Artificial Intelligence

[Brian Peacock]

...whereas human outputs emerge with the appearance of reactive models with predictive elements.

Descriptions of human cognition are abstractions. Meat can't model. We may as well say that LLMs model. Again, an abstraction. And it's important to note that we don't actually know how LLMs "think". It is currently a black box. Like the human mind.

Nitpickery. A theory of mind is a meat-based model, as is understanding what will happen to your trousers if you don't wear a belt. I can see your undies mate.

[Brian Peacock]

We don't actually know if they have a self, and we probably will never be able to know. Just the same as I can't definitively know if you have self-awareness.

I think the problem with this is that, at some level, you're assuming your selfhood(!) is something which is only derived from, and exists within, your mind, within your intellect shall we say, rather than as the entirety of your being existing within your bodily interactions with the environment. Don't believe Descartes, you are far more than your thoughts!

[pErvinalia]

[referring to your previous previous post] What are some of the things the people* developing AI are doing to that end?

* - putting aside Musk, who's obviously a megalomaniac.

[pErvinalia]

...whereas human outputs emerge with the appearance of reactive models with predictive elements.

Descriptions of human cognition are abstractions. Meat can't model. We may as well say that LLMs model. Again, an abstraction. And it's important to note that we don't actually know how LLMs "think". It is currently a black box. Like the human mind.

Nitpickery. A theory of mind is a meat-based model, as is understanding what will happen to your trousers if you don't wear a belt. I can see your undies mate.

We only model insomuch as it looks that way from the outside. The same way it might look for an AI doing its thing.

[pErvinalia]

We don't actually know if they have a self, and we probably will never be able to know. Just the same as I can't definitively know if you have self-awareness.

I think the problem with this is that, at some level, you're assuming your selfhood(!) is something which is only derived from, and exists within, your mind, within your intellect shall we say, rather than as the entirety of your being existing within your bodily interactions with the environment. Don't believe Descartes, you are far more than your thoughts!

We all work from the assumption that everyone else has consciousness. If we didn't then murdering people would be OK. At some point we may need to extend that to AI. Even if the chance is small, we will have an ethical responsibility to treat them as moral beings.

[pErvinalia]

Sorry, that reply seemed more related to what you quoted than what you said. I'll try again a bit later.

[pErvinalia]

...whereas human outputs emerge with the appearance of reactive models with predictive elements.

Descriptions of human cognition are abstractions. Meat can't model. We may as well say that LLMs model. Again, an abstraction. And it's important to note that we don't actually know how LLMs "think". It is currently a black box. Like the human mind.

Nitpickery. A theory of mind is a meat-based model, as is understanding what will happen to your trousers if you don't wear a belt.

There is no literal modelling going on. It's an abstraction we give to the black box based on observing inputs and outputs. The exact same thing can be done with AIs.

[Tero]

Added some comments to my Finnish write up. Google translated:

The content of the Mollickk book explains everything you can expect with artificial intelligence, or sometimes be surprised by the result. This experiment as a user is probably the way in which a large number of us get acquainted with the subject and eventually find a suitable use. If you are looking for a more technical explanation of how AI actually learns and works, I recommend the slightly older Artificial Intelligence -- A Guide For Thinking Humans. It also explains those games. The author is Melanie Mitchell. The book highlights one interesting problem. We humans soon get used to the text produced by artificial intelligence. It can even pretend to be stupid and speak everyday language. But we still have a sense of which text is "real" and which comes from artificial intelligence. I don't mean to say that I know which artificial intelligence was used, but they all seem to have the same presentation style. I can't take for real the enthusiasm that AI shows for every topic seriously. In a report I just heard on the radio, young people are more advanced than adults in spotting AI. Maybe from experience? We then have to adapt to the situation and consider which parts of the AI ​​texts we quote directly. Mitchell's book shows that AI does worse with images than with text.

I changed one line of the translation.

[Brian Peacock]

We don't actually know if they have a self, and we probably will never be able to know. Just the same as I can't definitively know if you have self-awareness.

I think the problem with this is that, at some level, you're assuming your selfhood(!) is something which is only derived from, and exists within, your mind, within your intellect shall we say, rather than as the entirety of your being existing within your bodily interactions with the environment. Don't believe Descartes, you are far more than your thoughts!

We all work from the assumption that everyone else has consciousness. If we didn't then murdering people would be OK. At some point we may need to extend that to AI. Even if the chance is small, we will have an ethical responsibility to treat them as moral beings.

If correct then presumably you'd advocate extending fundamental human rights to AI?

[Tero]

People of my generation are pretty good at avoiding "computers" after they retire. It's hard enough to get an answer to an email. Texts work better.

So, AI will be the next thing working people will get sick of, faster than email.

[Tero]

Generative AI is a parrot!
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=jmBJKqM_l18

[Brian Peacock]

...whereas human outputs emerge with the appearance of reactive models with predictive elements.

Descriptions of human cognition are abstractions. Meat can't model. We may as well say that LLMs model. Again, an abstraction. And it's important to note that we don't actually know how LLMs "think". It is currently a black box. Like the human mind.

Nitpickery. A theory of mind is a meat-based model, as is understanding what will happen to your trousers if you don't wear a belt.

There is no literal modelling going on. It's an abstraction we give to the black box based on observing inputs and outputs. The exact same thing can be done with AIs.

You're putting aside the word 'appearance' in what I wrote. Sure we assume consciousness in other humans based on our own observations of ourselves, but we actually do know the structure and content of MLSs like LLMs. We don't have to abstract their outputs. You're also putting aside that a theory of mind &/or an understanding of the natural world is also a model.

[pErvinalia]

We don't actually know if they have a self, and we probably will never be able to know. Just the same as I can't definitively know if you have self-awareness.

I think the problem with this is that, at some level, you're assuming your selfhood(!) is something which is only derived from, and exists within, your mind, within your intellect shall we say, rather than as the entirety of your being existing within your bodily interactions with the environment. Don't believe Descartes, you are far more than your thoughts!

We all work from the assumption that everyone else has consciousness. If we didn't then murdering people would be OK. At some point we may need to extend that to AI. Even if the chance is small, we will have an ethical responsibility to treat them as moral beings.

If correct then presumably you'd advocate extending fundamental human rights to AI?

If we believe they are conscious, then yes. Wouldn't you?

[L'Emmerdeur]

It seems extremely unlikely that consciousness is simply a concatenation of algorithms. Like all biological processes it's bound to be messier than that. I'm certainly not invoking anything 'spiritual' but I think Brian Peacock is onto something in pointing to a wider basis for consciousness than what is behind the composition of any existing AIs, and particularly LLMs.

No AI is actually a 'black box.' The exact details of how an advanced LLM produces its output may not be nailed down but it's not a complete mystery either. It's algorithms all the way down.

[pErvinalia]

...whereas human outputs emerge with the appearance of reactive models with predictive elements.

Descriptions of human cognition are abstractions. Meat can't model. We may as well say that LLMs model. Again, an abstraction. And it's important to note that we don't actually know how LLMs "think". It is currently a black box. Like the human mind.

Nitpickery. A theory of mind is a meat-based model, as is understanding what will happen to your trousers if you don't wear a belt.

There is no literal modelling going on. It's an abstraction we give to the black box based on observing inputs and outputs. The exact same thing can be done with AIs.

You're putting aside the word 'appearance' in what I wrote. Sure we assume consciousness in other humans based on our own observations of ourselves, but we actually do know the structure and content of MLSs like LLMs. We don't have to abstract their outputs. You're also putting aside that a theory of mind &/or an understanding of the natural world is also a model.

We're not abstracting outputs. We are abstracting the process of getting outputs from inputs. Saying that we model things, and AI doesn't, is saying that we treat the relationship between inputs and outputs in AI differently to how we treat the same in humans. What's the basis for treating AI different? I'd suggest it's a feeling. Up to this point the only data point for consciousness is biology. We feel uneasy with the idea that a non-biological machine could be conscious. But if that's the case, then it isn't a reasonable objection to the idea that machines can be conscious. We've got to come up with something better than that.