
If those constraints are derived from mathematical logic, would mathematical logic, then, be ontologically prior to phenomena?JimC wrote:Certainly not a substance, but possibly a set of constraints, deriving from mathematical logic.
As one of the quotes in my sig states, mathematics isn't a flawless or complete discipline. As such, it will naturally reach its limits of what it can describe. No doubt, scientists have done amazing things with it, and continue to do so, but it seems wise to be aware of its inherent limitations, too. Mathematics is a rational construct. A damned good one, no doubt, but nevertheless, it is a tool devised to describe the phenomenal world. Seems to me that the phenomenal world describes itself perfectly, and any rational construct used to describe it will always fall a tad short. Mathematics, I think, is subject to the same limitations as any other language.Such constraints may impose a limit on the potential structures of the material universe. The way in which physical laws are frequently found to closely mirror abstract mathematical relationships is suggestive of this, but certainly not proof...
Wittgenstein's Tractatus, according to the author, was specifically designed to describe this limit:
"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."
