Metaphysics as an Error

[Comte de Saint-Germain]

The question of God is related to that of existence, of course, and to be sceptical of existence means to be sceptical of God specifically as well.
What does this mean? It means that if metaphysics is removed, one is only left with the 'apparent' world, the empirical world - what may now be called the real world. It means that if there is to be any room for God, it is as an empirical concept, not as some supra-empirical concept.

Hello again.
We may doubt that any thing within the empirical world actually exists; but if the objects of that world do not exist, then what are they - what IS the empirical world?

Why are you asking me? You are the one claiming that metaphysics is possible.

Surely, it must BE something else that yields this illusion/delusion/apparency of those objects?

Why must it be? You are asking rhetorically what I am asking you t oset out to prove. You are, amusingly enough, attempting to establish as obvious what I am questioning. Not a very efficient way of doing things, I would say.

Your scepticism of 'reality' implicitly infers that the objects of the world may not themselves be real. But if so, then they have to be something else that is not 'them', or they have to be 'nothing'. Either way, it seems that you cannot avoid harbouring a specific ontology within your scepticism. That is, if you say "if metaphysics is removed, one is only left with the 'apparent' world, the empirical world - what may now be called the real world", then you are not home free from metaphysics, because your position entails an ontology, albeit an unspecified one.

So according to you, it is impossible not to make any comments. So to say "it is not A", one automatically implies "It is something else than A". I've never heard something so preposterous. I don't see why saying that something is not A necessary means that it must be something else. At the most, you can ask me, if it is not A, then what it is. In fact, you have earlier and my response has been quite clear - I don't know. I don't claim any knowledge of it. More importantly, and this is what this thread is about, there is no reason to believe this sort of knowledge is possible.

As I said to you at RDnet, this whole discussion pivots upon what 'the empirical world' IS. And even if you don't know what it is, your scepticism about the existence of the objects therein necessarily pushes you into believing that it is something else, or nothing at all. You may not have understood this previously.

For clarification, this has nothing to do with my lack of understanding of your position. Your defence is fairly commonplace, though less eloquent than commonly pronounced.

Anyway, it is my position that one cannot be a relativist or a sceptic about the reality/existence of anything (including the world), without being chained to an ontology. In which case, your argument reduces to using a metaphysic to doubt [all other] metaphysics.

It's a pity that you are apparently unable to understand my original post.

I have to agree with Jamest on this point; if you say the world isnt as it appears to be, your doing metaphysics.

First of all, I would appreciate it if you tried to use English properly. Mistakes are human, but missing apostrophes and substituting 'you're' for 'your' in the same sentence is unacceptable. Second, I haven't claimed 'the world isn't as it appears to be'..

Unless there is some evidence or argument to demonstrate that measurability has any metaphysical implications, then clearly, such an equivocation is unwarranted and can not - as of yet - be accepted.

Isnt the measurement problem exactly such evidence?
The two slits experiment shows an example of this; elecrons perform diffraction through two slits as normal for waves, (its considered the interference of the probability wave that gives rise to the diffraction pattern, right?). But observation or measurement of the electron stops them behaving as waves, it destroys or collapses the probability wave and so the electron behaves as a particle.
Now the point is that the measurement or observation causes an observable change in the 'empirical reality' and not a small shift; it determines the nature of the electron to be either wave or particulate in nature with entirely different empirical results!

Eeeehh. No. Please don't bring Quantum Mechanics into this discussion.

The idea that one should refrain from speaking of such things is seen to be as cowardice, precisely because it is assumed that 'there is something out there'. The extension, the implication is that there is something to be described, even when it might be unknowable.

Isnt this 'something' exactly what Quantum mechanics describes?


As a casual follower of both Quantum Mechanics and traditional mysticism, sometimes it is hard to distinguish which camp issued a particular quote, and I dont just mean 'new age quantum quacks', I refer to the 'founding fathers' of QM, likes of Max Plank who said

All matter originates and exists only by virtue of a force... We must assume behind this force the existence of a conscious and intelligent Mind. This Mind is the matrix of all matter.

A casual follower of both Quantum Mechanics and traditional mysticism? What, you blew your brain out of an airlock?

The point is, however, that the methods not of getting to metaphysics, but the methods of coming to the idea of metaphysics, the methods by which one makes the assumption that there is something that can be covered by the term existence are suspect. This, of course, is highly problematic, not in the least because it is apparently assumed that denying the existence of the sun would mean to deny the sun as an empirical phenomenon, when nothing like that is intended. The sun is empirical and can be measured, but the idea that it is caused by some 'metaphysical sun', some 'thing-in-itself', this idea comes with suspect methods. That is to say, methods that have never been successfully argued for or provided evidence for.

Recall if you will that special relativity put paid to the idea of a 'hard' fixed space time out there independent of the observer, within separate frames of reference, such as on a moving train or on the statiinary platform there can be no agreement on symultaneity of events.
A simpe example, using the sun you refer to; as we know light from the sun takes several minutes to reach us, the sun we measure is not the real sun as 'the sun-itself' is, its an outdated image several minutes old. The famous example, if the sun disapeared NOW it would be several minutes before we noticed. Quite simply, our measured empercal world is not the actual world as it really is, any claims based on emperical measurements as the practical are fine, but as the factual need be considered carefully, very carefully. This suggests for me, a real need for metaphysics; we really do need to know what the hell we are talking about!

You are so incredibly ignorant about science I don't know where to begin. In fact, I don't think I will..

It seems so obvious to many people that all things must be caused (even though a causal relationship is used with reliability in the empirical world, and there's no reason to believe that its usage in metaphysics is valid)

If you talk about the "apparency" of the [objects in the] world, then surely you have to talk about the apparency of causal relationships between them? That is, if object A does not actually exist and is in fact reducible to [as yet] some unknowable essence,

Who says it is reducable to some unknowable essence? Who says objects exists? Oh right, you do. Why don't you first establish some of these bullshit claims before you bother the rest of us with this rot.

then in what sense can we talk about IT being the cause of anything that happens to object B? That is, if the objects of the world are merely 'apparent', then so too are the causal relationships which we ascribe to them. In other words, it would be wrong to say that the concept of 'causality' is a phenomenon occuring from and between empirical objects.

Christ on a fuckstick this is dense. You have raped, as I can discern, three philosophical concepts in this small bit of text. It's hard for me to get through this, because I actually know what I'm talking about. If you mean to say that causality deals in apparent relationships between empirical concepts (like the sun and the clouds) then sure, that's exactly what I'm saying. The extrapolation beyond this 'apparent world' - rather a misnomer, since it is the only real one - of causality as you do later:

That is, we must seek beyond the apparency of empirical things and ask questions such as "What causes the apparency of causality between the apparency of things?".

Is what I have objected to and you have provided no basis for.

My position is that if the empirical world is reducible to something else, then any obvious causality must also be attributable to that something else.
In the previous discussion, I used the analogy of a cartoon to get my point across: that none of the entities therein (such as Wile E. Coyote) actuallty exist - they just appear to exist; that none of those entities, therefore, have causal potency - that too is just an apparency; that any necessary causality required to yield this apparency of cartoon characters and causal relations between them, must emanate from beyond that realm of 'cartoon characters'.

that empirical reality must be caused by 'something else', and that this something else must be of some quality that is metaphysical.

It must be caused by 'something else' (or even 'nothing'), lest we say that the empirical world is self-caused - but how can something that only appears to exist, be self-caused?

Again, this is so muddied that it makes no sense. Address the questions of the OP, or show how they are faulty. This gets us nowhere, and I have no intention of turning in circles for 20 pages here as well.

@ the OP: I tried, ineptly, to express some of those same ideas in a paper in undergrad Philosophy umpteen years ago. My prof, bless his heart, replied something along the lines of, 'Yes, but there still must be something out there causing the phenomena.' (Or maybe it was 'experiences'.) It struck me as odd at the time, but I didn't have an adequate response at the time.

My response: "Causality is a concept we use, reliably, in reference to the empirical world. There is no basis, evidence or argument, proposed or existence on which we can infer that it can be reliably (let alone truthfully) used in reference to metaphysics. The assumption that something out there must be causing the phenomenon is one that is made because we are used to dealing with causes in the empirical world, it's a mistake of a mind evolved in the empirical world."

Eventually, I came across Hume's Hume's problem of induction, which, as far as I know, remains unsolved. Going from observation of a particular, even a very large set of particulars, to a metaphysical explanation, particularly a universal, seems to be a leap. Maybe even a leap of faith? The leap may work, in the sense that the theory makes very accurate predictions about what happens under certain conditions, but it turns out to be groundless when it is proposed as an accurate description of the way things really are.

And then there's Sextus Empiricus' problem of the criterion, which I don't think has adequately been addressed, either.

In short, any metaphysical construct, insofar as it proposes a 'known' ontology, seems to require a leap. As long as a leap is required, I don't see how it qualifies as 'knowledge', or how it can be characterized as known to be ultimately true.

Pardon if this approach was already taken in the original discussion, but I wasn't there, so...

No, it wasn't, actually. It was filled addressing the childish objections of people that apparently are wholly unable to understand Kant - let alone the philosophy that came after him.

My claim is that ideas about reality are only useful if they are taken as judgments about the putative physical world we find ourselves in. Anything else is an example of misusing our intelligence to outsmart ourselves. I can make that claim without resorting to anything that is not based in science or common sense physical.

I think.

Dont put much faith in the uncommon thing called common sence, as Einstein said

Common sense is the collection of prejudices acquired by age eighteen.

There is a conflict right there; science (Physics) views the atoms, forces and probability wave functions in a very different way to our common sense views the bunny rabbit.

Coming from the whack-job who habitually rapes quantum mechanics, I think Speed of Sound is safe on that count.

Eventually, I came across Hume's Hume's problem of induction, which, as far as I know, remains unsolved. Going from observation of a particular, even a very large set of particulars, to a metaphysical explanation, particularly a universal, seems to be a leap. Maybe even a leap of faith? The leap may work, in the sense that the theory makes very accurate predictions about what happens under certain conditions, but it turns out to be groundless when it is proposed as an accurate description of the way things really are.

I think that I partly addressed this problem in my previous post to Jerome, when I discussed the concept of causality. Feel free to comment on that post.

No, he didn't. If anything, I have pre-empted the notion that, within an empirical concept, certain assumptions can be used to make reliable predictions. I have no problem with Popperian pragmatism. That's quite different from what you propose with your VERY ugly 'causality' distraction.

[Little Idiot]

My claim is that ideas about reality are only useful if they are taken as judgments about the putative physical world we find ourselves in. Anything else is an example of misusing our intelligence to outsmart ourselves. I can make that claim without resorting to anything that is not based in science or common sense physical.

I think.

Dont put much faith in the uncommon thing called common sence, as Einstein said

Common sense is the collection of prejudices acquired by age eighteen.

There is a conflict right there; science (Physics) views the atoms, forces and probability wave functions in a very different way to our common sense views the bunny rabbit.

That is the point. I don't put any faith in common sense. I'm saying our idea about reality is based in common sense and it is not a very good idea unless we leave it in the realm of common sense. Metaphysics pretends to be brighter than that and fails horribly.

Just because we can have an abstract thought and catch a mammoth does not mean that we can catch anything any juicier if we don't shut the fuck up and have dinner.

But if you can tell me about where you got your idea of reality without any physical analogy I'll listen.

If, as you say; you accept that our common sense view is not very good, but is still useful - for catching lunch or fixing our PC.
If science accepts its own understanding imperfect, but useful for a working theory subject to improvement.
Then does metaphysics have to be perfect in order to be useful?
Clearly it does not have to be, nor does it claim to be perfect and compete. All that is neeed is the possibility of improvement and the possibility of increasing the understanding of humanity to justify a place for metaphyics as a branch on the tree of human enquiry.

Since we know that we do not experience the actual real world as it really is in any instant - at least a small delay for the sound and light to enter the CNS and be processed - then there is sufficient grounds to merit inquiry into how things really are, beyond the simple practicality of aquiring lunch.
While it is good sense to aquire lunch first, our large brains have allowed us spare time in which we can ponder such questions.

[FBM]

I'll settle for certain enough. I use the same principle to pull up pants or make a sandwich as I use to apply the science of the mind. When my legs cease to exist in this plane of reality I will go checkout some metaphysics books.

Sounds good to me. That's the approach I take. I don't doubt my experience; I just don't try to extract anything metaphysical out of it. Rather, I don't try to fabricate anything metaphysical from it.

[FBM]

As I said to you at RDnet, this whole discussion pivots upon what 'the empirical world' IS. And even if you don't know what it is, your scepticism about the existence of the objects therein necessarily pushes you into believing that it is something else, or nothing at all. You may not have understood this previously.

Maybe Academic skeptics would fall into this trap, but not Pyrrhonian skeptics. Suspension of judgement on all metaphysical matters is just that: suspension of judgement.

Anyway, it is my position that one cannot be a relativist or a sceptic about the reality/existence of anything (including the world), without being chained to an ontology. In which case, your argument reduces to using a metaphysic to doubt [all other] metaphysics.

Similar to the above statement. I'm not chained to an ontology. An Academic skeptic may be, but not a careful Pyrrhonian skeptic.

[Comte de Saint-Germain]

As I said to you at RDnet, this whole discussion pivots upon what 'the empirical world' IS. And even if you don't know what it is, your scepticism about the existence of the objects therein necessarily pushes you into believing that it is something else, or nothing at all. You may not have understood this previously.

Maybe Academic skeptics would fall into this trap, but not Pyrrhonian skeptics. Suspension of judgement on all metaphysical matters is just that: suspension of judgement.

Precisely. I don't see what it is about this that is so hard to understand.

Anyway, it is my position that one cannot be a relativist or a sceptic about the reality/existence of anything (including the world), without being chained to an ontology. In which case, your argument reduces to using a metaphysic to doubt [all other] metaphysics.

Similar to the above statement. I'm not chained to an ontology. An Academic skeptic may be, but not a careful Pyrrhonian skeptic.

Aye, aye.

[FBM]

Precisely. I don't see what it is about this that is so hard to understand.

Similar to the above statement. I'm not chained to an ontology. An Academic skeptic may be, but not a careful Pyrrhonian skeptic.

Aye, aye.

I'd love to be chained to an ontology, because that would mean that there was a complete and consistent one. However...

[Animavore]

I more agree with the OP. I never know what people are even talking about when they talk about a "thing-in-itself" or the "thingyness" of things
I dunno. Maybe I'm thick or something?
Plato makes it worse by talking about a more "perfect" thing behind everything and goes on about a table having a more "perfect" table situated, as far as I can make out, in another dimension, one more perfect than this one I can actually see with my eyes. Again Its totally subjective such a concept. While his perfect table may be made out a transcendental mahogany mine would be one with shackles and Jessica Alba chained down to.
There seems to be a lot of over-reaching to describe these things. I tend to call a spade a spade not a supra-spade emanating from a world beyond of which I see it only "imperfectly". And although I'm aware that different creatures can view it in different light-spectrums, something which metaphysicists like to use as analogy when taking about how "imperfectly" (I would say incompletely) we see objects, the analogy fails for me because it doesn't have any thing other worldly about it.

I never studied philosophy so I could be talking bollox.

EDIT: For clarity.

[Luis Dias]

Ah, so you guys are over here!

Thanks, Samsa, for your help.

(Is it true that RDF is gonna blow itself up? I really think the looks and design of this site is shitty as hell! It hurts my fucking eyes).

Sooooo... what's up? What are the realists and idealists up to?

[Comte de Saint-Germain]

History of an error - Nietzsche

1. The true world -- unattainable but for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man; he lives in it, he is it.

(The oldest form of the idea, relatively sensible, simple and persuasive. A circumlocution for the sentence, "I, Plato, am the truth.")

2. The true world -- unattainable for now, but promised for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man ("for the sinner who repents").

(Progress of the idea: it becomes more subtle, insidious, incomprehensible -- it becomes female, it becomes Christian.)

3. The true world -- unattainable, indemonstrable, unpromisable; but the very thought of it -- a consolidation, an obligation, an imperative.

(At bottom, the old sun, but seen through mist and skepticism. The idea has become elusive, pale, Nordic, Konigsbergian)

4. The true world -- unattainable? At any rate, unattained, and being unattained, also unknown. Consequently, not consoling, redeeming, or obligating: how could something unknown obligate us?

(Gray morning, The first yawn of reason. The cockcrow of positivism)

5. The "true" world -- an idea which is no longer good for anything, not even obligating -- an idea which has become useless and superfluous -- consequently a refuted idea: let us abolish it!

(Bright day; breakfast: return of bon sens and cheer-fulness; Plato's embarrassed blush; pandemonium of all free spirits.)

6. The true world -- we have abolished. What world has remained? The apparent one perhaps? But no! With the true world we also have abolished the apparent one.

(Noon: moment of the briefest shadow; end of the longest error; high point of humanity; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.')

-------

4 is Kant, what you describe as 'Thing-in-itself'. Plato is less well covered by this, but his theory of forms is more relevant in Christian perspective anyway. The truly important bit is Kant with his thing-in-itself. The precise point is that you don't know what is denoted with it. Regardless, I have demolished Kant with my fourth great problem of metaphysics.

Namely, applying causality to metaphysics, is like applying colour to metaphysics. If I ask you, what colour is existence, you would look at me puzzled and ask me, why do you think you can apply colour to existence. And yet, when applying causality to metaphysics, which is just as rooted in the empirical world as colour, it is apparently 'allowed'. Indeed, it is considered a way to Truth. Silly, if you ask me. As I put it:

"Causality is a concept we use, reliably, in reference to the empirical world. There is no basis, evidence or argument, proposed or existence on which we can infer that it can be reliably (let alone truthfully) used in reference to metaphysics. The assumption that something out there must be causing the phenomenon is one that is made because we are used to dealing with causes in the empirical world, it's a mistake of a mind evolved in the empirical world."

[Comte de Saint-Germain]

Ah, so you guys are over here!

Thanks, Samsa, for your help.

(Is it true that RDF is gonna blow itself up? I really think the looks and design of this site is shitty as hell! It hurts my fucking eyes).

Sooooo... what's up? What are the realists and idealists up to?

You can change the design in user control panel to prosilver2. Much better. Just go to user control panel, board settings, change to pro_ubuntu to prosilver2.

Welcome! I tried inviting you, but the PM system wouldn't let me at RD.

[jamest]

We may doubt that any thing within the empirical world actually exists; but if the objects of that world do not exist, then what are they - what IS the empirical world?

Why are you asking me? You are the one claiming that metaphysics is possible.

Actually, I am here countering your scepticism.

Surely, it must BE something else that yields this illusion/delusion/apparency of those objects?

Why must it be? You are asking rhetorically what I am asking you t oset out to prove. You are, amusingly enough, attempting to establish as obvious what I am questioning. Not a very efficient way of doing things, I would say.

Firstly, note the grammatical error at "asking you t oset". See, you make typos too. Therefore, in future, don't lower yourself to belittling my own. I'm not here for an English lesson... and if I was, I'd be looking for a better tutor than yourself. So let's just concentrate on the debate. Thankyou.

You opened the thread with negative claims about metaphysics. These claims were founded upon your scepticism about the actual reality/existence of anything, including (by necessity) those objects that constitute the empirical world. That is, your position that the world is just "apparent" entails an existential doubt about those things that constitute 'the world'. Inferentially, this necessarily means that those things are reducible to something else - since they cannot BE themselves, lest we'd be equating them to actual existence/reality.

What I'm saying to you is that your position implies an ontology because you have said something very definite about the empirical world regarding its apparency. You've said it and so you need to address what I have reasoned can be inferred from that.

So according to you, it is impossible not to make any comments. So to say "it is not A", one automatically implies "It is something else than A". I've never heard something so preposterous. I don't see why saying that something is not A necessary means that it must be something else.

Actually, I have said that it has to be something else, or ‘nothing’ - which still entails an ontology.
This must be the case, because if something is not A, then it has to be something that is not A, or nothing at all. A matter of logic.

At the most, you can ask me, if it is not A, then what it is. In fact, you have earlier and my response has been quite clear - I don't know.

As I said, what it actually is, is not important at this juncture. What is important, is that if A is not A, then it is something else or nothing at all - which entails an unspecified ontology/metaphysic, which you are using to make negative claims about metaphysics.
That is, your argument is self-defeating… illogical.

You see, the only way to be sceptical about existence/reality, is to be completely sceptical to the point that you don’t say anything definite about what the empirical world is (or is not). And then, the only conclusion that you could draw, would be that “I have no idea about what is OR IS NOT real/existing. Therefore, I shall make no judgements about metaphysics.”.

More importantly, and this is what this thread is about, there is no reason to believe this sort of knowledge is possible.

As I‘ve said, if you tell me that A is not A, then an ontology can be inferred about A. That is, telling me that A is not A is an ontological statement in itself.

If you talk about the "apparency" of the [objects in the] world, then surely you have to talk about the apparency of causal relationships between them? That is, if object A does not actually exist and is in fact reducible to [as yet] some unknowable essence,

Who says it is reducable to some unknowable essence? Who says objects exists? Oh right, you do. Why don't you first establish some of these bullshit claims before you bother the rest of us with this rot.

If A does not exist, then A cannot cause B. A can only cause B if A actually exists. Just simple logic.
That is, if A and its ‘siblings’ do not exist, then none of the apparent events occurring within the empirical world can be attributed to any of them.

… Consequently, any and all events must be caused by something which itself is not an empirical entity, since none of those events can be attributed to anything within the fishbowl of the empirical world.

[Luis Dias]

You can change the design in user control panel to prosilver2. Much better. Just go to user control panel, board settings, change to pro_ubuntu to prosilver2.

AAAahhhh! You're a bliss, my friend, a bliss!

Welcome! I tried inviting you, but the PM system wouldn't let me at RD.

I stopped reading RDF when it went down, I was kind of let down by the decision to close it (I mean wtf?), it was by pure chance that I stopped by some minutes ago and was able to read Samsa's PM.

[Comte de Saint-Germain]

We may doubt that any thing within the empirical world actually exists; but if the objects of that world do not exist, then what are they - what IS the empirical world?

Why are you asking me? You are the one claiming that metaphysics is possible.

Actually, I am here countering your scepticism.

Yes you are! And you are doing it very well! You are a very special boy, James! A very special boy, indeed!

Surely, it must BE something else that yields this illusion/delusion/apparency of those objects?

Why must it be? You are asking rhetorically what I am asking you t oset out to prove. You are, amusingly enough, attempting to establish as obvious what I am questioning. Not a very efficient way of doing things, I would say.

Firstly, note the grammatical error at "asking you t oset". See, you make typos too. Therefore, in future, don't lower yourself to belittling my own. I'm not here for an English lesson... and if I was, I'd be looking for a better tutor than yourself. So let's just concentrate on the debate. Thankyou.[/quote]

Where did I point out your errors in English? Unless you are Little Idiot, rather than just a little idiot , I don't see what you are complaining about.

You opened the thread with negative claims about metaphysics. These claims were founded upon your scepticism about the actual reality/existence of anything, including (by necessity) those objects that constitute the empirical world.

I never said the empirical word is 'constituted' of objects. Those are your words. I very much doubt I would abuse the word 'objects' in such a horribly off-putting way.

That is, your position that the world is just "apparent" entails an existential doubt about those things that constitute 'the world'.

No sure I used apparent either, more like you used it first and in an attempt to 'keep it simple for stupid', I took over the world. The point is not so much that the world is apparent as much as the Kantian real world doesn't exist. Read Nietzsche's history of an error above. Consequently, the apparent world becomes the real world. Real, of course, in this instance is rather superfluous. One might as well say simply 'world'. We don't need to call our Earth the 'real Earth'. There's no other Earth to confuse it with.

Inferentially, this necessarily means that those things are reducible to something else - since they cannot BE themselves, lest we'd be equating them to actual existence/reality.

Again, you fail to miss the point that has been sofar made by at least two people. Namely, that withholding judgement doesn't mean that rejecting answer means others are therefore the case, rather, one is withholding judgement.

What I'm saying to you is that your position implies an ontology because you have said something very definite about the empirical world regarding its apparency. You've said it and so you need to address what I have reasoned can be inferred from that.

Yeah. You're pulling shit out of your ass. That's not quite the same as making an inference.

So according to you, it is impossible not to make any comments. So to say "it is not A", one automatically implies "It is something else than A". I've never heard something so preposterous. I don't see why saying that something is not A necessary means that it must be something else.

Actually, I have said that it has to be something else, or ‘nothing’ - which still entails an ontology.

I didn't say it was nothing, I said I withheld judgement. I said there was no basis for such a judgement.

This must be the case, because if something is not A, then it has to be something that is not A, or nothing at all. A matter of logic.

Actually, you are forgetting some things may not be truth-apt. Damn you suck at this..!

At the most, you can ask me, if it is not A, then what it is. In fact, you have earlier and my response has been quite clear - I don't know.

As I said, what it actually is, is not important at this juncture. What is important, is that if A is not A, then it is something else or nothing at all - which entails an unspecified ontology/metaphysic, which you are using to make negative claims about metaphysics.
That is, your argument is self-defeating… illogical.

You see, the only way to be sceptical about existence/reality, is to be completely sceptical to the point that you don’t say anything definite about what the empirical world is (or is not). And then, the only conclusion that you could draw, would be that “I have no idea about what is OR IS NOT real/existing. Therefore, I shall make no judgements about metaphysics.”.

Yeah, that's what I've done, bub.

More importantly, and this is what this thread is about, there is no reason to believe this sort of knowledge is possible.

As I‘ve said, if you tell me that A is not A, then an ontology can be inferred about A. That is, telling me that A is not A is an ontological statement in itself.

Riight.

If you talk about the "apparency" of the [objects in the] world, then surely you have to talk about the apparency of causal relationships between them? That is, if object A does not actually exist and is in fact reducible to [as yet] some unknowable essence,

Who says it is reducable to some unknowable essence? Who says objects exists? Oh right, you do. Why don't you first establish some of these bullshit claims before you bother the rest of us with this rot.

If A does not exist, then A cannot cause B. A can only cause B if A actually exists. Just simple logic.

Why should a non-existence A not be able to cause a non-existent B? Does Harry Potter exist? We explain the story of Harry Potter by causes.. You haven't thought this through very well. You're still thinking way too simplistically about 'existence'. I can beat you six ways from sunday, but I don't have to. You haven't even addressed the rudimentary criticisms.

That is, if A and its ‘siblings’ do not exist, then none of the apparent events occurring within the empirical world can be attributed to any of them.

… Consequently, any and all events must be caused by something which itself is not an empirical entity, since none of those events can be attributed to anything within the fishbowl of the empirical world.

Concepts don't need existential status to provide reliable predictions, and within that network of predictions causal relations can be used to enhance reliability. That's all causality does. That you - and others - have extended causality beyond it and have gone as far to say that this empirical causality is not the 'real thing' is your problem, not mine.

[Comte de Saint-Germain]

You can change the design in user control panel to prosilver2. Much better. Just go to user control panel, board settings, change to pro_ubuntu to prosilver2.

AAAahhhh! You're a bliss, my friend, a bliss!

That's what she said!

Welcome! I tried inviting you, but the PM system wouldn't let me at RD.

I stopped reading RDF when it went down, I was kind of let down by the decision to close it (I mean wtf?), it was by pure chance that I stopped by some minutes ago and was able to read Samsa's PM.

Chance is my middle-name!

[FBM]

...Actually, I have said that it has to be something else, or ‘nothing’ - which still entails an ontology.
This must be the case, because if something is not A, then it has to be something that is not A, or nothing at all. A matter of logic.

Or you can take the Pyrrhonist approach and suspend all judgement on any metaphysical issue. No ontology.

Again, you seem to be conflating Academic and Pyrrhonist skepticisms. Academic skepticism is dogmatic when it makes the assertion that knowledge is impossible. A careful Pyrrhonist wouldn't even claim to know that knowledge is impossible.