DaveDodo007... I mean... Rationalskepticism,lol.

[pErvinalia]

The argument goes as follows:

x Claims have been made that logical reasoning is an example of metaphysical evidence.

x Theropod says that we should reject anything that is based on logical reasoning alone - i.e. because it is metaphysical evidence (something which he doesn't believe has any value or is even valid)

x Ugaboo points out that that would include rejecting mathematics.

x Weaver points out that other proponents of metaphysics (most notably Jamest) have said that Mathematics isn't a metaphysical concept. Therefore, he made the point that some metaphysicians claim that maths is a metaphysical concept (Ugaboo did when he challenged what Theropod said), while others (jamest) claim that it isn't.

x The main problem with Weaver's statement was the confusion around the use of "you". That's what he was challenged about by most, and that's what he apologised for and clarified. You are the only one who is continuing the battle over what he said.

The main problem still exists - that ughaibu pointing out the error in Theropod's position has nothing to do with metaphysics.

I (and Weaver) think it does. Theropod has been arguing against metaphysics the whole thread, but that lead him to the silly position that he has to reject logical reasoning. Ugaboo pointed out one aspect of why that was silly, as Maths relies on logical reasoning (and in my view, and I suspect his view, it is a metaphysical system).

Why would rejecting mathematics as a metaphysical concept be at all relevant to the claim that logical reasoning is an example of metaphysical evidence? The only way that would make sense is if someone had said that ALL logical reasoning IS metaphysical evidence, but that's just fucking insane.

I don't know why that would be insane. If it's not metaphysical, what is it then? It's certainly not empirical. Are there other types of things out there?

Both mathematics and metaphysics rely on logical reasoning but they don't need to overlap.

Ok, explain why they don't need to overlap. What other types of evidence are there out there?

The confusion over "you" was irrelevant. That's not what ughaibu himself was confused over (who surely is the most relevant person?).

I'd have to go back to that point in the thread and read it, but I thought he was hung up over the "you" thing.

[Scott1328]

Shit now it's happening here. Fuck.

[Mr.Samsa]

The main problem still exists - that ughaibu pointing out the error in Theropod's position has nothing to do with metaphysics.

I (and Weaver) think it does. Theropod has been arguing against metaphysics the whole thread, but that lead him to the silly position that he has to reject logical reasoning. Ugaboo pointed out one aspect of why that was silly, as Maths relies on logical reasoning (and in my view, and I suspect his view, it is a metaphysical system).

I don't think ughaibu thinks that maths is a metaphysical system. He pointed out why Theropod was wrong because his comment led to the rejection of all things based on logical reasoning, like mathematics. There's no reason to assume that ughaibu was arguing against him because he believed that mathematics was a part of metaphysics or a metaphysical system (especially since, if I recall correctly, ughaibu doesn't actually believe that).

Why would rejecting mathematics as a metaphysical concept be at all relevant to the claim that logical reasoning is an example of metaphysical evidence? The only way that would make sense is if someone had said that ALL logical reasoning IS metaphysical evidence, but that's just fucking insane.

I don't know why that would be insane. If it's not metaphysical, what is it then? It's certainly not empirical. Are there other types of things out there?

...So if I say "all ducks are yellow, Bob is a duck, therefore Bob is yellow", I am using metaphysics to reach that conclusion? Of course there are things other than metaphysical and empirical. There are logical entities, abstract concepts, fictional notions, etc etc. These can have metaphysical connotations, empirical ones, or neither.

Both mathematics and metaphysics rely on logical reasoning but they don't need to overlap.

Ok, explain why they don't need to overlap. What other types of evidence are there out there?

I don't see a need to point out another kind of evidence as that would be irrelevant. As I explained with the biology and physics example, two things can rely on the same kind of evidence without that evidence necessarily be relevant to each field.

Saying that mathematics is a logical system doesn't mean that all logical systems are mathematics, neither does saying that metaphysics is a logical system. Maybe it would help if we discuss another kind of logical system: ethics. Ethics is based on logical reasoning and so is mathematics, but mathematics is pretty much irrelevant to ethics - the truth or validity of claims like "1+1=2" has no bearing on whether we should value well-being and avoid suffering or whatever moral values take your fancy.

The confusion over "you" was irrelevant. That's not what ughaibu himself was confused over (who surely is the most relevant person?).

I'd have to go back to that point in the thread and read it, but I thought he was hung up over the "you" thing.

Nah, his concern was over the weird conflation of metaphysics and maths (this is his only comment before his suspension but when I discussed it with him afterwards he didn't seem to disagree with my interpretation of his confusion).

In his comment he refers to "drawing a Venn diagram", which refers to the use of logical reasoning in each field without them necessarily overlapping. That is, imagine a big circle called "logical reasoning" and within that circle there are two smaller circles, one labelled "metaphysics" and one labelled "mathematics". The two smaller circles don't (necessarily) touch.

[pErvinalia]

Ok, I just went back and read the few pages around "the incident" and I really need to read further back to get the gist of the story line. I'm not going to do that. I don't care that much. But from what I read, I wasn't entirely clear on what Ugaboo was trying to say. He gave a "wtf?" at his mistaken belief that Weaver was claiming that metaphysics excluded mathematics, which would seem to me to indicate that he thinks mathematics is part of metaphysics. But he wibbled a bit about "belief of natural selection" vs "natural selection" and how the former was a metaphysical stance and the latter wasn't (I'm not sure of the distinction). The thing with natural selection was that it was paired with mathematics when he took Theropod to task about reasoned evidence. He also said that it was entirely possible to hold to a logically reasoned position without it being metaphysical (which would seem to exclude mathematics from metaphysics). All up, I'm a bit confused, and I suspect Weaver could have been as well. I don't think it's entirely clear what point Ugaboo was making in his reply to Theropod. He could have simply been rubbishing outside of the context of metaphysics, but the whole discussion was about metaphysics, so it would seem strange to take it out of that context. We'll have to see what he says when he gets back from suspension.

[LucidFlight]

Ugaboo.

[pErvinalia]

The main problem still exists - that ughaibu pointing out the error in Theropod's position has nothing to do with metaphysics.

I (and Weaver) think it does. Theropod has been arguing against metaphysics the whole thread, but that lead him to the silly position that he has to reject logical reasoning. Ugaboo pointed out one aspect of why that was silly, as Maths relies on logical reasoning (and in my view, and I suspect his view, it is a metaphysical system).

I don't think ughaibu thinks that maths is a metaphysical system. He pointed out why Theropod was wrong because his comment led to the rejection of all things based on logical reasoning, like mathematics. There's no reason to assume that ughaibu was arguing against him because he believed that mathematics was a part of metaphysics or a metaphysical system (especially since, if I recall correctly, ughaibu doesn't actually believe that).

He could have been doing that, but the whole discussion was in the context of logical evidence being metaphysics. It seems silly to take a statement out of it's broader context (i.e. it would be silly if Ugaboo did that when he made his reply).

Why would rejecting mathematics as a metaphysical concept be at all relevant to the claim that logical reasoning is an example of metaphysical evidence? The only way that would make sense is if someone had said that ALL logical reasoning IS metaphysical evidence, but that's just fucking insane.

I don't know why that would be insane. If it's not metaphysical, what is it then? It's certainly not empirical. Are there other types of things out there?

...So if I say "all ducks are yellow, Bob is a duck, therefore Bob is yellow", I am using metaphysics to reach that conclusion? Of course there are things other than metaphysical and empirical. There are logical entities, abstract concepts, fictional notions, etc etc. These can have metaphysical connotations, empirical ones, or neither.

I'm certainly no philosopher, but I assumed that logic (which is an abstract concept) and other abstract concepts are all metaphysical. I.e. they aren't physical. What else is there other than physical and not-physical?

Both mathematics and metaphysics rely on logical reasoning but they don't need to overlap.

Ok, explain why they don't need to overlap. What other types of evidence are there out there?

I don't see a need to point out another kind of evidence as that would be irrelevant. As I explained with the biology and physics example, two things can rely on the same kind of evidence without that evidence necessarily be relevant to each field.

Saying that mathematics is a logical system doesn't mean that all logical systems are mathematics, neither does saying that metaphysics is a logical system. Maybe it would help if we discuss another kind of logical system: ethics. Ethics is based on logical reasoning and so is mathematics, but mathematics is pretty much irrelevant to ethics - the truth or validity of claims like "1+1=2" has no bearing on whether we should value well-being and avoid suffering or whatever moral values take your fancy.

If logic is a subset of metaphysics (like I assumed it was) then this doesn't address my point. If we have only two types of things: physical and metaphysical, then mathematics has to be metaphysical. That of course doesn't mean that everything that is metaphysical is mathematical, but that's irrelevant to the point I am making.

The confusion over "you" was irrelevant. That's not what ughaibu himself was confused over (who surely is the most relevant person?).

I'd have to go back to that point in the thread and read it, but I thought he was hung up over the "you" thing.

Nah, his concern was over the weird conflation of metaphysics and maths (this is his only comment before his suspension but when I discussed it with him afterwards he didn't seem to disagree with my interpretation of his confusion).

In his comment he refers to "drawing a Venn diagram", which refers to the use of logical reasoning in each field without them necessarily overlapping. That is, imagine a big circle called "logical reasoning" and within that circle there are two smaller circles, one labelled "metaphysics" and one labelled "mathematics". The two smaller circles don't (necessarily) touch.

I think that's a flawed interpretation of what he was saying there. He gave a "wtf?" about the suggestion that metaphysics excludes mathematics (i.e. in a venn diagram they would be non-overlapping circles - which is the opposite of what he was saying; that is, they do overlap). As I was imaging the system, the big circle would be 'metaphysics' and within it would be a bunch of other circles some overlapping some not, including 'mathematics'.

[pErvinalia]

Ugaboo.

[Mr.Samsa]

Ok, I just went back and read the few pages around "the incident" and I really need to read further back to get the gist of the story line. I'm not going to do that. I don't care that much. But from what I read, I wasn't entirely clear on what Ugaboo was trying to say. He gave a "wtf?" at his mistaken belief that Weaver was claiming that metaphysics excluded mathematics, which would seem to me to indicate that he thinks mathematics is part of metaphysics.

I think it's more that he's confused over what that claim even means and how it's relevant to what he said. This is demonstrated by the fact that in his initial comment about maths he also used a second example - natural selection. He explicitly states later that he's not saying that natural selection has anything to do with metaphysics.

So why would he use two examples, one which is supposed part of metaphysics whilst the other he states isn't?

But he wibbled a bit about "belief of natural selection" vs "natural selection" and how the former was a metaphysical stance and the latter wasn't (I'm not sure of the distinction).

That was a split off discussion from the comment he made, as Theropod went on to suggest that natural selection was (essentially) metaphysically true. The distinction he was making there was just that the process of natural described to explain observations is not a metaphysical position because it makes no claims about reality, whereas specific beliefs about natural selection (e.g. "it's a true description of the real world") are metaphysical claims.

The relevant part is in this comment though where he makes reference to the fact that he brought up the idea to discuss the reasoned arguments behind natural selection (i.e. the logical reasoning that Theropod rejects), and he didn't bring it up to make a metaphysical claim.

The thing with natural selection was that it was paired with mathematics when he took Theropod to task about reasoned evidence.

Exactly.

He also said that it was entirely possible to hold to a logically reasoned position without it being metaphysical (which would seem to exclude mathematics from metaphysics).

What, how?! That would entail the position that mathematics can potentially be a logically reasoned position that isn't metaphysical. It cannot be interpreted as saying that this is necessarily the case (not that it matters anyway in the discussion).

All up, I'm a bit confused, and I suspect Weaver could have been as well. I don't think it's entirely clear what point Ugaboo was making in his reply to Theropod. He could have simply been rubbishing outside of the context of metaphysics, but the whole discussion was about metaphysics, so it would seem strange to take it out of that context. We'll have to see what he says when he gets back from suspension.

The context is simply Theropod rejecting fields based on logical reasoning. Mathematics being an example of such a field. Everything else is irrelevant.

We don't need to wait for ughaibu to get back, I've spoken to him and my interpretation seems to be correct.

I don't think ughaibu thinks that maths is a metaphysical system. He pointed out why Theropod was wrong because his comment led to the rejection of all things based on logical reasoning, like mathematics. There's no reason to assume that ughaibu was arguing against him because he believed that mathematics was a part of metaphysics or a metaphysical system (especially since, if I recall correctly, ughaibu doesn't actually believe that).

He could have been doing that, but the whole discussion was in the context of logical evidence being metaphysics. It seems silly to take a statement out of it's broader context (i.e. it would be silly if Ugaboo did that when he made his reply).

There's no need to "take it out of its broader context", it's still relevant to the discussion it's just that you and Weaver seem to be drawing odd conclusions from it. Theropod tried to make the claim that fields based on logical reasoning are simply opinion, and ughaibu makes the accurate claim that this would entail a rejection of mathematics (since it's a field based on logical reasoning). That's it, that's the argument - Theropod refuted (unless he also rejects mathematics).

There is no need to make up this idea that the logical reasoning from one field must be relevant to all fields that use logical reasoning. Science itself is based on logical reasoning as well but that doesn't mean it necessarily makes metaphysical claims.

...So if I say "all ducks are yellow, Bob is a duck, therefore Bob is yellow", I am using metaphysics to reach that conclusion? Of course there are things other than metaphysical and empirical. There are logical entities, abstract concepts, fictional notions, etc etc. These can have metaphysical connotations, empirical ones, or neither.

I'm certainly no philosopher, but I assumed that logic (which is an abstract concept) and other abstract concepts are all metaphysical. I.e. they aren't physical. What else is there other than physical and not-physical?

Metaphysical doesn't mean "non-physical". Metaphysics refers to the study of what's real. If you hold a metaphysical position like physicalism then you believe that what is metaphysically true is the physical world and that there is no such thing as a "non-physical" thing.

Logic and abstract entities are not metaphysical.

I don't see a need to point out another kind of evidence as that would be irrelevant. As I explained with the biology and physics example, two things can rely on the same kind of evidence without that evidence necessarily be relevant to each field.

Saying that mathematics is a logical system doesn't mean that all logical systems are mathematics, neither does saying that metaphysics is a logical system. Maybe it would help if we discuss another kind of logical system: ethics. Ethics is based on logical reasoning and so is mathematics, but mathematics is pretty much irrelevant to ethics - the truth or validity of claims like "1+1=2" has no bearing on whether we should value well-being and avoid suffering or whatever moral values take your fancy.

If logic is a subset of metaphysics (like I assumed it was) then this doesn't address my point. If we have only two types of things: physical and metaphysical, then mathematics has to be metaphysical. That of course doesn't mean that everything that is metaphysical is mathematical, but that's irrelevant to the point I am making.

Logic is not a subset of metaphysics, metaphysics is (more or less for the sake of simplicity here) a subset of logic. And as mentioned above, "metaphysics" is not the opposite to physical.

Nah, his concern was over the weird conflation of metaphysics and maths (this is his only comment before his suspension but when I discussed it with him afterwards he didn't seem to disagree with my interpretation of his confusion).

In his comment he refers to "drawing a Venn diagram", which refers to the use of logical reasoning in each field without them necessarily overlapping. That is, imagine a big circle called "logical reasoning" and within that circle there are two smaller circles, one labelled "metaphysics" and one labelled "mathematics". The two smaller circles don't (necessarily) touch.

I think that's a flawed interpretation of what he was saying there. He gave a "wtf?" about the suggestion that metaphysics excludes mathematics (i.e. in a venn diagram they would be non-overlapping circles - which is the opposite of what he was saying; that is, they do overlap). As I was imaging the system, the big circle would be 'metaphysics' and within it would be a bunch of other circles some overlapping some not, including 'mathematics'.

Like I say, I've spoken to him and I'm right.

Anyway, I think I can see where your confusion is coming from now. Is it a common belief that metaphysics means "non-physical"? Maybe that's where Weaver is slipping up. It would certainly explain the irrational anger of members on RatSkep over the suggestion that they were making "metaphysical" claims...

[Hermit]

Is it a common belief that metaphysics means "non-physical"? Maybe that's where Weaver is slipping up.

At the risk of initiating yet another tangent let me ask this: Can metaphysics be regarded as treating noumena, empiricism as treating phenomena, and logic an axiomatically based methodology of thought?

[pErvinalia]

@Samsa, replace "physical" for "empirical". That's what I meant, despite using the wrong terminology.

[Mr.Samsa]

Is it a common belief that metaphysics means "non-physical"? Maybe that's where Weaver is slipping up.

At the risk of initiating yet another tangent let me ask this: Can metaphysics be regarded as treating noumena, empiricism as treating phenomena, and logic an axiomatically based methodology of thought?

Empiricism can be about phenomena AND noumena, it just depends on how strongly it's stated. For example, you can accept the idea that using our senses is a valuable method for generating knowledge about the observable world and it would be consistent with methodological naturalism, a non-metaphysical position which limits its claims to what we can see for the sake of practicality. But then we could say that using our senses is the only method for generating knowledge about the real world, in which case it would be closer to metaphysical naturalism and as such a metaphysical position.

Essentially, empiricism is just an epistemological position - that is, a claim about what knowledge is and how we can get it. This theory of knowledge can be applied to different positions, some metaphysical and some not.

Otherwise I think I'd agree with what you said.

@Samsa, replace "physical" for "empirical". That's what I meant, despite using the wrong terminology.

That doesn't really help though as you get the same problem. Metaphysics isn't the non-empirical and you can have metaphysical positions which are focused and grounded entirely in the empirical - e.g. scientific and naive realism.

[pErvinalia]

Those aren't based in the empirical. They are based in the application of some form of logic. Any empirical observations are irrelevant to that metaphysical stance. The only relevance of the empirical, is that they occur.

Basically, what is "metaphysical evidence", if it is not something distinct from empirical evidence? And what is it that it is distinct from logical reasoning. I assumed logic was metaphysical, but if it isn't necessarily, that means that metaphysical evidence has some distinction from logical reasoning. What is it?

[Hermit]

Empiricism can be about phenomena AND noumena, it just depends on how strongly it's stated. For example, you can accept the idea that using our senses is a valuable method for generating knowledge about the observable world and it would be consistent with methodological naturalism, a non-metaphysical position which limits its claims to what we can see for the sake of practicality. But then we could say that using our senses is the only method for generating knowledge about the real world, in which case it would be closer to metaphysical naturalism and as such a metaphysical position.

Essentially, empiricism is just an epistemological position - that is, a claim about what knowledge is and how we can get it. This theory of knowledge can be applied to different positions, some metaphysical and some not.

Perhaps I should have mentioned that when I mentioned empiricism I was referring to the Humean variant. It neither rejects noumena nor embraces them, It simply ignores the issue altogether. As categories empiricism, metaphysics and logic are totally distinct. That is why I prefer my definitions to yours. In practice, of course, empiricists will too frequently stray into the metaphysical domain and metaphysicians tend to help themselves to generous portions of empirically derived knowledge. Neither of those two domains are of any use without the use of the third domain - logic.

[Mr.Samsa]

Those aren't based in the empirical. They are based in the application of some form of logic. Any empirical observations are irrelevant to that metaphysical stance. The only relevance of the empirical, is that they occur.

They are based in the empirical and justified by the logical. The point is simply that the metaphysics in that framework is the empirical and it would make no sense to contrast metaphysics with the empirical.

You can contrast metaphysical evidence with empirical evidence, that would make sense, but the important distinction is that it's the evidence which is not empirical, rather than the object itself.

Basically, what is "metaphysical evidence", if it is not something distinct from empirical evidence?

As above, the evidence is distinct from each other but metaphysics is not distinct from the empirical.

And what is it that it is distinct from logical reasoning.

The evidence in metaphysics is logical reasoning, yes.

I assumed logic was metaphysical, but if it isn't necessarily, that means that metaphysical evidence has some distinction from logical reasoning. What is it?

The distinction is that metaphysical evidence is a subset of logic. Logic is just a framework of axioms and principles that lead us to valid conclusions - when applied to metaphysics it is metaphysical evidence, when applied to maths it is mathematical evidence, when applied to ethics it is ethical evidence. Those fields (and more) utilise logic to reach conclusions but they don't necessarily utilise the logic and principles from other fields.

Again, I refer back to my example of biology and physics. They both utilise empirical evidence, but the empirical evidence in biology is not necessarily relevant to physics. The same applies to maths and metaphysics in that they both utilise logical reasoning but the reasoning used in maths is not necessarily relevant to metaphysics.

[pErvinalia]

Ok, I'm still not getting it. Explain to me the difference between empiricism and metaphysics. If they are distinct views of the world/reality (which is what I thought they were) then I don't see how they can have overlapping "evidence".

EDit: from wiki article on metaphysics (not sure how accurate this is):

Thereafter, metaphysics denoted philosophical enquiry of a non-empirical character into the nature of existence.[6

That would seem to suggest that the two concepts/world-views are non-overlapping.