Metaphysics as an Error

[Matthew Shute]

Claims made without evidence can be discarded without evidence.

Hubba hubba hubba. Can I please transplant your brain into the body of a nubile nymph?

[jamest]

Claims made without evidence can be discarded without evidence.

Hubba hubba hubba. Can I please transplant your brain into the body of a nubile nymph?

You prefer bimbos then?

[jamest]

You know whee I am on this shit. There are lots of trees and they ain't in me.

Then you cannot be a member of the J-team. If you are categorically stating that trees/things exist externally and distinct to you, then you must harbour a materialistic ontology... a specific metaphysic. You're no use to them now.

The aim of this thread is discuss whether metaphysics is even possible. Well you have a metaphysic, so you're going to have to join the A-team.

[jamest]

Same question; I can live with - The experienc-ing of a tree is an event happening within me, and, the experience-ed tree is an internal (mental) event/object.
But you didnt show why my experience of the tree being internal is identical to the actual tree being internal. This may or may not be what you mean, but it is not a clearly made point.

I'm not sure why you're confused. You can't be confused about the notion of something being either internal or external to oneself. And if an internal tree is not distinct and separate from 'you', then the tree must reduce to an event happening in and of you, yielding the representation of 'a tree'.
An experienced entity cannot be distinct and separate to the experiencer, then. Basically, it's an illusion of what is.

Even if I were to be just a brain in a body, an experienced tree would still be reducible to an event in and of the brain. That is, the tree would be reducible to 'brain' - an illusion of what is.

[SpeedOfSound]

You know whee I am on this shit. There are lots of trees and they ain't in me.

Then you cannot be a member of the J-team. If you are categorically stating that trees/things exist externally and distinct to you, then you must harbour a materialistic ontology... a specific metaphysic. You're no use to them now.

The aim of this thread is discuss whether metaphysics is even possible. Well you have a metaphysic, so you're going to have to join the A-team.

'fraid not. Which direction do you reach when you want to touch a tree? If you want to plant a tree do you plant it in a hole that is inward or outward? How about when you wipe your ass? Can you tell your ass from a hole in the ground without metaphysics?

[jamest]

You know whee I am on this shit. There are lots of trees and they ain't in me.

Then you cannot be a member of the J-team. If you are categorically stating that trees/things exist externally and distinct to you, then you must harbour a materialistic ontology... a specific metaphysic. You're no use to them now.

The aim of this thread is discuss whether metaphysics is even possible. Well you have a metaphysic, so you're going to have to join the A-team.

'fraid not. Which direction do you reach when you want to touch a tree? If you want to plant a tree do you plant it in a hole that is inward or outward? How about when you wipe your ass? Can you tell your ass from a hole in the ground without metaphysics?

C'mon SOS, you're avoiding the obvious. You embrace a specific metaphysic. It's okay, they don't lock you up for it.

[Little Idiot]

Same question; I can live with - The experienc-ing of a tree is an event happening within me, and, the experience-ed tree is an internal (mental) event/object.
But you didnt show why my experience of the tree being internal is identical to the actual tree being internal. This may or may not be what you mean, but it is not a clearly made point.

I'm not sure why you're confused. You can't be confused about the notion of something being either internal or external to oneself. And if an internal tree is not distinct and separate from 'you', then the tree must reduce to an event happening in and of you, yielding the representation of 'a tree'.
An experienced entity cannot be distinct and separate to the experiencer, then. Basically, it's an illusion of what is.

Even if I were to be just a brain in a body, an experienced tree would still be reducible to an event in and of the brain. That is, the tree would be reducible to 'brain' - an illusion of what is.

My bold above; note how you swap between tree and experienced tree? this is my point.
The experienced object, exerienced tree is internal. But this is different to saying the tree is internal.
I suggest you need to either stick to internal experience of the tree, or establish why the actual tree is internal, rather than the experienced representation of the tree.
Dont get me wrong, I say the tree is not out there outside the mind; there is no outside the mind (only outside the body) - but you need to establish this. Otherwise these guys are not going to buy it.
They wont buy it even when you do establish it - but atleast all th bases are covered by our side.
sorry if I am not clear here, need to sleep.

[Little Idiot]

You know whee I am on this shit. There are lots of trees and they ain't in me.

Then you cannot be a member of the J-team. If you are categorically stating that trees/things exist externally and distinct to you, then you must harbour a materialistic ontology... a specific metaphysic. You're no use to them now.

The aim of this thread is discuss whether metaphysics is even possible. Well you have a metaphysic, so you're going to have to join the A-team.

'fraid not. Which direction do you reach when you want to touch a tree? If you want to plant a tree do you plant it in a hole that is inward or outward? How about when you wipe your ass? Can you tell your ass from a hole in the ground without metaphysics?

C'mon SOS, you're avoiding the obvious. You embrace a specific metaphysic. It's okay, they don't lock you up for it.

SoS is a physicalist, and said so many times; that is a metaphysical position you know.
Unless, do you no longer claim physicalism is right, SoS?

[jamest]

Same question; I can live with - The experienc-ing of a tree is an event happening within me, and, the experience-ed tree is an internal (mental) event/object.
But you didnt show why my experience of the tree being internal is identical to the actual tree being internal. This may or may not be what you mean, but it is not a clearly made point.

I'm not sure why you're confused. You can't be confused about the notion of something being either internal or external to oneself. And if an internal tree is not distinct and separate from 'you', then the tree must reduce to an event happening in and of you, yielding the representation of 'a tree'.
An experienced entity cannot be distinct and separate to the experiencer, then. Basically, it's an illusion of what is.

Even if I were to be just a brain in a body, an experienced tree would still be reducible to an event in and of the brain. That is, the tree would be reducible to 'brain' - an illusion of what is.

My bold above; note how you swap between tree and experienced tree? this is my point.
The experienced object, exerienced tree is internal. But this is different to saying the tree is internal.
I suggest you need to either stick to internal experience of the tree, or establish why the actual tree is internal, rather than the experienced representation of the tree.
Dont get me wrong, I say the tree is not out there outside the mind; there is no outside the mind (only outside the body) - but you need to establish this. Otherwise these guys are not going to buy it.
They wont buy it even when you do establish it - but atleast all th bases are covered by our side.
sorry if I am not clear here, need to sleep.

Oh, I had no intention of presenting an in-depth and progressive look at my philosophy, here. Establishing that there is no "outside" takes more reasoning than has been presented thus far - I'm under no illusion about that.
Here, I'm just trying to establish how it is even possible to begin to approach metaphysics. Hopefully, you can agree that the question about whether the world is internal or external to oneself, is a legitimate question and that we have the potential to answer it? If so, then the claim that there is no means to approach metaphysics, is a fallacy borne of an unfounded assertion about not being able to know anything beyond the empirical.
What time zone are you in? GMT + 3?

[SpeedOfSound]

You know whee I am on this shit. There are lots of trees and they ain't in me.

Then you cannot be a member of the J-team. If you are categorically stating that trees/things exist externally and distinct to you, then you must harbour a materialistic ontology... a specific metaphysic. You're no use to them now.

The aim of this thread is discuss whether metaphysics is even possible. Well you have a metaphysic, so you're going to have to join the A-team.

'fraid not. Which direction do you reach when you want to touch a tree? If you want to plant a tree do you plant it in a hole that is inward or outward? How about when you wipe your ass? Can you tell your ass from a hole in the ground without metaphysics?

C'mon SOS, you're avoiding the obvious. You embrace a specific metaphysic. It's okay, they don't lock you up for it.

SoS is a physicalist, and said so many times; that is a metaphysical position you know.
Unless, do you no longer claim physicalism is right, SoS?

I claim middleism, Formerly know as physicalism.

[SpeedOfSound]

SoS is a physicalist, and said so many times; that is a metaphysical position you know.
Unless, do you no longer claim physicalism is right, SoS?

I understand your mental impairment and I'm willing to try and work with you here.

Suppose you have a mental representation of five fish and a bucket. The representation has three inside and two flopping around outside of the bucket. Is it fair to say that with respect to the bucket that the fish are in the fucking bucket???

Could we say that the two outside are external to the bucket and the three inside are internal to the bucket?

Or are you going to insist that they are all in the bucket?

[jamest]

SoS is a physicalist, and said so many times; that is a metaphysical position you know.
Unless, do you no longer claim physicalism is right, SoS?

I understand your mental impairment and I'm willing to try and work with you here.

Suppose you have a mental representation of five fish and a bucket. The representation has three inside and two flopping around outside of the bucket. Is it fair to say that with respect to the bucket that the fish are in the fucking bucket???

Could we say that the two outside are external to the bucket and the three inside are internal to the bucket?

Or are you going to insist that they are all in the bucket?

SOS, the bucket isn't observing the event. If it was, we'd be asking the same question: are the bucket's observations external or internal to itself?

Whether two fish escape the bucket is irrelevant. The pertinent question is whether the OBSERVATION, by the bucket, of two fish escaping itself, is an internal or external affair. That is, the key word is the awareness/observation/experience, of an event.

Why don't you understand that the observation/judgement/experience of an event, is not the reality of an event itself? Given the erroneous history of mankind's judgement, this should be easy to comprehend, otherwise our observation/judgement/experience, would never ever have been in error.

Also, regards your comment about "middleism": the concept of harbouring a semi-ontology, does not register. Perhaps you should elucidate.

[SpeedOfSound]

SoS is a physicalist, and said so many times; that is a metaphysical position you know.
Unless, do you no longer claim physicalism is right, SoS?

I understand your mental impairment and I'm willing to try and work with you here.

Suppose you have a mental representation of five fish and a bucket. The representation has three inside and two flopping around outside of the bucket. Is it fair to say that with respect to the bucket that the fish are in the fucking bucket???

Could we say that the two outside are external to the bucket and the three inside are internal to the bucket?

Or are you going to insist that they are all in the bucket?

SOS, the bucket isn't observing the event. If it was, we'd be asking the same question: are the bucket's observations external or internal to itself?

Whether two fish escape the bucket is irrelevant. The pertinent question is whether the OBSERVATION, by the bucket, of two fish escaping itself, is an internal or external affair. That is, the key word is the awareness/observation/experience, of an event.

Why don't you understand that the observation/judgement/experience of an event, is not the reality of an event itself? Given the erroneous history of mankind's judgement, this should be easy to comprehend, otherwise our observation/judgement/experience, would never ever have been in error.

Also, regards your comment about "middleism": the concept of harbouring a semi-ontology, does not register. Perhaps you should elucidate.

Now you are rushing ahead to metaphysics. Or some other confusion, label how you like. The problem with your failed attempts at laying out your philosophy is that you are thinking carefully and clearly.

I asked a question about the fish and the bucket not mankind's mind and observation. The reason I ask these silly obvious questions is so that we can get some solid ground. This solid ground is absolutely necessary if I am to answer your question about middleism. Answer the question about using the words internal and external in the context of fish in buckets.

Then tell me if the fish n bucket story is metaphysics in your definition.

[Surendra Darathy]

Here, I'm just trying to establish how it is even possible to begin to approach metaphysics.

When will you get started? You can begin by stating a question whose answer will imply a definite metaphysics.

In an empirical, metaphysics-free discourse, statements are not made about "experience", but only about the "world". There are your statements, in the world, in black and white. What's missing from your discourse? That's right: You shy away from making any statements about the world, in favor of making statements describing your plan to how it is even possible to begin to approach metaphysics. And yet, all your statements are to an empiricist simply "messages" coming from a localized coordinate in the world. You write a statement in an internet forum, and responses to it quote the statement as if it was a part of the world, as if it appeared on a computer screen. Those messages are all there is to talk about, here.

We shoot the "experiencers" all to hell, and simply make statements about the world. If you say the appearance of statements in and of themselves demands "experiencers", you must show how that is. Once we get past that hurdle, we can go back to processing statements about the world, and quit wibbling about "experiencers". All you need are entities with sensory features, capable of responding to a world of which those responding entities are simply parts. There's only a world. You can call it "reality", but compared to what? A dream world? All we have are the reports, and as soon as you make a report, the report is simply another part of the world. Keep it under wraps as "experience", and it might as well not be included as part of the world. When you let it out, it's a "report".

Reports are collected, and the collections, also considered as part of the world, get their responses. It just keeps going, and no need to show a metaphysics is ever presented.

[jamest]

It occured to me, after my last post to SOS, that 'observation' is the word that kills the empirical/relativist/sceptical position. Why? Because by ignoring the fact that 'something' has to observe the world in order to make theories/conclusions/predictions about it, one is readily equipped to discuss nothing other than the relationships between observed entities (Aka 'science').
But what of the observer? What is that? And how can we ignore the significance of 'its' observations being distinct to that which is observed?
This is the root of the problem here. And I want to see somebody from the J-team address this problem.