rEvolutionist wrote:
Obviously there is a selection mechanism of some sort. The problem is that you are specifying exactly what that selection method is (i.e. Darwinian-like) without being able to show that (because it's an internal immaterial process). The only way you could show that it is a Darwinian natural selection type process is if you could show the neural correlates, which I'm assuming can't be done yet.
I don't get why you'd think this. A Darwinian selection process is simply one where the selection criteria is the consequences, and that's what happens with behavior. There's no internal immaterial process, we're just talking about external observable behaviors at this point.
rEvolutionist wrote:As I said, it's not that there is a selection going on that is the problem. It's that you specify exactly what the mechanism is without being able to actually see or test that mechanism. That's why it is a just-so story. I can explain how the inner homunculus wants food, so selects for food. Nothing to do with Darwinian selection there.
You could try that but you'd need to specify how exactly the homunculus selects for food, and to be consistent with the observable data you'd need to state that it selects for food by the consequences, and when you say that you'd be asserting that an homunculus behaves according to a Darwinian selection process - we'd then question what evidence we have for the homunculus bit.
rEvolutionist wrote:This is circular reasoning. You explain operant conditioning by call to a Darwinian-like selection method, and then explain that selection method by call to operant conditioning.
Not quite, operant conditioning is a specific selection process, and how operant conditioning works (rather than simply how it's described) is more detailed that the simple law of effect - the details are what I outlined in the end section of my first post.
rEvolutionist wrote:
yeah, this makes the most sense to me. There's a proper physical correlate to what's going on.
This is a standard problem of
"neuro"-evidence blinding people. The neuro-evidence I mention there tells you absolutely nothing new that isn't contained by the behavioral explanations I gave you, it's the same process just at a deeper level. Yet people view the neuro as more "real" or convincing, even though it can be practically meaningless at the most relevant levels.
rEvolutionist wrote:But we do wind up at my original series of questions about the role of consciousness in the whole process. Is consciousness really adding anything to the process (it would seem to add to accuracy and speed), or is it a bit of a post hoc explanation for something that's going on without the aid of consciousness at all?
Like I touch on above, I don't think the process is possible without consciousness (depending on how you're defining that). Without the ability to experience, voluntarily behave, and plan for future events, operant conditioning simply wouldn't work.
rEvolutionist wrote:As a gross materialist, I have a lot of sympathy with Dennett's (and other's) idea that consciousness is an illusion of sorts, and plenty of data shows that physiologically the brain is taking action before the conscious mind even decides to act. There's also plenty of data showing that the conscious mind simply bullshits it's way through an event, literally making up stories to explain an event that consciously one feels in control of. But then, it's hard to deny that higher order cognition can provide complex inputs to behaviour. I can sit down before making a decision and think through all the past info I have on the subject - stuff I've googled, books I've read, convos I've had with Samsa etc. It's hard to deny that thoughtful analytical thinking CAN affect decision making. It's a dichotomy that I find myself having a hard time explaining and contending with. That's why I continue to obsess over psychology and consciousness and neurology etc..
One thing I'd add is that I'm not sure how it makes sense to talk of consciousness as an "illusion". It's a common criticism of Dennett's work but to say something is an illusion is to talk about an experience being misleading or different from how you viewed it, but for that to occur you need to experience the misleading experience, so consciousness is still occurring. Questioning the extent of the role that higher order cognitive processes play is definitely a worthwhile endeavour, but ruling it out completely as a factor in decision making seems misguided to me.
rEvolutionist wrote:Yeah, but you are just repeating the obvious outwardly observed behaviour. This says nothing about an internal Darwinian-like selection process.
What internal process are you talking about? We're talking about behavior, that's what operant conditioning is operating on.
rEvolutionist wrote:In natural selection, traits literally go extinct. You've claimed the same for internal behaviour selection. Where's your proof for this?
Behaviors literally go extinct.
rEvolutionist wrote:You used an example earlier where you said (if I remember correctly) that preening will go to extinction in the food button experiment. Let's look at that. For a start, it's not going to extinction, as the bird will still know how to preen outside of the food experiment. So it hasn't gone to "extinction". That should be enough to put down this idea, but I expect you'll say it goes to extinction in the context of the food experiment.
Yes, when we talk about extinction we're talking about the behavior under the control of a specific discriminative stimulus. As a comparison, it's like saying that a particular bird has gone extinct in one particular environment, like Earth. But that's also just an issue with that specific example - when used correctly, extinction and punishment procedures will completely eliminate the behavior in all instances unless explicitly retrained again (comparable to a Jurassic Park genetic program recreating the extinct behaviors).
rEvolutionist wrote: Even if I granted that as an analogue to natural selection (which I don't), it's easy to see a situation where the pigeon is simply full and doesn't want to eat anymore. What's it going to do? Just sit there till it falls asleep? Unlikely. It will preen (which most birds do before resting at night). So the behaviour hasn't literally become "extinct". It's just taken a back seat for some other behaviour.
Sure, but that wouldn't be extinction - that situation is where they are being reinforced for cleaning themselves, so the behavior increases and grows.
rEvolutionist wrote:Sure, but once again, this doesn't imply a Darwinian-like selection process. My homunculus might have decided it didn't like being poked in its body's mouth.
Again, you
can posit that explanation if you like, but you'll still need to explain the fact that behaviors are shaped by their consequences (i.e. a Darwinian selection process).
rEvolutionist wrote:Yeah, I know that. I didn't expand for the sake of brevity. The point is that there are clear environmental selection pressures (death, inability to reproduce, etc) that are the selection mechanism. It's just not clear what the mechanism is in the mind (since we are talking about conscious beings) that plays a similar part. It's not clear how behaviours are "replicated" either. If you disavow the concept of the meme as a unit of replication (which I'm assuming you do, but you could be just disavowing the use of memetics as a scientific field) then behaviours in a conscious being (which are the same concept as a meme - that is a replicating idea) being units of selection makes no sense either.
I don't follow your reasoning here. The problem with memes wasn't that it posited a selection process for behaviors and ideas, but that it had no concrete observable evidence for this, no mathematical laws to graph this process, and it didn't explain how it did this better than all the models we currently had doing the same thing.
With things like operant conditioning, we have a clear idea of what the mechanism is. We know that pressures affect the rate of behavioral classes (reinforcement, punishment, discriminative stimuli, etc) and we observe them occurring exactly as we predict each time.
rEvolutionist wrote:Yeah, I like it when we deal in physical stuff, as we can hold it in our hands and make sense of it.

The problem is that we are talking about conscious beings - i.e. ineffable stuff like ideas and qualia etc. Although,, on this point, do connections literally cease to exist, or do they just become so weak as to become unused?
Well we've always been talking about physical things, I'm just saying that we don't need a biological death for it to make sense. Behaviors are physical and we observe them dying off.
As for the neurological side of things, they can both die off and/or become weak and unused. They're just representations of the behaviors, so what happen to the behavior also happens in the brain. Some behaviors die off completely and so the neurons correlating to them die off completely as well, whereas others die off to a point where they don't affect our daily lives and so the neurons correlating to them die off to a similar degree.
But it's not like the neurons are "more real" than the behaviors they represent.
“The real question is not whether machines think but whether men do. The mystery which surrounds a thinking machine already surrounds a thinking man.” - B. F. Skinner.