Even the physicist in me cant argue against that; we should also accept the same for all science - 'there are means of aquiring knowledge that physics and science can not give us'. Maybe a couple of examples would be good to enforce the point; say logical certainties or mathematical certainties which cant be proven by emperical method?jamest wrote:
Yes, there will be specific complaints about this or that, from above; but my primary concern is to show that there are means of acquiring knowledge that physics cannot give to us.
Maybe offer a definition of what science and scientific method is to help those who are not sure what it is and is not?
This would make clear why you say the next sentence about the internal or external nature of the world.
Please clarify; you sayThe internal or external nature of 'the world', for instance, is something beyond the scope of physics, yet reason dictates that the objects in the world must either be internal or external to whatever it is that I am. Further reasoning can then be employed in consideration of which of those options must be true. For instance, I would say that an observed entity, such as 'a tree', is an event happening to 'me', whatever I am - even if that is just a brain inside a human body. That is, the tree is something internalized. It is a self-constructed representation of something.
1. the tree is an event happening to me,
and
2. the tree is internalized.
My point; do you mean the tree or do you mean
1. the experience-ing of the tree is an event happening to me,
and
2. the experience of the tree is internalized.
I support and agree with the later version, I want clarification if you mean the original version.
Good job.How could this idea be rejected, then, other than to argue for the externalized reality of everything that is observed? But, wherein lies the sense in that? You may then say (as your scepticism would necessitate) that we cannot know either way whether the tree is internalized or externalized. But I say that we can, by analysing the distinction between myself, the tree, and my observation of a tree. Consider this:
a) There is me.
b) There is a tree.
c) There is my observation of the tree.
If an external-to-me entity, the tree would have to exist independently of my observation of it. That is, its reality would not be synonymous with my observation of it. So, even if existent externally to 'me', what I observe of the tree is an internalized entity. And, as a self-constructed representation, then how is it constructed? Well, it doesn't take much consideration to see that internalized entities are products of quale/sensations - I observe an object via the particular manner/order in which sensations of it are presented to my awareness. For instance, the internalized Sun can be defined in terms of its rounded yellowness and heat, to say the least.
I anticipate - as would be usual - a barrage of "What is yellowness?" and "What is heat?" questions. Well, as I said in the thread at RDnet, I can only talk about love to those that have loved. Likewise, I can only talk about sensations to those that have them. It's no use trying to explain what it's like to sense colours, to a blind man. No amount of information will yield an insight into what it is like to know colours and sounds and pain and love, etc.. So, I won't bother trying. My metaphysic is not dependent upon explaining what sensations are to those that do not know. My metaphysic is presented to those that need no explanation. If you are one of those individuals, then read-on. If not, then don't forget to recharge your battery later.
There are other approaches to showing that the world is internalized. We could discuss the values and definitions we impose upon that world, for instance. Or we could discuss the nature of sensations such as 'pain' and 'cold', which are obviously self-constructs facilitating a favourable result for the entity that experiences those sensations. For example, to feel pain when touching a flame with our hands, is a good thing in that it facilitates a recoil from that flame, thus preserving the form and function of the hands. A similar thing could be said of 'cold' (or 'hot') - that the world is not cold or hot, but that such sensations are self-constructs facilitating the preservation of both form and function, of the body.
My metaphysic expands upon the above and then progresses from it. If, for example, the world is internalized - a self-construct - then there is a distinction to be made between the world and that which views the construct. In normal parlance, I would say that there is a distinction between perceiver and perceived.
More significantly, when discussing the 'make-up' of this experience that we call 'the world', one has to define experience not just in terms of those things that are experienced, but in terms of the perceiver too; or, in terms of that which constructs and then observes those things. This brings me to Kant, who basically said that we cannot know anything beyond experience. I wouldn't disagree with that per se, but I would now add that since 'experience' is more than those things that are experienced - that is, since any definition of 'experience' would now have to embrace "that which constructs and then observes those things" - then speaking of the self as distinct to the world, does not exceed the boundaries laid-down by Kant. All I have done here, essentially, is expose the limitations of Kant's understanding of experience. My claim is that once defined properly, my conclusions are metaphysical, but do not transgress any lines drawn by Kant.
Anyway, I shall leave it there. As I said, my primary concern is to show the potentiality for constructing a specific metaphysic. At this juncture, the finale of that metaphysic is not important.
As always, serious critiques are welcomed.
