The subjective observer is a fictional character

[GrahamH]

BTW james. Do you think it was belittling of you to use the term pseudo-science to refer to my posts?

I apologise if the use of that term was infered as belittling. I was only suggesting that 'brain models' are essentially lacking in required detail and are essentially speculative. Akin to a caveman describing the sun as "something that is burning, persistently".

Ha! I think that is what you are doing James. Looking at 'the mind' as an eternal immaterial flame, as people used to look to a Sun God. You don't want to know how it works and think the explanations are ridiculous, just as the Sun worshippers would have thought talk of nuclear fusion was a ridiculous denial of the Sun God's power.

[jamest]

Ha! I think that is what you are doing James. Looking at 'the mind' as an eternal immaterial flame, as people used to look to a Sun God. You don't want to know how it works and think the explanations are ridiculous, just as the Sun worshippers would have thought talk of nuclear fusion was a ridiculous denial of the Sun God's power.

I have my own thoughts about the mind/brain, correct. But here, I have entertained the thoughts of others. I've contemplated what people such as yourself have said, and have thoroughly explained the problems inherent within your thinking. As I said to SOS:

Talking about the internal functioning of a brain does not prove anything, then, unless such models avoid the problems associated with assumption; consideration; causality; purpose; meaning; etc., required as a basis for formulating these models.

I am assuming nothing within this thread, nor am I intent on arguing the idealistic perspective. It is clearly evident that I am devoting my time to an assault upon fallacious ideas associated with brain models that attempt to fully explain human identity and behaviour in purely materialistic terms.

What you say implies that I'm sat here with my fingers in my ears, preaching mantras about my own philosophy in response to every post that is made. That simply isn't true. I've devoted my time to finding flaws within arguments/models, such as the flaws inherent within your previous post about 'assumption'. Let's face it, you're not going to like my responses unless they agree with everything that you say.

[GrahamH]

The problem I see in your thinking there is that you have made huge assumptions about the nature of 'assumptions' and 'meaning', as if you had certain information that these cannot be 'tags' relating to representational relations between brain states and 'the world'.

An assumption is the application of a generalised pattern classification to a situation about which there is limited information. If the data is incomplete pick an interpretation that fits some of it. Do you have a sound argument against NNs doing that, firing in recognition of an incomplete stimulus pattern?

For the brain to know that its own internal states are synonymous with "information" and are "incomplete", demands a model of the brain that isn't simply responding to its own internal NNs. In fact, it demands a model of the brain that knows its own internal states are synonymous with information about something which is not itself. This would enable said brain to apply external meaning to its own internal states. However, how can a brain know that its own internal states are synonymous with information about something which is not itself?
It cannot know this, Graham. And any credible brain-model must incorporate this realisation therein. That is, there can be no NNs "firing in recognition of an incomplete stimulus", since said NNs would not be firing in response to the world, but in response to an idea about that world.

How many times do we have to spell this out to you? There is no homunculus in your head that 'knows what brain states mean'. That isn't the model. The recognition functions of NNs constitute 'knowing', not by being 'known' as brain states, but by function as recognisers.

Your eye points at your mothers face and the neural activity that results is a filter and decision matrix that feeds into motor control that elicits "Mama" from your mouth. There is no requirement for a homunculus to make that happen. You probably think that there is no 'knowing' in it either, but that is because you have a confused idea of what 'knowing' is. Don't get sidetracked by the simplicity of this example response. The inputs to the decision matrix are unimaginably complex and allow for complex responses, including not speaking, or speaking in another language, or smiling.

As for 'meaning' it is accuracy, saliency and survival.

'Survival'? You hope to strengthen the credibility of your model by integrating purpose into it? Such concepts are utilised by idealists, Graham. You are straying from your original goal: to explain human behaviour in terms of a brain-model that does not incorporate assumption; meaning; purpose; consideration, into it.

Yes, survival. You claim to understand natural selection? Same principle applies, what works propagates. An ability to recognise behaviours that promote survival is most likely the origin of 'purpose' as a concept.
There is no homunculus knowing a purpose, but the brain can classify behaviours as 'purposeful'. The neurons don;t need to 'know what that means', but they can respond to it like any other input.

A NN that responds to an angry expression has 'meaning' that influences behaviour.

Graham, your brain model cannot include responses to "an angry expression". In fact, your brain model can only include responses to NNs. Indeed, the concept of 'anger' is not one detected by any sense. Anger is infered - requiring the presence of an inferER who applies meaning to its observations.

NNs can function in a way that amounts to inference. They can recognise expressions and link that recognition to responses. They can 'learn' which responses work and which don't. Recognising an expression does allow a linguistic tag to be associated with it. NNs can produce a name for some of the things they recognise, such as 'tree' or 'angry face' or 'angry person'.

The same expression recognised in the presence of other recognitions may render the detection more or less relevant - more or less 'meaningful'.

Graham, the brain is in a void, observing nothing other than 'lego states'. Pray tell, how does the brain infer that one lego state is angry at another? Clearly, the meaning of 'anger' comes AFTER deciding that its 'lego states' are representative of external entities. Such inference cannot occur UNTIL this decision has been made.

Put the lego away and start using your grey matter to comprehend what is being presented. The NNs are causal and map stimuli to responses. Your toys and cartoons pretend that there is no causality (or rather, they displace it into the cartoonists mind). Denial of causality is not an appropriate objection to the model, unless you can prove causality false!

I'm going to end my response here, Graham. It's late and I don't want to spend more time on your post when I've already exposed major flaws apparent in your thinking. If you think that I haven't addressed something significant from the rest of your post, then let me know and I'll give it some attention.

I don't think you have raised any significant criticism so far. What you have done is fail to comprehend what is presented. You keep assuming 'meaning' is something a homunculus must be responsible for. If you have any serious intent here throw out your toy doll and leave the Theatre. If you think you have understood the argument repeat it back to us. Avoid any parody and present an honest exposition of the model.

[SpeedOfSound]

Talking about the internal functioning of a brain does not prove anything, then, unless such models avoid the problems associated with assumption; consideration; causality; purpose; meaning; etc., required as a basis for formulating these models.

Please tell me in more detail what this sentence is on about.

Maybe break these things out.

[SpeedOfSound]

Talking about the internal functioning of a brain does not prove anything, then, unless such models avoid the problems associated with assumption; consideration; causality; purpose; meaning; etc., required as a basis for formulating these models.

Yo! James!! I'm having a problem with your list.

In particular assumption and causality seem inconsistent with the others
What's up? What you mean?

[FBM]

Sorry to just pop my head in here without contributing anything. I'd just like to ask a favor. If you all find a minute, would you mind popping over to this thread: http://rationalia.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=38&t=10923 and voting? I know the level of dialog there isn't quite what it is here, so I'm not asking you to do anything more than vote. It would be very interesting to me. Thanks.

[GrahamH]

A point of clarification:

If the data is incomplete pick an interpretation that fits some of it.

I mean that a response to an event inevitably has incomplete information about the event. If our eyes look at a face we don't see the entire detail of the face but we still have to recognise it. We can see that perception does work on incomplete information. This looks like a winking face, but it isn't a face. There is enough information present to indicate faceness. I don't mean anything so absurd as "the brain must know the information is incomplete".

[jamest]

I'm hoping to have more time tomorrow - especially in the evening - to deal with previous posts from the past couple of days. But I have a nagging question and wondered if there were any reasonable answers:

If brains states (NNs) are responses to the external environment, then how does the brain distinguish between those NNs that refer to its own body and those that refer to the environment beyond that body? That is, how does the brain distinguish between 'the self' (body) and the non-self (world)?

In answering the question, we have to remember that 'the body' is actually external to the brain. So, there will be NNs associated with the body in which the brain is housed and NNs associated with the environment beyond that body. The question is, how does the brain know which NNs refer to which?

[GrahamH]

I'm hoping to have more time tomorrow - especially in the evening - to deal with previous posts from the past couple of days. But I have a nagging question and wondered if there were any reasonable answers:

If brains states (NNs) are responses to the external environment, then how does the brain distinguish between those NNs that refer to its own body and those that refer to the environment beyond that body? That is, how does the brain distinguish between 'the self' (body) and the non-self (world)?

In answering the question, we have to remember that 'the body' is actually external to the brain. So, there will be NNs associated with the body in which the brain is housed and NNs associated with the environment beyond that body. The question is, how does the brain know which NNs refer to which?

By the connections, James. NN that are in a functional chain from neurons in the retina are responding to things 'seen in the world'. Relative location of objects can be inferred from an image, and moving POV allows for very accurate location. NNs receiving input from tactile and pain neurons in the body 'feel the body'. NNs at higher levels link, for example, the visual appearance of a free with the tactile sense of the texture of the bark, the smell of the flowers and the sound of the breeze rustling the leaves link up in higher, more abstract levels of the brain.

Only the things which have detectable location, such as trees and body parts, have definite location. More abstract responses, such as trees in general, or language, don't have perceivable location, because they are part of an unseen mechanism without clear links to the world.

Sense of self location is probably arises from a mix of signals. Visual and auditory navigation places 'the observer' behind the eyes / between the ears because these sense have lots of spacial information in them. An emotional centre is often taken to be located in the heart or gut because the class of emotional responses have strong effects there, and provide definite location information.

I suspect that beyond the body location mentioned above there is no particular sense of 'in here' other than a lack of sense of location. I don't think of an imagined tree being 'in here', but it clearly isn't 'out there'. The choices are then to classify it, if at all, as 'in here' or 'nowhere'.

Some evidence of NNs performing spacial location tasks here
Distinct neural correlates of visual long-term memory for spatial location and object identity: A positron emission tomography study in humans
MORRIS MOSCOVITCH*t, SHITIJ KAPURtt, STEFAN K6HLER*t, AND SYLVAIN HOULEt (1994)

SoS may have something more up to date.

[GrahamH]

In another thread, not so far away...

There are flaws inherent within this thread, I think, which are leading to a false conclusion...

When we define the 'self', everyone assumes that the self is the entity that one can attribute qualia/experiences to, such as bodily form, thoughts and associated feelings. That is, nearly everyone identifies the self as that entity which is experienced.
So, does the experienced self craft its own thoughts? No, since the experienced self is an effect of 'crafting'. The experienced self is the identity discerned from the totality of its experiences.

What we are - our true identity - transcends what is observed of ourselves. If one was speaking of our true identity as 'the brain', for instance, one would still say that essentially 'we' do craft our own thoughts because ultimately, 'we' are the brain. Likewise, an idealist might say something along the lines of the self being integral to whatever it is that 'crafts' and 'observes' experience (the experiencER). So, ultimately, whatever we really are, 'we' still do actually craft our thoughts/sensations/feelings... even if we (the experienced self) have no apparent knowledge of how this is being done.

No idealist or materialist should identify itself with being an experienced entity. Consequently, all answers to the question posed at the start of this thread, should really be "Yes, ultimately, we do craft our own thoughts".

This is essentially what I am implying in the OP, and why I asked you several times to say what you meant by 'observe qualia'. According to what you have just written you don't consider 'The experiencer' to be the same as 'the observer of experience' and you agree that the aspect of mind that does the thinking is not that which 'has experiences'.

Bravo James! We agree at last. The 'subjective observer' of the topic title is 'the experiencer that has experiences' and it seems we agree that this is known only by observation from outside the inferred subjectivivity. The 'subjective observer' is a fiction of a person within that has experiences. This fiction is crafted / learned/recognised by the brain. The brain knows it, but doesn't experience it. There is no Hard Problem.

[jamest]

In another thread, not so far away...

There are flaws inherent within this thread, I think, which are leading to a false conclusion...

When we define the 'self', everyone assumes that the self is the entity that one can attribute qualia/experiences to, such as bodily form, thoughts and associated feelings. That is, nearly everyone identifies the self as that entity which is experienced.
So, does the experienced self craft its own thoughts? No, since the experienced self is an effect of 'crafting'. The experienced self is the identity discerned from the totality of its experiences.

What we are - our true identity - transcends what is observed of ourselves. If one was speaking of our true identity as 'the brain', for instance, one would still say that essentially 'we' do craft our own thoughts because ultimately, 'we' are the brain. Likewise, an idealist might say something along the lines of the self being integral to whatever it is that 'crafts' and 'observes' experience (the experiencER). So, ultimately, whatever we really are, 'we' still do actually craft our thoughts/sensations/feelings... even if we (the experienced self) have no apparent knowledge of how this is being done.

No idealist or materialist should identify itself with being an experienced entity. Consequently, all answers to the question posed at the start of this thread, should really be "Yes, ultimately, we do craft our own thoughts".

This is essentially what I am implying in the OP, and why I asked you several times to say what you meant by 'observe qualia'. According to what you have just written you don't consider 'The experiencer' to be the same as 'the observer of experience'

Correction: I don't consider the experiencer to be the same as the experience. (The observer of experience is really just a clumsy way of saying the experiencer).

and you agree that the aspect of mind that does the thinking is not that which 'has experiences'.

Correction: The essence of thought is not the same thing as those thoughts. Rather, the essence of experience is not the same thing as those experiences.

Bravo James! We agree at last.

Unfortunately, not. I guess this means that you no longer consider my aforementioned post to be 'good'.

The 'subjective observer' of the topic title is 'the experiencer that has experiences' and it seems we agree that this is known only by observation from outside the inferred subjectivivity.

Actually, from an idealistic perspective, the subjective observer is just the observer of subjective things/experiences. That is, it is the experiences that are considered subjective, not the observer. Key to understanding my own perspective, is knowing that I think that there are two notions of the self:

1) The reality of the self.
2) The subjective belief about what the self is.

Note that an objective/real self is still required to harbour subjective opinion. Note too that from my perspective 'human identity' is the subjective experience/belief. Therefore, a brain or an immaterial observer is still required to harbour said beliefs.

The 'subjective observer' is a fiction of a person within that has experiences.

Correction: the subjective observer is an observer of a fiction... which includes subjective beliefs about what the observer is.

This fiction is crafted / learned/recognised by the brain. The brain knows it, but doesn't experience it. There is no Hard Problem.

Well, more on this later, when I have more time.

[GrahamH]

Alas, no agreement then.

However, you did write

The experienced self is the identity discerned from the totality of its experiences.

So do you mean that the 'experienced self', that 'nearly everyone identifies' as 'I who experience' does not in fact have experiences? At least we might agree there.

I think I see your subtle distinction. The experiencer is unable to know anything about itself. It knows itself only as this fictional character 'The Self who experiences'.

The distance between us on this point then is that I suggest that knowing this character accounts for S.O., but you say that Experiencing what is mistakenly attributed to this character is necessary in addition to any information held about it.

[SpeedOfSound]

James. Please straighten out that sentence that I mentioned above when you get back. I thought that was a great post too and was stunned. The thing is, we aren't communicating too well.

http://rationalia.com/forum/viewtopic.p ... 51#p420751

[LaMont Cranston]

GrahamH, If I understand where you are trying to get to, I disagree with where you are going. The experiencer and the observer of the experience are one and the same. Observing, in and of itself, is an experience...unless you can demonstrate that it is some other way...or you know of some why to have experiencing and observing to be two different things.

More than that, it appears that the act of observing determines how we judge the experience. That's on us, and we make decisions based on how we observe and judge. On that other thread, I asked when something becomes a thought. If we don't think it, is it a thought? I get it that there are all kinds of things going on in our bodies, and we are not aware of what is happening with every muscle, blood cell, nerve ending, etc. We are aware of whatever it is we are aware of, and we have that experience in present time.

There is this idea that are brain is segmented into parts that don't communicate with each other. Freud didn't invent this idea, but he had a great deal to do with popularizing it, and, ever since Sigmund, most others who have tried to describe how we function have had some version of that model. In case I've missed it, just where does our awareness/consciousness fit into all of this?

[SpeedOfSound]

GrahamH, If I understand where you are trying to get to, I disagree with where you are going. The experiencer and the observer of the experience are one and the same.

There ain't no observer or experiencer at the level of how the brain works.