On treeness of Oak1, and other things

[Xamonas Chegwé]

Zeno's arrow paradox claims that an arrow cannot ever hit the target because it first must travel half of the distance, then half of the remaining distance, then half of the remaining distance, etc. He claimed that since there were an infinite series of steps, the arrow would never complete the journey.

What he had actually done, in stating the paradox, was to claim that an infinite series cannot have a sum. Specifically, this series.



Here is a simple proof that the series does in fact converge.

Let S = 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 + ....

So 2S = 2(1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 + ....)

2S = 1 + 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 + ....

But, if we discard the first term, this is just S.

So

2S = 1 + S

2S - S = 1

S = 1

Thus the sum of the infinite series is 1. No calculus needed. Zeno lacked the technique to do this, as did anyone at that time - but it is hardly rocket-science once you spot the trick! Had it been explained to Zeno, he would certainly have been able to follow the logic.

Unless you object, I'll use this as the basis of Zeno's refutation, later. It saves me doing the donkey work.

Of course I don't mind. It is a well known proof. But I got the name of the paradox wrong - this is actually for the Dichotomy Paradox. The Achilles & the Tortoise one is essentially the same thing dressed up differently.

The Arrow, or Fletcher's, Paradox states that an arrow cannot move because, at any single instant of time, it can only exist in one single place and cannot be moving between places. He effectively quantises time! Refutations are less straightforward than the others - one way is to argue that time is continuous and so, no matter how small an instant is taken, it can always be broken down into yet smaller instances in which the position of the arrow changes. Other arguments go so far as to invoke relativity! However, the simplest thing is simply to say that Zeno is making an assumption about time (that it is composed of discreet, quantum instances) that simply cannot be shown to be true or false, hence neither can anything relying upon it.

[Little Idiot]

Zeno's arrow paradox claims that an arrow cannot ever hit the target because it first must travel half of the distance, then half of the remaining distance, then half of the remaining distance, etc. He claimed that since there were an infinite series of steps, the arrow would never complete the journey.

What he had actually done, in stating the paradox, was to claim that an infinite series cannot have a sum. Specifically, this series.



Here is a simple proof that the series does in fact converge.

Let S = 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 + ....

So 2S = 2(1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 + ....)

2S = 1 + 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 + ....

But, if we discard the first term, this is just S.

So

2S = 1 + S

2S - S = 1

S = 1

Thus the sum of the infinite series is 1. No calculus needed. Zeno lacked the technique to do this, as did anyone at that time - but it is hardly rocket-science once you spot the trick! Had it been explained to Zeno, he would certainly have been able to follow the logic.

Unless you object, I'll use this as the basis of Zeno's refutation, later. It saves me doing the donkey work.

Of course I don't mind. It is a well known proof. But I got the name of the paradox wrong - this is actually for the Dichotomy Paradox. The Achilles & the Tortoise one is essentially the same thing dressed up differently.

The Arrow, or Fletcher's, Paradox states that an arrow cannot move because, at any single instant of time, it can only exist in one single place and cannot be moving between places. He effectively quantises time! Refutations are less straightforward than the others - one way is to argue that time is continuous and so, no matter how small an instant is taken, it can always be broken down into yet smaller instances in which the position of the arrow changes. Other arguments go so far as to invoke relativity! However, the simplest thing is simply to say that Zeno is making an assumption about time (that it is composed of discreet, quantum instances) that simply cannot be shown to be true or false, hence neither can anything relying upon it.

Didnt we quantize time with the plank time?
Speaking from memory there is a smallest unit of time and we know its size. I have a few links somewhere....

[Surendra Darathy]

The Arrow, or Fletcher's, Paradox states that an arrow cannot move because, at any single instant of time, it can only exist in one single place and cannot be moving between places. He effectively quantises time! Refutations are less straightforward than the others - one way is to argue that time is continuous and so, no matter how small an instant is taken, it can always be broken down into yet smaller instances in which the position of the arrow changes. Other arguments go so far as to invoke relativity! However, the simplest thing is simply to say that Zeno is making an assumption about time (that it is composed of discreet, quantum instances) that simply cannot be shown to be true or false, hence neither can anything relying upon it.

What is problematic here is quantising time for a macroscopic object such as an "arrow" in units normalised to an arrow. La de da.

Didnt we quantize time with the plank time?

Yes, but if you don't understand what quantisation is about, don't fucking bring it up. I thought I was done with you, but your capacity for error seems limitless. Oh, and BTW, the guy's name was spelled "Planck".

[GrahamH]

Didnt we quantize time with the plank time?
Speaking from memory there is a smallest unit of time and we know its size. I have a few links somewhere....

Not according to the oracle. Planck Time doesn't seem to be quantisation. It is a measurement issue and times shorter than Planck TIme may behave differently.

[Little Idiot]

<snip>

I need not concerm myself with all of any and all possible multiverse(s), because I am using logic here in our space-time existence. As long as the logic is sound here in our space time it will surfice for my purpose. I repeat, I am using logic here in space time, to determine what can be said here in space time with our linguistic understanding of space and time. I am not suggesting a new language and thought method be applied in reality; all words and thinking are here in our space-time.

Ah, I thought you were trying to talk about reality, but perhaps you mean nothing can be said about reality. Instead you are talking about existence, 'in our space-time', which is not real, but exists.

So, within any particular existence it is valid to use logic to talk about things within that existence. OK
I assume you will be using empirical observation to formulate your axioms. Will you bother to test any theories, or will you go with your 'other way of knowing'?
It seems nothing can be said about that which might be real but not exist here.
It seems nothing can be said about any 'other existence' not 'in our space-time'.

Is that your position?

No. Thats not my position.
I am talking about reality. I am using language to do so, and logic to show the validity of how I do so.
I am using language here in space and time, using finite and limited thought to formulate descriptions.
I am using logic to validate the description based on Axiom (1).

If I say "reality is X" is true, there is a distinction between the language used to describe reality("reality is X") and the truth of the statement.
The language used is obviously a description of reality, that X is a property of reality.
The truth or untruth of the statement is a distinct thing.
We can therefore discriminate between (1) the linguistic constraints of the language, and
(2) the logical constraints and reasonable constraints on the truth. They are essentially different things.

(1) My linguistic constraints include the consideration that I am talking of a reality which is beyond time and space. I can not say reality is a <insert word>.... because 'a' is a singular article known in relation to other articles. Most words of our language are space and time and causal specific, because they are drawn from our experience in space and time , to describe our experience in space and time. These are lingustic issues, connected with the subject being outside space and time. But they can be solved as linguistic issues by careful wording.

(2) The logical issues are essentially different. Does the conclusion follow from the premis? Is my reasoning sound or faulty?
This does not depend upon the nature of the subject (reality) being outside space and time, it depends on the validity of logic and reason used here inside space and time.

[Xamonas Chegwé]

Didnt we quantize time with the plank time?
Speaking from memory there is a smallest unit of time and we know its size. I have a few links somewhere....

Not according to the oracle. Planck Time doesn't seem to be quantisation. It is a measurement issue and times shorter than Planck TIme may behave differently.

And even if Zeno's paradox is true for planks, it isn't necessarily true for arrows too, is it.

Seriously. The refutation that the paradox was based on assumptions about time that were unprovable still stands. Even if time ultimately is quantisable, he went on to make assumptions about the properties of quantised time that were equally unprovable. And, if you climb an unprovable ladder, you can't prove you'll reach the roof.

[Little Idiot]

Didnt we quantize time with the plank time?
Speaking from memory there is a smallest unit of time and we know its size. I have a few links somewhere....

Not according to the oracle. Planck Time doesn't seem to be quantisation. It is a measurement issue and times shorter than Planck TIme may behave differently.

And even if Zeno's paradox is true for planks, it isn't necessarily true for arrows too, is it.

Seriously. The refutation that the paradox was based on assumptions about time that were unprovable still stands. Even if time ultimately is quantisable, he went on to make assumptions about the properties of quantised time that were equally unprovable. And, if you climb an unprovable ladder, you can't prove you'll reach the roof.

What do you mean? an arrow is just a small plank with a point at one end. Whats good for small planks is good for arrows, in my not so serious opinion.

[Little Idiot]

Didnt we quantize time with the plank time?

Yes, but if you don't understand what quantisation is about, don't fucking bring it up. I thought I was done with you, but your capacity for error seems limitless. Oh, and BTW, the guy's name was spelled "Planck".

You are never going to be done with me.
My capacity for error knows only one limit, which is the only one which matters. This is where we talk of what can humanity know of reality.
Everything else is throw away, as I said before, I think. Only one subject is significant to me, and to us all, did we but know it.

And I did throw in the point about Planck time as a question, not an assertion. The clue is in the use of the syntax called 'a question mark' illustrated below
?

and this is a smilie

[GrahamH]

Moving this to the relevent topic:

BMI is the imaginings or ideas of big mind. I don't see the difference.

Okay. So BM imagines or ideas what? Every atom, particle, force in Oak1 and lays it out in space/time? Or does BM just imagine all of the possible experiences all IM's could ever have?

The atoms etc are our experiences - can we discuss a single object in any way other than as the content of our experience? We simply do not know EDIT= experience anything of 'the thing itself' which some of us like to talk about - Its pure speculation to say we know anything about the thing itself outside our experience of the thing, and this includes saying its really a physical or material thing. All we really know about the tree is our experience of the tree. And we know the experience is mental because we know it as a result of our mind's construction of a representation within our mind; we only know this representation.

So now you are an empiricist again? What about 'other ways of knowing' that go beyond the experience?

No need to reply here, that's for the other topic. Sorry for the interruption.

No, I am not an empiricist, I just accept that we only know experiences of the environment as mental, subjective experiences. We dont experience (I should maybe have said experience not know) the things in themselves, and have no basis to claim we do experiennce them.

Yes, yes, 'experience' is 'mental' and there is no 'experience of noumena'. However, you have just spent time arguing that logic and maths are 'ways of knowing' that go beyond experience. By your own reasoning then, we can know more than just the subjective experience. You seem to want it both ways

You seem to have built a straw man of empiricism which amounts to 'we can only know the experience' and a fantasy of 'logic & maths are routes to pure knowledge without reference to the empirical'.

I think all your opponents here would agree that we do know things beyond the experience, using logic and maths, and that the link between them is mutually validating.
Experience without theory is not knowledge. (at least R1 'theory')
Theory without experience is not knowledge. (it is fantasy)

[Little Idiot]

Moving this to the relevent topic:

BMI is the imaginings or ideas of big mind. I don't see the difference.

Okay. So BM imagines or ideas what? Every atom, particle, force in Oak1 and lays it out in space/time? Or does BM just imagine all of the possible experiences all IM's could ever have?

The atoms etc are our experiences - can we discuss a single object in any way other than as the content of our experience? We simply do not know EDIT= experience anything of 'the thing itself' which some of us like to talk about - Its pure speculation to say we know anything about the thing itself outside our experience of the thing, and this includes saying its really a physical or material thing. All we really know about the tree is our experience of the tree. And we know the experience is mental because we know it as a result of our mind's construction of a representation within our mind; we only know this representation.

So now you are an empiricist again? What about 'other ways of knowing' that go beyond the experience?

No need to reply here, that's for the other topic. Sorry for the interruption.

No, I am not an empiricist, I just accept that we only know experiences of the environment as mental, subjective experiences. We dont experience (I should maybe have said experience not know) the things in themselves, and have no basis to claim we do experiennce them.

Yes, yes, 'experience' is 'mental' and there is no 'experience of noumena'. However, you have just spent time arguing that logic and maths are 'ways of knowing' that go beyond experience. By your own reasoning then, we can know more than just the subjective experience. You seem to want it both ways

You seem to have built a straw man of empiricism which amounts to 'we can only know the experience' and a fantasy of 'logic & maths are routes to pure knowledge without reference to the empirical'.

I think all your opponents here would agree that we do know things beyond the experience, using logic and maths, and that the link between them is mutually validating.
Experience without theory is not knowledge. (at least R1 'theory')
Theory without experience is not knowledge. (it is fantasy)

Your argument (against me) is flawed because you make no distinction between experience and know.
We experience only our mental experience, (and I ask you to confirm that it looks to me that you are agreeing to this here). We can say this is empirical experience. We agree it cant be experience of things in themselves, of 'noumena'

But this is different to what we can or can not know about.

We can know that two parallel lines never meet (before infinity) and we can know that (any odd plus any even always gives an odd) but can we ever empirically experience these things.

Clearly there is a difference between experience and know, do you agree.

[GrahamH]

Moving this to the relevent topic:

...

No, I am not an empiricist, I just accept that we only know experiences of the environment as mental, subjective experiences. We dont experience (I should maybe have said experience not know) the things in themselves, and have no basis to claim we do experiennce them.

Yes, yes, 'experience' is 'mental' and there is no 'experience of noumena'. However, you have just spent time arguing that logic and maths are 'ways of knowing' that go beyond experience. By your own reasoning then, we can know more than just the subjective experience. You seem to want it both ways

You seem to have built a straw man of empiricism which amounts to 'we can only know the experience' and a fantasy of 'logic & maths are routes to pure knowledge without reference to the empirical'.

I think all your opponents here would agree that we do know things beyond the experience, using logic and maths, and that the link between them is mutually validating.
Experience without theory is not knowledge. (at least R1 'theory')
Theory without experience is not knowledge. (it is fantasy)

Your argument (against me) is flawed because you make no distinction between experience and know.
We experience only our mental experience, (and I ask you to confirm that it looks to me that you are agreeing to this here). We can say this is empirical experience. We agree it cant be experience of things in themselves, of 'noumena'

"experience only our mental experience" is a meaningless tautology. Do you mean that 'experience' is as an aspect of what we call 'mental'?

But this is different to what we can or can not know about.

Do you know anything about trees? How did you come by that knowledge?

We can know that two parallel lines never meet (before infinity) and we can know that (any odd plus any even always gives an odd) but can we ever empirically experience these things.

That is how we define 'parallel lines'. There is no reason to suppose there actually are any infinite parallel lines. They are merely an abstractions of finite lines imagined to be free of deviation.

Our experience is limited, localised in time and space, so we only speculate about infinities in abstract terms. We can't say if anything infinite exists, nor that we can know infinity.

Clearly there is a difference between experience and know, do you agree.

As I said, we need experience and understanding to know something. The understanding is grounded in the experience. We can re-arrange things we know from understanding experience to create fantasies, and then claim to know them, but that is even further removed from 'noumena'.

We might define an entity lacking all attributes that we experience and understand as faults in ourselves. We have then constructed a fiction from our experience. Do you call ideas about that fiction 'knowledge'?

[Little Idiot]

Moving this to the relevent topic:

...

No, I am not an empiricist, I just accept that we only know experiences of the environment as mental, subjective experiences. We dont experience (I should maybe have said experience not know) the things in themselves, and have no basis to claim we do experiennce them.

Yes, yes, 'experience' is 'mental' and there is no 'experience of noumena'. However, you have just spent time arguing that logic and maths are 'ways of knowing' that go beyond experience. By your own reasoning then, we can know more than just the subjective experience. You seem to want it both ways

You seem to have built a straw man of empiricism which amounts to 'we can only know the experience' and a fantasy of 'logic & maths are routes to pure knowledge without reference to the empirical'.

I think all your opponents here would agree that we do know things beyond the experience, using logic and maths, and that the link between them is mutually validating.
Experience without theory is not knowledge. (at least R1 'theory')
Theory without experience is not knowledge. (it is fantasy)

Your argument (against me) is flawed because you make no distinction between experience and know.
We experience only our mental experience, (and I ask you to confirm that it looks to me that you are agreeing to this here). We can say this is empirical experience. We agree it cant be experience of things in themselves, of 'noumena'

"experience only our mental experience" is a meaningless tautology. Do you mean that 'experience' is as an aspect of what we call 'mental'?

It is only tautology if when I say "we have experience" you already agree that its mental and thus identical to "we have mental experience" Other wise the addition of the word mental adds to the meaning of the original phrase, and it is not a tautology.
I did ask if you agreed to this, but you didnt agree or disagree; Again, a simple question; do you or do you not agree that all experience is mental?

But this is different to what we can or can not know about.

Do you know anything about trees? How did you come by that knowledge?

I know about trees by having experienced them. But I also know a little about black holes and other things which I have not experienced, like mexico.

We can know that two parallel lines never meet (before infinity) and we can know that (any odd plus any even always gives an odd) but can we ever empirically experience these things.

That is how we define 'parallel lines'. There is no reason to suppose there actually are any infinite parallel lines. They are merely an abstractions of finite lines imagined to be free of deviation.

So what?
Because its a definition, does not suggest it is not known. Even if we can never confirm by experience that there no infinite parallel lines, you are adding more evidence; we know there are no infinite straight lines, but we can not know this by experience unless we know every straight line!
My point remains valid; it is clear that we can know knowledge that we can not experience.

Our experience is limited, localised in time and space, so we only speculate about infinities in abstract terms. We can't say if anything infinite exists, nor that we can know infinity.

That's more evidence, we can still know things about infinities, such as the thread about the sum of infinite series; we can prove it does sum (or otherwise that it does not sum), more knowledge we cant experience.

Clearly there is a difference between experience and know, do you agree.

As I said, we need experience and understanding to know something. The understanding is grounded in the experience. We can re-arrange things we know from understanding experience to create fantasies, and then claim to know them, but that is even further removed from 'noumena'.

You can claim some knowledge comes from experience, but not that all knowledge comes from physical experience.
If you actually answer the question about 'do you agree all experience is mental' we can finish this off by saying;
All knowledge is based on the mental; some on (mental) phyical experiences, some on the use of mental logic.

We might define an entity lacking all attributes that we experience and understand as faults in ourselves. We have then constructed a fiction from our experience. Do you call ideas about that fiction 'knowledge'?

Some 'knowledge' can be a special class of knowledge; fictional knowledge. If I speak 'klingon' from star trek, its not a 'real' language spoken by real klingons, but I could comunicate in written or verbal form with another speaker showing some real knowledge content.
If I study the works of fiction, I could write reviews, earn money, and debate with others concerning my knowledge of a fictional subject.

As I tried to explain earlier we can make a distinction; "I speak Klingon" is true.
I have a fictional subject - there are no real klingons, its a fictional language
I have real knowledge - as shown if I speak with another who knows the language.

To try make it more clear;
I dont speak klingon, but lets assume 'Xak ikit tikle' was klingon for 'I speak klingon', then I could say
'Xak ikit tikle' is true.
'Xak ikit tikle' is a fictional subject, written in a fictional language (the content language).
but its truth value expressed in English (the meta-language) is real knowledge.

Would you agree with me?

[GrahamH]

"experience only our mental experience" is a meaningless tautology. Do you mean that 'experience' is as an aspect of what we call 'mental'?

It is only tautology if when I say "we have experience" you already agree that its mental and thus identical to "we have mental experience" Other wise the addition of the word mental adds to the meaning of the original phrase, and it is not a tautology.
I did ask if you agreed to this, but you didnt agree or disagree; Again, a simple question; do you or do you not agree that all experience is mental?

OK, so when you say "we experience our mental experience" you just mean "we have experience (which we call 'mental'", not that there is some extra level of experience of the experience or observing the perception. Is that the case?

But this is different to what we can or can not know about.

Do you know anything about trees? How did you come by that knowledge?

I know about trees by having experienced them. But I also know a little about black holes and other things which I have not experienced.

Yes. You have experienced reports from people who have experienced effects that seem to be due to black holes. Your knowledge of black holes is due to empirical science, which employs observation and theory.

We can know that two parallel lines never meet (before infinity) and we can know that (any odd plus any even always gives an odd) but can we ever empirically experience these things.

That is how we define 'parallel lines'. There is no reason to suppose there actually are any infinite parallel lines. They are merely an abstractions of finite lines imagined to be free of deviation.

Our experience is limited, localised in time and space, so we only speculate about infinities in abstract terms. We can't say if anything infinite exists, nor that we can know infinity.

Clearly there is a difference between experience and know, do you agree.

As I said, we need experience and understanding to know something. The understanding is grounded in the experience. We can re-arrange things we know from understanding experience to create fantasies, and then claim to know them, but that is even further removed from 'noumena'.

We might define an entity lacking all attributes that we experience and understand as faults in ourselves. We have then constructed a fiction from our experience. Do you call ideas about that fiction 'knowledge'?

Any thoughts on the last part?

[Little Idiot]

"experience only our mental experience" is a meaningless tautology. Do you mean that 'experience' is as an aspect of what we call 'mental'?

It is only tautology if when I say "we have experience" you already agree that its mental and thus identical to "we have mental experience" Other wise the addition of the word mental adds to the meaning of the original phrase, and it is not a tautology.
I did ask if you agreed to this, but you didnt agree or disagree; Again, a simple question; do you or do you not agree that all experience is mental?

OK, so when you say "we experience our mental experience" you just mean "we have experience (which we call 'mental'", not that there is some extra level of experience of the experience or observing the perception. Is that the case?

When I say "we experience our mental experience", what I mean is that all our experience is mental. The content; mental, the observer; mental, the observed, mental. Its all mental. We have no experience of anything not mental.
So yes; we have our experience which we call mental.
How do you understand experience? (I am rewording the question 'do you agree all experience is mental, which you are seemingly reluctant to answer).

But this is different to what we can or can not know about.

Do you know anything about trees? How did you come by that knowledge?

I know about trees by having experienced them. But I also know a little about black holes and other things which I have not experienced.

Yes. You have experienced reports from people who have experienced effects that seem to be due to black holes. Your knowledge of black holes is due to empirical science, which employs observation and theory.

We can know that two parallel lines never meet (before infinity) and we can know that (any odd plus any even always gives an odd) but can we ever empirically experience these things.

That is how we define 'parallel lines'. There is no reason to suppose there actually are any infinite parallel lines. They are merely an abstractions of finite lines imagined to be free of deviation.

Our experience is limited, localised in time and space, so we only speculate about infinities in abstract terms. We can't say if anything infinite exists, nor that we can know infinity.

Clearly there is a difference between experience and know, do you agree.

As I said, we need experience and understanding to know something. The understanding is grounded in the experience. We can re-arrange things we know from understanding experience to create fantasies, and then claim to know them, but that is even further removed from 'noumena'.

We might define an entity lacking all attributes that we experience and understand as faults in ourselves. We have then constructed a fiction from our experience. Do you call ideas about that fiction 'knowledge'?

Any thoughts on the last part?

Well I did what I think to be a clear explaination of fiction and knowledge when I said in the last post
Some 'knowledge' can be a special class of knowledge; fictional knowledge. If I speak 'klingon'

from star trek, its not a 'real' language spoken by real klingons, but I could comunicate in written or verbal form with another speaker showing some real knowledge content.
If I study the works of fiction, I could write reviews, earn money, and debate with others concerning my knowledge of a fictional subject.

As I tried to explain earlier we can make a distinction; "I speak Klingon" is true.
I have a fictional subject - there are no real klingons, its a fictional language
I have real knowledge - as shown if I speak with another who knows the language.

To try make it more clear;
I dont speak klingon, but lets assume 'Xak ikit tikle' was klingon for 'I speak klingon', then I could say
'Xak ikit tikle' is true.
'Xak ikit tikle' is a fictional subject, written in a fictional language (the content language).
but its truth value expressed in English (the meta-language) is real knowledge.

Would you agree with me?

So I ask, do you have any thoughts on that
Do you agree to the distinction between the (language and linguistic content) and the (truth)?

regarding

We might define an entity lacking all attributes that we experience and understand as faults in ourselves

I am not sure what you mean. can you rephrase for me?

[GrahamH]

When I say "we experience our mental experience", what I mean is that all our experience is mental. The content; mental, the observer; mental, the observed, mental. Its all mental. We have no experience of anything not mental.
So yes; we have our experience which we call mental.
How do you understand experience? (I am rewording the question 'do you agree all experience is mental, which you are seemingly reluctant to answer).

1. You can't show 'the observer' to be 'mental. It is merely one of your axioms.
2. We can define 'experience' to be mental, but what the experience is of is not shown to be mental.

Well I did what I think to be a clear explaination of fiction and knowledge when I said in the last post
Some 'knowledge' can be a special class of knowledge; fictional knowledge. If I speak 'klingon'

from star trek, its not a 'real' language spoken by real klingons, but I could comunicate in written or verbal form with another speaker showing some real knowledge content.

A fictional language is not something you can converse with. If you can do that it musty be a real language. If I invent a fictional language Poplosian, without creating a real functional language, it is a fiction. If I design the thing as a functional language then it is a language.

As you say, it's the Klingons that are fictional. The language Klingon is a real language. The history told about the language might be fiction.

If I study the works of fiction, I could write reviews, earn money, and debate with others concerning my knowledge of a fictional subject.

Indeed you could, but it would have absolutely no metaphysical significance, would it? You could write reams of prose about Klingons or Hobbits and the only link between that knowledge and 'reality' would be the fact that the ideas involved would all be rehashing and recombining of ideas acquired from experience.

To try make it more clear;
I dont speak klingon, but lets assume 'Xak ikit tikle' was klingon for 'I speak klingon', then I could say
'Xak ikit tikle' is true.

It is clear enough. If you define a lexicon and grammar and thus define what Xak ikit tikle means then it might indeed be 'true'.
As it is I suspect you just made up some meaningless character strings, in which case it is not 'true'. If you do define the language you can trace the roots of the semantics. Where would that take you, to the world of experience?

We might define an entity lacking all attributes that we experience and understand as faults in ourselves

I am not sure what you mean. can you rephrase for me?

I mean that we experience change, substance, confusion, ignorance etc. We can use those experiences to define an abstract concept of a being that is changeless, immaterial, omniscient etc. We aren't identifying real attributes of a real being, we are merely defining what this being would not be. Such thinking doesn't transcend experience, it is a fiction based on experience.