consider:

E (where E = empirical world).

Now, there are only three possible metaphysics to associate with E:

(i) E is the totality of all that is.
(ii) E is reducible to something else (S) that is different to E. That is, S is the essence of E.
(iii) E is not the totality of all that is, so that S different to E also exists.

Regarding 'causality', logic can generate truisms for each scenario:

(i) Causality exists within E. That is, if E is the totality of all that is, then the constituent parts of E must be interacting with an order commensurate with that understood by science.
(ii) E has been caused by S (which might be a plural, at this juncture). This must be the case, because if E does not exist, except as an appearance reducible to S, there must be a reason (cause) for E.
(iii) Causality exists within E (see (i) for explanation). Alternatively, S is effecting/causing the order discerned within E.

In other words, as with the concepts of 'internal' and 'external', the concept of 'causality' must be integral to any of the three metaphysical outcomes that are possible in relation to E.

[jamest]

SOS, 'fish in buckets' = E.

Anything else of relevance, you will find in my two previous posts.

[Comte de Saint-Germain]

I've mentioned causality erroneously extrapolated to metaphysics from empiricism but I also think that this can be seen as a cognitive illusion. We see causal relationships in our daily lives, and we are so used to recognising and using causation, that we believe that we believe that all of this must be caused as well. That is to say, our brains are wired to recognise causality even when there is no basis for it.

Another implied ontology, Jerome. Your basis for dispusting metaphysics cannot be based upon an assumed metaphysic - surely you can/will acknowledge this?

I 'dispuste' metaphysics on the basis of there being no evidence or argument for it - neither of which is 'metaphysical' in nature.

That is, here, your comment about what brains do has ontological implications for brains - not to mention everything external to them.

How's that, exactly?

Further, your comment is illogical anyway, because you say that there is no basis for 'causality', whilst simultaneously attributing causality to the brain (its 'wiring' is the cause of us seeing cause).

Who says there is no basis for causality? I think cause and effect are useful concepts within empirical reality. That doesn't mean that I believe it can be expected to be used in metaphysics.

The cause of seeing causality in the world? You cannot answer that question - your stance prevents it!

Of course not, I have no idea what it means..

I don't need any particular evidence for this claim,

What you do need - given your stance on metaphysics - is to stop using a metaphysic to substantiate that stance.

I haven't.

You're not in a position to discuss the essence of causality, then. But the 'basic approach to metaphysics' that I outlined in my previous post, does facilitate consideration of 'causality'.
Again, consider:

E (where E = empirical world).

Now, there are only three possible metaphysics to associate with E:

(i) E is the totality of all that is.
(ii) E is reducible to something else (S) that is different to E. That is, S is the essence of E.
(iii) E is not the totality of all that is, so that S different to E also exists.

Regarding 'causality', logic can generate truisms for each scenario:

(i) Causality exists within E. That is, if E is the totality of all that is, then the constituent parts of E must be interacting with an order commensurate with that understood by science.
(ii) E has been caused by S (which might be a plural, at this juncture). This must be the case, because if E does not exist, except as an appearance reducible to S, there must be a reason (cause) for E.
(iii) Causality exists within E (see (i) for explanation). Alternatively, S is effecting/causing the order discerned within E.

In other words, as with the concepts of 'internal' and 'external', the concept of 'causality' must be integral to any of the three metaphysical outcomes that are possible in relation to E.

You're making metaphysical claims. I am not. You have no basis for these claims. This lack of basis is the topic here, not the claims themselves.

[jamest]

I've mentioned causality erroneously extrapolated to metaphysics from empiricism but I also think that this can be seen as a cognitive illusion. We see causal relationships in our daily lives, and we are so used to recognising and using causation, that we believe that we believe that all of this must be caused as well. That is to say, our brains are wired to recognise causality even when there is no basis for it.

Another implied ontology, Jerome. Your basis for dispusting metaphysics cannot be based upon an assumed metaphysic - surely you can/will acknowledge this?

I 'dispuste' metaphysics on the basis of there being no evidence or argument for it - neither of which is 'metaphysical' in nature.

So you say, but you didn't answer the question.

That is, here, your comment about what brains do has ontological implications for brains - not to mention everything external to them.

How's that, exactly?

Simply because you attributed causality of 'seeing causality in the world' to the wiring of the brain.

The cause of seeing causality in the world? You cannot answer that question - your stance prevents it!

Of course not, I have no idea what it means.

You have no idea what 'causality' means? Yet find it useful for doing science?

You're making metaphysical claims. I am not. You have no basis for these claims. This lack of basis is the topic here, not the claims themselves.

I've just provided a basis for doing/starting metaphysics, which didn't entail me having any specific metaphysic. You've ignored it, but I'll present it here again, in the hope that you respond:

Consider:

E (where E = empirical world).

Now, there are only three possible metaphysics to associate with E:

(i) E is the totality of all that is.
(ii) E is reducible to something else that is different to E. That is, something else is the essence of E.
(iii) E is not the totality of all that is, so that 'something' different to E also exists.

This is a matter of logic. Please don't come back with the usual counter that "human logic is limited and may be flawed", since it implies an ontology: that we are human... and that E is the totality of all that is. (You cannot use an ontology/metaphysic to refute the potential for doing metaphysics).

Logic can now add something definite regarding each of the three possibilities, above:

(i) Nothing [else] exists internally or externally to E.
(ii) E is an apparent event happening internally to whatever E reduces to. (E appears to exist but in fact reduces to something that is not E. Therefore, the appearance of E is an event happening within and to something else that is not E).
(iii) Something else exists externally to E.

For each potential metaphysic, these are just necessary truisms - simple logic.

It may be true that our first use of the concepts 'internal' and 'external' were as consequences of observing E, but this does not mean that those concepts cannot be used in metaphysical logic associated with E - you have no reason whatsoever to encage those concepts within E, forever. Indeed, as demonstrated above, those concepts must be integral to any of the three metaphysical outcomes that are possible in relation to E.

[SpeedOfSound]

SOS, 'fish in buckets' = E.

Anything else of relevance, you will find in my two previous posts.

E is all we know.

[the PC apeman]

...and all ye need to know.

[logical bob]

We can ask the question, 'is it real?', 'how do we know if the physical world is or could be a computer simulation or a mental experience?'
To do this, we need to avoid the assumption that the physical is the only reality, which it may be, or may not.
To do this, we need to avoid the assumption that the emperical is all we've got - I know you will say 'ah but it is all we've got'; how do you know it is the only reality, which it may be, or may not.

If there is reality beyond the empirical then we have no access to it and therefore can't know anything about it.

[Comte de Saint-Germain]

I've mentioned causality erroneously extrapolated to metaphysics from empiricism but I also think that this can be seen as a cognitive illusion. We see causal relationships in our daily lives, and we are so used to recognising and using causation, that we believe that we believe that all of this must be caused as well. That is to say, our brains are wired to recognise causality even when there is no basis for it.

Another implied ontology, Jerome. Your basis for dispusting metaphysics cannot be based upon an assumed metaphysic - surely you can/will acknowledge this?

I 'dispuste' metaphysics on the basis of there being no evidence or argument for it - neither of which is 'metaphysical' in nature.

So you say, but you didn't answer the question.

That is, here, your comment about what brains do has ontological implications for brains - not to mention everything external to them.

How's that, exactly?

Simply because you attributed causality of 'seeing causality in the world' to the wiring of the brain.

Sure. No idea why this is important. I've used this sort of empirical causality many times in this thread. The point is that there's nothing metaphysical about this sort of causality, and you haven't shown that it is.

The cause of seeing causality in the world? You cannot answer that question - your stance prevents it!

Of course not, I have no idea what it means.

You have no idea what 'causality' means? Yet find it useful for doing science?

No, 'it' - your question. I don't understand your question. I don't understand what is metaphysical about empirical casaulity. You haven't shown it.

You're making metaphysical claims. I am not. You have no basis for these claims. This lack of basis is the topic here, not the claims themselves.

I've just provided a basis for doing/starting metaphysics, which didn't entail me having any specific metaphysic. You've ignored it, but I'll present it here again, in the hope that you respond:

Consider:

E (where E = empirical world).

Now, there are only three possible metaphysics to associate with E:

(i) E is the totality of all that is.
(ii) E is reducible to something else that is different to E. That is, something else is the essence of E.
(iii) E is not the totality of all that is, so that 'something' different to E also exists.

This is a matter of logic. Please don't come back with the usual counter that "human logic is limited and may be flawed", since it implies an ontology: that we are human... and that E is the totality of all that is. (You cannot use an ontology/metaphysic to refute the potential for doing metaphysics).

Logic can now add something definite regarding each of the three possibilities, above:

(i) Nothing [else] exists internally or externally to E.
(ii) E is an apparent event happening internally to whatever E reduces to. (E appears to exist but in fact reduces to something that is not E. Therefore, the appearance of E is an event happening within and to something else that is not E).
(iii) Something else exists externally to E.

For each potential metaphysic, these are just necessary truisms - simple logic.

It may be true that our first use of the concepts 'internal' and 'external' were as consequences of observing E, but this does not mean that those concepts cannot be used in metaphysical logic associated with E - you have no reason whatsoever to encage those concepts within E, forever. Indeed, as demonstrated above, those concepts must be integral to any of the three metaphysical outcomes that are possible in relation to E.

What's there to respond to? It's all very nice and well, but you haven't provided any basis or argument that you are capable of metaphysics. You haven't answered the question of this thread. You have simply assumed it - making yourself superfluous.

[Little Idiot]

We can ask the question, 'is it real?', 'how do we know if the physical world is or could be a computer simulation or a mental experience?'
To do this, we need to avoid the assumption that the physical is the only reality, which it may be, or may not.
To do this, we need to avoid the assumption that the emperical is all we've got - I know you will say 'ah but it is all we've got'; how do you know it is the only reality, which it may be, or may not.

If there is reality beyond the empirical then we have no access to it and therefore can't know anything about it.

Why so?
That based on the assumption that the only possible way of knowing is by empirical - How can you possibly demonstrate that. Presumably if emperical method is the only way to know things, this question must be answered by using emperical method.
What about logical statements; say 'If a is a P and all Ps are Q, then a is Q'. (Can this be shown for all P's and Q's)
What about statements which cant be verified emperically, such as mathematical rules; say 'any odd number added to any even number will give an odd result' which is obviously true (and can easily be proven mathematically, yet to verify emperically beyond doubt would require an infinite number of trials.'

[Luis Dias]

Mathematics are basic empirical problems organized in the most abstract and developed way we could possibly have imagined.

It all started and is basically founded in empirical problems. How much are two apples plus two apples? Etc.

[Little Idiot]

Mathematics are basic empirical problems organized in the most abstract and developed way we could possibly have imagined.

It all started and is basically founded in empirical problems. How much are two apples plus two apples? Etc.

This shows that maths started in emperical problems, which is fine. We live in a world where this is practical and useful.

What this has no bearing on is that the same maths can be applied to non-emperical subjects too.

To use the quote from an RDF sig; 'maths is the part of science we could do if we woke up tomorrow and found the universe was gone'
This assumes we could wake up if the universe was gone; opps metaphysics again!