Morality, ethics and atheism

[JimC]

I don't see how mentioning evolution adds anything to the argument that moral precepts are of human origin.

Basically because of a massive religious tradition that moral precepts can only have a divine origin. The argument that they are rooted in our evolved nature (but then culturally determined in detail) provides an alternative narrative...

[Hermit]

I don't see how mentioning evolution adds anything to the argument that moral precepts are of human origin.

Basically because of a massive religious tradition that moral precepts can only have a divine origin. The argument that they are rooted in our evolved nature (but then culturally determined in detail) provides an alternative narrative...

That is as trivially true as saying the Eiffel tower is rooted in iron ore.

[pErvinalia]

He's been saying that from the start. What strawman have you been arguing against?

[Hermit]

He's been saying that from the start. What strawman have you been arguing against?

None. My reply was to this:

The argument that they [moral precepts] are rooted in our evolved nature (but then culturally determined in detail)...

You need remedial reading comprehension lessons.

[pErvinalia]

He's been saying that from the start. What strawman have you been arguing against?

None. My reply was to this:

No, your reply was LITERALLY to this:

Basically because of a massive religious tradition that moral precepts can only have a divine origin. The argument that they are rooted in our evolved nature (but then culturally determined in detail) provides an alternative narrative...

.....

The argument that they [moral precepts] are rooted in our evolved nature (but then culturally determined in detail)...

Which he's been saying from the start.

[Hermit]

He's been saying that from the start. What strawman have you been arguing against?

None. My reply was to this:

No, your reply was LITERALLY to this:

Basically because of a massive religious tradition that moral precepts can only have a divine origin. The argument that they are rooted in our evolved nature (but then culturally determined in detail) provides an alternative narrative...

.....

The argument that they [moral precepts] are rooted in our evolved nature (but then culturally determined in detail)...

Which he's been saying from the start.

The irony of accusing me of strawmanning is not lost on me. The medication you're on does something else besides fucking with your concentration.

[JimC]

I don't see how mentioning evolution adds anything to the argument that moral precepts are of human origin.

Basically because of a massive religious tradition that moral precepts can only have a divine origin. The argument that they are rooted in our evolved nature (but then culturally determined in detail) provides an alternative narrative...

That is as trivially true as saying the Eiffel tower is rooted in iron ore.

You know that, and I know that, and the members of the population with some knowledge of biology know that. Perhaps it is "trivially true" to us, but to those who have bought the argument that morality requires a "divine touch", it provides another way of looking at human nature, and could be an important step in their divestment of religion...

[L'Emmerdeur]

Evolution is a compelling explanation for morals, it's just that once it's done explaining them, they're no longer morals. Contrary to L'Emmerdeur's belief that his theory is not about oughts, it very much is as it says what those oughts are not.

OK, I think maybe we are in agreement to some extent, and it comes down to different usage. I am not disputing that moral truths (oughts) exist in the context of human morality. However we can observe that moral truths are really not universal--different cultures hold different values as moral truth. That would tend to disprove the hypothesis that there are indisputably objective moral truths. I'm not attempting to address moral truths/oughts themselves (which I accept as a given) rather I'm making an observation regarding their overall nature.

When you write 'morals' it appears that you are referring to 'objective moral truths'. My usage of the term is less specific, which reflects my belief that morality need not be grounded in an objective standard to exist. I don't think the evolutionary explanation of human morals devalues them to the point that they're no longer morals.

[L'Emmerdeur]

So if morality does not go deeper than culture, are chimpanzees manifesting instinct or culture?

Instinct.

Well you did say you were not going to attempt to defend your assertions; I can't fault you on that.  

Hard to argue a negative I suppose. For the positive, I will refer to a review paper on the topic. Noting that I first brought up the chimpanzee behavior described in a theist's facile attempt to claim that 'Evolution Can't Explain Morality,' in which 'moralistic' behavior is exhibited by some chimpanzees. Regarding whether chimpanzee behavior is cultural or instinctive:

'Cultures in chimpanzees'

As an increasing number of field studies of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) have achieved long-term status across Africa, differences in the behavioural repertoires described have become apparent that suggest there is significant cultural variation. Here we present a systematic synthesis of this information from the seven most long-term studies, which together have accumulated 151 years of chimpanzee observation.

This comprehensive analysis reveals patterns of variation that are far more extensive than have previously been documented for any animal species except humans. We find that 39 different behaviour patterns, including tool usage, grooming and courtship behaviours, are customary or habitual in some communities but are absent in others where ecological explanations have been discounted.

Among mammalian and avian species, cultural variation has previously been identified only for single behaviour patterns, such as the local dialects of song-birds. The extensive, multiple variations now documented for chimpanzees are thus without parallel. Moreover, the combined repertoire of these behaviour patterns in each chimpanzee community is itself highly distinctive, a phenomenon characteristic of human cultures but previously unrecognised in non-human species.

I think a one-word answer to the question is insufficient.  

When do you suppose this cultural element first arose in our species?

When we became capable of abstraction and value creation.

One of the pets of a friend of mine was a chimpanzee. A reasonably well trained chimpanzee. It did not bite anyone, pull their hair or pinch their skin. It did tricks on command. It had no concept of good or bad whatsoever. All it knew was that some of its behaviour was followed by unpleasant things, like being yelled at or hit with a rolled up newspaper, and some of its behaviour was followed by pleasant things, like being treated to tasty titbits.

Here it is being jealous. My friend was not allowed to kiss his partner in the chimp's presence. It used to bite, pull hair and pinch skin when it was jealous, but after a few unpleasant consequences it stopped doing that and discovered that blocking my friend's mouth was an acceptable way to prevent the kissing. No moral precepts entered into any of this. We just like to anthropomorphise.

I would suggest that the example we have in chimpanzees does not actually support your assertion, despite your personal experience with one member of the species. It seems more likely that recognisable morality as a cultural phenomenon arose in our ancestor species--probably long before anatomically modern humans were on the scene. I appreciate the opportunity to explore this question with you. I agree with you that human morality is cultural. Where we appear to diverge is with my claim that it is deeply rooted in our nature as a relatively intelligent social species--it is more than merely cultural--it appears to be an inherent aspect of our species.

[Brian Peacock]

We all know that morality is conditional. That seems to be baked in. Even the believer operates on that principle. There are always exceptions to be made it seems, even where people declare their outlook to be unequivocally correct, fixed, absolute, righteous, or whatever.

Let's take an extreme example: It is wrong to strangle your own infant. Who wouldn't agree with such an indisputably clear-cut statement as that? We ought not strangle our own offspring for sound evolutionary reasons, but also for compelling personal, psychological, and social reasons. Anybody disagree? But there are any number of scenarios where strangling your own infant could be framed as being the most compassionate, right, moral thing to do. And I'm sure you can probably imagine at least one straight away.

So where does that leave the story about the evolved nature of our moral outlook? Isn't morality, in the context of evolution, just a paragraph in a larger story about the evolved nature of our cognitive capacities?

I think the answer to that can be found in the kind of scenarios that allow something like domestic infanticide to be framed as a right and moral course of action. That answer being in the framing of our moral claims - where the validity of a claim rests upon its justification, and where that justification rests on an accurate account of the context, circumstances, or the conditions at play.

So. Please tell the court in your own words: Why did you strangle your infant?

[rasetsu]

Evolution is a compelling explanation for morals, it's just that once it's done explaining them, they're no longer morals. Contrary to L'Emmerdeur's belief that his theory is not about oughts, it very much is as it says what those oughts are not.

OK, I think maybe we are in agreement to some extent, and it comes down to different usage. I am not disputing that moral truths (oughts) exist in the context of human morality. However we can observe that moral truths are really not universal--different cultures hold different values as moral truth. That would tend to disprove the hypothesis that there are indisputably objective moral truths. I'm not attempting to address moral truths/oughts themselves (which I accept as a given) rather I'm making an observation regarding their overall nature.

When you write 'morals' it appears that you are referring to 'objective moral truths'. My usage of the term is less specific, which reflects my belief that morality need not be grounded in an objective standard to exist. I don't think the evolutionary explanation of human morals devalues them to the point that they're no longer morals.

Well, no, that's not what I meant, but at this point I'm tired of trying to make my point plain. If morals devolves into simply what is useful, it's no less moral for me to murder you because it's useful to me and I value my own good above all else, than is being altruistic because you value the benefit toward the species as the most valuable; morals end up on the cutting room floor when you make it merely an evolutionary instinct, devoid of either subjective or objective morality. As I said two posts ago, you're proposing an error theory, in which moral statements are neither true nor false because the belief that moral propositions themselves can be true or false is itself false. And trying to define it as moral by fiat is no less ineffective; morals reduce to ipse dixit imperatives.

[Hermit]

So if morality does not go deeper than culture, are chimpanzees manifesting instinct or culture?

Instinct.

Well you did say you were not going to attempt to defend your assertions; I can't fault you on that.  

Hard to argue a negative I suppose. For the positive, I will refer to a review paper on the topic. Noting that I first brought up the chimpanzee behavior described in a theist's facile attempt to claim that 'Evolution Can't Explain Morality,' in which 'moralistic' behavior is exhibited by some chimpanzees. Regarding whether chimpanzee behavior is cultural or instinctive:

'Cultures in chimpanzees'

As an increasing number of field studies of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) have achieved long-term status across Africa, differences in the behavioural repertoires described have become apparent that suggest there is significant cultural variation. Here we present a systematic synthesis of this information from the seven most long-term studies, which together have accumulated 151 years of chimpanzee observation.

This comprehensive analysis reveals patterns of variation that are far more extensive than have previously been documented for any animal species except humans. We find that 39 different behaviour patterns, including tool usage, grooming and courtship behaviours, are customary or habitual in some communities but are absent in others where ecological explanations have been discounted.

Among mammalian and avian species, cultural variation has previously been identified only for single behaviour patterns, such as the local dialects of song-birds. The extensive, multiple variations now documented for chimpanzees are thus without parallel. Moreover, the combined repertoire of these behaviour patterns in each chimpanzee community is itself highly distinctive, a phenomenon characteristic of human cultures but previously unrecognised in non-human species.

I think a one-word answer to the question is insufficient.  

When do you suppose this cultural element first arose in our species?

When we became capable of abstraction and value creation.

One of the pets of a friend of mine was a chimpanzee. A reasonably well trained chimpanzee. It did not bite anyone, pull their hair or pinch their skin. It did tricks on command. It had no concept of good or bad whatsoever. All it knew was that some of its behaviour was followed by unpleasant things, like being yelled at or hit with a rolled up newspaper, and some of its behaviour was followed by pleasant things, like being treated to tasty titbits.

Here it is being jealous. My friend was not allowed to kiss his partner in the chimp's presence. It used to bite, pull hair and pinch skin when it was jealous, but after a few unpleasant consequences it stopped doing that and discovered that blocking my friend's mouth was an acceptable way to prevent the kissing. No moral precepts entered into any of this. We just like to anthropomorphise.

I would suggest that the example we have in chimpanzees does not actually support your assertion, despite your personal experience with one member of the species. It seems more likely that recognisable morality as a cultural phenomenon arose in our ancestor species--probably long before anatomically modern humans were on the scene. I appreciate the opportunity to explore this question with you. I agree with you that human morality is cultural. Where we appear to diverge is with my claim that it is deeply rooted in our nature as a relatively intelligent social species--it is more than merely cultural--it appears to be an inherent aspect of our species.

You will have noticed that the authors of the article you linked to are explicit about which definition of 'culture' they use. It's in the first paragraph following the introductory one. They speak of behaviour patterns which are transmitted intergenerationally among populations. 'Behaviour pattern(s)' is mentioned ten times. 'Behaviour' in its various forms turns up 42 times.

Anything starting with 'moral' gets a big, fat zero. You'd think that if some behaviour patterns of the various chimpanzee populations exhibited something you labelled 'proto-morality', there'd be a mention of it. As far as behaviour is concerned, it would be rather more significant than passing the skill of picking marrow out of a bone with a twig on to the next generation of chimps.

[L'Emmerdeur]

Evolution is a compelling explanation for morals, it's just that once it's done explaining them, they're no longer morals. Contrary to L'Emmerdeur's belief that his theory is not about oughts, it very much is as it says what those oughts are not.

OK, I think maybe we are in agreement to some extent, and it comes down to different usage. I am not disputing that moral truths (oughts) exist in the context of human morality. However we can observe that moral truths are really not universal--different cultures hold different values as moral truth. That would tend to disprove the hypothesis that there are indisputably objective moral truths. I'm not attempting to address moral truths/oughts themselves (which I accept as a given) rather I'm making an observation regarding their overall nature.

When you write 'morals' it appears that you are referring to 'objective moral truths'. My usage of the term is less specific, which reflects my belief that morality need not be grounded in an objective standard to exist. I don't think the evolutionary explanation of human morals devalues them to the point that they're no longer morals.

Well, no, that's not what I meant, but at this point I'm tired of trying to make my point plain. If morals devolves into simply what is useful, it's no less moral for me to murder you because it's useful to me and I value my own good above all else, than is being altruistic because you value the benefit toward the species as the most valuable; morals end up on the cutting room floor when you make it merely an evolutionary instinct, devoid of either subjective or objective morality. As I said two posts ago, you're proposing an error theory, in which moral statements are neither true nor false because the belief that moral propositions themselves can be true or false is itself false. And trying to define it as moral by fiat is no less ineffective; morals reduce to ipse dixit imperatives.

What if the only way you can see to achieve the altruist end of 'benefit toward the species' is by killing me?

I have agreed with Hermit that human morality is an aspect of human culture. It is certainly not 'merely an evolutionary instinct' though it appears to me to be derived from and informed by the history of our species--an evolved trait. I have not rejected a subjective basis for morality; my apologies for not being clear enough about that.

I have surmised that you are equating 'moral values' with 'objectively true moral values.' You have not corrected that surmise. Maybe I'm mistaken, but if not an objective source is required. We can hypothesize that human morality has always been nothing more or less than a generally agreed set of values held by a community. Absent an objective source that hypothesis has not been disproved.

If that is the case nothing is changed by the further hypothesis of an evolutionary origin. Human morality exists. Morals have weight and meaning in human social groups of all sizes. This is regardless of whether they are 'ipse dixit imperatives' or derived from an as yet undefined objective source or claimed to have been handed down by a deity. The absence of any 'objectively true' basis for human morality does not change its position in people's lives. Morality abides.

I have yet to find a definitive source of objectively true human morality-- it appears to be a myth like so many other myths. Morality nonetheless also appears to be a necessary, integral component of human social groups. Human beings give morality and moral values meaning; that is sufficient. No further justification for their existence is necessary.

[L'Emmerdeur]

So if morality does not go deeper than culture, are chimpanzees manifesting instinct or culture?

Instinct.

Well you did say you were not going to attempt to defend your assertions; I can't fault you on that.  

Hard to argue a negative I suppose. For the positive, I will refer to a review paper on the topic. Noting that I first brought up the chimpanzee behavior described in a theist's facile attempt to claim that 'Evolution Can't Explain Morality,' in which 'moralistic' behavior is exhibited by some chimpanzees. Regarding whether chimpanzee behavior is cultural or instinctive:

'Cultures in chimpanzees'

As an increasing number of field studies of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) have achieved long-term status across Africa, differences in the behavioural repertoires described have become apparent that suggest there is significant cultural variation. Here we present a systematic synthesis of this information from the seven most long-term studies, which together have accumulated 151 years of chimpanzee observation.

This comprehensive analysis reveals patterns of variation that are far more extensive than have previously been documented for any animal species except humans. We find that 39 different behaviour patterns, including tool usage, grooming and courtship behaviours, are customary or habitual in some communities but are absent in others where ecological explanations have been discounted.

Among mammalian and avian species, cultural variation has previously been identified only for single behaviour patterns, such as the local dialects of song-birds. The extensive, multiple variations now documented for chimpanzees are thus without parallel. Moreover, the combined repertoire of these behaviour patterns in each chimpanzee community is itself highly distinctive, a phenomenon characteristic of human cultures but previously unrecognised in non-human species.

I think a one-word answer to the question is insufficient.  

When do you suppose this cultural element first arose in our species?

When we became capable of abstraction and value creation.

One of the pets of a friend of mine was a chimpanzee. A reasonably well trained chimpanzee. It did not bite anyone, pull their hair or pinch their skin. It did tricks on command. It had no concept of good or bad whatsoever. All it knew was that some of its behaviour was followed by unpleasant things, like being yelled at or hit with a rolled up newspaper, and some of its behaviour was followed by pleasant things, like being treated to tasty titbits.

Here it is being jealous. My friend was not allowed to kiss his partner in the chimp's presence. It used to bite, pull hair and pinch skin when it was jealous, but after a few unpleasant consequences it stopped doing that and discovered that blocking my friend's mouth was an acceptable way to prevent the kissing. No moral precepts entered into any of this. We just like to anthropomorphise.

I would suggest that the example we have in chimpanzees does not actually support your assertion, despite your personal experience with one member of the species. It seems more likely that recognisable morality as a cultural phenomenon arose in our ancestor species--probably long before anatomically modern humans were on the scene. I appreciate the opportunity to explore this question with you. I agree with you that human morality is cultural. Where we appear to diverge is with my claim that it is deeply rooted in our nature as a relatively intelligent social species--it is more than merely cultural--it appears to be an inherent aspect of our species.

You will have noticed that the authors of the article you linked to are explicit about which definition of 'culture' they use. It's in the first paragraph following the introductory one. They speak of behaviour patterns which are transmitted intergenerationally among populations. 'Behaviour pattern(s)' is mentioned ten times. 'Behaviour' in its various forms turns up 42 times.

Anything starting with 'moral' gets a big, fat zero. You'd think that if some behaviour patterns of the various chimpanzee populations exhibited something you labelled 'proto-morality', there'd be a mention of it. As far as behaviour is concerned, it would be rather more significant than passing the skill of picking marrow out of a bone with a twig on to the next generation of chimps.

With the above in mind, would you say that the children were exhibiting instinctive behavior or cultural behavior in this study?

Would you agree that their behavior displayed a grasp of moral values or at least indicates an inclination to holding such values?

[Hermit]

So if morality does not go deeper than culture, are chimpanzees manifesting instinct or culture?

Instinct.

Well you did say you were not going to attempt to defend your assertions; I can't fault you on that.  

Hard to argue a negative I suppose. For the positive, I will refer to a review paper on the topic. Noting that I first brought up the chimpanzee behavior described in a theist's facile attempt to claim that 'Evolution Can't Explain Morality,' in which 'moralistic' behavior is exhibited by some chimpanzees. Regarding whether chimpanzee behavior is cultural or instinctive:

'Cultures in chimpanzees'

As an increasing number of field studies of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) have achieved long-term status across Africa, differences in the behavioural repertoires described have become apparent that suggest there is significant cultural variation. Here we present a systematic synthesis of this information from the seven most long-term studies, which together have accumulated 151 years of chimpanzee observation.

This comprehensive analysis reveals patterns of variation that are far more extensive than have previously been documented for any animal species except humans. We find that 39 different behaviour patterns, including tool usage, grooming and courtship behaviours, are customary or habitual in some communities but are absent in others where ecological explanations have been discounted.

Among mammalian and avian species, cultural variation has previously been identified only for single behaviour patterns, such as the local dialects of song-birds. The extensive, multiple variations now documented for chimpanzees are thus without parallel. Moreover, the combined repertoire of these behaviour patterns in each chimpanzee community is itself highly distinctive, a phenomenon characteristic of human cultures but previously unrecognised in non-human species.

I think a one-word answer to the question is insufficient.  

When do you suppose this cultural element first arose in our species?

When we became capable of abstraction and value creation.

One of the pets of a friend of mine was a chimpanzee. A reasonably well trained chimpanzee. It did not bite anyone, pull their hair or pinch their skin. It did tricks on command. It had no concept of good or bad whatsoever. All it knew was that some of its behaviour was followed by unpleasant things, like being yelled at or hit with a rolled up newspaper, and some of its behaviour was followed by pleasant things, like being treated to tasty titbits.

Here it is being jealous. My friend was not allowed to kiss his partner in the chimp's presence. It used to bite, pull hair and pinch skin when it was jealous, but after a few unpleasant consequences it stopped doing that and discovered that blocking my friend's mouth was an acceptable way to prevent the kissing. No moral precepts entered into any of this. We just like to anthropomorphise.

I would suggest that the example we have in chimpanzees does not actually support your assertion, despite your personal experience with one member of the species. It seems more likely that recognisable morality as a cultural phenomenon arose in our ancestor species--probably long before anatomically modern humans were on the scene. I appreciate the opportunity to explore this question with you. I agree with you that human morality is cultural. Where we appear to diverge is with my claim that it is deeply rooted in our nature as a relatively intelligent social species--it is more than merely cultural--it appears to be an inherent aspect of our species.

You will have noticed that the authors of the article you linked to are explicit about which definition of 'culture' they use. It's in the first paragraph following the introductory one. They speak of behaviour patterns which are transmitted intergenerationally among populations. 'Behaviour pattern(s)' is mentioned ten times. 'Behaviour' in its various forms turns up 42 times.

Anything starting with 'moral' gets a big, fat zero. You'd think that if some behaviour patterns of the various chimpanzee populations exhibited something you labelled 'proto-morality', there'd be a mention of it. As far as behaviour is concerned, it would be rather more significant than passing the skill of picking marrow out of a bone with a twig on to the next generation of chimps.

With the above in mind, would you say that the children were exhibiting instinctive behavior or cultural behavior in this study?

The following would indicate that the behaviour is socialised:

In the case of the friendly puppet, the children largely refused to observe how it suffered. However, in the case of the antisocial puppet, the six-year-old children's preference was to reject the stickers and spend their coins witnessing the punishment was significant. They even experienced pleasure by watching him suffer, shown in their expressions. In contrast, the four- and five-year-old children did not show this behaviour.

Would you agree that their behavior displayed a grasp of moral values or at least indicates an inclination to holding such values?

The children's behaviour very likely displayed a grasp of moral values or at least indicates an inclination to holding such values. As for the chimpanzees' behaviour, I cannot say without reading some reviews/critiques of the original study, which is paywalled.