Metaphysics as an Error

[jamest]

Simply because you attributed causality of 'seeing causality in the world' to the wiring of the brain.

Sure. No idea why this is important. I've used this sort of empirical causality many times in this thread. The point is that there's nothing metaphysical about this sort of causality, and you haven't shown that it is.

Because what you say infers a specific stance within the philosophy of the mind. In this case, 'identity theory', which is a materialistic outlook that reduces mind states to brain states.

Talking about the brain as an empirical construct has nothing to do with 'inferring a specific stance within the philosophy of mind'.

It does if you're talking about mind states being reduced to that construct.

What I did was to explain how one could initiate a metaphysical enquiry. I said that there must only be three possible metaphysical directions one can take in association with E, and then I introduced significant truisms that could be associated with each possibility.
In other words, I have formulated a basic approach to metaphysics.

Exactly, but you've offered no basis for the possibility of an approach to metaphysics.

What? You say "Exactly", which infers to me an agreement of what I said (as per the underlined parts of my statement), and then proceed to disagree.

You want me to provide a basis for the possibility of an approach to metaphysics? And I did! So what is it about that approach/effort that you didn't like?
Seriously, I'm utterly confused. Please respond so that I can resolve this issue.

[Little Idiot]

What do we end up with? We end up with the four great problems of Metaphysics. One, that metaphysical content - the concept of thing-in-itself - has no argument or evidence going for it. We have no way of measuring 'reliability' within metaphysics, or what that would mean. Within the empirical world, science is the most reliable tool for measurement. Reliable simply means that it (often) makes accurate predictions. However, the empirical world is a construct of predictions, so even the world 'reliable' CAN NOT be used in reference to metaphysics. We'll get to that later.

The term reliability is an analogue term with a range of values. The term reality is a digital term; it is or it is not.

How do you know this? Science defines the term reliability and it is within science that the term is used. Where does the definition from reality come from? Why is it dichotomous? More importantly, the question of this thread: "Why do you believe you have access to this information, and why do you believe your intuitions correspond with anything metaphysical?"

Its not hard; either something IS actual or is NOT. You dont get a bit actual.
Nobody bar you has mentioned intuitions, let alone mine.

Metaphysics of reality does not need a guide for reliability, only a guide for reality.
The thing-in-itself is one way, not the only way, of talking about the reality of the thing as opposed to the apearance of the thing.

Sure, but what does this have to do with the thread?

Oh, I dont know, maybe, say, err, you know; metaphysics, the study of reality. Specifically the 'doing' of metaphysics.

The second great problem of metaphysics is the problem of the possibility of Metaphysics. It is conceivable (leaving alone possible) that we have evidence and arguments that metaphysics is possible, but that we simply have none for specific content. Meaning that there is something ineffable that we ineptly express with 'existence' when used metaphysically, but that it still denotes something. For this, no evidence or argument has ever been posited. No philosopher hitherto has seen fit to explore this issue.

The statement that reality must be ‘something’ would be an error, if reality were the source of all things including space and time, it may be beyond the very possibility of being a ‘thing’ which is only a concept defined in terms of other things or thing and not-thing.
To say "No philosopher hitherto has seen fit to explore this issue." is simply an error. Huge sections of some philosophies are dedicated to this very topic.

I'm genuinely surprised.. What do you think the topic of this thread is?

Since metaphysics is the study of reality, your error (my bold above) that reality is 'something' is significant to the thread. You cant dismiss the study of reality without a concept of reality. You are trying to dismiss metaphysics, with a very weak understanding of 'reality' which if you recall I asked you several times what the word mean and you avoided answering.

Third, there are very great doubts whether it is possible to mount an argument or evidence for either of the above problems. This means, the third great problem of metaphysics is that there is no reason to believe that we are able to ever do metaphysics. This means, put simply, that there is no basis on which to assume that either arguments or evidence, respectively, ratio or senses, are capable of providing the sort of information that would qualify as evidence of the possibility of metaphysics. Quite clearly, metaphysical content is not empirical, and we have no evidence or argument to believe that our minds are capable of anything beyond rudimentary problem solving.

Metaphysical content need not be empirical, although it may draw from empirical evidence its enquiry is not limited to empirical. However, this does not suggest the metaphysics is in error, it simply shows it is not empirical. As SoS has agreed, we don’t know that empirical is the only way of knowing. In fact we do know that it is not the only way of knowing, therefore to say metaphysics is not emperical does not mean metaphysics is not a way of knowing.

I don't know what any of this means, and I don't know how you think you can make these claims without any evidence or argument.

I have provided both evidence and argument in posts to SoS and Logical Bob.

Fourth is a problem of linguistics. Earlier the observation was made that 'reliable' is a concept rooted in empiricism. There's no reason to believe that in metaphysics, concepts/words from empiricism will still work. Take, per example, the term 'causality'. Within empiricism, it denotes a relationship between two events. Namely, that the occurrence of one event necessitates the other. If event A, then event B. There's no reason to believe that this idea applies to metaphysics. The idea that 'the empirical world must be caused', per example, is assuming that causality applies outside of the empirical world. There is no argument or evidence for this. Put short, it is assumed that a domain-specific concept can be used as domain-general. Again, sans evidence, and sans argument.

Linguistics issues are simply that; issues of the limitations of language. This does not mean metaphysics is limited because some every day concepts may not be metaphysically valid.
As per example, 'the emperical world must be caused' is not a correct statement, cause and effect simply do not apply 'outside of space-time'. This is not an argument against metaphysics, rather an argument for metaphysics; the need to understand what can be understood about 'outside space and time' - obviously, any attempt to work mentally on the subject 'outside space and time' can not be limited to emperical measurements within space and time. It is therefore only an argument against using language wrongly, since 'outside' is a spacial term it can not be used to correctly describe 'outside space and time'. This can only be done through metaphysics.

You couldn't have missed the point more. This is about a category error, about the unbased assumption of deploying concepts outside of their normal domain. You haven't understood a single point I've made. Now, I've had actual discussions with people on this issue - some people understand what I'm saying. You do not understand what I am saying. My saying that you don't understand what I'm saying is not some tactic I use to shake off criticism. You just simply don't understand what I'm saying. You don't understand any of it. Why don't you ask people here whether they believe you understand what I'm saying or whether you're just going off on strawman after strawman..

Which is exactly what I am refering to; using concepts outside there domain is a limitation on the concepts and language used not a limit on metaphysics.

I can think and talk of something beyond space time using very specific thoughts and language; metaphysics can provide a frame work to hold thought steady in this subtle realm.

James and I can argue about such a realm and comunicate and exchange concepts concerning it. The fact that you can not do so, and that you can not comprehend that it can be done is a limit on your understanding, not mine.

(illustration, not to distract from the thread but to show what I mean. (Disclaimer the language used here is rough and aproximate to illustrate my point);
James does, I believe, say; the 'real causality' is in the realm beyond time, and appears in the space time world as a result. I dispute this, and say there is no 'real causality' only the appearence of causality because causality requires time and can not be in the realm of timeless, where change is impossible, and can at most be a product of that realm, while not being in that realm. This is pure metaphysics, we reach our different positions via reasoning.)

Quoting people who agree with you is a waste of time. Although SoS has a more clear understanding of what I am refering than yourself.

Instead of telling me I dont understand you, why not actually answer my point. Saying I dont understand you IS just a tactic, (it seems fairer to say that you dont understand me) like not answering the question or points I make is just a tactic.

[Little Idiot]

I gave examples before, which unless you can refute have already shown other ways of knowing. I refer to mathematical knowledge which is impossible to prove emperically such as (a simple and obviously true example) any odd plus any even will always give an odd. This is correct for all odds and evens, but cant be verified emperically for all odds and evens without an infinite number of trials.
I refere to logic, such as 'If a is a P and all Ps are Q, then a is Q'. (Can this be shown for all P's and Q's)

So your whole proof is that math and logic is metaphysics?

No.

I dont say math and logic is metaphysics.
These are examples where emperical knowledge is either totally useless or at best only one way of knowing.
This proves there are other ways of knowing.
My proof goes on from here.

The point of the examples, which you have not yet disproved is that there are other ways apart from emperical. Which you have been arguing against, and others such as SD and Logical Bob have been suggesting or stating.

[jamest]

Instead of telling me I dont understand you, why not actually answer my point. Saying I dont understand you IS just a tactic, (it seems fairer to say that you dont understand me) like not answering the question or points I make is just a tactic.

Obscurantism, is perhaps the key word here.

[Comte de Saint-Germain]

Simply because you attributed causality of 'seeing causality in the world' to the wiring of the brain.

Sure. No idea why this is important. I've used this sort of empirical causality many times in this thread. The point is that there's nothing metaphysical about this sort of causality, and you haven't shown that it is.

Because what you say infers a specific stance within the philosophy of the mind. In this case, 'identity theory', which is a materialistic outlook that reduces mind states to brain states.

Talking about the brain as an empirical construct has nothing to do with 'inferring a specific stance within the philosophy of mind'.

It does if you're talking about mind states being reduced to that construct.

There's nothing metaphysical about a functionalist psychological account.

What I did was to explain how one could initiate a metaphysical enquiry. I said that there must only be three possible metaphysical directions one can take in association with E, and then I introduced significant truisms that could be associated with each possibility.
In other words, I have formulated a basic approach to metaphysics.

Exactly, but you've offered no basis for the possibility of an approach to metaphysics.

What? You say "Exactly", which infers to me an agreement of what I said (as per the underlined parts of my statement), and then proceed to disagree.

You want me to provide a basis for the possibility of an approach to metaphysics? And I did! So what is it about that approach/effort that you didn't like?
Seriously, I'm utterly confused. Please respond so that I can resolve this issue.

You have initiated a metaphysical enquiry, but you have not provided any evidence that it can be grounded, that it is possible to do this based on evidence or argument. You've merely made some metaphysical inferences - not any argument evidence that these inferences are grounded. In less polite terms, you're talking out of your ass, and I'm asking you to demonstrate that you're not talking out of your ass. I mean, how difficult is it to understand the topic of this thread? I'm genuinely puzzled.

What do we end up with? We end up with the four great problems of Metaphysics. One, that metaphysical content - the concept of thing-in-itself - has no argument or evidence going for it. We have no way of measuring 'reliability' within metaphysics, or what that would mean. Within the empirical world, science is the most reliable tool for measurement. Reliable simply means that it (often) makes accurate predictions. However, the empirical world is a construct of predictions, so even the world 'reliable' CAN NOT be used in reference to metaphysics. We'll get to that later.

The term reliability is an analogue term with a range of values. The term reality is a digital term; it is or it is not.

How do you know this? Science defines the term reliability and it is within science that the term is used. Where does the definition from reality come from? Why is it dichotomous? More importantly, the question of this thread: "Why do you believe you have access to this information, and why do you believe your intuitions correspond with anything metaphysical?"

Its not hard; either something IS actual or is NOT. You dont get a bit actual.

Why not? Do you have evidence for this? Do you have an argument for this?

Nobody bar you has mentioned intuitions, let alone mine.

Considering you have no evidence or argument and have provided no source of information on which you base the above, I must consider them to be intuitions.

Metaphysics of reality does not need a guide for reliability, only a guide for reality.
The thing-in-itself is one way, not the only way, of talking about the reality of the thing as opposed to the apearance of the thing.

Sure, but what does this have to do with the thread?

Oh, I dont know, maybe, say, err, you know; metaphysics, the study of reality. Specifically the 'doing' of metaphysics.

This thread is not about metaphysical content.

I'm genuinely surprised.. What do you think the topic of this thread is?

Since metaphysics is the study of reality, your error (my bold above) that reality is 'something' is significant to the thread. You cant dismiss the study of reality without a concept of reality. You are trying to dismiss metaphysics, with a very weak understanding of 'reality' which if you recall I asked you several times what the word mean and you avoided answering.

Please. What do you think the topic of this thread is?

Third, there are very great doubts whether it is possible to mount an argument or evidence for either of the above problems. This means, the third great problem of metaphysics is that there is no reason to believe that we are able to ever do metaphysics. This means, put simply, that there is no basis on which to assume that either arguments or evidence, respectively, ratio or senses, are capable of providing the sort of information that would qualify as evidence of the possibility of metaphysics. Quite clearly, metaphysical content is not empirical, and we have no evidence or argument to believe that our minds are capable of anything beyond rudimentary problem solving.

Metaphysical content need not be empirical, although it may draw from empirical evidence its enquiry is not limited to empirical. However, this does not suggest the metaphysics is in error, it simply shows it is not empirical. As SoS has agreed, we don’t know that empirical is the only way of knowing. In fact we do know that it is not the only way of knowing, therefore to say metaphysics is not emperical does not mean metaphysics is not a way of knowing.

I don't know what any of this means, and I don't know how you think you can make these claims without any evidence or argument.

I have provided both evidence and argument in posts to SoS and Logical Bob.

No you haven't.

Fourth is a problem of linguistics. Earlier the observation was made that 'reliable' is a concept rooted in empiricism. There's no reason to believe that in metaphysics, concepts/words from empiricism will still work. Take, per example, the term 'causality'. Within empiricism, it denotes a relationship between two events. Namely, that the occurrence of one event necessitates the other. If event A, then event B. There's no reason to believe that this idea applies to metaphysics. The idea that 'the empirical world must be caused', per example, is assuming that causality applies outside of the empirical world. There is no argument or evidence for this. Put short, it is assumed that a domain-specific concept can be used as domain-general. Again, sans evidence, and sans argument.

Linguistics issues are simply that; issues of the limitations of language. This does not mean metaphysics is limited because some every day concepts may not be metaphysically valid.
As per example, 'the emperical world must be caused' is not a correct statement, cause and effect simply do not apply 'outside of space-time'. This is not an argument against metaphysics, rather an argument for metaphysics; the need to understand what can be understood about 'outside space and time' - obviously, any attempt to work mentally on the subject 'outside space and time' can not be limited to emperical measurements within space and time. It is therefore only an argument against using language wrongly, since 'outside' is a spacial term it can not be used to correctly describe 'outside space and time'. This can only be done through metaphysics.

You couldn't have missed the point more. This is about a category error, about the unbased assumption of deploying concepts outside of their normal domain. You haven't understood a single point I've made. Now, I've had actual discussions with people on this issue - some people understand what I'm saying. You do not understand what I am saying. My saying that you don't understand what I'm saying is not some tactic I use to shake off criticism. You just simply don't understand what I'm saying. You don't understand any of it. Why don't you ask people here whether they believe you understand what I'm saying or whether you're just going off on strawman after strawman..

Which is exactly what I am refering to; using concepts outside there domain is a limitation on the concepts and language used not a limit on metaphysics.

Who said it was? The problem then becomes finding concepts that can apply to metaphysics. How do we know what concepts can be applied to metaphysics? Please, go ahead.. present your arguments or evidence for it..

I can think and talk of something beyond space time using very specific thoughts and language; metaphysics can provide a frame work to hold thought steady in this subtle realm.

How do you know that you can think and talk of something beyond space time? How do you know that it is anything like you 'think' or 'talk' about? It seems you now agree with me implicitly that they are intuitions. In any case, you have no evidence or argument for them. We are finally approaching the point of my original post. It seems odd that it takes 30 pages for you lot to finally get at the level of the opening post.

James and I can argue about such a realm and comunicate and exchange concepts concerning it. The fact that you can not do so, and that you can not comprehend that it can be done is a limit on your understanding, not mine.

Limit on your understanding? I completely agree. I'm just curious as to how you do it. Based on what argument and what evidence you makes these claims. In case you are interested - this is the topic of this thread, not any of the other bullshit you have posted.

(illustration, not to distract from the thread but to show what I mean. (Disclaimer the language used here is rough and aproximate to illustrate my point);
James does, I believe, say; the 'real causality' is in the realm beyond time, and appears in the space time world as a result. I dispute this, and say there is no 'real causality' only the appearence of causality because causality requires time and can not be in the realm of timeless, where change is impossible, and can at most be a product of that realm, while not being in that realm. This is pure metaphysics, we reach our different positions via reasoning.)

Yet you have no argument or evidence that your reasoning pertains to anything metaphysical. You merely assume that your mind/brain - whatever - is capable of this. You assume that reasoning is a valid method of acquiring knowledge about metaphysics. You have no evidence, nor any argument for it.

Quoting people who agree with you is a waste of time. Although SoS has a more clear understanding of what I am refering than yourself.

Not to piss on anyone here, but no one here has a greater understanding of philosophy of consciousness than I do. You'd have to go to a professor of philosophy of consciousness - like Dennett, per example - to find someone who understands it better than I do. Even so, I can hold myself fairly well in that sort of setting. As for philosophy in the larger picture, I doubt anyone here would make such assertions. On the flipside, there are people here that are far more knowledgeable on science than I am, and that is far more praiseworthy.
The idea that either you or Jamest understands philosophy better than I do - or anything that has been mentioned in this thread save for Quantum Mechanics - is laughable.

Instead of telling me I dont understand you, why not actually answer my point. Saying I dont understand you IS just a tactic, (it seems fairer to say that you dont understand me) like not answering the question or points I make is just a tactic.

[the PC apeman]

SOS, 'fish in buckets' = E.

Anything else of relevance, you will find in my two previous posts.

E is all we know.

...and all ye need to know.

But is it all that can be known?
How can you establish that it is all that can be known?

Let's dig up Keats and ask him.

Alternatively, you could explain what epistemological methods you'd like to deploy other than (E) reason applied to empirical data. We can only know what we can know for any given definition of knowledge. What's your definition?

[Comte de Saint-Germain]

Instead of telling me I dont understand you, why not actually answer my point. Saying I dont understand you IS just a tactic, (it seems fairer to say that you dont understand me) like not answering the question or points I make is just a tactic.

Obscurantism, is perhaps the key word here.

You know a thread has pretty much hit rock bottom intellectually when you're called obscurantist by a metaphysician.

SOS, 'fish in buckets' = E.

Anything else of relevance, you will find in my two previous posts.

E is all we know.

...and all ye need to know.

But is it all that can be known?
How can you establish that it is all that can be known?

Let's dig up Keats and ask him.

Alternatively, you could explain what epistemological methods you'd like to deploy other than (E) reason applied to empirical data. We can only know what we can know for any given definition of knowledge. What's your definition?

[Little Idiot]

Instead of telling me I dont understand you, why not actually answer my point. Saying I dont understand you IS just a tactic, (it seems fairer to say that you dont understand me) like not answering the question or points I make is just a tactic.

Obscurantism, is perhaps the key word here.

You know a thread has pretty much hit rock bottom intellectually when you're called obscurantist by a metaphysician.

That, or your argument has hit rock bottom.

I can only speak for myself, but James would probably agree, when I say; I am not a metaphysician, I am a philosophy aspirant, metaphysics is a tool use to achieve certain goals, it is not the end nor totality of my endeavour.
I say 'philosophy' in the greek sense; the love of wisdom.
I say 'aspirant' because I would not claim to be at the end of the endeavour.

[Little Idiot]

SOS, 'fish in buckets' = E.

Anything else of relevance, you will find in my two previous posts.

E is all we know.

...and all ye need to know.

But is it all that can be known?
How can you establish that it is all that can be known?

Let's dig up Keats and ask him.

Alternatively, you could explain what epistemological methods you'd like to deploy other than (E) reason applied to empirical data. We can only know what we can know for any given definition of knowledge. What's your definition?

Well to be honest I have given two examples of other methods, and repeated myself several times; the simple mathematical and logical statements that I used, as yet I dont think anyone has shown that I am in error. I quote myself as I understand you may not wish to read back through all my posts for the examples.

I refer to mathematical knowledge which is impossible to prove emperically such as (a simple and obviously true example) any odd plus any even will always give an odd. This is correct for all odds and evens, but cant be verified emperically for all odds and evens without an infinite number of trials.
I refere to logic, such as 'If a is a P and all Ps are Q, then a is Q'. (Can this be shown for all P's and Q's

Maybe you could answer my question first?
Forgive me for discounting your answer above as humour not a serious answer.

My point is that these have been shown as examples of other ways and they are examples which are hard or impossible to establish by emperical method.

[Comte de Saint-Germain]

Instead of telling me I dont understand you, why not actually answer my point. Saying I dont understand you IS just a tactic, (it seems fairer to say that you dont understand me) like not answering the question or points I make is just a tactic.

Obscurantism, is perhaps the key word here.

You know a thread has pretty much hit rock bottom intellectually when you're called obscurantist by a metaphysician.

That, or your argument has hit rock bottom.

My argument is the culmination of three thousand years of philosophy.

I can only speak for myself, but James would probably agree, when I say; I am not a metaphysician, I am a philosophy aspirant, metaphysics is a tool use to achieve certain goals, it is not the end nor totality of my endeavour.
I say 'philosophy' in the greek sense; the love of wisdom.

I say 'aspirant' because I would not claim to be at the end of the endeavour.

What endeavour? What have you done so far in love of wisdom? You certainly haven't studied Kant or the critiques thereof.

Oh and,

Just because I dare to think differently to you does not count as evidence that I am dumb.

There's a big difference between different and uneducated.

[jamest]

There's nothing metaphysical about a functionalist psychological account.

If you knew what you were talking about, you'd know that 'functionalism' is non-reductive on the issue of what mental states are. To imply that psychological content (mind states) is reducible to the brain (brain states), is not a purely functionalist perspective. I repeat, what you said about the brain being the cause of pyschological content, is commensurate with being an identity theorist. A materialist!

[Surendra Darathy]

That based on the assumption that the only possible way of knowing is by empirical - How can you possibly demonstrate that. Presumably if emperical method is the only way to know things, this question must be answered by using emperical method.

This is as if to say that a logical proof demonstrates knowledge beyond the empirical. But that logical proof must be confronted. OK, fine. Do you just say, "Well there's my proof, and it stands as a proof of knowledge beyond the empirical."

We're back to what Pannenberg was trying to do at RDnet, which was to show that none of his axioms could be rejected. What is it, then to "reject an axiom"? Especially one that has not been presented?

Those who extol the virtues of proving metaphysical claims by asserting that their axioms are unimpeachable have only placed the problem at one more remove.

Anyone who claims to have such a proof will present it the way Pannenberg tried to do, state his axioms plainly, and let the confrontation take place. I don't see that happening here.

What this has no bearing on is that the same maths can be applied to non-emperical subjects too.

Nevertheless, if you are going to engage in non-empirical proofs, you must present a set of axioms. But we seem to be skipping by that, rather gaily, to an assertion that presentation of axioms is not necessary. This is the "Argument from claiming to be able to bend a spoon." The catch is that it is a non-empirical spoon.

Presumably if emperical method is the only way to know things, this question must be answered emperical method.

All you have to do to show that there is a means of knowledge beyond the empirical is to lay out the axioms and present the proof. Otherwise, you're just saying, "I have knowledge beyond the empirical, but I can't show it to you because it's beyond the empirical."

What do you need in order to accept that your unsupported statements are not being dismissed prejudicially. If you don't wish to present evidence, present some axioms.

A statement that "the universe consists of the empirical, plus something that is beyond the empirical" is not an axiom,

Suppose another statement, that "the empirical universe simply cannot be all that is". Is this an "axiom"?

A discussant who treats such statements as axioms had better define the difference between axioms and articles of faith. Usually a logician will start with something simpler, such as "'A and ~A' is a contradiction".

This is why a statement that "metaphysics is an error" only leaves one waiting for a proof that it is not an error. A good set of axioms would be a nice start.

Perhaps it is not fair to say, "metaphysics is an error" and more fair to say, "metaphysics has no axioms".

I have shown that physical existence can not be known to be the only possible existence, and that reality may be different to physical existence therefore there is a theoretically possible ‘other’ reality apart from existence and thus justified metaphysics as the enquiry into the theoretically possible ‘other.’

You have also not shown that you don't have a monster under bed. Does that mean you have a monster under your bed?

Metaphysical content need not be empirical, although it may draw from empirical evidence its enquiry is not limited to empirical. However, this does not suggest the metaphysics is in error, it simply shows it is not empirical. As SoS has agreed, we don’t know that empirical is the only way of knowing. In fact we do know that it is not the only way of knowing, therefore to say metaphysics is not emperical does not mean metaphysics is not a way of knowing.

I don't know what any of this means, and I don't know how you think you can make these claims without any evidence or argument.

something IS actual or is NOT

There's an example of trying to do non-contradiction, but without defining "actual". See? You pretend you've gotten started, but you haven't. "Actual" is a superfluous word there. A statement either is (true) or is not (true). It doesn't make the statement more true to say "this statement is actually true". "Actual" is a bullshit term, unless by it you mean "empirical". I will agree that a statement is supported empirically or it is not. If it is not, by what is it supported?

metaphysics, the study of reality

Are you sure you don't want to identify metaphysics as the "Study of actual reality"? After all, metaphysics might include imaginary reality in addition to actual reality.

It's OK if you do, but I will call the study of imaginary reality something else. I will call it "fiction".

You cant dismiss the study of reality without a concept of reality.

OK. I'm willing to define "reality" as "everything that is not unreal". This is called a tautology, in case you are still catching up on the basics of metaphysics.

Which is exactly what I am refering to; using concepts outside there domain is a limitation on the concepts and language used not a limit on metaphysics.

So why do you want to talk about the prospect of discussing a subject that is not bespoke?

I can think and talk of something beyond space time using very specific thoughts and language; metaphysics can provide a frame work to hold thought steady in this subtle realm.

You can use the phrase "something beyond space and time". Just words, so far. That "something" is not bespoke. In that phrase, "something" is rather like an algebraic placeholder. The statement is not yet an equation, using the analogy of mathematics. When you go a little farther, you make a simple tautology, such as "God is that which is beyond space and time." Are we any the wiser? The statement has an "equals sign" in it, but the tautology is too simple to be informative.

[the PC apeman]

But is it all that can be known?
How can you establish that it is all that can be known?

Let's dig up Keats and ask him.

Alternatively, you could explain what epistemological methods you'd like to deploy other than (E) reason applied to empirical data. We can only know what we can know for any given definition of knowledge. What's your definition?

Well to be honest I have given two examples of other methods, and repeated myself several times; the simple mathematical and logical statements that I used, as yet I dont think anyone has shown that I am in error. I quote myself as I understand you may not wish to read back through all my posts for the examples.

I refer to mathematical knowledge which is impossible to prove emperically such as (a simple and obviously true example) any odd plus any even will always give an odd. This is correct for all odds and evens, but cant be verified emperically for all odds and evens without an infinite number of trials.
I refere to logic, such as 'If a is a P and all Ps are Q, then a is Q'. (Can this be shown for all P's and Q's

Maybe you could answer my question first?
Forgive me for discounting your answer above as humour not a serious answer.

My point is that these have been shown as examples of other ways and they are examples which are hard or impossible to establish by emperical method.

Logic (and by extension, mathematics) are charming tools. When applied to themselves you end up with stained sheets and a silly grin. Now if you're starting out by assuming that these tools have some metaphysical significance, then it is not surprising that you would come to the conclusion that metaphysics is possible.

I have answered your question. E is all that can be known if you define knowledge as the result of reason applied to empirical data. It is established by the definition.

What you've responded with is reason alone. Applied to nothing. And even at that you've failed to produce a reasonable case for the possibility of metaphysics.

[Surendra Darathy]

I am not a metaphysician, I am a philosophy aspirant, metaphysics is a tool use to achieve certain goals, it is not the end nor totality of my endeavour.
I say 'philosophy' in the greek sense; the love of wisdom.
I say 'aspirant' because I would not claim to be at the end of the endeavour.

Well, then you don't appreciate that "technique" is an aspect of the creation of art. Galleries are full of utter banality executed with miserable technical skill. One's subjective sense of a dedication to that inner quest gets a cold splash of water on its face when a newly-minted mediocrity meets a summary of 3000 years of the history of thought.

Personally, I think that philosophy represents the history of failed models of cognition. Following the scientific revolution, philosophy tends toward the recognition of the limitations of natural language in relation to mathematics in describing the world.

You'd have to go to a professor of philosophy of consciousness - like Dennett, per example - to find someone who understands it better than I do. Even so, I can hold myself fairly well in that sort of setting.

The main reason for this appearance is that Dennett has a story and he's sticking to it, the better to present a point of view consistently across many peer-reviewed publications. That sense of the word "understanding" is in the willingness to try to articulate an internally-consistent set of statements. It is uncertain that someone who writes as prolifically as does Dennet can be held to account for being "consistent", although his papers do refer to other papers he has published. Dennett is quite well-informed about a lot of the empirical research into human behavior that relates to his philosophy.

[SpeedOfSound]

Metaphysical content need not be empirical, although it may draw from empirical evidence its enquiry is not limited to empirical. However, this does not suggest the metaphysics is in error, it simply shows it is not empirical. As SoS has agreed, we don’t know that empirical is the only way of knowing. In fact we do know that it is not the only way of knowing, therefore to say metaphysics is not emperical does not mean metaphysics is not a way of knowing.

I'm amused that my claim of not being able to know something could become a cornerstone for the new metaphysics. Can I get this shit named after me?