Metaphysics as an Error

[Comte de Saint-Germain]

Surendra Darathy,

I edited my post when I posted it here, and included a final paragraph that outlined four big problems. These are problems that anyone who would - as you say - start in with metaphysics would encounter. One of these problems is what I have called the fourth problem. Might as well be the first problem, number is unimportant. It's about a linguistic or conceptual problem.
I'm a bit influenced here by David Papineau who discussed conceptual dualism in his philosophy of consciousness. Basically, he proposes that we have two different types of concepts - different classes - material concepts and phenomenal concepts, and that these different sorts of concepts are responsible for the 'feeling', the 'idea' that there is something different between the brain and the mind.
Now, I don't want to discuss Papineau here - obviously - but I am influenced by this way of thinking about concepts. I suppose you might call it Ryle's category error, but refined to concepts. I'm saying that causality and purpose, per example, are empirical concepts and that applying them beyond the empirical world - like per example, on the empirical world itself - is without basis.

What Jamest does, I think, is quite intuitive. Because he lives in the empirical world and is used to using causal relationships between everyday things, he applies the same 'causality' detector for the empirical world itself. But, we must ask ourselves, is there any basis for this? Why should we believe that this method that makes accurate predictions in the empirical world can also make predictions about the metaphysical?

Indeed, when we think about, we are immediately puzzled! We can't even test whether causality could be used in that way.. We can't think of any argument. It's obvious that, even if metaphysics is possible, Jamest is on the wrong end. More importantly, most philosophers have thusfar been on this wrong end and have been unable to substantiate this.

As for myself, I have no problem with saying 'something caused this or that' - you want to say it, that's just fine with me. Even philosophically, I feel sympathetic for it, because it is quite intuitive. I just ask 'why be so certain about it'. I think I'll look up Nietzsche and quote him next..

[Surendra Darathy]

To a scientist, it's just data.

Do I sound as though I'm wearing a white coat? I'm not a scientist and I don't give a fug about his or her perspective - as if that were relevant to this issue. A scientist doesn't decide what is or whether there are grounds for metaphysics.

There's alot of overlooking going on from your camp, Sir. I've spent considerable time in this thread producing arguments of one kind or another, most of which have been dispensed with the shrug of a shoulder, or ignored altogether. Here, for instance, you completely avoid my reasoning for explaining why there has to be 'something' upon which the data is based... that there cannot be just data out there... and that empirical data is clearly a human construct: an effort to understand that which is the object of our study. Do you not consider that upon such a pivotal point, that reasoning is worth addressing?

People try to do metaphysics on the data, and this wibbling goes quite beyond the interpretation of the data within the context of a theory.

Let's forget about the data. Let's concentrate upon that in which it is grounded

Hey, you're the fucking metaphysician here. Start in on the fucker. Show that you can concentrate on it. Want to talk about that in which it is grounded? That ball is still in your court, and it's looking increasingly as if you are using an overcooked lasagna noodle as a racket.

[Comte de Saint-Germain]

Found it! Posted it in the other - RDF - thread, but it was one of the last pages, and I started in the beginning. Gave me a chance to read all the hilarious Don Quixote and LotR stuff though..

//EDIT: This is Nietzsche, of course:

There are still harmless self-observers who believe that there are “immediate certainties”; for example, “I think,” or as the superstition of Schopenhauer put it, “I will”; as though knowledge here got hold of its object purely and nakedly as “the thing in it self,” without any falsification on the part of either the subject or the object. But that “immediate certainty,” as well as “absolute knowledge” and the “thing in itself,” involve a contradictio in adjecto. I shall repeat a hundred times; we really ought to free ourselves from the seduction of words! Let the people suppose that knowledge means knowing things entirely; the philosopher must say to himself: “When I analyze the process that is expressed in this sentence, ‘I think,’ I find a whole series of daring assertions that would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to prove—for example, that it is I who think, that there must necessarily be something that thinks, that thinking is an activity and operation on the part of a being who is thought of as a cause, that there is an ‘ego,’ and, finally, that it is already determined what is to be designated by thinking—that I know what thinking is. For if I had not already decided within myself what it is, by what standard could I determine whether that which is just happening is not perhaps ‘willing’ or ‘feeling’? In short, the assertion ‘I think’ assumes that I compare my state at the present moment with other states of myself which I know, in order to determine what it is; on account of this retrospective connection with further ‘knowledge,’ it has, at any rate, no immediate certainty for me.”— In place of the “immediate certainty” in which the people may believe in the case at hand, the philosopher thus finds a series of metaphysical questions presented to him, truly searching questions of the intellect; to wit: “From where do I get the concept of thinking? Why do I believe in cause and effect? What gives me the right to speak of an ego, and even of an ego as cause, and finally of an ego as the cause of thought?” Whoever ventures to answer these metaphysical questions at once by an appeal to a sort of intuitive perception, like the person who says, “I think, and know that this, at least, is true, actual, and certain”—will encounter a smile and two question marks from a philosopher nowadays. “Sir,” the philosopher will perhaps give him to understand, “it is improbable that you are not mistaken; but why insist on the truth?”

[Surendra Darathy]

Now, I don't want to discuss Papineau here - obviously - but I am influenced by this way of thinking about concepts. I suppose you might call it Ryle's category error, but refined to concepts. I'm saying that causality and purpose, per example, are empirical concepts and that applying them beyond the empirical world - like per example, on the empirical world itself - is without basis.

And I am saying that "concepts" are artifacts of discourse. We do not have to limit it to the verbal. Discourse is an empirical fact. The scientist does not ask what "lies behind" the fact of discourse, for it is something to do with the brain, and various folds in it, and its connections to the tongue and to furiously-typing fingers.

The occultists want to get us back to the undivided awareness. Now "undivided awareness" is a nice pair of words, but they do not "get us off" in the same way as, say, a nice pair of nipples. For starters, our awareness is divided between the left nipple and the right one. Which one is the "right" one. Now we're onto ethics.

But putative metaphysics is not like that. It's all verbal. There are words that map to the equal-signs used by mathematicians and scientists, like the word "is", but "is" gets stretched all to shit by them as they extend it to ontological matters. It's just part of the conjugation of a copulative verb which, overextended, behaves like a mistake.

Everything is without basis, in the absence of the articulation of the basis. Mathematicians know how to do this, for example with vector spaces. There, "basis" is actually a word with a definition. Right there in wikipedia under "vector spaces". Hilbert spaces, enamorata of quantum physicists, are an extension of this concept. Ooh. Concept. There's a word. But there you have it: Hilbert spaces are defined on a manifold, or something like that.

[SpeedOfSound]

That's all another discussion but I didn't say that now did I. I said I know how the brain makes abstractions and mistakes.

Yes, what you're saying is that the brain is responsible for thought. That is, thought is reducible to brain-states. That's a claim commensurate with identity theory - a materialist outlook.

Holy shit dude! Do you know which century this is? Even you chief wibbler Chalmers accepts this much about the mind. Read A Book!!

[SpeedOfSound]

I'm sorry, but these claims cannot be made, except as a materialist - in which case, they are irrelevant to the discussion, as you cannot negate metaphysics with a metaphysic (I need that in my sig, don't I?).

If you claim that my claims are false then you will have to falsify science which is where I get them. Has nothing to do with isms. Just us folks doing experiments and making relative sense of things.

Actually, there is no science proving that mind states are reducible to brain states. You're making it up!

That's all another discussion but I didn't say that now did I. I said I know how the brain makes abstractions and mistakes.

Science doesn't speak of mind states, it speaks of mental states, which is a functionalist approach to describing the brain in more abstract terms - it does not mean that one is making metaphysical claims. Much of this is faulty perception of the science of psychology. Merely because idealists appropriate the mind does not mean that mental states necessarily are states of the mind, rather than empirical constructs. I understand that this may be confusing to some, but that doesn't mean it is relevant to this thread.

I'm beginning to like Edelman's handy dismissal of the problems with his C and C' and phenomenal transform. But it seems a bit like a dirty trick at first...

But the jamest is claiming that cognition itself, not just awareness, is some festering spooks oozing. I think LI hinted at this too. Not satisfied with the domain of the HP they want to scrape the easy stuff into the toilet of cosmic ubermind too.

Anyway. We need another thread for this stuff. But I think I may have to start drinking again first.

[jamest]

That's all another discussion but I didn't say that now did I. I said I know how the brain makes abstractions and mistakes.

Yes, what you're saying is that the brain is responsible for thought. That is, thought is reducible to brain-states. That's a claim commensurate with identity theory - a materialist outlook.

Holy shit dude! Do you know which century this is? Even you chief wibbler Chalmers accepts this much about the mind. Read A Book!!

Hey, I do my own wibbling, thankyou very much.

[Surendra Darathy]

festering spooks oozing

Good name for a thrash-metal band.

the toilet of cosmic ubermind

And another. A palpable hit.

Hey, I do my own wibbling, thankyou very much.

No, actually. You don't.

We need another thread for this stuff.

We need another fucking universe. But that one is not forthcoming.

[jamest]

Let's forget about the data. Let's concentrate upon that in which it is grounded

You mean that for which you have no data? What can be said about it?

C: Show me your data Road Runner. What is it about?

R: It's about nothing. It's just data.

C: That's good shit you're smokin, but it blinds you to obvious logic: data has to be about something. It is a language that describes something. You know, a scientist doesn't just observe statistics and formulae - these are the things that he constructs in an attempt to describe the order apparent within this 'thing'. That's why scientific data is often wrong, or incomplete - because it's a formulation of reason, rather than something observed through a telescope. That is, empirical data is not in the empirical realm, it's in the head. That is, empirical data is not the 'empirical realm' and is therefore not synonymous with it.
I tell ya dude, data cannot be about nothing. Where there's data, there's something.

R: Okay, then what else can you say about this 'thing', apart from empirical data?

C: Well, I read this book once, by some bloke called jamest, who defined this 'something' as 'E' and then proceeded to list the three possible metaphysical outlooks that exist in relation to E. That is, after having established a grounds for metaphysics (E), he then set-out to show the basic approach to doing that metaphysics. This was significant, because it was a slap in the face for those relativists that had claimed that metaphysics was baseless and unapproachable.
Also, having explained why E was more than 'data', he was able to show that metaphysics was possible, in relation to E itself, without transgressing the borders of the 'empirical realm'. In a nutshell, he had opened the door to metaphysics that Kant had closed two centuries earlier.

R: But was he able to say anything significant about 'E' itself? You know, like "It's turtles all the way down"?

C: Yes, he was. But that was in another book. In this book, he just concentrated on resurrecting metaphysics and destroying relativism. That is, by showing that there was both grounds and approach to metaphysics, and having re-opened the door shut by Kant, relativism was finished as a credible philosophy thereafter.

R: So, can you tell us what's in the 2nd book?

C: Sure, as long as you understand and accept what he says in book 1. Otherwise, what's the point?

[Little Idiot]

Let's forget about the data. Let's concentrate upon that in which it is grounded

You mean that for which you have no data? What can be said about it?

C: Show me your data Road Runner. What is it about?

R: It's about nothing. It's just data.

C: That's good shit you're smokin, but it blinds you to obvious logic: data has to be about something. It is a language that describes something. You know, a scientist doesn't just observe statistics and formulae - these are the things that he constructs in an attempt to describe the order apparent within this 'thing'. That's why scientific data is often wrong, or incomplete - because it's a formulation of reason, rather than something observed through a telescope. That is, empirical data is not in the empirical realm, it's in the head. That is, empirical data is not the 'empirical realm' and is therefore not synonymous with it.
I tell ya dude, data cannot be about nothing. Where there's data, there's something.

R: Okay, then what else can you say about this 'thing', apart from empirical data?

C: Well, I read this book once, by some bloke called jamest, who defined this 'something' as 'E' and then proceeded to list the three possible metaphysical outlooks that exist in relation to E. That is, after having established a grounds for metaphysics (E), he then set-out to show the basic approach to doing that metaphysics. This was significant, because it was a slap in the face for those relativists that had claimed that metaphysics was baseless and unapproachable.
Also, having explained why E was more than 'data', he was able to show that metaphysics was possible, in relation to E itself, without transgressing the borders of the 'empirical realm'. In a nutshell, he had opened the door to metaphysics that Kant had closed two centuries earlier.

R: But was he able to say anything significant about 'E' itself? You know, like "It's turtles all the way down"?

C: Yes, he was. But that was in another book. In this book, he just concentrated on resurrecting metaphysics and destroying relativism. That is, by showing that there was both grounds and approach to metaphysics, and having re-opened the door shut by Kant, relativism was finished as a credible philosophy thereafter.

R: So, can you tell us what's in the 2nd book?

C: Sure, as long as you understand and accept what he says in book 1. Otherwise, what's the point?

Now thats a good post.
<looks for a smilie 'nailed'>

[the PC apeman]

Let's forget about the data. Let's concentrate upon that in which it is grounded

You mean that for which you have no data? What can be said about it?

C: Show me your data Road Runner. What is it about?

R: It's about nothing. It's just data.

C: That's good shit you're smokin, but it blinds you to obvious logic: data has to be about something. It is a language that describes something. You know, a scientist doesn't just observe statistics and formulae - these are the things that he constructs in an attempt to describe the order apparent within this 'thing'. That's why scientific data is often wrong, or incomplete - because it's a formulation of reason, rather than something observed through a telescope. That is, empirical data is not in the empirical realm, it's in the head. That is, empirical data is not the 'empirical realm' and is therefore not synonymous with it.
I tell ya dude, data cannot be about nothing. Where there's data, there's something.

R: Okay, then what else can you say about this 'thing', apart from empirical data?

C: Well, I read this book once, by some bloke called jamest, who defined this 'something' as 'E' and then proceeded to list the three possible metaphysical outlooks that exist in relation to E. That is, after having established a grounds for metaphysics (E), he then set-out to show the basic approach to doing that metaphysics. This was significant, because it was a slap in the face for those relativists that had claimed that metaphysics was baseless and unapproachable.
Also, having explained why E was more than 'data', he was able to show that metaphysics was possible, in relation to E itself, without transgressing the borders of the 'empirical realm'. In a nutshell, he had opened the door to metaphysics that Kant had closed two centuries earlier.

R: But was he able to say anything significant about 'E' itself? You know, like "It's turtles all the way down"?

C: Yes, he was. But that was in another book. In this book, he just concentrated on resurrecting metaphysics and destroying relativism. That is, by showing that there was both grounds and approach to metaphysics, and having re-opened the door shut by Kant, relativism was finished as a credible philosophy thereafter.

R: So, can you tell us what's in the 2nd book?

C: Sure, as long as you understand and accept what he says in book 1. Otherwise, what's the point?

Shorter version: Nothing.

Sarcastic version: Once you believe in god you'll understand why there's no evidence. But you must belieeeeeeeve first.

BTW, have C and R switch roles?

[the PC apeman]

I tell ya dude, data cannot be about nothing. Where there's data, there's something.

Maybe, maybe not. I don't know. You don't know. But what is the benefit of making that assumption? I mean, with all this data we construct an explanatory model which allows us to make predictions. It's all very beneficial. Most do this model construction without much thought day-to-day, others do it rigorously as scientists. What benefit do you gain by saying 'here's our model AND it matches... something.' 'Something' for which we have no other access than the data we just used on the other side of this comparison.

[Surendra Darathy]

I tell ya dude, data cannot be about nothing.

Yup. Data are about getting out of town before the next hurricane. Maps tell you where the active faults are. Don't want to risk not living through the next earthquake? Move a little farther from the fault zone. Duck hunters set out decoys because decoys are empirical to natural-born ducks.

Data are about the relation between putting your hand on a hot stove and burning your hand. Causality or correlation? I'll tell you which one merits less wibbling.

[Kenny Login]

Hello - I am new to the site so hope I'm not intruding too much.

data has to be about something. It is a language that describes something. You know, a scientist doesn't just observe statistics and formulae - these are the things that he constructs in an attempt to describe the order apparent within this 'thing'.

I very much agree with this.

Everyone does metaphysics. The idea of doing it as a formal exercise may be unpalatable to some, but it's unavoidable.

[Luis Dias]

Hello - I am new to the site so hope I'm not intruding too much.

data has to be about something. It is a language that describes something. You know, a scientist doesn't just observe statistics and formulae - these are the things that he constructs in an attempt to describe the order apparent within this 'thing'.

I very much agree with this.

Everyone does metaphysics. The idea of doing it as a formal exercise may be unpalatable to some, but it's unavoidable.

"Everyone believes in God, the atheists are just in deniiaaaaal"