Leaps of faith

[charlou]

Objective reality does not = metaphysical ... and nor did Seraph mean that. Really, wtf?

[JOZeldenrust]

Objective reality does not = metaphysical ... and nor did Seraph mean that. Really, wtf?

Metaphysics is the study of what characterizes objective reality, of what it means to 'be'. Speaking of 'objective reality' presupposes some metaphysical position.

[beige]

Hope you don't mind the ambivalence of this comment.

Not at all.

So basically because each casual relationship is as tenuous as the next, each leap is of equal magnitude and equally problematic - despite how many correlating examples you get?

I can see how that might be problematic, but luckily for the human race reality works quite nicely given the probabilities we have. I've just returned from my brother-in-law-to-be's stag do. So I'm going to go to bed and not move for the next two weeks.

[Trolldor]

Fuck your leaps of faith. Reality is fucking confusing as it is.

For example, observing a particle determines its history, while before that every possible history it could have had it did have, simultaneously.

Fuck you quantum.

[Hermit]

So basically because each casual relationship is as tenuous as the next, each leap is of equal magnitude and equally problematic - despite how many correlating examples you get?

That's the nub of the problem of induction. All we can say about any particular theory is that it works. Until of course it doesn't, as the inductivist turkey found out. My confidence that the sun will rise tomorrow and cause daylight is in principle the same as the turkey's confidence that the 9 o'clock chime of the church bell causes the farmer to bring food; The sequence of events has been observed repeatedly. We are accustomed to it happening. Our confidence in the validity is caused (did I say caused? *grin*) by this repetition rather than some analytical tool that would allow us to say: "This sequence of events is an example of A causing B."

Most humans, including atheists and skeptics, find it impossible to get their heads around the conclusion Hume came up with: No matter how often a sequence of events is observed or successfully predicted, the belief in causation is and remains an article of faith.

By the way, I would not use the word 'casual' either. It implies another judgement we are not entitled to make in the context of this discussion.

[hiyymer]

So basically because each casual relationship is as tenuous as the next, each leap is of equal magnitude and equally problematic - despite how many correlating examples you get?

That's the nub of the problem of induction. All we can say about any particular theory is that it works. Until of course it doesn't, as the inductivist turkey found out. My confidence that the sun will rise tomorrow and cause daylight is in principle the same as the turkey's confidence that the 9 o'clock chime of the church bell causes the farmer to bring food; The sequence of events has been observed repeatedly. We are accustomed to it happening. Our confidence in the validity is caused (did I say caused? *grin*) by this repetition rather than some analytical tool that would allow us to say: "This sequence of events is an example of A causing B."

Most humans, including atheists and skeptics, find it impossible to get their heads around the conclusion Hume came up with: No matter how often a sequence of events is observed or successfully predicted, the belief in causation is and remains an article of faith.

By the way, I would not use the word 'casual' either. It implies another judgement we are not entitled to make in the context of this discussion.

So I guess that means that miracles happen, since people report them a lot. It doesn't mean anything that they can't be repeated under "controlled conditions".

[Hermit]

So basically because each casual relationship is as tenuous as the next, each leap is of equal magnitude and equally problematic - despite how many correlating examples you get?

That's the nub of the problem of induction. All we can say about any particular theory is that it works. Until of course it doesn't, as the inductivist turkey found out. My confidence that the sun will rise tomorrow and cause daylight is in principle the same as the turkey's confidence that the 9 o'clock chime of the church bell causes the farmer to bring food; The sequence of events has been observed repeatedly. We are accustomed to it happening. Our confidence in the validity is caused (did I say caused? *grin*) by this repetition rather than some analytical tool that would allow us to say: "This sequence of events is an example of A causing B."

Most humans, including atheists and skeptics, find it impossible to get their heads around the conclusion Hume came up with: No matter how often a sequence of events is observed or successfully predicted, the belief in causation is and remains an article of faith.

By the way, I would not use the word 'casual' either. It implies another judgement we are not entitled to make in the context of this discussion.

So I guess that means that miracles happen, since people report them a lot. It doesn't mean anything that they can't be repeated under "controlled conditions".

Calling sequences of events miracles is no more justified than calling them naturally caused. All we can say is that we get accustomed to daylight commencing around sunrise. To think of it as a miracle is no more justified than to say that the sun is the cause of daylight.

[beige]

Calling sequences of events miracles is no more justified than calling them naturally caused. All we can say is that we get accustomed to daylight commencing around sunrise. To think of it as a miracle is no more justified than to say that the sun is the cause of daylight.

Makes me glad I'm a pragmatist.

[Hermit]

Calling sequences of events miracles is no more justified than calling them naturally caused. All we can say is that we get accustomed to daylight commencing around sunrise. To think of it as a miracle is no more justified than to say that the sun is the cause of daylight.

Makes me glad I'm a pragmatist.

Same here.

All of us really are, but that doesn't stop many of us from also carrying delusional notions with us.

[Trolldor]

Calling sequences of events miracles is no more justified than calling them naturally caused.

Far less justified in calling the sun rise a miracle when every possible shred of evidence we have says 'natural phenomena'. More justified in calling the sun rise 'naturally caused' when all evidence points to it being 'naturally caused'.

[Hermit]

More justified in calling the sun rise 'naturally caused' when all evidence points to it being 'naturally caused'.

Oh, it's caused, is it? And we have evidence that it is? Great.

You clearly can't get your head around the problem of induction.

[beige]

You clearly can't get your head around the problem of induction.

I find that most people are actually on some level cognisant of it, but don't explicitly state it, or know the philosophical name for it. For example, with scientific things a probabilistic level of knowledge is implied - so most people simply don't state that it's probabilistic. It's one of the first things people learn about science, that no matter how much evidence you have - you could still be wrong.

Is the "problem" of induction really a problem, or is it a good thing in providing a driving force for refining understanding in science?

Edit: Probability in practical terms, not absolute terms of course

[Trolldor]

More justified in calling the sun rise 'naturally caused' when all evidence points to it being 'naturally caused'.

Oh, it's caused, is it? And we have evidence that it is? Great.

You clearly can't get your head around the problem of induction.

You're absolutely right. Our knowledge of physics gives us absolutely no insight at all in to how the universe works.

[mistermack]

You clearly can't get your head around the problem of induction.

I'm surprised. The "problem of induction" is EXACTLY the problem with the "Socrates" syllogism.

All men are black
Socrates is a man
Socrates is black

The only way you can CONFIRM line 1, is to check ALL men, and confirm that they are black. So to use line 1, without making an unwarranted assumption, you have to check that socrates is a man, and confirm that he is black.

You therefore have to be aware of the truth of line 3, before you can legitimately use line 1.
Otherwise, you are just making an unwarranted assumption that line 1 is true, just like the "all swans are white" fallacy.
.

[Hermit]

I'm surprised. The "problem of induction" is EXACTLY the problem with the "Socrates" syllogism.

All men are black
Socrates is a man
Socrates is black

The only way you can CONFIRM line 1, is to check ALL men, and confirm that they are black. So to use line 1, without making an unwarranted assumption, you have to check that socrates is a man, and confirm that he is black.

You therefore have to be aware of the truth of line 3, before you can legitimately use line 1.
Otherwise, you are just making an unwarranted assumption that line 1 is true, just like the "all swans are white" fallacy.

Would you kindly take your junk back to where it belongs, please?