Svartalf wrote:AQ NEVER was centralized... it's always been a kind of nebula of groups united by a certain amount of common ground (sunni islamic supremacism and readiness to use every method including the most violent to reach their aims are two I can name).
For a time, there was a particularly large node clustered around bin laden because he brought in a lot of money, had wide and powerful connections, and was a good coordinator... once he was targeted as the mastermind and the man to eliminate, he obviously began to be shunned because nobody wanted to be leaning on the tree when lightning struck.
Cancers are best treated early, before they metastasize. While there's always been decentralization in any underground terrorist movement, my point is that the strike at Afghanistan while it had such a cluster of high-value targets was not necessarily poorly-conceived.
and this kind of indirect message is really a two bladed sword, because potential hosts will have greater readiness for invasion, not to mention a series of alternate and contingency plans.
I'm not arguing that the policy was certainly correct. I'm simply laying out one possible explanation for it.
In the meantime, the US has actually LOST prestige as a military nation, because it has shown it never learned the lesson of Vietnam, and let itself be dragged into a morass from where it has difficulty extracting itself without leaving behind a situation worse than the one that was in place when they waded in.
I'm not sure that any "lessons from Vietnam" are really applicable, myself. The geography, culture, military power, available strength, and internal motivation of the enemy were all different. Those are all factors in any decision to engage an enemy, and necessarily change the nature of the decision to be taken.
and no, even without Iraq, you would never have succeeded in eradicating the taliban... Pakistan would never have let you do a proper cleaning of its North provinces, like Waziristan, even if by some kind of miracle you had beaten the logistical problems of operating there and done what a logistically favored and numerically superior Red Army failed to achieve.
Perhaps. The issue of Pakistan was certainly one best dealt with by diplomacy, and whether that was possible or not is doubtful at best, considering their lack of ability to control their own frontiers. I think a decisive victory might well have been possible had we been better able to close the routes through the Hindu Kush passes. Like any "what-if" history, that's debatable.
So far as the Red Army, whatever logistical and numerical advantages they had were squandered through both political and doctrinal failures ... the failure to respect the locals being high on the list. I think that we could have avoided the problems we're having now, along those lines, had we not suffered the reignition of the Taliban resistance after the Iraq invasion started siphoning our resources.
and let's face it, Pakistan is the root of the taliban problem, nothing will cure it if it's not eradicated at the source... a potential third Vietnam in its own right.
Agreed. Our failure to close off the routes into Afghanistan assured that result ... and that possibility should've been regarded more seriously in the planning stages, I think.
BTW, are you willing to receive Palestinian based attacks on ground that both your government and any number of private persons and organisations in the US openly support Israel and its oppression and encroachment policies? Because your argument just justified that.
Have the Palestinians asked for any war criminals on our territory to be handed over for trial?