New account of Air France flight 447 disaster published

[klr]

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/12/08/flight_447/

New account of Flight 447 disaster published

Computer rashly let meatsacks take over

By Andrew Orlowski

Lack of manual flying experience contributed to the crash of a fully functional commercial airliner two years ago, killing all 228 people aboard.

Air France Flight 447 crashed while flying through an Atlantic storm in July 2009, the worst ever French aviation accident. The black box recorders were not recovered for almost two years. They revealed that storm conditions caused instruments on the aircraft to temporarily malfunction, but that in fact it had crashed into the sea while completely airworthy, due to the pilots' failure to understand the situation. The official report concluded that lack of training in manual flying led them to actively fly the plane into the sea.

Now Popular Mechanics has published a step-by-step layman's explanation of the crash culled from black box recordings. Amongst the contributory factors were: confusion between the two inexperienced co-pilots, a possible failure to realise that the plane's flight computer - doubting its own assessment of the conditions - had temporarily allowed the pilots much more control authority than it normally would, and somewhat surprisingly a lack of synchronisation between the two joysticks.

Even more surprising is the lack of feedback. Even while the airline was plunging to earth at 10,000 feet per minute, the pilots were not certain whether it was climbing or falling.

It's old news, but it's a fascinating read - http://www.popularmechanics.com/print-t ... 7?page=all

Bootnote

Note that the magazine translates "putain" as "damn it", which isn't really accurate, something we attribute to prudery

[Seth]

First rule of flying in clouds: Pitot heat.

The biggest problem here is that there are fewer and fewer truly qualified big-iron pilots every year. New pilots these days are button-pushers who have little experience in unusual attitudes and self-analyzed emergency response. They don't get the in-flight training they should because airlines don't trust them, and mostly want to save money by flying computer-guided, tightly controlled flights that use as little fuel as possible, which means that pilots are actually prohibited from taking manual control of the aircraft either in flight or during landing and take off, except in an emergency, which means they get sloppy in their concentration, instrument scans, and indicator interpretation.

Airlines should be REQUIRED by law to force pilots and co-pilots to make at least one entirely manually-controlled flight per week, with use of only basic instruments and navigation equipment. No GPS, no flight control software or equipment, no autopilots. VORs, sectionals and approach charts ONLY.

[klr]

First rule of flying in clouds: Pitot heat.

The biggest problem here is that there are fewer and fewer truly qualified big-iron pilots every year. New pilots these days are button-pushers who have little experience in unusual attitudes and self-analyzed emergency response. They don't get the in-flight training they should because airlines don't trust them, and mostly want to save money by flying computer-guided, tightly controlled flights that use as little fuel as possible, which means that pilots are actually prohibited from taking manual control of the aircraft either in flight or during landing and take off, except in an emergency, which means they get sloppy in their concentration, instrument scans, and indicator interpretation.

Well, that's the take-home message of this alright. The plane was still flyable, but the pilots seemingly could hack it in the circumstances. And this is Air France. Makes you wonder what the average RyanAir pilot is like in a crisis ...

Airlines should be REQUIRED by law to force pilots and co-pilots to make at least one entirely manually-controlled flight per week, with use of only basic instruments and navigation equipment. No GPS, no flight control software or equipment, no autopilots. VORs, sectionals and approach charts ONLY.

Unfortunately, I can see some serious passenger safety issue/concerns for whichever flights draw the "manually controlled" straw. But there has to be some way of maintaining pilot proficiency.

[Seth]

First rule of flying in clouds: Pitot heat.

The biggest problem here is that there are fewer and fewer truly qualified big-iron pilots every year. New pilots these days are button-pushers who have little experience in unusual attitudes and self-analyzed emergency response. They don't get the in-flight training they should because airlines don't trust them, and mostly want to save money by flying computer-guided, tightly controlled flights that use as little fuel as possible, which means that pilots are actually prohibited from taking manual control of the aircraft either in flight or during landing and take off, except in an emergency, which means they get sloppy in their concentration, instrument scans, and indicator interpretation.

Well, that's the take-home message of this alright. The plane was still flyable, but the pilots seemingly could hack it in the circumstances. And this is Air France. Makes you wonder what the average RyanAir pilot is like in a crisis ...

Airlines should be REQUIRED by law to force pilots and co-pilots to make at least one entirely manually-controlled flight per week, with use of only basic instruments and navigation equipment. No GPS, no flight control software or equipment, no autopilots. VORs, sectionals and approach charts ONLY.

Unfortunately, I can see some serious passenger safety issue/concerns for whichever flights draw the "manually controlled" straw. But there has to be some way of maintaining pilot proficiency.

It shouldn't be a passenger safety issue at all for pilots to hand-fly the aircraft. Billions of passengers were safer I think before cockpit automation took over. What we see here is that it is cockpit automation itself that is in large part responsible for the accident.

[Gawdzilla Sama]

Sully would have saved 'em.

[HomerJay]

Does anyone remember a Big Black called Sound of Impact?

After reading the cover I thought US domestics flights were flown by monkeys who couldn't keep the thing in the air.

Have the stats improved with less monkey input?

[Jason]

Reading the account of the black box recording is chilling to say the least.. This Bonin was incredibly incompetent, but so was Robert. How could he fail to check the attitude indicator and realize that Bonin was, insanely, still climbing? How could he not look at it even after they had stalled but still had time to pull out of it? It would take an experienced pilot hardly a moments thought to realize what was happening if they'd looked at the AI and the altimeter. It boggles the mind.

[HomerJay]

Does anyone remember a Big Black live album called Sound of Impact?

After reading the cover I thought US domestics flights were flown by monkeys who couldn't keep the thing in the air.

Have the stats improved with less monkey input?

*edited to make sense

[Gawd]

It shouldn't be a passenger safety issue at all for pilots to hand-fly the aircraft. Billions of passengers were safer I think before cockpit automation took over. What we see here is that it is cockpit automation itself that is in large part responsible for the accident.

What the fuck kind of beast are you doing now, Seth? Human error is the number 1 cause of aircraft incidents. Just get rid of the pilots, they are expensive dead weight that cause the problems.

[Seth]

It shouldn't be a passenger safety issue at all for pilots to hand-fly the aircraft. Billions of passengers were safer I think before cockpit automation took over. What we see here is that it is cockpit automation itself that is in large part responsible for the accident.

What the fuck kind of beast are you doing now, Seth? Human error is the number 1 cause of aircraft incidents. Just get rid of the pilots, they are expensive dead weight that cause the problems.

Human action is the one and only solution to mechanical (or electrical) failure of an aircraft. It is therefore prudent to keep pilots proficient.

[Gawd]

It shouldn't be a passenger safety issue at all for pilots to hand-fly the aircraft. Billions of passengers were safer I think before cockpit automation took over. What we see here is that it is cockpit automation itself that is in large part responsible for the accident.

What the fuck kind of beast are you doing now, Seth? Human error is the number 1 cause of aircraft incidents. Just get rid of the pilots, they are expensive dead weight that cause the problems.

Human action is the one and only solution to mechanical (or electrical) failure of an aircraft. It is therefore prudent to keep pilots proficient.

That is so wrong it makes George Bush look smart. A human is worst at handling system failures than a computer is where diagnostics, backups, and workarounds kick in automatically. At best, your pilot can pray.

[Warren Dew]

Not a big advertisement for the Airbus cockpit design.

[Seth]

It shouldn't be a passenger safety issue at all for pilots to hand-fly the aircraft. Billions of passengers were safer I think before cockpit automation took over. What we see here is that it is cockpit automation itself that is in large part responsible for the accident.

What the fuck kind of beast are you doing now, Seth? Human error is the number 1 cause of aircraft incidents. Just get rid of the pilots, they are expensive dead weight that cause the problems.

Human action is the one and only solution to mechanical (or electrical) failure of an aircraft. It is therefore prudent to keep pilots proficient.

That is so wrong it makes George Bush look smart. A human is worst at handling system failures than a computer is where diagnostics, backups, and workarounds kick in automatically. At best, your pilot can pray.

No computer could have done what Sully Sullenberger did, or what Capt. Al Haynes and his crew did on UA 232 in 1989, among other examples of systems failures that everyone including the engineers who designed the planes though made the aircraft unflyable.

[Gawd]

No computer could have done what Sully Sullenberger did, or what Capt. Al Haynes and his crew did on UA 232 in 1989, among other examples of systems failures that everyone including the engineers who designed the planes though made the aircraft unflyable.

You are obviously computer illiterate if you think software can't throttle the engines when there is loss of hydraulics to the flaps.

[Warren Dew]

In the case of UA 232, the issue was not just throttling of the engines, but independent throttling of the engines to control turns, altitude, air speed, and attitude, most of which are normally controlled through elevators, ailerons, and rudder rather than engines. As of a few years ago computers could not use engines that way, though they may be able to do so now or soon.

Sullenberger's key decision was the decision to save lives by ditching the plane rather than trying to get it to a nearby airport to make a likely doomed attempt for a normal landing. I don't see computers making that kind of a judgement call any time soon.