Metaphysics as an Error

[Comte de Saint-Germain]

Reposted, though slightly updated. Last paragraph added.

What does it mean to say "Metaphysics is an error"? It means to ask the question "What do we mean when we say this or that exists?" and to find the answers we find in philosophy and outside unsatisfactory. It is not a profession of faith that metaphysics is impossible, but rather a profound scepticism, a lack of affiliation with any one claim that states it holds the answer to the question what 'existence' means.
Why is this scepticism? Why is this criticism? Because it surpasses being a simple contrarian. One must first understand metaphysics, what has been proposed under the banner of metaphysics before one can find it unsatisfactory, and it is criticism, because it demolishes an important concept, whilst providing a new, more subtle, more elevated value.

Beside this, it is important to note that not existence is an error, but metaphysics. The critique, and the scepticism, is not directed at the word existence, which in the human language can fluctuate from denoting the problematic metaphysical keystone to some precisely defined scientific state. We could easily imagine that 'existence' is defined as 'measurable'. In that case, the word escapes the critique, but metaphysics does not. One is immediately warned, however, that such business of defining often is committed in the area of equivocation, where on one side, existence has a metaphysical face, and on the other side, it is this highly defined scientific state of measurability.
This, clearly can not stand. Unless there is some evidence or argument to demonstrate that measurability has any metaphysical implications, then clearly, such an equivocation is unwarranted and can not - as of yet - be accepted. One observes, this criticism and the scepticism is dipped in knowledge, not ignorance of metaphysical theories.

It should immediately become clear that the essential problem here is 'satisfactory'. Some people might argue that the evidence and argument has been satisfactorily provided for the existence of God. Similarly, we can expect people to state that evidence and arguments have been satisfactorily provided that existence itself makes any sense. The question of God is related to that of existence, of course, and to be sceptical of existence means to be sceptical of God specifically as well.
What does this mean? It means that if metaphysics is removed, one is only left with the 'apparent' world, the empirical world - what may now be called the real world. It means that if there is to be any room for God, it is as an empirical concept, not as some supra-empirical concept.

The argument here enters its most difficult stage. Not that it is difficult in itself, but because people seem unwilling to keep to the argument. It seems so obvious to many people that all things must be caused (even though a causal relationship is used with reliability in the empirical world, and there's no reason to believe that its usage in metaphysics is valid) that empirical reality must be caused by 'something else', and that this something else must be of some quality that is metaphysical. The idea that one should refrain from speaking of such things is seen to be as cowardice, precisely because it is assumed that 'there is something out there'. The extension, the implication is that there is something to be described, even when it might be unknowable.
The point is, however, that the methods not of getting to metaphysics, but the methods of coming to the idea of metaphysics, the methods by which one makes the assumption that there is something that can be covered by the term existence are suspect. This, of course, is highly problematic, not in the least because it is apparently assumed that denying the existence of the sun would mean to deny the sun as an empirical phenomenon, when nothing like that is intended. The sun is empirical and can be measured, but the idea that it is caused by some 'metaphysical sun', some 'thing-in-itself', this idea comes with suspect methods. That is to say, methods that have never been successfully argued for or provided evidence for.

What do we end up with? We end up with the four great problems of Metaphysics. One, that metaphysical content - the concept of thing-in-itself - has no argument or evidence going for it. We have no way of measuring 'reliability' within metaphysics, or what that would mean. Within the empirical world, science is the most reliable tool for measurement. Reliable simply means that it (often) makes accurate predictions. However, the empirical world is a construct of predictions, so even the world 'reliable' CAN NOT be used in reference to metaphysics. We'll get to that later.
The second great problem of metaphysics is the problem of the possibility of Metaphysics. It is conceivable (leaving alone possible) that we have evidence and arguments that metaphysics is possible, but that we simply have none for specific content. Meaning that there is something ineffable that we ineptly express with 'existence' when used metaphysically, but that it still denotes something. For this, no evidence or argument has ever been posited. No philosopher hitherto has seen fit to explore this issue.
Third, there are very great doubts whether it is possible to mount an argument or evidence for either of the above problems. This means, the third great problem of metaphysics is that there is no reason to believe that we are able to ever do metaphysics. This means, put simply, that there is no basis on which to assume that either arguments or evidence, respectively, ratio or senses, are capable of providing the sort of information that would qualify as evidence of the possibility of metaphysics. Quite clearly, metaphysical content is not empirical, and we have no evidence or argument to believe that our minds are capable of anything beyond rudimentary problem solving.
Fourth is a problem of linguistics. Earlier the observation was made that 'reliable' is a concept rooted in empiricism. There's no reason to believe that in metaphysics, concepts/words from empiricism will still work. Take, per example, the term 'causality'. Within empiricism, it denotes a relationship between two events. Namely, that the occurrence of one event necessitates the other. If event A, then event B. There's no reason to believe that this idea applies to metaphysics. The idea that 'the empirical world must be caused', per example, is assuming that causality applies outside of the empirical world. There is no argument or evidence for this. Put short, it is assumed that a domain-specific concept can be used as domain-general. Again, sans evidence, and sans argument.

[jamest]

The question of God is related to that of existence, of course, and to be sceptical of existence means to be sceptical of God specifically as well.
What does this mean? It means that if metaphysics is removed, one is only left with the 'apparent' world, the empirical world - what may now be called the real world. It means that if there is to be any room for God, it is as an empirical concept, not as some supra-empirical concept.

Hello again.
We may doubt that any thing within the empirical world actually exists; but if the objects of that world do not exist, then what are they - what IS the empirical world? Surely, it must BE something else that yields this illusion/delusion/apparency of those objects?

Your scepticism of 'reality' implicitly infers that the objects of the world may not themselves be real. But if so, then they have to be something else that is not 'them', or they have to be 'nothing'. Either way, it seems that you cannot avoid harbouring a specific ontology within your scepticism. That is, if you say "if metaphysics is removed, one is only left with the 'apparent' world, the empirical world - what may now be called the real world", then you are not home free from metaphysics, because your position entails an ontology, albeit an unspecified one.

As I said to you at RDnet, this whole discussion pivots upon what 'the empirical world' IS. And even if you don't know what it is, your scepticism about the existence of the objects therein necessarily pushes you into believing that it is something else, or nothing at all. You may not have understood this previously.

Anyway, it is my position that one cannot be a relativist or a sceptic about the reality/existence of anything (including the world), without being chained to an ontology. In which case, your argument reduces to using a metaphysic to doubt [all other] metaphysics.

[SpeedOfSound]

SO you are pretty sure that 4 year-olds are doing metaphysics?

[Little Idiot]

I have to agree with Jamest on this point; if you say the world isnt as it appears to be, your doing metaphysics.

Unless there is some evidence or argument to demonstrate that measurability has any metaphysical implications, then clearly, such an equivocation is unwarranted and can not - as of yet - be accepted.

Isnt the measurement problem exactly such evidence?
The two slits experiment shows an example of this; elecrons perform diffraction through two slits as normal for waves, (its considered the interference of the probability wave that gives rise to the diffraction pattern, right?). But observation or measurement of the electron stops them behaving as waves, it destroys or collapses the probability wave and so the electron behaves as a particle.
Now the point is that the measurement or observation causes an observable change in the 'empirical reality' and not a small shift; it determines the nature of the electron to be either wave or particulate in nature with entirely different empirical results!

The idea that one should refrain from speaking of such things is seen to be as cowardice, precisely because it is assumed that 'there is something out there'. The extension, the implication is that there is something to be described, even when it might be unknowable.

Isnt this 'something' exactly what Quantum mechanics describes?


As a casual follower of both Quantum Mechanics and traditional mysticism, sometimes it is hard to distinguish which camp issued a particular quote, and I dont just mean 'new age quantum quacks', I refer to the 'founding fathers' of QM, likes of Max Plank who said

All matter originates and exists only by virtue of a force... We must assume behind this force the existence of a conscious and intelligent Mind. This Mind is the matrix of all matter.

The point is, however, that the methods not of getting to metaphysics, but the methods of coming to the idea of metaphysics, the methods by which one makes the assumption that there is something that can be covered by the term existence are suspect. This, of course, is highly problematic, not in the least because it is apparently assumed that denying the existence of the sun would mean to deny the sun as an empirical phenomenon, when nothing like that is intended. The sun is empirical and can be measured, but the idea that it is caused by some 'metaphysical sun', some 'thing-in-itself', this idea comes with suspect methods. That is to say, methods that have never been successfully argued for or provided evidence for.

Recall if you will that special relativity put paid to the idea of a 'hard' fixed space time out there independent of the observer, within separate frames of reference, such as on a moving train or on the statiinary platform there can be no agreement on symultaneity of events.
A simpe example, using the sun you refer to; as we know light from the sun takes several minutes to reach us, the sun we measure is not the real sun as 'the sun-itself' is, its an outdated image several minutes old. The famous example, if the sun disapeared NOW it would be several minutes before we noticed. Quite simply, our measured empercal world is not the actual world as it really is, any claims based on emperical measurements as the practical are fine, but as the factual need be considered carefully, very carefully. This suggests for me, a real need for metaphysics; we really do need to know what the hell we are talking about!

[jamest]

SO you are pretty sure that 4 year-olds are doing metaphysics?

Hello again SOS.
I don't know any 4 year-olds that have started threads about metaphysics being an error, whilst simultaneously talking about the apparency of the world. Jerome is making actual philosophical statements about unreality, which necessitates an ontological allegiance - even if he is ignorant of that fact.

[jamest]

It seems so obvious to many people that all things must be caused (even though a causal relationship is used with reliability in the empirical world, and there's no reason to believe that its usage in metaphysics is valid)

If you talk about the "apparency" of the [objects in the] world, then surely you have to talk about the apparency of causal relationships between them? That is, if object A does not actually exist and is in fact reducible to [as yet] some unknowable essence, then in what sense can we talk about IT being the cause of anything that happens to object B? That is, if the objects of the world are merely 'apparent', then so too are the causal relationships which we ascribe to them. In other words, it would be wrong to say that the concept of 'causality' is a phenomenon occuring from and between empirical objects.
That is, we must seek beyond the apparency of empirical things and ask questions such as "What causes the apparency of causality between the apparency of things?".

My position is that if the empirical world is reducible to something else, then any obvious causality must also be attributable to that something else.
In the previous discussion, I used the analogy of a cartoon to get my point across: that none of the entities therein (such as Wile E. Coyote) actuallty exist - they just appear to exist; that none of those entities, therefore, have causal potency - that too is just an apparency; that any necessary causality required to yield this apparency of cartoon characters and causal relations between them, must emanate from beyond that realm of 'cartoon characters'.

that empirical reality must be caused by 'something else', and that this something else must be of some quality that is metaphysical.

It must be caused by 'something else' (or even 'nothing'), lest we say that the empirical world is self-caused - but how can something that only appears to exist, be self-caused?

[FBM]

@ the OP: I tried, ineptly, to express some of those same ideas in a paper in undergrad Philosophy umpteen years ago. My prof, bless his heart, replied something along the lines of, 'Yes, but there still must be something out there causing the phenomena.' (Or maybe it was 'experiences'.) It struck me as odd at the time, but I didn't have an adequate response at the time.

Eventually, I came across Hume's Hume's problem of induction, which, as far as I know, remains unsolved. Going from observation of a particular, even a very large set of particulars, to a metaphysical explanation, particularly a universal, seems to be a leap. Maybe even a leap of faith? The leap may work, in the sense that the theory makes very accurate predictions about what happens under certain conditions, but it turns out to be groundless when it is proposed as an accurate description of the way things really are.

And then there's Sextus Empiricus' problem of the criterion, which I don't think has adequately been addressed, either.

In short, any metaphysical construct, insofar as it proposes a 'known' ontology, seems to require a leap. As long as a leap is required, I don't see how it qualifies as 'knowledge', or how it can be characterized as known to be ultimately true.

Pardon if this approach was already taken in the original discussion, but I wasn't there, so...

[SpeedOfSound]

SO you are pretty sure that 4 year-olds are doing metaphysics?

Hello again SOS.
I don't know any 4 year-olds that have started threads about metaphysics being an error, whilst simultaneously talking about the apparency of the world. Jerome is making actual philosophical statements about unreality, which necessitates an ontological allegiance - even if he is ignorant of that fact.

I suppose it may be a matter of definition. I am more inclined to call the search for reality an issue of biology than one of metaphysics myself. I like to look at how an organism might come by such silly ideas as what is really real. I have a plan to catch the mammoth. If the mammoth is not there then he doesn't exist. Oh my, what if I don't really exist? What if the mammoth really really exist in another plane and he is having the same thoughts about me?

Does my plan to catch the mammoth really exist? Is it physical? Can I catch my plan?

It's a god damned good thing that we didn't go down these roads until our species got a foot hold or we wouldn't of.

My claim is that ideas about reality are only useful if they are taken as judgments about the putative physical world we find ourselves in. Anything else is an example of misusing our intelligence to outsmart ourselves. I can make that claim without resorting to anything that is not based in science or common sense physical.

I think.

[Little Idiot]

My claim is that ideas about reality are only useful if they are taken as judgments about the putative physical world we find ourselves in. Anything else is an example of misusing our intelligence to outsmart ourselves. I can make that claim without resorting to anything that is not based in science or common sense physical.

I think.

Dont put much faith in the uncommon thing called common sence, as Einstein said

Common sense is the collection of prejudices acquired by age eighteen.

There is a conflict right there; science (Physics) views the atoms, forces and probability wave functions in a very different way to our common sense views the bunny rabbit.

[Little Idiot]

Eventually, I came across Hume's Hume's problem of induction, which, as far as I know, remains unsolved. Going from observation of a particular, even a very large set of particulars, to a metaphysical explanation, particularly a universal, seems to be a leap. Maybe even a leap of faith? The leap may work, in the sense that the theory makes very accurate predictions about what happens under certain conditions, but it turns out to be groundless when it is proposed as an accurate description of the way things really are.

Is this not covered by the difference between evidence and proof? between proof and disproof?

A hundred white swans only provide evidence to support the theory that all swans are white (not proof)
A single black swan disproves the theory that all swans are white.

This is why science only offers provisional truths, and is (in principle) ready to rethink when new evidence is provided?

[SpeedOfSound]

My claim is that ideas about reality are only useful if they are taken as judgments about the putative physical world we find ourselves in. Anything else is an example of misusing our intelligence to outsmart ourselves. I can make that claim without resorting to anything that is not based in science or common sense physical.

I think.

Dont put much faith in the uncommon thing called common sence, as Einstein said

Common sense is the collection of prejudices acquired by age eighteen.

There is a conflict right there; science (Physics) views the atoms, forces and probability wave functions in a very different way to our common sense views the bunny rabbit.

That is the point. I don't put any faith in common sense. I'm saying our idea about reality is based in common sense and it is not a very good idea unless we leave it in the realm of common sense. Metaphysics pretends to be brighter than that and fails horribly.

Just because we can have an abstract thought and catch a mammoth does not mean that we can catch anything any juicier if we don't shut the fuck up and have dinner.

But if you can tell me about where you got your idea of reality without any physical analogy I'll listen.

[FBM]

Is this not covered by the difference between evidence and proof? between proof and disproof?

A hundred white swans only provide evidence to support the theory that all swans are white (not proof)
A single black swan disproves the theory that all swans are white.

This is why science only offers provisional truths, and is (in principle) ready to rethink when new evidence is provided?

It goes a tad further and suggests that proof may very well be impossible. Proof by induction is, anyway.

And, yes, I think the scientific community as a whole has, in recent decades, backed away from the once-common assertion that this or that metaphysical construct was absolute and final. I see this as a positive step towards acknowledging our limitations. However, it's still commonly believed/assumed (not necessarily by scientists, but at least among the public) that we will one day achieve absolute certainty through scientific progress, but we simply don't have enough data yet. This belief/assumption seems to be baseless.

[jamest]

Eventually, I came across Hume's Hume's problem of induction, which, as far as I know, remains unsolved. Going from observation of a particular, even a very large set of particulars, to a metaphysical explanation, particularly a universal, seems to be a leap. Maybe even a leap of faith? The leap may work, in the sense that the theory makes very accurate predictions about what happens under certain conditions, but it turns out to be groundless when it is proposed as an accurate description of the way things really are.

I think that I partly addressed this problem in my previous post to Jerome, when I discussed the concept of causality. Feel free to comment on that post.

[SpeedOfSound]

Is this not covered by the difference between evidence and proof? between proof and disproof?

A hundred white swans only provide evidence to support the theory that all swans are white (not proof)
A single black swan disproves the theory that all swans are white.

This is why science only offers provisional truths, and is (in principle) ready to rethink when new evidence is provided?

It goes a tad further and suggests that proof may very well be impossible. Proof by induction is, anyway.

And, yes, I think the scientific community as a whole has, in recent decades, backed away from the once-common assertion that this or that metaphysical construct was absolute and final. I see this as a positive step towards acknowledging our limitations. However, it's still commonly believed/assumed (not necessarily by scientists, but at least among the public) that we will one day achieve absolute certainty through scientific progress, but we simply don't have enough data yet. This belief/assumption seems to be baseless.

I'll settle for certain enough. I use the same principle to pull up pants or make a sandwich as I use to apply the science of the mind. When my legs cease to exist in this plane of reality I will go checkout some metaphysics books.

[SpeedOfSound]

Is this not covered by the difference between evidence and proof? between proof and disproof?

A hundred white swans only provide evidence to support the theory that all swans are white (not proof)
A single black swan disproves the theory that all swans are white.

This is why science only offers provisional truths, and is (in principle) ready to rethink when new evidence is provided?

It goes a tad further and suggests that proof may very well be impossible. Proof by induction is, anyway.

And, yes, I think the scientific community as a whole has, in recent decades, backed away from the once-common assertion that this or that metaphysical construct was absolute and final. I see this as a positive step towards acknowledging our limitations. However, it's still commonly believed/assumed (not necessarily by scientists, but at least among the public) that we will one day achieve absolute certainty through scientific progress, but we simply don't have enough data yet. This belief/assumption seems to be baseless.

I'll settle for certain enough. I use the same principle to pull up pants or make a sandwich as I use to apply the science of the mind. When my legs cease to exist in this plane of reality I will go checkout some metaphysics books.

I don't see the problem with apparent causality. Causality is even shakier than reality.