On treeness of Oak1, and other things

[SpeedOfSound]

Thats why you reach the self-contradictory conclusion there aint no fucking observer - the observer is a subject, not an object. The observer will never be found as an object, but the capacity for you to make the observations and state 'there aint no fucking observer' depends on you observing the observations upon which you reach your conclusion.

Subject and object are words to talk about the private nature of our experience. They aren't things in themselves. I rejected those two smelly words at 14. Haven't used them for anything in 45 years.

The science is that when these SW's are set up in the brain that there is then recognition. It goes no further than that. There is no special place in the physical brain to deliver this recognition to. It's all that is necessary to explain all of the fundamentals of how we sense, think , and behave.

If this recognition persists in some qualia space then it is a conscious percept. It is now causal in further brain activity. This be thinking and planning. It is complicated by all the other semi-persistent things present in that moment. Things such as context and unconscious priming, further sensory input, attention modulation, etc.

it is believed driven by interactions with the basal ganglia that evolved from older mechanisms that allow us to move in sequences of muscular activation.

There is no mind place to deliver this stuff to. IT HAS ALREADY ARRIVED!

[SpeedOfSound]

The only way to cure the retreat is to stop retreating and stand firm and say "I am now Mind, hear me fucking roar". Which is classical Cartesian dualism.

What you wrote in c is classical Cartesian dualism. You can't save it like you claim by turning both mind and PW into menticles. It doesn't even matter if I turn both mind and PW into physicles. Still dualism. With the idea of processing and representation and then presentation you will always have the dualist problem of infinite retreat. I do mean retreat.

Exactly, you 'tell me' i.e. assert the point. You do not explain or justify it.
The point (idealistic monism ('its all mental') is a duality) is no more valid than if I 'tell' you the physicalist monism ('its all physical') is a duality.

I do not accept this as a valid eplaination; there is simply mental mind, mentally creating and mentally knowing the mental ideas. For duality there needs to be two direrent things; where is the second (non-mental) thing to complete the duality?

Your quotes were messed up. Can you go back and fix that?

This is going to take a little work. You believe the stuff out there is the mental stuff of the Big Mind. I believe it's just stuff. Lets call it Stuff and not worry about what it is. We have substance monism.

Our brain and sense are Stuff too. They interact with the Stuff to do the stuff that Stuff does. We sense the Stuff and the brain sets up in these interactive patterns with it. The brain is Stuff. The patterns are made of the same Stuff. The brain Stuff makes our body Stuff do things.

I stop at just Stuff. YOU keep adding this mind that observes the Stuff. That is a Transform from one kind to another. From process of observation to the observer. You have jumped a level somewhere inside the brain to your idea of mind.

For you the Stuff is made of BM imaginings. BMI. BMI interacts with BMI in the PW. That interaction is sensing. You then have a Transform to get the interaction of the BMI back again to your individual minds imaginings.
If what you believe were true none of this sensing/brain shit would have any use whatever. It's BMI and our brains are bubbles in the BM so the we could DIRECTLY experience it. But we don't so you have to hand it off to the mind again.

You still have mind containing imaginings and that is dualism. The mind is one thing and the BMI is another.

[SpeedOfSound]

LI

Your ideas go dual as soon as you say that the BM imagines the PW. Unless the BM IS the PW rather than imagines it. Which is sort of kind of what I believe.

'cept it ain't a mind it's a universe thingy.

The science of the brain does not suffer this dualism. But the science of the brain can show you why humans suffer the dualistic illusion.

[Surendra Darathy]

The point I claim to have won is that we have other ways of knowing, in addition to the empirical...

In light of what XC has written about geometry and 'reality', I think it safe to say that a means of producing assumptions is not a way of "knowing". The willingness to check assumptions and drop them in the face of a single counterexample is a way of knowing, but I don't know what you would call it. Rejection of perversity, or something like that?

What should we call a willingness to delete an axiom based on a contradiction of it?

The fact that we can invent instruments to expand the spatial scales of data collection (microscopes and telescopes, generically) and increasingly-accurate clocks (dependent on rate processes taking place in a spatial context) does not mean that space-time is anything more than a model for organising the data.

As XC points out, it organises data so well that one feels rather a sense of surprise in discovering the universe is a mite on the back of a turtle shell, and more turtles all the way down...

There are no constraints as to metaphysical descriptions of what the nature of "real reality is". Metaphysics is ungrounded.

[jamest]

1. Zeno's paradoxes presume that an infinite series cannot sum to a finite amount - this is demonstrably false.

I'm a bit short on time, but wanted to pick-up on this. The issue is not whether Zeno was right or wrong (though I would defend the argument in terms of the distinction between tangible and conceptual infinities). The issue is whether Zeno's argument (or the argument of the guys who allegedly proved him wrong), was a construct not wholly dependent upon observation, so that it went beyond observation. Certainly, one cannot prove that Zeno was wrong by pointing at something within the world. So, to prove Zeno wrong necessitates a logic that goes beyond observation.

Btw, the thing with Euclid - I was just refering to the curvature of spacetime.

[SpeedOfSound]

1. Zeno's paradoxes presume that an infinite series cannot sum to a finite amount - this is demonstrably false.

I'm a bit short on time, but wanted to pick-up on this. The issue is not whether Zeno was right or wrong (though I would defend the argument in terms of the distinction between tangible and conceptual infinities). The issue is whether Zeno's argument (or the argument of the guys who allegedly proved him wrong), was a construct not wholly dependent upon observation, so that it went beyond observation. Certainly, one cannot prove that Zeno was wrong by pointing at something within the world. So, to prove Zeno wrong necessitates a logic that goes beyond observation.

Btw, the thing with Euclid - I was just refering to the curvature of spacetime.

So what's the point? That logic and reasoning and math are now metaphysics? WTF?

[GrahamH]

1. Zeno's paradoxes presume that an infinite series cannot sum to a finite amount - this is demonstrably false.

I'm a bit short on time, but wanted to pick-up on this. The issue is not whether Zeno was right or wrong (though I would defend the argument in terms of the distinction between tangible and conceptual infinities). The issue is whether Zeno's argument (or the argument of the guys who allegedly proved him wrong), was a construct not wholly dependent upon observation, so that it went beyond observation. Certainly, one cannot prove that Zeno was wrong by pointing at something within the world. So, to prove Zeno wrong necessitates a logic that goes beyond observation.

Btw, the thing with Euclid - I was just refering to the curvature of spacetime.

Observation is precisely why even Zeno knew he must be wrong. The slower runner is overtaken and the arrow does reach the target. Observation contradicts the suppsed paradox. The later mathematics shows the error in thinking that led to an apparent paradox, which was only a faulty 'way of knowing' (i.e. not knowing).

[Surendra Darathy]

So, to prove Zeno wrong necessitates a logic that goes beyond observation.

I will try to be conciliatory in responding to this, James, because the simple statement above illustrates precisely the confusion you are entertaining. The conciliatory part is that I do not call it an "error", yet. Once I point out to you the nature of your confusion, I will subsequently have to term your deployment of such statements an "error". Now:

Proof is not something that is done by means of "observation". This is a fundamental constraint of empirical approaches, such as the scientific. What is powerful about the axiomatic systems of geometry is that the axioms actually are in accord with empirical information. If space-time is shown to have non-Euclidean geometry observationally, it actually scores points for the worth of studying non-Euclidean geometry as an axiomatic system.

The concept of "proof" is strictly applicable only in axiomatic systems. XC illustrated very clearly how Zeno was proved wrong by extending the axiomatic system under which Zeno tried to conclude something about infinite sums.

You should be grateful to XC for his patient exposition of this point, instead of immediately forgetting it in order to try to score purely rhetorical points.

You are arriving at the point where you have to fish or cut bait, and that is the recognition of what an axiomatic system ever promises to do. Ironically, this is (I think) tied to your reluctance to assemble the axioms and definitions of your own system coherently, in a single post, and instead your choice to toss fallacious brickbats at empirical systems.

The fact of axiomatic systems is clearly laid out by XC, and that axiomatic systems must be willing to bin any axiom when the consequences of using it lead to a counterexample of it. Whether or not axiomatic systems derive any support for their axioms from the empirical is beside the point; it is just quite pleasant when the axioms receive support from the empirical. Purportedly metaphysical systems purposively avoid using any axioms that might be checked empirically. When you try to sort out purportedly metaphysical systems, rigorously posed in terms of axioms, you cannot get out of them anything that you did not inject in your axioms.

Systems in which the axioms are sacrosanct and immune to binning are called "belief systems".

[Xamonas Chegwé]

You did not win the point, LI.

You merely claimed that the existence of mathematical proofs somehow validated your point. But mathematical proofs are built upon earlier proofs, etc. (it's proofs all the way down) until, in the final analysis, they are built upon axioms which cannot be proven and are merely taken as being self-evident.

Here's the stinger.

Those axioms are accepted as self-evident because they agree with our observation of empirical data.

Thats a U-turn from your position earlier where you said

A proof in science means only that empirical results agree with predicted results within acceptable margins of experimental error. It is only ever a demonstration that the theory it is 'proving' is a reasonable model, not the truth.

In maths, a proof is far more than this. A mathematical proof, if it is sound, is absolute. It follows directly from clear definitions and previously proven lemmas. Take away the universe and maths will still be true.

So, yes, I would say that things can be known other than by empirical evidence but only very special and completely abstract things.

The point I claim to have won is that we have other ways of knowing, in addition to the empirical, which you clearly agreed with, in the above quote.

Even if the axioms are accepted by people because they agree with our observation of empirical data, does that sufice to prove the axioms truth relies upon such agreement, or does it only show we accept more easily things which agree with observation, regardless of the truth of the thing?

Even if, as you are saying, we accept axioms which agree with emperical observations, that does not mean that (odd + even = odd for all evens and odds) or (irrationality of root 2) can be demonstrated emperically.

Therefore;
Why does my point "emperical evidence can not demonstrate all known knowledge, therefore there is at least one other way of gaining knowledge" not stand?
Since this is the crux of the victory I claimed, why am I not entitled to make the claim?

Later. I have a funeral to go to. But basically, my wording was misleading in the earlier quote. I will elaborate later.

OK. Allow me to explain (and apologise for) the sloppy wording here.

In maths, a proof is far more than this. A mathematical proof, if it is sound, is absolute[2]. It follows directly from clear definitions[1] and previously proven lemmas. Take away the universe and maths will still be true[3].

So, yes, I would say that things can be known other than by empirical evidence but only very special and completely abstract things.[4]

1. The key phrase is "clear definitions". This is synonymous here with "clearly defined axioms", which is the phrase I should have used.
2. No logical system can be built purely upon thin air. There must be a foundation upon which the logic stands. Mathematical proofs are absolute if, and only if, the axiomatic foundation that underlies them is true and the logic that builds upon these axioms is sound. This was not made clear at all - it was sloppy of me and I have no defence for missing it from my statement above except for can't-be-arsedness!
3. With 1 and 2 established, I stand by this statement. Provided the axioms hold, maths is absolutely true.
4. Rigorous logic has proved many theorems in mathematics that can never be demonstrated empirically: that there is an infinite number of primes, the irrationality of π, Fermat's last theorem, etc. All of these flow from precise, axiomatic definitions by clear logical steps. It is such theorems that I refer to in this last sentence - they can only be 'known' through the application of rigorous logic, owing to the infinite number of cases that would require checking empirically. The caveat that is missing though (and again, for which I have no excuse) is that stated in point 2.

Apologies again if I misled you. I should know better than to argue with philosophers without being rigorously accurate in my wording. All I can add in my defense is that I haven't done this for a while.

[Xamonas Chegwé]

1. Zeno's paradoxes presume that an infinite series cannot sum to a finite amount - this is demonstrably false.

I'm a bit short on time, but wanted to pick-up on this. The issue is not whether Zeno was right or wrong (though I would defend the argument in terms of the distinction between tangible and conceptual infinities). The issue is whether Zeno's argument (or the argument of the guys who allegedly proved him wrong), was a construct not wholly dependent upon observation, so that it went beyond observation. Certainly, one cannot prove that Zeno was wrong by pointing at something within the world. So, to prove Zeno wrong necessitates a logic that goes beyond observation.

Btw, the thing with Euclid - I was just refering to the curvature of spacetime.

the distinction between tangible and conceptual infinities

? Kindly explain this distinction and its relevance.

Certainly, one cannot prove that Zeno was wrong by pointing at something within the world.

Shoot an arrow at a target and it hits the target. Zeno claims that it never can. This is a clear demonstration of the falsity of his arguments by observation. Understanding the exact nature of his falsehood requires some fairly simple but relatively recently established mathematics but the empirical proof is enough to show he is wrong.


Regarding the curvature of spacetime. Euclidian geometry is not sufficient to model this, true, because Euclidian geometry applies to an idealised, simplified model of one aspect of the universe. Similarly, Euclidian theorems do not apply to geometry carried out on the surface of a sphere. Again, if the axioms hold and the logic is sound, the results hold. In the two cases given, the parallel postulate does not hold (I did mention this in an earlier post) and must be replaced with an equivalent axiom - there are many such, each leading to a separate, non-Euclidian geometry.

Euclidian geometry only yields results in Euclidian space. Non-Euclidian geometries yield results in the particular types of space that they model. There is no contradiction here - axioms are chosen that fit the empirical characteristics of the space being modeled. In planar space, parallel lines never meet and are always equally far apart. On the surface of a sphere, parallel lines converge and meet. In order to model the two systems, therefore, different axioms are required.



I should like to point out that Euclid's axioms were only given by me as a well-known example of the axiomatic basis of maths when I was asked for one. In more modern formal systems, different axioms are used, many of which are logically equivalent to those given by Euclid.

The Peano axioms are among the best known but there are many other systems.

[jamest]

Btw, the thing with Euclid - I was just refering to the curvature of spacetime.

the distinction between tangible and conceptual infinities

? Kindly explain this distinction and its relevance.

It's not relevant. I was just making the point that there is still a possible defence of Zeno's argument, imo anyway, which hinges upon a discussion between the conceptualisation of infinities, and tangible infinities. Let's just pretend I didn't say anything, as it's not relevant to this thread.

Certainly, one cannot prove that Zeno was wrong by pointing at something within the world.

Shoot an arrow at a target and it hits the target. Zeno claims that it never can.

Zeno claims that it never should. What we observe is of no relevance, since we cannot be sure that we are observing real events. It might all be in the mind - an illusion.
The only way to prove Zeno wrong, is to employ logic/math that tells us more than any observation ever could!

This is a clear demonstration of the falsity of his arguments by observation.

Again, what we observe may all be 'in the mind', so that nothing actually does move through space-time. That is, Zeno cannot be refuted by observation.

the empirical proof is enough to show he is wrong.

Only if one is a materialist that believes in the reality of what one is observing.

I wanted to add - about non-Euclidean geometries: that the 19th century mathematicians that 'discovered' them, didn't do so through a telescope. Further evidence, I would say, of the mind transcending observation. Which is all, essentially, that is relevant to this discussion.

[SpeedOfSound]

1. Zeno's paradoxes presume that an infinite series cannot sum to a finite amount - this is demonstrably false.

I'm a bit short on time, but wanted to pick-up on this. The issue is not whether Zeno was right or wrong (though I would defend the argument in terms of the distinction between tangible and conceptual infinities). The issue is whether Zeno's argument (or the argument of the guys who allegedly proved him wrong), was a construct not wholly dependent upon observation, so that it went beyond observation. Certainly, one cannot prove that Zeno was wrong by pointing at something within the world. So, to prove Zeno wrong necessitates a logic that goes beyond observation.

Btw, the thing with Euclid - I was just refering to the curvature of spacetime.

Observation is precisely why even Zeno knew he must be wrong. The slower runner is overtaken and the arrow does reach the target. Observation contradicts the suppsed paradox. The later mathematics shows the error in thinking that led to an apparent paradox, which was only a faulty 'way of knowing' (i.e. not knowing).

You mean there are more than one faulty ways of not knowing?

[GrahamH]

Zeno claims that it never should. What we observe is of no relevance, since we cannot be sure that we are observing real events. It might all be in the mind - an illusion.
The only way to prove Zeno wrong, is to employ logic/math that tells us more than any observation ever could!

[GrahamH]

1. Zeno's paradoxes presume that an infinite series cannot sum to a finite amount - this is demonstrably false.

I'm a bit short on time, but wanted to pick-up on this. The issue is not whether Zeno was right or wrong (though I would defend the argument in terms of the distinction between tangible and conceptual infinities). The issue is whether Zeno's argument (or the argument of the guys who allegedly proved him wrong), was a construct not wholly dependent upon observation, so that it went beyond observation. Certainly, one cannot prove that Zeno was wrong by pointing at something within the world. So, to prove Zeno wrong necessitates a logic that goes beyond observation.

Btw, the thing with Euclid - I was just refering to the curvature of spacetime.

Observation is precisely why even Zeno knew he must be wrong. The slower runner is overtaken and the arrow does reach the target. Observation contradicts the suppsed paradox. The later mathematics shows the error in thinking that led to an apparent paradox, which was only a faulty 'way of knowing' (i.e. not knowing).

You mean there are more than one faulty ways of not knowing?

Maybe there infinite ways of not knowing and it's just that we humans are mired in empiricism that leaves us without foundation for thinking up more of them . Could different axioms yield an equally consistent and complex mathematics that contradict our own? If we have no concern for conforming our mathematics to observed reality what are the constraints? Could we have 1+1 = 7 and square circles given the right axioms and definitions?

Put another way, are there any 'fundamental truths' about the particular mathematics humans have developed?

[jamest]

Zeno claims that it never should. What we observe is of no relevance, since we cannot be sure that we are observing real events. It might all be in the mind - an illusion.
The only way to prove Zeno wrong, is to employ logic/math that tells us more than any observation ever could!

It should be obvious:

1) Zeno has an argument.
2) That argument cannot be negated via observation because we cannot be sure whether observed motion is just an illusion apparent within the mind.
3) Therefore, Zeno must be disputed via logic that transcends the observed world, or not at all.