I see no reason to accept that free will is highly unlikely to exist, particularly as it is easy to demonstrate what appears to be free will. Also, as all healthy human beings unavoidably assume and successfully act on the assumption that they have free will (what Wegner et al call "the illusion of free will"), denial of free will is denial of observation, and no theory can outrank observation without entailing triviality.apophenia wrote:you still have yet to introduce free will as a fact to be explained. While such is a digression, true, I'd be interested in what you see as the fact which determinists feel cannot be explained. That would go a long way to clearing up my confusion about which aspects of your example you were trying to show.
An agent has free will on occasions when that agent makes and enacts a conscious choice from amongst realisable alternatives. The explanatory problem isn't limited to deterministic models, it also applies to probabilistic models. So, if an explanation is possible, that explanation is not, as far as I know, within the present repertoire of scientific explanations, because the explanatory model would need a prediction generating algorithm which is neither deterministic nor probabilistic. This problem seems to be intractable, as it follows from the dual requirements of realisable alternatives and the intentional selection of conscious choice.
No problem and thanks for the apology.apophenia wrote:Anyway, I neglected to do so earlier, so let me apologize for my rather uncharitable reading of your point.