Free Will.

[tuco]

The question is: How to test for free will?

If its not possible to design test for free will, debates are just debates. Metaphysics never proved anything.

Actually, there is play of free will even when deterministic factors are at play.
When I am taken with the need to poop, I can decide to delay it until either I am finished with what Im doing, and sovereignly decide to give in, or I do perceive the need to be too imperious to resist anymore, and even then I could still resist and risk pooping my pants.

Lets assume, anything is possible what is not impossible. Free will in deterministic universe. Still, how do we test it? Because if we cant test it, falsify it, then we can only talk about it.

[JimC]

The question is: How to test for free will?

If its not possible to design test for free will, debates are just debates. Metaphysics never proved anything.

Actually, there is play of free will even when deterministic factors are at play.
When I am taken with the need to poop, I can decide to delay it until either I am finished with what Im doing, and sovereignly decide to give in, or I do perceive the need to be too imperious to resist anymore, and even then I could still resist and risk pooping my pants.

That example fits perfectly well into my assertion that we have a compelling, vivid illusion of free will.

[Hermit]

If it is inherently impossible to fully predict the future state of a physical system, even with perfect knowledge of initial conditions (to the limit imposed by quantum uncertainty) and unlimited computational power, then the system cannot be said to be fully determined.

So we have to wait until we have perfect knowledge to finally settle the matter? I'm getting this image of a snowflake attempting to survive in hell. And now we have the perfect opportunity to derail into epistemology. Fuck. I think I am a snowflake and this is...

[pErvinalia]

The question is: How to test for free will?

If its not possible to design test for free will, debates are just debates. Metaphysics never proved anything.

Actually, there is play of free will even when deterministic factors are at play.
When I am taken with the need to poop, I can decide to delay it until either I am finished with what Im doing, and sovereignly decide to give in, or I do perceive the need to be too imperious to resist anymore, and even then I could still resist and risk pooping my pants.

But if we assume a deterministic universe, your decision is made by everything that came before that decision. That is, you actually don't make a free choice. You might choose between two or more different actions, but the action you choose is a result of everything that came before, not any free agency.

[pErvinalia]

rEvolutionist wrote:

In any case, randomness in physical interactions/laws doesn't help the argument for free will. Free will really implies an agency that is disconnected from what came before it.

Generally, I agree that there is a disconnect. Although you could not have free will (without some form of spirit nonsense) in an absolutely determinist physical universe, free will is not guaranteed by a non-determinist universe that I suggest arises from a combination of chaos theory and the lack of absolute precision in starting conditions.

Chaos theory isn't a theory of non-determinism. You need to stop using it in this way.

As an aside, I do see a connection between prediction and determinism. If it is inherently impossible to fully predict the future state of a physical system, even with perfect knowledge of initial conditions (to the limit imposed by quantum uncertainty) and unlimited computational power, then the system cannot be said to be fully determined.

But introducing "perfect knowledge" into the system is a different problem to the problem of chaos. No one is suggesting that with perfect knowledge it would not be possible to predict the future states of a deterministic system.

I have a similar view on free will as I do to consciousness (which are surely linked). Both are useful illusions, which let us act in the world as if we were free agents. Decisions made under the spell of this view of the world are likely to be fast, effective and useful to survival under the conditions that applied during most of our evolutionary history.

I don't think they have any effect on speed of action. What they would do is allow for a theory of mind (if only informal in the days preceding psychology and neurology etc) and therefore the development of complex social systems, which would seem to be one of humanity's greatest strengths.

There have been several articles in the New Scientist over the years about measurements of brain activity which occur fractionally before the neurones involved in "conscious" decision making fire. It is implied that this is contrary to the standard view of free will; whether this is valid I'm not certain...

Yeah, that's known as "Libet's Delay". What it's showing is that a lot of what we consider conscious decisions are actually being initiated subconsciously up to half a second or more before we even consciously make the choice to act.

As far as chaos and quantum theory go, it's not proved that identical starting conditions will produce different outcomes.
What quantum theory says is that it's NOT POSSIBLE in practice to have identical starting conditions.

You can still argue that if starting conditions were identical, you would get identical outcomes. That might be true, but it can't happen so it's irrelevant.
I think.

That is certainly the way I was thinking...

It's not irrelevant as that says nothing about whether the universe is deterministic. The possibility that you might never get two exact same initial conditions in two different systems doesn't refute a deterministic universe.

[JimC]

The question is: How to test for free will?

If its not possible to design test for free will, debates are just debates. Metaphysics never proved anything.

Actually, there is play of free will even when deterministic factors are at play.
When I am taken with the need to poop, I can decide to delay it until either I am finished with what Im doing, and sovereignly decide to give in, or I do perceive the need to be too imperious to resist anymore, and even then I could still resist and risk pooping my pants.

But if we assume a deterministic universe, your decision is made by everything that came before that decision. That is, you actually don't make a free choice. You might choose between two or more different actions, but the action you choose is a result of everything that came before, not any free agency.

If we re-phrased that as "the action you choose is influenced by everything that came before", and certainly rejected any hint of vital energy or spirit, we could have a more nuanced viewpoint. At the moment of decision, it is possible for a degree of randomness to creep in, in the sense of slight differences in the firing of neurones (possibly via chaos theory). Still totally mechanistic at base, but not with that absolute, almost Calvinist feel of being totally preordained. This degree of fuzziness as to outcomes in "choices" differing slightly if the tape were rolled again isn't the classic view of a totally free agent, which I still view as a useful illusion, but it also avoids the rigidity of the Laplacian clockwork universe.

[JimC]

rEvolutionist wrote:

But introducing "perfect knowledge" into the system is a different problem to the problem of chaos. No one is suggesting that with perfect knowledge it would not be possible to predict the future states of a deterministic system.

No, there is a strong link. Perfect knowledge, in the sense that I used it, is all about the initial conditions, and is simply impossible to achieve. Not only impossible because of limitations of the observer, but because of inherent quantum uncertainty about the position and momentum of a given particle. Chaos theory comes in when we consider the evolution of a dynamic system, where arbitrarily small differences in initial conditions lead to widely different future outcomes in the system. So, any dynamic system cannot be perfectly predicted, unless we are talking about statistical predictions rather than the exact positions and momenta of every particle in the future. And this is a universal phenomenon, rather than a lack of ability of the conscious beings attempting to predict.

[pErvinalia]

The question is: How to test for free will?

If its not possible to design test for free will, debates are just debates. Metaphysics never proved anything.

Actually, there is play of free will even when deterministic factors are at play.
When I am taken with the need to poop, I can decide to delay it until either I am finished with what Im doing, and sovereignly decide to give in, or I do perceive the need to be too imperious to resist anymore, and even then I could still resist and risk pooping my pants.

But if we assume a deterministic universe, your decision is made by everything that came before that decision. That is, you actually don't make a free choice. You might choose between two or more different actions, but the action you choose is a result of everything that came before, not any free agency.

If we re-phrased that as "the action you choose is influenced by everything that came before", and certainly rejected any hint of vital energy or spirit, we could have a more nuanced viewpoint. At the moment of decision, it is possible for a degree of randomness to creep in, in the sense of slight differences in the firing of neurones (possibly via chaos theory). Still totally mechanistic at base, but not with that absolute, almost Calvinist feel of being totally preordained. This degree of fuzziness as to outcomes in "choices" differing slightly if the tape were rolled again isn't the classic view of a totally free agent, which I still view as a useful illusion, but it also avoids the rigidity of the Laplacian clockwork universe.

But if you allow randomness in there, then it's not a deterministic system any more. If the system is deterministic, then "influenced" isn't accurate.

Have you read about Penrose and Hammeroff and their postulation for a quantum underpinning of consciousness? It's been generally discredited, but discredited for the specifics of the postulation, not necessarily the general idea. But again, randomness in thought/consciousness still doesn't provide "free will". I reckon that "free will" has to imply spiritual nonsense by its very definition.

[pErvinalia]

rEvolutionist wrote:

But introducing "perfect knowledge" into the system is a different problem to the problem of chaos. No one is suggesting that with perfect knowledge it would not be possible to predict the future states of a deterministic system.

No, there is a strong link. Perfect knowledge, in the sense that I used it, is all about the initial conditions, and is simply impossible to achieve. Not only impossible because of limitations of the observer, but because of inherent quantum uncertainty about the position and momentum of a given particle. Chaos theory comes in when we consider the evolution of a dynamic system, where arbitrarily small differences in initial conditions lead to widely different future outcomes in the system. So, any dynamic system cannot be perfectly predicted, unless we are talking about statistical predictions rather than the exact positions and momenta of every particle in the future. And this is a universal phenomenon, rather than a lack of ability of the conscious beings attempting to predict.

Ok, but this really has nothing to do with determinism and free will. The universe goes on doing its thing whether we predict what it's doing or not.

[rainbow]

It has nothing to do with physics.
To have a deterministic universe you require an Objective Reality.

Who says there's no objective reality?

We cannot assume an Objective Reality exists since we can only observe the universe subjectively.

That's irrelevant to free will, though. Whether we have free will or not is independent of whether we are interacting with underlying really real reality, or a non really real subjective reality.

The only way an Objective Reality could exist is if the Universe could be observed by a Supreme Being.

What does "Objective Reality" have to do with observation by a "Supreme Being", whatever that is?

Many Eastern Philosophical Thinkers:
http://www.hinduwebsite.com/divinelife/ ... eality.asp
http://www.patheos.com/Library/Buddhism ... ine-Beings

...even within certain thinkers in Judeo-Christianity.

[pErvinalia]

You didn't answer the questions I asked.

[rainbow]

You didn't answer the questions I asked.

Read the links.

[pErvinalia]

I did. Aside from being utter wibble, neither of them asserted that objective reality doesn't exist. And neither of them provided a rational response to your bollocks about objective reality needing a "supreme being". And further, you didn't address what all this wibble has to do with determinism or free will.

[rainbow]

The question is: How to test for free will?

If its not possible to design test for free will, debates are just debates. Metaphysics never proved anything.

Actually, there is play of free will even when deterministic factors are at play.
When I am taken with the need to poop, I can decide to delay it until either I am finished with what Im doing, and sovereignly decide to give in, or I do perceive the need to be too imperious to resist anymore, and even then I could still resist and risk pooping my pants.

That example fits perfectly well into my assertion that we have a compelling, vivid illusion of free will.

http://www.allaboutphilosophy.org/exist ... ry-faq.htm

[Svartalf]

The question is: How to test for free will?

If its not possible to design test for free will, debates are just debates. Metaphysics never proved anything.

Actually, there is play of free will even when deterministic factors are at play.
When I am taken with the need to poop, I can decide to delay it until either I am finished with what Im doing, and sovereignly decide to give in, or I do perceive the need to be too imperious to resist anymore, and even then I could still resist and risk pooping my pants.

That example fits perfectly well into my assertion that we have a compelling, vivid illusion of free will.

I don't see where it is an illusion.