Surendra Darathy wrote:jamest wrote: Here, I'm just trying to establish how it is even possible to begin to approach metaphysics.
When will you get started? You can begin by stating a question whose answer will imply a definite metaphysics.
I did: I asked whether
one's observations were internal or external to oneself.
... So, why is this a question whose answer will imply a definite metaphysics? Because:
1) If one's observations of 'things' are external to oneself, this implies a metaphysic commensurate with materialism/realism.
2) If one's observations of 'things' are internal to oneself, this feeds a metaphysic commensurate with idealism... which requires a progressive elucidation (see '3').
3) If one's observations of 'things' are internal to oneself, this means that 'the world' [of one's observation] is actually reducible to oneself. At this juncture, this would not be sufficient to refute the existence of a world external to oneself. However, it has important ramifications for Kant's conclusions regarding the impossibilty of rational metaphysics. I did explain why in a previous post - basically, it means that 'the world' has to be properly defined to the extent that it embraces the observer, as well as what is observed. Consequently, this facilitates a discussion of what the observer is, without transgressing Kant's restrictions about that which can be discussed. In other words, Kant's philosophy does not negate the possibility of discussing oneself as distinct to the empirical world. Consequently,
not all metaphysical discussion is suffocated by what Kant said.
In an empirical, metaphysics-free discourse, statements are not made about "experience", but only about the "world".
I'm aware of this. But as I keep saying, this ignores both the internal/external element of that which is observed... and the nature of the observer itself. Clearly, it has to be acknowledged that 'the world' is an observation (since 'observation' is the key to what science discerns)... and, therefore, questions about the nature of the observer and the internal/external whereabouts of 'its' observations, are legitimate.
There are your statements, in the world, in black and white. What's missing from your discourse? That's right: You shy away from making any statements about the world,
in favor of making statements describing your plan to how it is even possible to begin to approach metaphysics.
Surely, that is my primary concern?
And yet, all your statements are to an empiricist simply "messages" coming from a localized coordinate in the world. You write a statement in an internet forum, and responses to it quote the statement as if it was a part of the world, as if it appeared on a computer screen. Those messages are all there is to talk about, here.
Are you saying that I should be able to communicate my messages to you 'psychically', in order to prove them? Surely not?
Anyway, where do you think that my messages came from? I am the brother of all mathematicians: I need no telescope... and though my observations may spark my enquiries, they certainly do not answer them. That is, what I know comes not from 'the world'. That much should be clear.
We shoot the "experiencers" all to hell, and simply make statements about the world.
There is now sufficient reason presented here for you to surrender your weapons and stick your hands up, I think.
If you say the appearance of statements in and of themselves demands "experiencers", you must show how that is. Once we get past that hurdle, we can go back to processing statements about the world, and quit wibbling about "experiencers".
I think that you need to actually address the details of what I have said in the last 24 hours, instead of 'doing a politician' on me. I have presented arguments that address your concerns - so, deal with them.