DaveDodo007... I mean... Rationalskepticism,lol.

[pErvinalia]

And the answer is logical evidence/reasoning.

Hang on, I thought we established earlier that metaphysical evidence is a subset of logical evidence (i.e. not all logical evidence is metaphysical evidence). So what sets metaphysical evidence apart from other types of logical evidence? Is it logical evidence that is concerned with questions of reality? I assume that's what it is.

Yep, metaphysical evidence is logical evidence applied to metaphysical questions.

If so, then give me an example of metaphysical evidence. And even more pertinently, give me an example of metaphysical evidence that doesn't rely on empiricism for its premises and yet still provides some part of the proof of some assertion.

I can't think of any evidence in metaphysics that relies on empiricism but a few have been discussed in this thread, like pragmatism, parsimony, the unreasonable effectiveness of science, etc. All of those are logical arguments that don't rely on empiricism.

Ok. But what do they have to do with "reality"? What does any of that have to do with "reality"? They seem like standard logical arguments to me, not metaphysical ones.

I think the better question is how do we enquire into the reality of the world with empiricism? What would such a thing look like? When you're asking the question of what is real, including whether what we observe is real, how could you possibly find empirical evidence to answer that question?

That's dodging the question. I said that empiricism has the potential to perhaps provide us with clues about the true nature of reality. Not that it must, or even does. So answer the question - What else has the potential to give us access to the true nature of reality?

The answer is metaphysics, no other method is as successful as it is.

I was hoping for more than just a repeat of former assertions. How does it provide access to the true nature of reality??

But I'm still interested in hearing exactly how you think empiricism could be relevant. Suppose that idealism is true and the world is a product of the imaginations of disembodied minds and that nothing physical at all exists - how do you use empiricism to support this claim?

You wouldn't. But if physicalism* was true, then empiricism could be telling us something about the true nature of reality.

* - I hope that is the right term. By that I mean if "reality" was basically synonymous with the physical world as we see it.

To add to the above reply about metaphysical evidence and logical evidence, what does it functionally mean to separate metaphysical evidence from the rest of logical evidence?

It simply means that logical evidence is relevant to metaphysics but not to mathematics.

You're not groking what I am getting at. What is it about metaphysics that makes it a special use of logic? Saying it concerns "reality" is pointless, as until it can actually provide some confirmed access to reality, you may as well say it concerns the truth of picnic tables. Unless it can actually provide some coherent proof of or method to access "reality". Can it?

What does metaphysics provide us? What does it tell us about reality that the rest of logical enquiry couldn't? I'm just not seeing what access to "reality" we are getting by employing "metaphysical evidence" as opposed to any other form of logical enquiry.

..."Metaphysics" is simply the name we give to any kind of logical enquiry into the nature of reality. It's purely descriptive.

Purely descriptive is about how I see it too. Where's some functional access to reality going on? I want to see why I should give metaphysics any more respect than logical enquiry into picnic tables.

The distinction is just that questions into reality aren't necessarily relevant to questions about mathematics. If I demonstrate that substance dualism is impossible due to the logical issues that face claims of an interaction between the physical and non-physical, then this isn't exactly going to help me solve a question about calculating the internal angles of a triangle.

Yeah, of course. I'm more interested in the distinction between logical enquiry and metaphysical enquiry. The latter appears to be a subset of the former by means of only a fuzzy definition. There appears to be no functional difference, unless you can show me how metaphysical enquiry has provided us some insight into "reality".

[Mr.Samsa]

I can't think of any evidence in metaphysics that relies on empiricism but a few have been discussed in this thread, like pragmatism, parsimony, the unreasonable effectiveness of science, etc. All of those are logical arguments that don't rely on empiricism.

Ok. But what do they have to do with "reality"? What does any of that have to do with "reality"? They seem like standard logical arguments to me, not metaphysical ones.

They are used to argue in favour of particular views of reality.

The answer is metaphysics, no other method is as successful as it is.

I was hoping for more than just a repeat of former assertions. How does it provide access to the true nature of reality??

It provides a coherent framework from which we can investigate what kinds of realities are possible and then we test these ideas in various ways to determine which are more or less likely given particular axioms.

But I'm still interested in hearing exactly how you think empiricism could be relevant. Suppose that idealism is true and the world is a product of the imaginations of disembodied minds and that nothing physical at all exists - how do you use empiricism to support this claim?

You wouldn't. But if physicalism* was true, then empiricism could be telling us something about the true nature of reality.

In other words, empiricism is useless unless we first demonstrate that empiricism is relevant using non-empirical methods.

* - I hope that is the right term. By that I mean if "reality" was basically synonymous with the physical world as we see it.

Yep, physicalism seems to be what you're describing.

It simply means that logical evidence is relevant to metaphysics but not to mathematics.

You're not groking what I am getting at. What is it about metaphysics that makes it a special use of logic? Saying it concerns "reality" is pointless, as until it can actually provide some confirmed access to reality, you may as well say it concerns the truth of picnic tables. Unless it can actually provide some coherent proof of or method to access "reality". Can it?

It's not a "special use of logic" though, and there's no need to assume that it actually can access reality in any way. All that matters is that's what it is attempting to do and this is such a fundamentally different question to the kind that mathematics can answer so logical reasoning in mathematics is useless to us.

..."Metaphysics" is simply the name we give to any kind of logical enquiry into the nature of reality. It's purely descriptive.

Purely descriptive is about how I see it too. Where's some functional access to reality going on? I want to see why I should give metaphysics any more respect than logical enquiry into picnic tables.

Metaphysics is simply the field that attempts to rationally justify claims about reality. If you don't care for making claims about reality then it's probably not relevant to you. If you want to make a claim like "logical reasoning can't give us access to reality" then you need metaphysics because you need to rationally justify that claim in some way (unless it's something you're happy to accept on faith).

Metaphysics isn't only about trying to "access" reality, it's also about investigating what kinds of claims and knowledge can actually be gathered on the issue of reality. The idea that we cannot access reality at all and that the entire enterprise is futile is itself a metaphysical position.

The distinction is just that questions into reality aren't necessarily relevant to questions about mathematics. If I demonstrate that substance dualism is impossible due to the logical issues that face claims of an interaction between the physical and non-physical, then this isn't exactly going to help me solve a question about calculating the internal angles of a triangle.

Yeah, of course. I'm more interested in the distinction between logical enquiry and metaphysical enquiry. The latter appears to be a subset of the former by means of only a fuzzy definition. There appears to be no functional difference, unless you can show me how metaphysical enquiry has provided us some insight into "reality".

I'm not sure where to start if you don't accept that metaphysical investigations have told us anything. Do you believe that substance dualism is just as likely as physicalism (i.e. that it's just as likely that we're controlled by a disembodied mind as it is that we're controlled by natural physical processes of the brain)? If not, the reasons you give will be based on evidence gathered and generated by metaphysicians.

The problem with metaphysics, like many areas of philosophy, is that since it's such an old field many of its conclusions have become so well ingrained in our world that we accept them as truisms and not metaphysical conclusions at all - yet the only reason we treat them as truisms is because the hard work justifying them has already been done.

[pErvinalia]

I can't think of any evidence in metaphysics that relies on empiricism but a few have been discussed in this thread, like pragmatism, parsimony, the unreasonable effectiveness of science, etc. All of those are logical arguments that don't rely on empiricism.

Ok. But what do they have to do with "reality"? What does any of that have to do with "reality"? They seem like standard logical arguments to me, not metaphysical ones.

They are used to argue in favour of particular views of reality.

You'll have to expand on this. I don't see how pragmatism and parsimony say anything at all about reality. They are philosophical 'methods' applied in the scientific method. And since the scientific method says nothing at all about reality, then neither do these. The last one I don't know what that is (and I'm not going to google it! :p ).

The answer is metaphysics, no other method is as successful as it is.

I was hoping for more than just a repeat of former assertions. How does it provide access to the true nature of reality??

It provides a coherent framework from which we can investigate what kinds of realities are possible and then we test these ideas in various ways to determine which are more or less likely given particular axioms.

Hmm. That doesn't sound like an assessment of reality. When axioms are introduced, we are necessarily talking about abstract concepts. Where is "reality" hidden in all this?

But I'm still interested in hearing exactly how you think empiricism could be relevant. Suppose that idealism is true and the world is a product of the imaginations of disembodied minds and that nothing physical at all exists - how do you use empiricism to support this claim?

You wouldn't. But if physicalism* was true, then empiricism could be telling us something about the true nature of reality.

In other words, empiricism is useless unless we first demonstrate that empiricism is relevant using non-empirical methods.

No, in the original words by myself and many in this (and/or the other) thread, we don't know whether it is useless or spot on. We have to be agnostic about it. And that means that we have to accept the fact that empiricism may potentially offer us some insights into "reality".

It simply means that logical evidence is relevant to metaphysics but not to mathematics.

You're not groking what I am getting at. What is it about metaphysics that makes it a special use of logic? Saying it concerns "reality" is pointless, as until it can actually provide some confirmed access to reality, you may as well say it concerns the truth of picnic tables. Unless it can actually provide some coherent proof of or method to access "reality". Can it?

It's not a "special use of logic" though, and there's no need to assume that it actually can access reality in any way.

But hang on, you said above: "They are used to argue in favour of particular views of reality. ", and "which ones are more or less likely"... How is this going to be done without accessing "reality" in some way??

What I'm trying to get at is what's so special about metaphysics? It claims to be special in that it investigates "reality" in some way, but until it can actually be proven that it does that, then it seems more an empty claim than anything special.

All that matters is that's what it is attempting to do and this is such a fundamentally different question to the kind that mathematics can answer so logical reasoning in mathematics is useless to us.

Yeah, I'm not interested in the distinction between metaphysics and mathematics (any more).

..."Metaphysics" is simply the name we give to any kind of logical enquiry into the nature of reality. It's purely descriptive.

Purely descriptive is about how I see it too. Where's some functional access to reality going on? I want to see why I should give metaphysics any more respect than logical enquiry into picnic tables.

Metaphysics is simply the field that attempts to rationally justify claims about reality.

Well that's totally different to what you said above: "enquiry into the nature of reality". It's not enquiring into the nature of reality. It's logically assessing claims about reality. That is, it says nothing about reality at all, it only says something about good or shit logic.

If you don't care for making claims about reality then it's probably not relevant to you. If you want to make a claim like "logical reasoning can't give us access to reality" then you need metaphysics because you need to rationally justify that claim in some way (unless it's something you're happy to accept on faith).

That sounds circular to me.

Metaphysics isn't only about trying to "access" reality, it's also about investigating what kinds of claims and knowledge can actually be gathered on the issue of reality. The idea that we cannot access reality at all and that the entire enterprise is futile is itself a metaphysical position.

Again, circular. It's defining itself based on its conclusions.

The distinction is just that questions into reality aren't necessarily relevant to questions about mathematics. If I demonstrate that substance dualism is impossible due to the logical issues that face claims of an interaction between the physical and non-physical, then this isn't exactly going to help me solve a question about calculating the internal angles of a triangle.

Yeah, of course. I'm more interested in the distinction between logical enquiry and metaphysical enquiry. The latter appears to be a subset of the former by means of only a fuzzy definition. There appears to be no functional difference, unless you can show me how metaphysical enquiry has provided us some insight into "reality".

I'm not sure where to start if you don't accept that metaphysical investigations have told us anything. Do you believe that substance dualism is just as likely as physicalism (i.e. that it's just as likely that we're controlled by a disembodied mind as it is that we're controlled by natural physical processes of the brain)? If not, the reasons you give will be based on evidence gathered and generated by metaphysicians.

Why would I say that they aren't as equally likely (from a metaphysical point of view)?? If we exclude empirical observations, which we must if we are trying to make claims about reality, then there is simply nothing to go by to accept one position over the other. I have absolutely no way of telling which one is more likely than the other.

The problem with metaphysics, like many areas of philosophy, is that since it's such an old field many of its conclusions have become so well ingrained in our world that we accept them as truisms and not metaphysical conclusions at all - yet the only reason we treat them as truisms is because the hard work justifying them has already been done.

Maybe. But I just want one solid example of where metaphysics lives up to its claim of being an arbiter about reality. As I said, I've seen nothing so far that would make me want to respect metaphysics over the logical enquiry into picnic tables.

[Gallstones]

Read it.

Great Expectations? I did, didn't care for it.

Yes, Required reading in Junior High/AKA middle school.

[Gallstones]

Holyfuckinggawd, the sorting of navel lint.

Go away.

Make me.

[piscator]

[piscator]

The wiki quote wasn't there when I replied but my response will be the same. The wiki quote refers to a "non-empirical enquiry", which is what we're referring to as "logical reasoning" or "metaphysical evidence".

So we get to the question above again: What is 'metaphysical evidence'?

And the answer is logical evidence/reasoning.

And how do we enquire into the reality of the world without empiricism? What else is likely to potentially give us access to the true nature of the world?

I think the better question is how do we enquire into the reality of the world with empiricism? What would such a thing look like? When you're asking the question of what is real, including whether what we observe is real, how could you possibly find empirical evidence to answer that question?

How could you even form the question empirically? It's a sine qua non that something which is "observable" is a fair subject for empiricism. Agonizing over it's relative "reality" is something more akin to an amusement than anything else. How would you know anyway?

[Mr.Samsa]

How could you even form the question empirically? It's a sine qua non that something which is "observable" is a fair subject for empiricism.

Exactly.

Agonizing over it's relative "reality" is something more akin to an amusement than anything else. How would you know anyway?

Well, I think it's more than just amusement in the sense that a lot of people make strong claims about reality. I simply ask them to back their claims up but when they realise that that means they have to do metaphysics, they just start shitting on metaphysics rather than admit they are taking their position on faith or metaphysics is useful. Skepticism is a useful thing and I see no reason to stop being skeptical just because the question seems hard.

As for 'how would we know' - well that's a very interesting metaphysical question! If you answer that we can know or can't know, or that the question is meaningless or unanswerable, then you're doing metaphysics.

[pErvinalia]

Holyfuckinggawd, the sorting of navel lint.

Go away.

Make me.

You smell like stale fart. You are upsetting Sethy.

[piscator]

How could you even form the question empirically? It's a sine qua non that something which is "observable" is a fair subject for empiricism.

Exactly.

Agonizing over it's relative "reality" is something more akin to an amusement than anything else. How would you know anyway?

Well, I think it's more than just amusement in the sense that a lot of people make strong claims about reality. I simply ask them to back their claims up but when they realise that that means they have to do metaphysics, they just start shitting on metaphysics rather than admit they are taking their position on faith or metaphysics is useful. Skepticism is a useful thing and I see no reason to stop being skeptical just because the question seems hard.

As for 'how would we know' - well that's a very interesting metaphysical question! If you answer that we can know or can't know, or that the question is meaningless or unanswerable, then you're doing metaphysics.

Sounds about right. Either that, or speculating.
If you can go on to devise a way to test for something like immanence, you've ruined it. You dick.

[Mr.Samsa]

They are used to argue in favour of particular views of reality.

You'll have to expand on this. I don't see how pragmatism and parsimony say anything at all about reality. They are philosophical 'methods' applied in the scientific method. And since the scientific method says nothing at all about reality, then neither do these. The last one I don't know what that is (and I'm not going to google it! :p ).

I've replied to this in the other thread but to summarise: they aren't methods applied in science (they can be but they are far more general than that). They are logical frameworks used to make one description of reality more or less likely than another.

It provides a coherent framework from which we can investigate what kinds of realities are possible and then we test these ideas in various ways to determine which are more or less likely given particular axioms.

Hmm. That doesn't sound like an assessment of reality. When axioms are introduced, we are necessarily talking about abstract concepts. Where is "reality" hidden in all this?

I was hoping for more than just a repeat of former assertions. How does it fail to sound like an assessment of reality??

You wouldn't. But if physicalism* was true, then empiricism could be telling us something about the true nature of reality.

In other words, empiricism is useless unless we first demonstrate that empiricism is relevant using non-empirical methods.

No, in the original words by myself and many in this (and/or the other) thread, we don't know whether it is useless or spot on. We have to be agnostic about it. And that means that we have to accept the fact that empiricism may potentially offer us some insights into "reality".

But, as demonstrated with my example that you tried to dodge, we know for a fact that it's a terrible method for investigating reality in itself. It would tell us absolutely nothing in that situation so how can it be a valid method to use?

The fact that it might accidentally make a correct claim is besides the point - as mentioned in the other thread, so might Harry Potter.

It's not a "special use of logic" though, and there's no need to assume that it actually can access reality in any way.

But hang on, you said above: "They are used to argue in favour of particular views of reality. ", and "which ones are more or less likely"... How is this going to be done without accessing "reality" in some way??

Because metaphysics is about generating knowledge about claims we make regarding reality. The areas of metaphysics who think we can access reality use those things I mention as evidence for those particular views to make them more or less likely, but the areas of metaphysics who think we can't access reality use evidence to support their claim that they cannot access reality. The latter group does not need to access reality in some way in order to claim that reality cannot be accessed - in fact, if they could access it then it would refute their own metaphysical position!

What I'm trying to get at is what's so special about metaphysics? It claims to be special in that it investigates "reality" in some way, but until it can actually be proven that it does that, then it seems more an empty claim than anything special.

There is nothing special about it, it's just an area of inquiry. People make claims about reality (e.g. "the soul exists", "what we observe is just a veil for something that exists behind it", "what I observe is real", "you cannot access reality beyond observation", etc) and metaphysics is the area that investigates the validity of these claims.

Metaphysics is simply the field that attempts to rationally justify claims about reality.

Well that's totally different to what you said above: "enquiry into the nature of reality". It's not enquiring into the nature of reality. It's logically assessing claims about reality. That is, it says nothing about reality at all, it only says something about good or shit logic.

Because it's a diverse field, as I mentioned above. And if we assess the logic of claims about reality then we are saying something about reality.

If you don't care for making claims about reality then it's probably not relevant to you. If you want to make a claim like "logical reasoning can't give us access to reality" then you need metaphysics because you need to rationally justify that claim in some way (unless it's something you're happy to accept on faith).

That sounds circular to me.

It's only "circular" in the sense that a definition must necessarily be self-referential. By definition, if you are making claims about reality then you are engaging in the act of making claims about reality (i.e. metaphysics).

If I tell you that my cat is the brown thing over there named "Spot" and you ask how I know, then I'll reply by saying, "Because my cat is brown, named "Spot", and he sits over there". If you were to accuse me of being "circular" then sure, in a trivial sense yes, but it's also a little bit ridiculous to accuse a definition of being circular as if that was a bad thing. If a definition didn't refer to itself then it would be fucking useless.

Metaphysics isn't only about trying to "access" reality, it's also about investigating what kinds of claims and knowledge can actually be gathered on the issue of reality. The idea that we cannot access reality at all and that the entire enterprise is futile is itself a metaphysical position.

Again, circular. It's defining itself based on its conclusions.

Again, calling definitions "circular" is one of the most absurd things I've ever heard.

I'm not sure where to start if you don't accept that metaphysical investigations have told us anything. Do you believe that substance dualism is just as likely as physicalism (i.e. that it's just as likely that we're controlled by a disembodied mind as it is that we're controlled by natural physical processes of the brain)? If not, the reasons you give will be based on evidence gathered and generated by metaphysicians.

Why would I say that they aren't as equally likely (from a metaphysical point of view)?? If we exclude empirical observations, which we must if we are trying to make claims about reality, then there is simply nothing to go by to accept one position over the other. I have absolutely no way of telling which one is more likely than the other.

I've responded to this in the other thread but I find it weird that you think a logically impossible concept is just as likely as a logically possible one. That is just baffling to me.

The problem with metaphysics, like many areas of philosophy, is that since it's such an old field many of its conclusions have become so well ingrained in our world that we accept them as truisms and not metaphysical conclusions at all - yet the only reason we treat them as truisms is because the hard work justifying them has already been done.

Maybe. But I just want one solid example of where metaphysics lives up to its claim of being an arbiter about reality. As I said, I've seen nothing so far that would make me want to respect metaphysics over the logical enquiry into picnic tables.

Why should it care about your respect? Many people think that art history is a pointless and stupid topic, but it still rolls on regardless of the opinion of some ignorant dude.

The best example is the one I've given above: you think that we can't say anything meaningful about reality. Great, that's a metaphysical claim. For the people that are interested in the topic it would be worth getting together and coming up with attempts to justify the claim, demonstrating its logical validity, presenting counterarguments and rebuttals, etc, so that you have an airtight solid position. That's metaphysics.

If you don't care about justifying claims you make then you won't have any interest or use in the fields that justify claims.

[pErvinalia]

They are used to argue in favour of particular views of reality.

You'll have to expand on this. I don't see how pragmatism and parsimony say anything at all about reality. They are philosophical 'methods' applied in the scientific method. And since the scientific method says nothing at all about reality, then neither do these. The last one I don't know what that is (and I'm not going to google it! :p ).

I've replied to this in the other thread but to summarise: they aren't methods applied in science (they can be but they are far more general than that). They are logical frameworks used to make one description of reality more or less likely than another.

It provides a coherent framework from which we can investigate what kinds of realities are possible and then we test these ideas in various ways to determine which are more or less likely given particular axioms.

Hmm. That doesn't sound like an assessment of reality. When axioms are introduced, we are necessarily talking about abstract concepts. Where is "reality" hidden in all this?

I was hoping for more than just a repeat of former assertions. How does it fail to sound like an assessment of reality??

'Huh?!? Now you're sounding like Lion or Rainbow. What exactly are you asking me?

It seems to me that you are asking me how making an empty statement about metaphysics investigating blah blah blah isn't a patently obvious insufficient explanation as to how it tells us something about reality. If so, then it's pretty fucking obvious - WE KNOW NOTHING ABOUT REALITY. How the hell can logic (let alone anything) tell us anything about something we know nothing about??

You wouldn't. But if physicalism* was true, then empiricism could be telling us something about the true nature of reality.

In other words, empiricism is useless unless we first demonstrate that empiricism is relevant using non-empirical methods.

No, in the original words by myself and many in this (and/or the other) thread, we don't know whether it is useless or spot on. We have to be agnostic about it. And that means that we have to accept the fact that empiricism may potentially offer us some insights into "reality".

But, as demonstrated with my example that you tried to dodge, we know for a fact that it's a terrible method for investigating reality in itself.

Bullshit. We know absolutely zero about reality. Where are you pulling this crap from? SHOW YOUR WORKING. How do we know that science is good, bad, average, anything... in regards to reality??

It would tell us absolutely nothing in that situation so how can it be a valid method to use?

Who said it was a valid method to use?? Your "argument" in these two threads has been utterly confused.

What's most ironic about this is that you appear to be jumping at anti-philosophy shadows the same way the idiots at ratskep jump at imagined hidden theist arguments in philosophy threads. You keep (in the two threads) erecting strawmen, that are totally irrelevant to anything anyone has said.

It's not a "special use of logic" though, and there's no need to assume that it actually can access reality in any way.

But hang on, you said above: "They are used to argue in favour of particular views of reality. ", and "which ones are more or less likely"... How is this going to be done without accessing "reality" in some way??

Because metaphysics is about generating knowledge about claims we make regarding reality. The areas of metaphysics who think we can access reality use those things I mention as evidence for those particular views to make them more or less likely, but the areas of metaphysics who think we can't access reality use evidence to support their claim that they cannot access reality. The latter group does not need to access reality in some way in order to claim that reality cannot be accessed - in fact, if they could access it then it would refute their own metaphysical position!

So what about the former ones? The things you mentioned - is that parsimony and pragmatism? If so, we can deal with that in the other thread. But I don't see them as evidence of anything. They are just philosophical assumptions.

What I'm trying to get at is what's so special about metaphysics? It claims to be special in that it investigates "reality" in some way, but until it can actually be proven that it does that, then it seems more an empty claim than anything special.

There is nothing special about it, it's just an area of inquiry. People make claims about reality (e.g. "the soul exists", "what we observe is just a veil for something that exists behind it", "what I observe is real", "you cannot access reality beyond observation", etc) and metaphysics is the area that investigates the validity of these claims.

Yeah, but the point I keep making is that we know zero about reality. Therefore we can't investigate claims as to their validity and likelihood of being about reality, outside of bread and butter logic. Therefore, I don't see what's so special about metaphysics. It doesn't tell us anything more than ye olde logic does. Hence why "metaphysical evidence", seems like a dog and pony show.

Metaphysics is simply the field that attempts to rationally justify claims about reality.

Well that's totally different to what you said above: "enquiry into the nature of reality". It's not enquiring into the nature of reality. It's logically assessing claims about reality. That is, it says nothing about reality at all, it only says something about good or shit logic.

Because it's a diverse field, as I mentioned above. And if we assess the logic of claims about reality then we are saying something about reality.

So you keep asserting, but you haven't shown how this is the case. Once again, we know ZERO about reality. Therefore, how can be certain we are "saying something about reality". i.e. metaphysical reality, not the word 'reality' in a sentence.

If you don't care for making claims about reality then it's probably not relevant to you. If you want to make a claim like "logical reasoning can't give us access to reality" then you need metaphysics because you need to rationally justify that claim in some way (unless it's something you're happy to accept on faith).

That sounds circular to me.

It's only "circular" in the sense that a definition must necessarily be self-referential. By definition, if you are making claims about reality then you are engaging in the act of making claims about reality (i.e. metaphysics).

I really wish you would quote the conversation leading up to the bits you do bother quoting. The way you quote makes it very difficult (well, at least very annoying) to go back and find exactly what was said and in what context. I'm sick of going back to find out context, so I'm just going to guess here. I suspect you were making some claim about how metaphysics tells us about reality. You then wound up trying to justify that claim by giving the definition of metaphysics. That's circular.

Metaphysics isn't only about trying to "access" reality, it's also about investigating what kinds of claims and knowledge can actually be gathered on the issue of reality. The idea that we cannot access reality at all and that the entire enterprise is futile is itself a metaphysical position.

Again, circular. It's defining itself based on its conclusions.

Again, calling definitions "circular" is one of the most absurd things I've ever heard.

If only you'd bother quoting properly we could explore this more. But I'm only left to guess at what we were discussing.

I'm not sure where to start if you don't accept that metaphysical investigations have told us anything. Do you believe that substance dualism is just as likely as physicalism (i.e. that it's just as likely that we're controlled by a disembodied mind as it is that we're controlled by natural physical processes of the brain)? If not, the reasons you give will be based on evidence gathered and generated by metaphysicians.

Why would I say that they aren't as equally likely (from a metaphysical point of view)?? If we exclude empirical observations, which we must if we are trying to make claims about reality, then there is simply nothing to go by to accept one position over the other. I have absolutely no way of telling which one is more likely than the other.

I've responded to this in the other thread but I find it weird that you think a logically impossible concept is just as likely as a logically possible one. That is just baffling to me.

As I said there, stop with the juvenile 'gotcha' bullshit. If you've got an argument to make, then make it. I don't know why substance dualism would be illogical. That's not to say it's not, just that I haven't thought about it. So if you want to explain why it is illogical, then do that. And THEN ask your question.

The problem with metaphysics, like many areas of philosophy, is that since it's such an old field many of its conclusions have become so well ingrained in our world that we accept them as truisms and not metaphysical conclusions at all - yet the only reason we treat them as truisms is because the hard work justifying them has already been done.

Maybe. But I just want one solid example of where metaphysics lives up to its claim of being an arbiter about reality. As I said, I've seen nothing so far that would make me want to respect metaphysics over the logical enquiry into picnic tables.

Why should it care about your respect? Many people think that art history is a pointless and stupid topic, but it still rolls on regardless of the opinion of some ignorant dude.

I'm trying to get you to explain why it is important. I accept that it is a serious field. But I want to know WHY. You are the proxy for metaphysics in this discussion. By me saying that I can't respect it over some other random wibble, is not a literal. It means that you aren't convincing me of why it is an important field. If you can't be bothered, then that's fine. But effectively saying it's an important field because it factually is, is not explaining anything. I accept it's an important field. I want you to explain WHY.

The best example is the one I've given above: you think that we can't say anything meaningful about reality. Great, that's a metaphysical claim.

Yeah, but it's not a claim about reality. It says absolutely nothing about what reality is or isn't. It just says whether I think we can access or know anything about reality or not. So in the context of the question I keep wanting you to answer (that is, what is metaphysics actually telling us about underlying reality?) it is not relevant.

For the people that are interested in the topic it would be worth getting together and coming up with attempts to justify the claim, demonstrating its logical validity, presenting counterarguments and rebuttals, etc, so that you have an airtight solid position. That's metaphysics.

Great, but it tells us nothing about reality. It only tells us about shitty or good logical reasoning. You see what I'm trying to get at?

If you don't care about justifying claims you make then you won't have any interest or use in the fields that justify claims.

Irrelevant to what is being asked of you. Show me where metaphysics tells us anything about reality. One line responses don't count.

[Mr.Samsa]

I was hoping for more than just a repeat of former assertions. How does it fail to sound like an assessment of reality??

'Huh?!? Now you're sounding like Lion or Rainbow. What exactly are you asking me?

You were using snarky throwaway lines rather than arguing your position so I thought I'd take a break and use your same lines. The underlying point was that you're not providing any reasons as to why you're right or think the way you do, you're simply rejecting what I say without any justification. What the fuck am I supposed to do about that?

It seems to me that you are asking me how making an empty statement about metaphysics investigating blah blah blah isn't a patently obvious insufficient explanation as to how it tells us something about reality. If so, then it's pretty fucking obvious - WE KNOW NOTHING ABOUT REALITY. How the hell can logic (let alone anything) tell us anything about something we know nothing about??

No, you have to explain why you think it's an empty statement and why you think we can know nothing about reality, or that logic can't do this. So far you've just been asserting over and over again that it can't. Show your working.

But, as demonstrated with my example that you tried to dodge, we know for a fact that it's a terrible method for investigating reality in itself.

Bullshit. We know absolutely zero about reality. Where are you pulling this crap from? SHOW YOUR WORKING. How do we know that science is good, bad, average, anything... in regards to reality??

I did show my working and you are still ignoring it. Re-read the discussion where I introduced the thought experiment. If empiricism cannot explain or describe reality if we lived in an idealist world (or solipsist, or dualist, etc etc) and it can only describe reality if reality happened to align with an empiricist view, then it is functionally useless.

It would be a broken clock approach to understanding reality, in the sense that most of the time it's useless but if the time just happened to align with where the hands are stuck then it could give us the right time.

If you don't agree that a method which can only give correct results through purely accidental means, and in a way where we have no actual way of knowing if its right or not, is a terrible method THEN SHOW YOUR FUCKING WORKING.

It would tell us absolutely nothing in that situation so how can it be a valid method to use?

Who said it was a valid method to use?? Your "argument" in these two threads has been utterly confused.

...Are you fucking serious now? I argued that it was a terrible method to use. You disagreed. What the fuck am I supposed to conclude here?

What's most ironic about this is that you appear to be jumping at anti-philosophy shadows the same way the idiots at ratskep jump at imagined hidden theist arguments in philosophy threads. You keep (in the two threads) erecting strawmen, that are totally irrelevant to anything anyone has said.

Except you did say it. That's what this whole discussion is about. You argued that empiricism could be a valid way of telling us things about reality, I explained exactly how and why it wasn't. And now you're saying that you weren't saying that it could be a valid method to use? Seriously?

Come the fuck on.

Because metaphysics is about generating knowledge about claims we make regarding reality. The areas of metaphysics who think we can access reality use those things I mention as evidence for those particular views to make them more or less likely, but the areas of metaphysics who think we can't access reality use evidence to support their claim that they cannot access reality. The latter group does not need to access reality in some way in order to claim that reality cannot be accessed - in fact, if they could access it then it would refute their own metaphysical position!

So what about the former ones? The things you mentioned - is that parsimony and pragmatism? If so, we can deal with that in the other thread. But I don't see them as evidence of anything. They are just philosophical assumptions.

They aren't assumptions, they are logical arguments/evidence. They give us information about what claims we should lend more weight to - for example, if two ideas are identical in every way except one posits an unnecessary entity, then we can argue that we should lend more weight to the one that doesn't multiply beyond necessity. This argument can be based on a whole host of factors but at the end of the day it swings us towards one over the other.

There is nothing special about it, it's just an area of inquiry. People make claims about reality (e.g. "the soul exists", "what we observe is just a veil for something that exists behind it", "what I observe is real", "you cannot access reality beyond observation", etc) and metaphysics is the area that investigates the validity of these claims.

Yeah, but the point I keep making is that we know zero about reality. Therefore we can't investigate claims as to their validity and likelihood of being about reality, outside of bread and butter logic. Therefore, I don't see what's so special about metaphysics. It doesn't tell us anything more than ye olde logic does. Hence why "metaphysical evidence", seems like a dog and pony show.

But why do you think it can't tell us anything about reality? You haven't explained yourself there, especially since my examples show that it does tell us a lot of useful things.

Because it's a diverse field, as I mentioned above. And if we assess the logic of claims about reality then we are saying something about reality.

So you keep asserting, but you haven't shown how this is the case. Once again, we know ZERO about reality. Therefore, how can be certain we are "saying something about reality". i.e. metaphysical reality, not the word 'reality' in a sentence.

By definition it's true. If you say "logic can't tell us anything about reality" then you are, by definition, making a claim about reality (i.e. that it can't be understood/investigated through the use of logic).

It's only "circular" in the sense that a definition must necessarily be self-referential. By definition, if you are making claims about reality then you are engaging in the act of making claims about reality (i.e. metaphysics).

I really wish you would quote the conversation leading up to the bits you do bother quoting. The way you quote makes it very difficult (well, at least very annoying) to go back and find exactly what was said and in what context. I'm sick of going back to find out context, so I'm just going to guess here. I suspect you were making some claim about how metaphysics tells us about reality. You then wound up trying to justify that claim by giving the definition of metaphysics. That's circular.

I quote the entirety of my post and the entirety of the relevant part of your post. You want me to post the entirety of your post preceding mine as well? What about my post before that? There has to be a limit, and I tend to quote more relevant sections than most other people - to the point where it pisses people off that I'm providing so much context.

With that said, everything you need context-wise is in that comment. Your reply was based directly on my comment and had nothing to do with the preceding discussion.

To recap: you said that logical reasoning can't give us access to reality. I explained that in order to justify that claim about reality then you'd need to utilise the methods of the field of inquiry concerned with justifying claims about reality. That's "circular" only in the sense that it must absolutely be true.

Again, calling definitions "circular" is one of the most absurd things I've ever heard.

If only you'd bother quoting properly we could explore this more. But I'm only left to guess at what we were discussing.

It's all quoted there. If you can't respond then just say so, don't pretend that it's anyone else's fault that you were shown up.

I've responded to this in the other thread but I find it weird that you think a logically impossible concept is just as likely as a logically possible one. That is just baffling to me.

As I said there, stop with the juvenile 'gotcha' bullshit. If you've got an argument to make, then make it. I don't know why substance dualism would be illogical. That's not to say it's not, just that I haven't thought about it. So if you want to explain why it is illogical, then do that. And THEN ask your question.

There's no fucking "gotcha" moment, you are making claims and I am refuting them. That's how a discussion goes. If you're upset that I keep showing you to be wrong then explain how you're right or how I'm mistaken, don't fall back on some empty claim that it's a "gotcha" moment.

To recap: you claimed that without empirical evidence there is no way to prefer one option over another. I present two options, one is logically impossible and the other is logically possible. There is no empirical information on the two options. Your position says that you have to remain agnostic on the probability of either being true, I'm saying that this is fucking ridiculous and even you must recognise that you can prefer the logically possible one over the logically impossible one.

Why should it care about your respect? Many people think that art history is a pointless and stupid topic, but it still rolls on regardless of the opinion of some ignorant dude.

I'm trying to get you to explain why it is important. I accept that it is a serious field. But I want to know WHY. You are the proxy for metaphysics in this discussion. By me saying that I can't respect it over some other random wibble, is not a literal. It means that you aren't convincing me of why it is an important field. If you can't be bothered, then that's fine. But effectively saying it's an important field because it factually is, is not explaining anything. I accept it's an important field. I want you to explain WHY.

You'd need to tell me what you consider as "important". It's just an academic field trying to answer questions that they find interesting, I don't see why it needs any "importance" beyond that.

The best example is the one I've given above: you think that we can't say anything meaningful about reality. Great, that's a metaphysical claim.

Yeah, but it's not a claim about reality. It says absolutely nothing about what reality is or isn't. It just says whether I think we can access or know anything about reality or not. So in the context of the question I keep wanting you to answer (that is, what is metaphysics actually telling us about underlying reality?) it is not relevant.

It is a claim about reality, it even uses the word "reality" in the claim. Metaphysics attempts to understand what kinds of things we can and cannot know about reality, and one of those things is whether it's even possible to know anything about reality. That's a claim about reality. Literally.

For the people that are interested in the topic it would be worth getting together and coming up with attempts to justify the claim, demonstrating its logical validity, presenting counterarguments and rebuttals, etc, so that you have an airtight solid position. That's metaphysics.

Great, but it tells us nothing about reality. It only tells us about shitty or good logical reasoning. You see what I'm trying to get at?

That you don't like the word "metaphysics" for some reason?

If you don't care about justifying claims you make then you won't have any interest or use in the fields that justify claims.

Irrelevant to what is being asked of you. Show me where metaphysics tells us anything about reality. One line responses don't count.

I've given you so many examples now. At this point if you don't want to understand it then there's no point me explaining it again and again. I'll try once more and that's it: if something is logically impossible then does that tell us something about reality? Of course it does. It tells us what reality can't look like.

If you disagree, show your working. One line responses don't count.

[pErvinalia]

I was hoping for more than just a repeat of former assertions. How does it fail to sound like an assessment of reality??

'Huh?!? Now you're sounding like Lion or Rainbow. What exactly are you asking me?

You were using snarky throwaway lines rather than arguing your position so I thought I'd take a break and use your same lines.

No I wasn't. I was pointing out that you are making assertions (often single line arguments) without any reasoning to back them up. There's nothing snarky about that.

And your response is to go juvenile?? Well done. How about you actually address the questions and answer them with more than empty assertions?

The underlying point was that you're not providing any reasons as to why you're right or think the way you do, you're simply rejecting what I say without any justification. What the fuck am I supposed to do about that?

I'm not the one making positive claims. You are explaining metaphysics to us, and we are providing rebuttals to points that appear to us to make no sense or have holes in their logic. It's up to you to address these, or go away. We don't have to provide evidence of anything, as we aren't making positive claims.

It seems to me that you are asking me how making an empty statement about metaphysics investigating blah blah blah isn't a patently obvious insufficient explanation as to how it tells us something about reality. If so, then it's pretty fucking obvious - WE KNOW NOTHING ABOUT REALITY. How the hell can logic (let alone anything) tell us anything about something we know nothing about??

No, you have to explain why you think it's an empty statement

I have repeatedly. Answering a complex question with one sentence is the very epitome of empty statements. You've done it regularly in these two threads.

and why you think we can know nothing about reality, or that logic can't do this. So far you've just been asserting over and over again that it can't. Show your working.

I don't have to show my working, Samsa. That's the null hypothesis. You're a scientist, you know how this works. YOU are the one claiming that we can access information about the underlying reality (i.e. potentially something distinct from what we see with our own eyes and instruments). It's up to YOU to prove something exists that we can't see with our own eyes and instruments. If you posited that unicorns where real and I said we know absolutely zero about unicorns, would it make sense for you to claim I have to show my working? Of course not. That would be idiotic. You know this. Stop playing games.

But, as demonstrated with my example that you tried to dodge, we know for a fact that it's a terrible method for investigating reality in itself.

Bullshit. We know absolutely zero about reality. Where are you pulling this crap from? SHOW YOUR WORKING. How do we know that science is good, bad, average, anything... in regards to reality??

I did show my working and you are still ignoring it. Re-read the discussion where I introduced the thought experiment. If empiricism cannot explain or describe reality if we lived in an idealist world (or solipsist, or dualist, etc etc) and it can only describe reality if reality happened to align with an empiricist view, then it is functionally useless.

It would be a broken clock approach to understanding reality, in the sense that most of the time it's useless but if the time just happened to align with where the hands are stuck then it could give us the right time.

This is primary school logic, Samsa. None of that shows that science is a terrible method for investigating reality. Why? BECAUSE WE HAVE NO CLUE WHAT REALITY IS. Once again, you are making a positive statement about what reality is (i.e. you are positively claiming that it is not what we physically see/measure). YOU have to provide evidence to back up your claim, or be summarily dismissed. Whatever underlying reality is, we have no way at present of knowing whether science is good, bad, average, or anything. This is simple stuff. On one hand you get all riled up at people who positively claim that science is a good method for investigating reality, but on the other hand you commit the diametrically opposite failure. You positive assert that science is crap at determining reality. You simply have NO way of knowing this. But if you do, go ahead and show us how science is definitively a crap method for accessing reality. To prove that, you will have to somehow prove that underlying reality ISN'T what science is measuring how. Good luck with that.

If you don't agree that a method which can only give correct results through purely accidental means, and in a way where we have no actual way of knowing if its right or not, is a terrible method THEN SHOW YOUR FUCKING WORKING.

I have shown my working, time and time again. As I've just done again above. You are struggling with primary school level logic.

It would tell us absolutely nothing in that situation so how can it be a valid method to use?

Who said it was a valid method to use?? Your "argument" in these two threads has been utterly confused.

...Are you fucking serious now? I argued that it was a terrible method to use. You disagreed. What the fuck am I supposed to conclude here?

For a start, you should dispense with the false dichotomies. The options aren't just terrible and good. Or even terrible and good and average and ok and moderately informative. There's an agnostic position that I've made clear numerous times to you. How about you start with what I have written, hey?

What's most ironic about this is that you appear to be jumping at anti-philosophy shadows the same way the idiots at ratskep jump at imagined hidden theist arguments in philosophy threads. You keep (in the two threads) erecting strawmen, that are totally irrelevant to anything anyone has said.

Except you did say it. That's what this whole discussion is about. You argued that empiricism could be a valid way of telling us things about reality, I explained exactly how and why it wasn't. And now you're saying that you weren't saying that it could be a valid method to use? Seriously?

Come the fuck on.

This is why you get pinged with the misrepresentation thing all the time. You either are deliberately misrepresenting or you can't parse simple English. I said it COULD POTENTIALLY be valid, not THAT IT WAS. So yes, how about you come the fuck on and learn to read?

Here's what I said you dishonest cunt: " I said that empiricism has the potential to perhaps provide us with clues about the true nature of reality. Not that it must, or even does." That looks absolutely nothing like the shameful misrepresentation you've presented above. No wonder you defend Strontium Dog with his idiotic misrepresentations like this.

Because metaphysics is about generating knowledge about claims we make regarding reality. The areas of metaphysics who think we can access reality use those things I mention as evidence for those particular views to make them more or less likely, but the areas of metaphysics who think we can't access reality use evidence to support their claim that they cannot access reality. The latter group does not need to access reality in some way in order to claim that reality cannot be accessed - in fact, if they could access it then it would refute their own metaphysical position!

So what about the former ones? The things you mentioned - is that parsimony and pragmatism? If so, we can deal with that in the other thread. But I don't see them as evidence of anything. They are just philosophical assumptions.

They aren't assumptions, they are logical arguments/evidence. They give us information about what claims we should lend more weight to - for example, if two ideas are identical in every way except one posits an unnecessary entity, then we can argue that we should lend more weight to the one that doesn't multiply beyond necessity. This argument can be based on a whole host of factors but at the end of the day it swings us towards one over the other.

Once again, this tells us nothing about reality. Parsimony tells us absolutely nothing about anything, other than practicalities in investigating ideas. And they are assumptions the way you use them. "They give us information about what claims we should lend more weight to - for example, if two ideas are identical in every way except one posits an unnecessary entity, then we can argue that we should lend more weight to the one that doesn't multiply beyond necessity." That employs an assumption, not a statement reflecting any underlying reality.

There is nothing special about it, it's just an area of inquiry. People make claims about reality (e.g. "the soul exists", "what we observe is just a veil for something that exists behind it", "what I observe is real", "you cannot access reality beyond observation", etc) and metaphysics is the area that investigates the validity of these claims.

Yeah, but the point I keep making is that we know zero about reality. Therefore we can't investigate claims as to their validity and likelihood of being about reality, outside of bread and butter logic. Therefore, I don't see what's so special about metaphysics. It doesn't tell us anything more than ye olde logic does. Hence why "metaphysical evidence", seems like a dog and pony show.

But why do you think it can't tell us anything about reality? You haven't explained yourself there,

I don't need to explain myself, Samsa. I'm not the one making a positive statement. I'm employing the null hypothesis. You're a scientist, you know this stuff. I no more have to explain how we don't know about something we can't see/touch/measure, than I have to explain how we don't know about unicorns.

especially since my examples show that it does tell us a lot of useful things.

"useful things". I specifically want you to back up your claims that metaphysics can tell us something about underlying reality. What does this underlying reality look/function like? How do we interact in our physical experience with this underlying reality? I wish you'd finally see what I am getting at. All metaphysics tells us about is the logical validity of arguments. It says absolutely nothing about underlying reality. If you think it does, then show us what it is saying about underlying reality. Start with the above questions if you like.

Because it's a diverse field, as I mentioned above. And if we assess the logic of claims about reality then we are saying something about reality.

So you keep asserting, but you haven't shown how this is the case. Once again, we know ZERO about reality. Therefore, how can be certain we are "saying something about reality". i.e. metaphysical reality, not the word 'reality' in a sentence.

By definition it's true. If you say "logic can't tell us anything about reality" then you are, by definition, making a claim about reality (i.e. that it can't be understood/investigated through the use of logic).

Gaah, this is basic logic that you are failing at, Samsa. You aren't making a claim about reality. You are making a claim about the investigation of reality. Not reality itself. Surely you can finally see this difference??

It's only "circular" in the sense that a definition must necessarily be self-referential. By definition, if you are making claims about reality then you are engaging in the act of making claims about reality (i.e. metaphysics).

I really wish you would quote the conversation leading up to the bits you do bother quoting. The way you quote makes it very difficult (well, at least very annoying) to go back and find exactly what was said and in what context. I'm sick of going back to find out context, so I'm just going to guess here. I suspect you were making some claim about how metaphysics tells us about reality. You then wound up trying to justify that claim by giving the definition of metaphysics. That's circular.

I quote the entirety of my post and the entirety of the relevant part of your post. You want me to post the entirety of your post preceding mine as well? What about my post before that? There has to be a limit, and I tend to quote more relevant sections than most other people - to the point where it pisses people off that I'm providing so much context.

Just do what most people do in a complex discussion, quote the maximum number of iterations that is allowable (I think it's five). There's simply no reason not to. By not doing that, you make it interminably hard to go and find exactly who said what and in what context. If I was being unkind I would say that you do this so that your repeated misrepresentations can't be so easily identified. To be honest, it seems like a fair hypothesis to me. You've got a long track record of this shit.

With that said, everything you need context-wise is in that comment. Your reply was based directly on my comment and had nothing to do with the preceding discussion.

I'm not just talking about that comment. I'm talking about most of your comments. In a complex discussion, it's much more beneficial to see the full context and see exactly who said what when.

And no, the full context isn't there. I can't see what your original statement was, so I can't judge at this point whether your rebuttal of my accusation of circularity is correct. I have to go and find your original quote and then assess your rebuttal. Just quote the full context, ffs. It's not hard.

Again, calling definitions "circular" is one of the most absurd things I've ever heard.

If only you'd bother quoting properly we could explore this more. But I'm only left to guess at what we were discussing.

It's all quoted there. If you can't respond then just say so, don't pretend that it's anyone else's fault that you were shown up.

Lol. You fail shockingly at basic logic, Samsa. As I just explained, without your original quote, which is what we are discussing here, a proper assessment of your rebuttal can't be made. This is basic logic. It really is no wonder that you can't understand what our objections to your assertions are.

I've responded to this in the other thread but I find it weird that you think a logically impossible concept is just as likely as a logically possible one. That is just baffling to me.

As I said there, stop with the juvenile 'gotcha' bullshit. If you've got an argument to make, then make it. I don't know why substance dualism would be illogical. That's not to say it's not, just that I haven't thought about it. So if you want to explain why it is illogical, then do that. And THEN ask your question.

There's no fucking "gotcha" moment, you are making claims and I am refuting them. That's how a discussion goes. If you're upset that I keep showing you to be wrong then explain how you're right or how I'm mistaken, don't fall back on some empty claim that it's a "gotcha" moment.

You are shocking at this logic game, man. You haven't shown how I am wrong. YOU'VE MADE A BARE ASSERTION THAT SUBSTANCE DUALISM IS ILLOGICAL. Until you show your working, that is simply a bare assertion. C'mon, you are smart enough to know this. I'm not one of the regular chumps you argue with at ratskep. You need to lift your game.

To recap: you claimed that without empirical evidence there is no way to prefer one option over another. I present two options, one is logically impossible and the other is logically possible. There is no empirical information on the two options. Your position says that you have to remain agnostic on the probability of either being true, I'm saying that this is fucking ridiculous and even you must recognise that you can prefer the logically possible one over the logically impossible one.

I can't believe I have to explain this to you. I clearly explained in my last post (and in the other thread) that you haven't shown why substance dualism is illogical. This is basic stuff. You are jumping at imaginary shadows. Lift your game.

Why should it care about your respect? Many people think that art history is a pointless and stupid topic, but it still rolls on regardless of the opinion of some ignorant dude.

I'm trying to get you to explain why it is important. I accept that it is a serious field. But I want to know WHY. You are the proxy for metaphysics in this discussion. By me saying that I can't respect it over some other random wibble, is not a literal. It means that you aren't convincing me of why it is an important field. If you can't be bothered, then that's fine. But effectively saying it's an important field because it factually is, is not explaining anything. I accept it's an important field. I want you to explain WHY.

You'd need to tell me what you consider as "important". It's just an academic field trying to answer questions that they find interesting, I don't see why it needs any "importance" beyond that.

It's important in the sense that it has it's own field. As I keep jokingly saying, there's no field for logical enquiry into picnic tables. This is obviously because it isn't an important field. I want to know why I should care about what metaphysics has given us beyond an explication of the various philosophical stances in regards to science and observation etc. This extra "reality" stuff, is not impressing me. I see no evidence concerning underlying reality. All I see is logical reasoning. As I said, I don't need the field of metaphysics to pull apart shonky logic.

The best example is the one I've given above: you think that we can't say anything meaningful about reality. Great, that's a metaphysical claim.

Yeah, but it's not a claim about reality. It says absolutely nothing about what reality is or isn't. It just says whether I think we can access or know anything about reality or not. So in the context of the question I keep wanting you to answer (that is, what is metaphysics actually telling us about underlying reality?) it is not relevant.

It is a claim about reality, it even uses the word "reality" in the claim. Metaphysics attempts to understand what kinds of things we can and cannot know about reality, and one of those things is whether it's even possible to know anything about reality. That's a claim about reality. Literally.

This is why I put the qualification earlier in this my previous post that I'm not interested in the trivially obvious aspect of metaphysics - that being that it literally involves the word "reality". That's idiotic. For the nth time, I want to know about these fantastical claims you make about metaphysics telling us something about underlying reality (i.e. the thing, not the fucking word ).

For the people that are interested in the topic it would be worth getting together and coming up with attempts to justify the claim, demonstrating its logical validity, presenting counterarguments and rebuttals, etc, so that you have an airtight solid position. That's metaphysics.

Great, but it tells us nothing about reality. It only tells us about shitty or good logical reasoning. You see what I'm trying to get at?

That you don't like the word "metaphysics" for some reason?

No, that you make baseless claims about the field. You keep claiming that it tells us something about reality. All it does is tell us about the validity of investigations into reality. That tells us sweet fuck all about reality itself. This is a fucking exceedingly simple point. Start getting it.

If you don't care about justifying claims you make then you won't have any interest or use in the fields that justify claims.

Irrelevant to what is being asked of you. Show me where metaphysics tells us anything about reality. One line responses don't count.

I've given you so many examples now.

No you haven't. You've given me three examples, and I've ignored the last one due to time and expediency. The first two tells us nothing whatsoever about reality. They are philosophical tools of practical value to researchers and thinkers. This has been explained to you. You haven't rebutted this point. You just keep saying the same original bare assertion over and over.

At this point if you don't want to understand it then there's no point me explaining it again and again. I'll try once more and that's it: if something is logically impossible then does that tell us something about reality? Of course it does. It tells us what reality can't look like.

NO IT DOESN'T! And i've rebutted this before and you haven't addressed it. You apparently don't know anything about logic. The underlying truth of a logical statement is only as good as its premises. If the premises are assumptions, then the truth of a logically coherent equation is only relevant to the condition of the assumptions. This is fucking basic stuff! You can't possibly hope to explain a subject that deals in logic if you don't understand the basics of logic itself.

If you disagree, show your working. One line responses don't count.

And juvenile shit doesn't count as well. I've explained my workings over and over again. I haven't made any one line assertions (other than presenting the null hypothesis). If you think I have, and you want to try and back your shit up, then show them.

[pErvinalia]

fucking jesus, that's a quote balls up. Don't reply to that till I fix the quotes. It could take some time.