The Almighty Unions

[egbert]

I
You act as if over the last 25 years I've never had a credit card. I've NEVER paid 28.8%.

And I've never got a $10 million $ BONUS.

What the fuck does your red herring about your personal credit card rate have to do with the reality of people getting screwed by banks?

[Seth]

There is also a distinction made between independent contractors and employees. Independent contractors are not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act at all.

Which is how everyone should be employed.

That's your opinion. There is a difference between "employee" and "independent contractor" under the law.

Why?

Because the two things are different. An independent contractor is a person who performs services for another person under an express or implied agreement and who is not subject to the other's control, or right to control, the manner and means of performing the services. An employee is a person who performs services for another who is subject to the other's control or right to control the manner and means of performing the services. Different things can be treated differently.

That's an arbitrary distinction made purely in order to facilitate government regulation of the employment relationship. My question is why should government be permitted to interfere with that relationship? In particular, where is the FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S constitutional authority to regulate the private relationship between employer and employee?

The only reason there is a distinction is for the convenience of government.

Not at all. It's convenient for people, too, like when I hire a roofer to put a roof on my house - he does the job, I pay him. If he misquotes the job and spends more on supplies and equipment, so he takes a loss on the job, then that's tough on him.

If I hire you as a laborer installing new roofs, why shouldn't I be able to pay you a day's wage for a day's work and let you worry about paying the taxes due?

If you're an employee, your employer is required to withhold money from your paycheck, and he is required to contribute matching funds to FICA, Social Security and Medicare.

Something I'm glad I don't have to do when I hire a plumber.

Right. But why should the plumbing company owner be required to do so for his plumbers? Why should the responsibility for paying employment taxes always fall upon the employee?

If you're an independent contractor, all those expenses fall on you. And that's how it should be for everyone.

Why? Why can't there be exceptions for situations when someone is hired to do a job and be subject to the control and right to control the manner and means of doing the job?

Why should there be? It's an arbitrary distinction at best. Why does dictating the manner, means and timing of the work change the nature of the relationship between the two individuals?

The employer should not be made into an involuntary tax collector for the federal government, and individuals should be responsible for paying for their own retirement plans and medical care, just like independent contractors are.

Why not? And, why?

Because it's an unfunded mandate. Government should not require private citizens to be unpaid employees of the government. If the government wants to collect taxes, then the IRS can apply to Congress for funding to hire tax collectors. Requiring me, an independent citizen and business owner, to do work for the federal government against my will is...wait for it...involuntary servitude.

Because of the 13th Amendment, for one thing, and because allowing slavery, peonage and involuntary servitude is, IMO, bad policy.

Slavery is defined as "involuntary servitude." If it's voluntary, it's not slavery.[/quote]

Never said it was. I'm also opposed to people selling themselves into slavery. Granted, however, that not all volunteered labor is that.

Why? What business is it of yours how I wish to conduct my life or who I wish to obligate myself to?

Because it is empowered to make laws for the General Welfare and within the powers delegated to it under the Constitution, so long as it does not violate a fundamental right.

Ah, I knew you were going to go there. Sorry, but the "general welfare" clause is NOT a grant of general or unlimited power to the Congress. Congress is only empowered to make laws pursuant to the express authority granted to it by the Constitution, and those laws must advance the general welfare of the People. You are fallaciously reading the general welfare and necessary and proper clauses to be overriding grants of power that allow literally any regulation whatsoever that Congress deems will promote the general welfare or is necessary and proper, but the clause is self-limiting: "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

The Congress shall have Power...To...lay and collect taxes...to...provide for the...general Welfare of the United States."

Note that the authority in Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 is the power to collect taxes to provide for the general welfare of the United States. This is a separate and distinct clause from all the rest of the powers delegated to Congress. Nowhere is Congress empowered to make any law it deems necessary to "provide for the general welfare." It may collect taxes, and the use to which the taxes may be put are specified in the second half of the clause: "...to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States.." This is a grant of authority to collect and use taxes, but it's a restriction on what those taxes may be used for: paying debts, keeping the military, and providing for the general welfare of the United States.

Nor does the "necessary and proper" clause support your contention. It says, "The Congress shall have Power...to...make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." (emphasis added)

Note the words "foregoing Powers."

This is specific reference to the long list of enumerated powers of Congress immediately above in Article 1, Section 8.

If the Founders had intended Congress to have unlimited plenary powers to make all "necessary and proper" laws to "provide for the general welfare" of the nation, there would have been no reason to make a list of enumerated powers. Article I, Section 8 would have simply said "Congress shall have the power to provide for the general welfare of the United States and shall have the power to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution this power."

But that's not what the Constitution says. Rather, it provides a narrow and specific list of powers that Congress may exercise, reserving everything else to the states, or to the people.

Under the canon of legislative interpretation called "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius", which means "the express mention of one thing excludes all others," "Items not on the list are assumed not to be covered by the statute." Thus, the express mention of particular enumerated powers denies the expansion of those powers to other, unenumerated powers. This concept is made manifest in the language of the Tenth Amendment, which says, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."

If the Congress (the United States) is granted plenary general powers to legislate as "necessary and proper" to provide for the "general welfare," then the language of the Tenth Amendment is mere surplusage and is meaningless.

But it's not. It's an expression of the legal fact that Congress has ONLY those powers explicitly delegated to it by the Constitution, which consist of ONLY those powers enumerated in Article I, Section 8. The "general welfare" clause is a RESTRICTION on Congress that tells Congress that any law it creates pursuant to an enumerated power must be constructed so as to advance the general welfare of the People, and that such laws must be both necessary AND proper to the exercise of the delegated authorities.

It has been urged and echoed, that the power "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States,'' amounts to an unlimited commission to exercise every power which may be alleged to be necessary for the common defense or general welfare. No stronger proof could be given of the distress under which these writers labor for objections, than their stooping to such a misconstruction. Had no other enumeration or definition of the powers of the Congress been found in the Constitution, than the general expressions just cited, the authors of the objection might have had some color for it; though it would have been difficult to find a reason for so awkward a form of describing an authority to legislate in all possible cases. A power to destroy the freedom of the press, the trial by jury, or even to regulate the course of descents, or the forms of conveyances, must be very singularly expressed by the terms "to raise money for the general welfare.

''But what color can the objection have, when a specification of the objects alluded to by these general terms immediately follows, and is not even separated by a longer pause than a semicolon? If the different parts of the same instrument ought to be so expounded, as to give meaning to every part which will bear it, shall one part of the same sentence be excluded altogether from a share in the meaning; and shall the more doubtful and indefinite terms be retained in their full extent, and the clear and precise expressions be denied any signification whatsoever? For what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted, if these and all others were meant to be included in the preceding general power? Nothing is more natural nor common than first to use a general phrase, and then to explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars.

But the idea of an enumeration of particulars which neither explain nor qualify the general meaning, and can have no other effect than to confound and mislead, is an absurdity, which, as we are reduced to the dilemma of charging either on the authors of the objection or on the authors of the Constitution, we must take the liberty of supposing, had not its origin with the latter. The objection here is the more extraordinary, as it appears that the language used by the convention is a copy from the articles of Confederation. The objects of the Union among the States, as described in article third, are "their common defense, security of their liberties, and mutual and general welfare. '' The terms of article eighth are still more identical: "All charges of war and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defense or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury,'' etc. A similar language again occurs in article ninth. Construe either of these articles by the rules which would justify the construction put on the new Constitution, and they vest in the existing Congress a power to legislate in all cases whatsoever.

But what would have been thought of that assembly, if, attaching themselves to these general expressions, and disregarding the specifications which ascertain and limit their import, they had exercised an unlimited power of providing for the common defense and general welfare? I appeal to the objectors themselves, whether they would in that case have employed the same reasoning in justification of Congress as they now make use of against the convention. How difficult it is for error to escape its own condemnation!

Source: James Madison, Federalist No. 41

Article I, section 8 of the Constitution confers upon Congress certain enumerated powers and a potentially more sweeping authority to provide for the general welfare, a goal also set forth in the Preamble. For proponents of a limited central government, the General Welfare Clause has been a source of great mischief. Interpreted elastically by constitutionalists of the "living document" persuasion, the Clause has helped serve up a gourmand’s feast of government programs, regulations, and intrusions that would have been unimaginable to the Framers.

Forty-three years ago, William W. Crosskey of the University of Chicago attempted to set the record straight–-to uncover the original meaning of the Constitution and shut down the revisionists who had robbed the document of its stability and permanence. Alas, Crosskey’s tome, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States, published in two volumes in 1953 with a third volume issued posthumously in 1980, only muddied the waters. Worse still, Crosskey managed to tarnish the image of James Madison, until then revered as a paladin in the struggle against encroaching government.

Leonard R. Sorenson, a professor of politics at Assumption College in Massachusetts, has undertaken to rescue us from our rescuer. According to Crosskey, Madison was duplicitous: Publicly, Madison proclaimed that the General Welfare Clause is merely a synonym for the enumerated powers considered collectively, not an independent source of power. But privately, Madison believed that the General Welfare Clause delegates to the Congress plenary legislative power; that the enumeration of specific powers served simply to allocate and assign governmental functions, establish certain procedural limitations, and illustrate some of the powers deemed to be necessary and proper. This alleged difference between Madison’s public and private persona is at the root of the so-called Madisonian contradiction.

Sorenson’s thesis, based primarily on Federalist No. 41, is that Madison regarded the enumeration as defining the objects entailed within the general welfare and the other general clauses that make up the Preamble (i.e., justice, domestic tranquility, common defense, and liberty). But those objects are the broad ends or purposes of the Constitution, not just means or powers. Therefore, states Sorenson, Madison understood the general terms of the Preamble to enlarge the dominion of government beyond the enumeration itself, although not to confer plenary power. Madison’s public position, ascribed to him by Crosskey, was that substantive powers are defined by specifying their number, kind, and application. On the contrary, Sorenson’s explanation is that (1) Madison perceived the Preamble of the Constitution as prescribing a limited number of limited ends; (2) the enumeration defines those ends more precisely; (3) the general welfare and other clauses that make up the Preamble vest particular powers beyond the enumeration, but only to accomplish the limited ends; and (4) the particular powers thus vested can be identified only through an examination of the enumerated powers themselves, in their relation to the authorized ends.

If that sounds recursive, it is intended to be. Sorenson maintains that the general ends or objects of the Constitution, as specified in the Preamble, define the purposes of the enumerated powers qua powers; but the enumerated powers, in their end-defining dimension, provide more specific meaning to the general purposes. Sorenson concludes that the purpose of the enumeration is to define the limited number of objects or purposes that fall within the idea of the general terms. Thus, a proposed new power must promote an object already authorized; that is, the new power must be derived from a general term, which means that it must also have an immediate and appropriate relation to an already enumerated power.

Perhaps an example from Sorenson will help. The Alien and Sedition Acts, under which aliens could be detained or deported, permitted prior restraint of speech and the press. It could be argued that Congress’s authority to pass the Acts was entailed within the enumerated power to suppress insurrections–-a particular means of providing for the common defense, domestic tranquility, and the general welfare. Madison rejects that formulation on the ground that suppressing an insurrection involves subsequent punishment, not prior restraint; the enumerated power neither explains nor defines any of the general terms in a manner that permits of censorship.

Sorenson weaves his way through The Federalist Papers (principally Nos. 39-44), dissecting and analyzing the text with diligence, erudition, and fastidious attention to detail. His work product should and perhaps will have an impact upon our courts, but there are significant obstacles to overcome.

First, the battle over the General Welfare Clause was all but lost six decades ago in United States v. Butler (1936) and Helvering v. Davis (1937). In Butler, the Court struck down the Agricultural Adjustment Act, which taxed processors in order to pay farmers to reduce production. Although invalidating the statute, the Court adopted the Hamiltonian view (almost in passing) that the General Welfare Clause is a separate grant of congressional authority, linked to and qualified by the spending power. Sorenson perceives correctly that virtually all governmental activity involves the expenditure of money; accordingly, there is little difference between Hamilton’s view and Crosskey’s position that the General Welfare Clause represents a plenary grant of power.

Any doubt remaining after Butler as to the scope of the General Welfare Clause was dispelled a year later in Helvering. There the Court defended the constitutionality of the 1935 Social Security Act, requiring only that welfare spending be for the common benefit as distinguished from some mere local purpose. Justice Benjamin Cardozo summed up what has become controlling doctrine ever since: "Nor is the concept of the general welfare static.... What is critical or urgent changes with the times."

Justice Harlan Stone struck the final blow in Flemming v. Nester in 1954, holding that questions concerning the propriety of conditions imposed on spending, and questions concerning the generality of the benefits, were for the Congress to resolve–-subject to judicial invalidation "only if the statute manifests a patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational justification." However disheartening such cases may be to advocates of a narrower and more constraining General Welfare Clause, they do reinforce the urgent need for quality research from competent scholars like Sorenson.

The second hurdle for Sorenson is that his scholarship may be more widely referenced by historians than by jurists. Curiously, Sorenson chose as his principal theme the refutation of Crosskey. Writing long after the Supreme Court had done its damage, Crosskey’s influence has been marginal. He is cited but three times in Supreme Court majority opinions, and in only one instance has the cited material implicated (tangentially) the General Welfare Clause. To be fair, Crosskey indisputably provided intellectual ammunition for the bad guys and, in that sense, Sorenson’s effort to disarm him (and them) is an important part of the ongoing struggle to secure a more propitious climate of ideas.

Third, the focus of that struggle for ideas may have shifted in light of the Supreme Court’s 1995 salvo in United States v. Lopez. The explosion of federal power under the expansive rubric of the Commerce Clause–-arguably more harmful than any aggrandizement traceable to the General Welfare Clause-–has at last been scrutinized by the Court. And if the Commerce Clause is ever restored to its rightful role–-that of ensuring the free flow of trade among the states-–the next campaign may indeed be waged against the Necessary and Proper Clause. Distended by the Court in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), that Clause now allows Congress to employ means in exercising its powers that are merely convenient--neither necessary nor proper. So, while welcoming Sorenson’s attack on the modernized General Welfare Clause, one should not be surprised if it is stalled by the allocation of scarce intellectual resources to more exigent projects. At a minimum, friends of liberty will surely find Sorenson's portrayal of Madison more congenial than Crosskey’s.

Proponents of a government constrained to exercise only its enumerated powers should not be discouraged if progress is gradual and halting. Sometimes, in order to effectuate radical change without rending the social fabric, we may have to content ourselves with incremental challenges to long-established doctrines. Sorenson has undeniably supplied more than his fair increment. By tracing to Madison a view less conducive to swollen government than the view embraced by the New Deal Court and its successors, Sorenson enrolls on the side of limited government. He is part of the crusade to circumscribe the reach of the feds–-even if his vision of Madison would not bind Congress as tightly to the original enumeration as old-line anti-federalists might desire.

Robert A. Levy
Potomac, Md.

Source: http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj16n1-11.html

Nice try though.

By what constitutional authority does the Congress presume to set wages?

It hasn't presume to "set wages," but it has presumed to set a minimum wage under the Commerce Clause.

I'm sorry, but setting a minimum wage is absolutely "setting wages." And by what constitutional authority does Congress set the wages within a state? The private contract between employer and employee is not "interstate commerce," nor does "regulate" mean what you think it means.

Where is it written that the Congress has such authority?

Article I, Section 8, U.S. Constitution.

Wrong, as shown above.

Last I checked, "setting wages" was not included in Article II, Section 8 of the Constitution.

Check Article I, Section 1, "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States..." And, Section 8,"The Congress shall have power to ....provide for the ... general welfare of the United States; [and] ... To regulate commerce .... and among the several states...;"

Disposed of by James Madison himself.

The FLSA is based on the Commerce Clause.

No, it's based on a Progressive interpretation of the Commerce Clause that has no constitutional weight behind it.

So where, exactly, does Congress derive its power to set a national minimum wage?

The Commerce Clause, although there are employers and employees who are not covered by the FLSA. Those that aren't are covered by State law. http://www.dol.gov/elaws/esa/flsa/scope/screen10.asp

How is the wage paid by an employer to his employee within a state "commerce among the several states?"

Is it better for people to be unemployed, and therefore a burden on the public purse, because they do not have sufficient skills to make them worthwhile employees, or is it better for them to hold some position and get paid for it, which allows them the opportunity to learn and make themselves more valuable to their employer, and to the market generally, so that they can advance themselves economically?

That's a matter of opinion and depends on policy goals. Maybe it is better for some people to be unemployed so that a great many people can be employed at a higher wage.

And should government get to decide this?

Why not?

Because it has no constitutional authority to do so.

What are the unintended consequences of vesting such vast economic power in Congress, pray tell?

You tell me.

Economic disaster and dangerous arrogation of power to the federal government never intended by the Founders.

Should not the markets determine who is employed and how much they get paid?

They generally do, except there is a minimum wage applicable to most employees and overtime laws applicable to most. The markets should determine who is employed and how much they get paid within the legal framework set by state, federal and local government. I'd like to not pay an annual business tax to my City, but they've seen fit to charge me. Should they have that power?

If the government has lawful authority to dictate a minimum wage, then why does it not have authority to dictate a maximum wage, or dictate specific wages? Do you not see a danger in the federal government dictating wages nationwide?

Is it better that tons of people earn extremely low wages so that a few people who are excited about the opportunity to work for free to gain experience can do so? Might be - but, whether that's the law of the land depends on the outcome of the political process. The answer to that question is not something that is carved in stone for all time, for all reasons, under all circumstances.

The most fundamental question you have to answer, before you can even address your questions, is where Congress derives its power to meddle in the wage structure of the nation.

I've answered that.

And I've debunked your answer. Try again.

I see absolutely no authority anywhere in the Constitution that permits or authorizes Congress to make laws regarding wages in the U.S. Do you?

Yes, in relation to commerce among the several states. So, employees engaged in businesses engaging in interstate commerce, sure. Just like States can set minimum wages - the federal government can if it is part of its regulation of interstate commerce.

Under this construction of the Commerce Clause, there is literally no activity at all that is beyond the reach of the federal government. This is the Progressive interpretation of the Commerce Clause, but it's not what the Founders intended.

If so, where?

Article I, Section 8 - I think it's clause 2.

If the Congress has no power to regulate wages,

Why wouldn't they have the power to set a minimum wage for businesses engaged in interstate commerce?

Because the wages paid within the state are not "interstate commerce." Just because Congress can regulate commerce "among the several states" does not mean that they can regulate every economic activity within a state that does not actually move between two states. The SCOTUS has been making serious inroads on the Progressive interpretation of the Commerce Clause of late, for example denying the "Gun Free Schools Act" as an overreaching. Likewise, it's likely that Obamacare will fall on the same general premise, which is that Congress does not have plenary power to regulate all commerce, no matter how peripherally connected it might be to some interstate transaction, it's limited to regulating commerce that actually crosses state lines, or that "affects" such commerce.

then the political issues you put forward are moot.

I've already stated the broad grant of authority to the Congress.

No, you've erroneously parroted the Progressive propaganda, which I've debunked by reference to the words of James Madison.

And as I read it, and as the Founders intended it, Congress is strictly limited in its powers to those ENUMERATED powers found in the Constitution. Everything else, including regulating wages, is left to the states, or to the people, in accordance with the 10th Amendment.

How about not claiming what the "Founders" intended without specifying who intended it and citing your source. It's a pet peeve of mine, this "Founders" nonsense. These were men, not gods and deifying them with this "Founders" nomenclature and pretending that they were all of one "golden age" mind that was pure and right in all things is silly.

I did.

The enumerated powers are very broad and general, sometimes, and it seems fairly clear that setting a minimum wage for those engaged in or employed by entities engaged in interstate commerce is not outside the realm of regulating interstate commerce.

That's a stretch at best, and in reality it's an expression of Progressive interpretation, which is a perversion of the original intent of the Founders.

Legions of black youth wander the streets of our urban slums precisely because they have neither the skills, education or work ethic to make them worth seven bucks an hour to McDonalds for flipping burgers. But if McDonalds could employ them at two dollars an hour to start, it might be worth the time and trouble of educating and training them in a useful skill, and they would be benefiting the economy at the same time. So long as they are free to move on to other jobs, it's not serfdom, peonage or slavery. Their economic success becomes dependent upon their willingness to learn and work hard.

It may also be that the legions of black and white persons well-qualified to staff McDonald's grills who are now making $8 an hour would then be reduced to $2 an hour. At the current minimum wage, McDonalds is not at a loss for qualified help. It's not like they're saying "shit man, we can't find qualified help around here - if only we could pay only $2 an hour, then we could afford to train the crackheads on the street to flip burgers..."

Which might get the crackheads off of crack and start them up the ladder to economic success.

Maybe, maybe not. Maybe nothing will get the crackheads off crack, except themselves, and it seems to me very likely that a crackhead isn't going to hold down a job if you offer him $100 an hour. But, then again, this determination is ultimately for our elected officials to make.

Perhaps at the state level, but certainly not at the federal level.

Flipping burgers should not be a career aspiration for anyone,

Says you. And, me too, but then again I don't presume to speak for everyone.

Well, if someone wants to work flipping burgers for life at $2.00 per hour, I'm fine with that, it's their life.

it should be an entry-level foothold on the ladder to success, nothing more,

Oh, I don't know - some folks can't do much more. The baggers at the supermarket aren't going to be heading up the corporate ladder anytime soon.

Depends. Most baggers I know are young people looking to earn some spending money until they get a real job.

and our newly-minted working class just out of high school should have ample access to such entry-level positions. It's a bad idea to reserve entry level jobs for experienced workers because it leaves nowhere for entry-level employees to start.

Assuming, of course, that we are in fact "reserving entry level jobs for experienced workers" by setting a minimum wage at like $7.25 an hour. I think most folks with any experience already got a raise.

Depends on the state of the labor market. The observable fact is that every hike in minimum wage rates causes mostly young, inexperienced workers to be excluded from the workforce.

That's what apprenticeship was all about. The master craftsman selected a young man who showed talent in the trade and gave him room and board, and perhaps a small stipend, in return for being taught the craft. A fair and reasonable quid pro quo relationship that is now essentially illegal in the US. Now, an apprentice has to be paid at least minimum wage, and often more than that in a unionized trade, which makes it too costly for the employer to afford, so he doesn't hire unskilled labor with the intent to educate them into the trade, he hires semi-skilled workers who have experience. And the new worker, no matter how skilled he might be, has to fork over money he doesn't have, or which he gets from the government, to go to "trade school" to learn the basic skills that an apprentice used to learn on the job, while having a place to live and food to eat. Thus, we have an entire trade school industry that costs both the public (through direct tax support and other government benefits) and the student inordinate amounts of money that could be avoided simply by allowing individuals wishing to learn a trade to freely negotiate with a master craftsman for an apprenticeship position that is beneficial economically to both.

Or, we could have a completely free market where those people who have no money get presented with contracts indenturing them as apprentices for 7 to 10 years, wherein they are basically the servant of the master (hence the old terminology for the law of "Master and Servant" under English and American jurisprudence). So instead of paying to go to school for a couple of years, the Master will only agree to apprentice the Servant if the Servant agrees to extended periods of servitude. Which is better? That's a policy decision for the legislature.

Isn't that essentially what we have now? Don't students "indenture" themselves to the federal student loan program, or a private lender, and don't schools charge such high fees that students are essentially indentured for a decade or more? How is that substantially different from what you outline?

With an apprenticeship, the Journeyman or the Master and the apprentice come to a contractual agreement about the term of the apprenticeship, and if the teacher renegs on the contract, the apprentice has legal recourse against him. I see nothing for the FEDERAL legislature to regulate. Perhaps a state legislature might wish to set mandatory contractual conditions for apprenticeships to prevent fraud by the Master Craftsman, but that's a legitimate role of government, policing society to prevent the initiation of force or fraud.

That's not what it was like when the "Founders" were around.

So?

The majority of workers back then were domestic servants, apprentices, temporary helpers, indentured servants, or slaves, and wage labor for a livelihood was the exception. The master-servant relationship was hierarchical and mutually obligatory and Masters were were allowed to impose harsh terms on the servant. When the servant failed to measure up to the norms or terms of labor, the servant might be disciplined, even whipped, by the master or imprisoned by a court. In colonial South Carolina (and Massachusetts, to a lesser extent), the master had statutory permission to put his servant to work for one week—not to exceed a total of two years—for every day the servant was absent from work without consent. In many colonies and localities, voluntary idleness was illegal, and a small number of the "indigent," "vagrant," or "dissolute" persons and criminals were bound to labor by law. We could go back to that way.

Or, we could utilize the best aspects of the apprenticeship practice while prohibiting the worse. You form a straw-man argument here by assuming it's an all-or-nothing proposition.

[Seth]

This is a cart-before-the-horse conundrum. Do wait staff earn their money through tips because that's how they are supposed to earn their money and therefore they can be denied an equal minimum wage, or do they earn their money through tips because the government has FORCED them to do so by discriminating against them with economic policy? I say it's the latter, and the proof is that in most other countries, wait staff are paid the prevailing minimum wage, and tips are gratuities intended to encourage exemplary service. One construction of the term "tips" is "to insure prompt service." Another is the very word "gratuity," which means a payment beyond what is required.

They were earning their money by tips before the FLSA was passed in 1938, and the exception from the minimum wage provisions was included because of that.

Well, they were "earning money" from tips, but that was nothing more than a social convention. And if an employee is willing to work for tips alone, or for a small wage augmented by tips, what business is it of the governments? Why should they be discriminated against when it comes to minimum wage laws?

In the absence of law, people entering into contracts is nothing more than a social convention too. So what? The law took into account the reality of the society to which it applied. That happens all the time.

You're on both sides of the ball here. One, if an employee is willing to work for tips alone, or for a small wage augmented by tips, what business is it of the governments? Well, any laws within the powers delegated to Congress to make laws for the General Welfare under Article I of the Constitution that are not otherwise unconstitutional are properly within the province of the Congress. It's the business of Congress to make laws that it deems are in the General Welfare. Arguably a minimum wage is in the General Welfare, and there can be rational bases to make exceptions to the general rule in given circumstances. On what basis do you claim that every law made by Congress must be universally applicable to all Americans under all circumstances?

Why should they be discriminated against when it comes to minimum wage laws? Because the reality of the society to which the law is applicable is that waiters and waitresses are compensated differently, because of their interaction with the public and receipt of tips for good service, that the Congress saw fit to make an exception to the general rule. The Congress made a determination that the wait staff profession didn't need a minimum wage because of their opportunity to make higher incomes through the tip custom. If you can convince enough Congressmen to change the law, that can change. I don't know what to tell you other than that. It's not unconstitutional. It has a rational basis. That doesn't mean that it can't be otherwise, or will never change.

What's "rational" about it? What constitutional authority does Congress have to determine who "needs" what wage?

Lots of exemptions are given to different kinds of labor laws. For example, "companions for the elderly" are exempt from minimum wage. Children who work for their parents are exempt from child labor laws. Newspaper delivery boys are exempt from minimum wage, overtime and child labor laws of the FLSA. Many others too... Administrative, professional and executive employees are exempt from the overtime requirements, as are taxi drivers, pieceworkers and many other types of workers - IT professionals, outside sales people, retail salespeople, etc. Equal protection is not violated by making these distinctions.

Well, that's a matter of opinion.

Everything is a matter of opinion to some extent, but the US Supreme Court agrees with me on this one.

Sadly true. But then this is a philosophical discussion, not a simple recitation of the existing law, isn't it? I'm more concerned with the moral and ethical arguments by which such discrimination is practiced than I am the fact that Progressives have managed to achieve an important Progressive goal, which is the insertion of the Executive State in to the private business relation and private contract between employer and employee. What are the moral and ethical justifications for such unconstitutional intrusions into the right of contract?

You assume it's unconstitutional without having demonstrated that, and the right to contract doesn't mean that there are no regulations concerning contracts. The only constitutional provision is the "Impairing the Obligations of Contract" clause. It doesn't say "the right to contract shall not be infringed."

Yes - it's a philosophical discussion. But, it was you who responded "well, that's a matter of opinion." My response illustrated that saying that is really pointless. Everything is basically a matter of opinion. In this case, my opinion that the minimum wage law doesn't violate equal protection is shared by some fairly substantial legal minds who have expounded on the topic at length and you can read their justifications. I'll not repeat them here. You've not cited any authority for your proposition that the minimum wage law violates the equal protection clause - you've merely suggested that that in order to be constitutional there can be no exceptions based on a reasoned analysis of the needs of the community to which the law applies. Your philsophical argument on that point makes little sense - making exceptions is not denying equal protection, as I pointed out already.

And you're making what amounts to an argument by authority. You're doing nothing but stating how things are without any examination of whether or not the way things are is either moral, ethical or a necessary and proper action by the federal government.

[Coito ergo sum]

I
You act as if over the last 25 years I've never had a credit card. I've NEVER paid 28.8%.

And I've never got a $10 million $ BONUS.

What the fuck does your red herring about your personal credit card rate have to do with the reality of people getting screwed by banks?

Actually, it's more about your bullshitting about 28.8% interest rates on Sears cards. That's not the rate. I've looked it up. So, my one example beats your none.

By the way, it's not a red herring, it's an example. A red herring something used to divert attention from the real issue.

Also, I looked up Citibank's current rates on Sears cards, and they aren't 28.8%. So, you're obviously just making shit up.

[Coito ergo sum]

That's an arbitrary distinction made purely in order to facilitate government regulation of the employment relationship. My question is why should government be permitted to interfere with that relationship? In particular, where is the FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S constitutional authority to regulate the private relationship between employer and employee?

The distinction between employee and independent contractor is a distinction, but not an arbitrary one. The two things are different.

I've already answered - at least twice, if not three times - why the government should be permitted. I already went through the Constitutional authority. Why do you keep asking the question over and over again? I quoted it.

The only reason there is a distinction is for the convenience of government.

Not at all. It's convenient for people, too, like when I hire a roofer to put a roof on my house - he does the job, I pay him. If he misquotes the job and spends more on supplies and equipment, so he takes a loss on the job, then that's tough on him.

If I hire you as a laborer installing new roofs, why shouldn't I be able to pay you a day's wage for a day's work and let you worry about paying the taxes due?

You can, if I'm an independent contractor and you and I have an express or implied agreement and you don't have the right to control the means by which I complete the job, etc.

If you're an employee, your employer is required to withhold money from your paycheck, and he is required to contribute matching funds to FICA, Social Security and Medicare.

Something I'm glad I don't have to do when I hire a plumber.

Right. But why should the plumbing company owner be required to do so for his plumbers? Why should the responsibility for paying employment taxes always fall upon the employee?

He doesn't, if he only subcontracts to independent contractors. If he hires employees, then there are rules that apply to employees, and if he asserts control or the right to control their work hours and the means by which they do their work, etc., then they are employees. The reason they do this is because a policy decision was made that to efficiently collect payroll taxes and other withholding, it was best to do it on the front end. Otherwise, the government would have to employ hundreds of thousands of auditors and enforcement agents to prosecute every tom, dick and harry that fails to pay the proper amounts.

Plus, why not?

If you're an independent contractor, all those expenses fall on you. And that's how it should be for everyone.

Why? Why can't there be exceptions for situations when someone is hired to do a job and be subject to the control and right to control the manner and means of doing the job?

Why should there be? It's an arbitrary distinction at best. Why does dictating the manner, means and timing of the work change the nature of the relationship between the two individuals?

Because Congress made the policy decision that it would be better, more efficient, and easier on the employees if the taxes were paid up front, rather than on the back end. Now, this seems to be a one way street. Are you ever going to answer a question, or is it just my job to keep repeatedly answering yours?

The distinction is not arbitrary. There is a rational reason for the distinction, as I have explained.

The nature of the relationship is changed, quite obviously, because it goes from one of the nature of "master and servant" to one of the nature of relative equals, or professional/skilled tradesman and customer. That should be plainly obvious.

Now - please - state your case for why the Congress can't make that distinction.

The employer should not be made into an involuntary tax collector for the federal government, and individuals should be responsible for paying for their own retirement plans and medical care, just like independent contractors are.

Why not? And, why?

Because it's an unfunded mandate. Government should not require private citizens to be unpaid employees of the government. If the government wants to collect taxes, then the IRS can apply to Congress for funding to hire tax collectors. Requiring me, an independent citizen and business owner, to do work for the federal government against my will is...wait for it...involuntary servitude.

Isn't, actually. It's no different than a government requiring you to mail in your taxes, or otherwise handle payment methods, rather than hiring someone to come out to your house and pick up the check. It's just a legal requirement - you want to hire employees, then you have to withhold certain items and remit them to the government.

Because of the 13th Amendment, for one thing, and because allowing slavery, peonage and involuntary servitude is, IMO, bad policy.

Slavery is defined as "involuntary servitude." If it's voluntary, it's not slavery.

Never said it was. I'm also opposed to people selling themselves into slavery. Granted, however, that not all volunteered labor is that.

Why? What business is it of yours how I wish to conduct my life or who I wish to obligate myself to?

Because Slavery and involuntary servitude is unconstitutional. If you want to volunteer your time somewhere, that's fine. Where did I say otherwise?

Because it is empowered to make laws for the General Welfare and within the powers delegated to it under the Constitution, so long as it does not violate a fundamental right.

Ah, I knew you were going to go there. Sorry, but the "general welfare" clause is NOT a grant of general or unlimited power to the Congress. Congress is only empowered to make laws pursuant to the express authority granted to it by the Constitution, and those laws must advance the general welfare of the People. You are fallaciously reading the general welfare and necessary and proper clauses to be overriding grants of power that allow literally any regulation whatsoever that Congress deems will promote the general welfare or is necessary and proper, but the clause is self-limiting: "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

The Congress shall have Power...To...lay and collect taxes...to...provide for the...general Welfare of the United States."

Note that the authority in Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 is the power to collect taxes to provide for the general welfare of the United States. This is a separate and distinct clause from all the rest of the powers delegated to Congress. Nowhere is Congress empowered to make any law it deems necessary to "provide for the general welfare." It may collect taxes, and the use to which the taxes may be put are specified in the second half of the clause: "...to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States.." This is a grant of authority to collect and use taxes, but it's a restriction on what those taxes may be used for: paying debts, keeping the military, and providing for the general welfare of the United States.

Nor does the "necessary and proper" clause support your contention. It says, "The Congress shall have Power...to...make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." (emphasis added)

Note the words "foregoing Powers."

This is specific reference to the long list of enumerated powers of Congress immediately above in Article 1, Section 8.

If the Founders had intended Congress to have unlimited plenary powers to make all "necessary and proper" laws to "provide for the general welfare" of the nation, there would have been no reason to make a list of enumerated powers. Article I, Section 8 would have simply said "Congress shall have the power to provide for the general welfare of the United States and shall have the power to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution this power."

But that's not what the Constitution says. Rather, it provides a narrow and specific list of powers that Congress may exercise, reserving everything else to the states, or to the people.

Under the canon of legislative interpretation called "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius", which means "the express mention of one thing excludes all others," "Items not on the list are assumed not to be covered by the statute." Thus, the express mention of particular enumerated powers denies the expansion of those powers to other, unenumerated powers. This concept is made manifest in the language of the Tenth Amendment, which says, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."

If the Congress (the United States) is granted plenary general powers to legislate as "necessary and proper" to provide for the "general welfare," then the language of the Tenth Amendment is mere surplusage and is meaningless.

But it's not. It's an expression of the legal fact that Congress has ONLY those powers explicitly delegated to it by the Constitution, which consist of ONLY those powers enumerated in Article I, Section 8. The "general welfare" clause is a RESTRICTION on Congress that tells Congress that any law it creates pursuant to an enumerated power must be constructed so as to advance the general welfare of the People, and that such laws must be both necessary AND proper to the exercise of the delegated authorities.

It has been urged and echoed, that the power "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States,'' amounts to an unlimited commission to exercise every power which may be alleged to be necessary for the common defense or general welfare. No stronger proof could be given of the distress under which these writers labor for objections, than their stooping to such a misconstruction. Had no other enumeration or definition of the powers of the Congress been found in the Constitution, than the general expressions just cited, the authors of the objection might have had some color for it; though it would have been difficult to find a reason for so awkward a form of describing an authority to legislate in all possible cases. A power to destroy the freedom of the press, the trial by jury, or even to regulate the course of descents, or the forms of conveyances, must be very singularly expressed by the terms "to raise money for the general welfare.

''But what color can the objection have, when a specification of the objects alluded to by these general terms immediately follows, and is not even separated by a longer pause than a semicolon? If the different parts of the same instrument ought to be so expounded, as to give meaning to every part which will bear it, shall one part of the same sentence be excluded altogether from a share in the meaning; and shall the more doubtful and indefinite terms be retained in their full extent, and the clear and precise expressions be denied any signification whatsoever? For what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted, if these and all others were meant to be included in the preceding general power? Nothing is more natural nor common than first to use a general phrase, and then to explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars.

But the idea of an enumeration of particulars which neither explain nor qualify the general meaning, and can have no other effect than to confound and mislead, is an absurdity, which, as we are reduced to the dilemma of charging either on the authors of the objection or on the authors of the Constitution, we must take the liberty of supposing, had not its origin with the latter. The objection here is the more extraordinary, as it appears that the language used by the convention is a copy from the articles of Confederation. The objects of the Union among the States, as described in article third, are "their common defense, security of their liberties, and mutual and general welfare. '' The terms of article eighth are still more identical: "All charges of war and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defense or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury,'' etc. A similar language again occurs in article ninth. Construe either of these articles by the rules which would justify the construction put on the new Constitution, and they vest in the existing Congress a power to legislate in all cases whatsoever.

But what would have been thought of that assembly, if, attaching themselves to these general expressions, and disregarding the specifications which ascertain and limit their import, they had exercised an unlimited power of providing for the common defense and general welfare? I appeal to the objectors themselves, whether they would in that case have employed the same reasoning in justification of Congress as they now make use of against the convention. How difficult it is for error to escape its own condemnation!

Source: James Madison, Federalist No. 41

Article I, section 8 of the Constitution confers upon Congress certain enumerated powers and a potentially more sweeping authority to provide for the general welfare, a goal also set forth in the Preamble. For proponents of a limited central government, the General Welfare Clause has been a source of great mischief. Interpreted elastically by constitutionalists of the "living document" persuasion, the Clause has helped serve up a gourmand’s feast of government programs, regulations, and intrusions that would have been unimaginable to the Framers.

Forty-three years ago, William W. Crosskey of the University of Chicago attempted to set the record straight–-to uncover the original meaning of the Constitution and shut down the revisionists who had robbed the document of its stability and permanence. Alas, Crosskey’s tome, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States, published in two volumes in 1953 with a third volume issued posthumously in 1980, only muddied the waters. Worse still, Crosskey managed to tarnish the image of James Madison, until then revered as a paladin in the struggle against encroaching government.

Leonard R. Sorenson, a professor of politics at Assumption College in Massachusetts, has undertaken to rescue us from our rescuer. According to Crosskey, Madison was duplicitous: Publicly, Madison proclaimed that the General Welfare Clause is merely a synonym for the enumerated powers considered collectively, not an independent source of power. But privately, Madison believed that the General Welfare Clause delegates to the Congress plenary legislative power; that the enumeration of specific powers served simply to allocate and assign governmental functions, establish certain procedural limitations, and illustrate some of the powers deemed to be necessary and proper. This alleged difference between Madison’s public and private persona is at the root of the so-called Madisonian contradiction.

Sorenson’s thesis, based primarily on Federalist No. 41, is that Madison regarded the enumeration as defining the objects entailed within the general welfare and the other general clauses that make up the Preamble (i.e., justice, domestic tranquility, common defense, and liberty). But those objects are the broad ends or purposes of the Constitution, not just means or powers. Therefore, states Sorenson, Madison understood the general terms of the Preamble to enlarge the dominion of government beyond the enumeration itself, although not to confer plenary power. Madison’s public position, ascribed to him by Crosskey, was that substantive powers are defined by specifying their number, kind, and application. On the contrary, Sorenson’s explanation is that (1) Madison perceived the Preamble of the Constitution as prescribing a limited number of limited ends; (2) the enumeration defines those ends more precisely; (3) the general welfare and other clauses that make up the Preamble vest particular powers beyond the enumeration, but only to accomplish the limited ends; and (4) the particular powers thus vested can be identified only through an examination of the enumerated powers themselves, in their relation to the authorized ends.

If that sounds recursive, it is intended to be. Sorenson maintains that the general ends or objects of the Constitution, as specified in the Preamble, define the purposes of the enumerated powers qua powers; but the enumerated powers, in their end-defining dimension, provide more specific meaning to the general purposes. Sorenson concludes that the purpose of the enumeration is to define the limited number of objects or purposes that fall within the idea of the general terms. Thus, a proposed new power must promote an object already authorized; that is, the new power must be derived from a general term, which means that it must also have an immediate and appropriate relation to an already enumerated power.

Perhaps an example from Sorenson will help. The Alien and Sedition Acts, under which aliens could be detained or deported, permitted prior restraint of speech and the press. It could be argued that Congress’s authority to pass the Acts was entailed within the enumerated power to suppress insurrections–-a particular means of providing for the common defense, domestic tranquility, and the general welfare. Madison rejects that formulation on the ground that suppressing an insurrection involves subsequent punishment, not prior restraint; the enumerated power neither explains nor defines any of the general terms in a manner that permits of censorship.

Sorenson weaves his way through The Federalist Papers (principally Nos. 39-44), dissecting and analyzing the text with diligence, erudition, and fastidious attention to detail. His work product should and perhaps will have an impact upon our courts, but there are significant obstacles to overcome.

First, the battle over the General Welfare Clause was all but lost six decades ago in United States v. Butler (1936) and Helvering v. Davis (1937). In Butler, the Court struck down the Agricultural Adjustment Act, which taxed processors in order to pay farmers to reduce production. Although invalidating the statute, the Court adopted the Hamiltonian view (almost in passing) that the General Welfare Clause is a separate grant of congressional authority, linked to and qualified by the spending power. Sorenson perceives correctly that virtually all governmental activity involves the expenditure of money; accordingly, there is little difference between Hamilton’s view and Crosskey’s position that the General Welfare Clause represents a plenary grant of power.

Any doubt remaining after Butler as to the scope of the General Welfare Clause was dispelled a year later in Helvering. There the Court defended the constitutionality of the 1935 Social Security Act, requiring only that welfare spending be for the common benefit as distinguished from some mere local purpose. Justice Benjamin Cardozo summed up what has become controlling doctrine ever since: "Nor is the concept of the general welfare static.... What is critical or urgent changes with the times."

Justice Harlan Stone struck the final blow in Flemming v. Nester in 1954, holding that questions concerning the propriety of conditions imposed on spending, and questions concerning the generality of the benefits, were for the Congress to resolve–-subject to judicial invalidation "only if the statute manifests a patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational justification." However disheartening such cases may be to advocates of a narrower and more constraining General Welfare Clause, they do reinforce the urgent need for quality research from competent scholars like Sorenson.

The second hurdle for Sorenson is that his scholarship may be more widely referenced by historians than by jurists. Curiously, Sorenson chose as his principal theme the refutation of Crosskey. Writing long after the Supreme Court had done its damage, Crosskey’s influence has been marginal. He is cited but three times in Supreme Court majority opinions, and in only one instance has the cited material implicated (tangentially) the General Welfare Clause. To be fair, Crosskey indisputably provided intellectual ammunition for the bad guys and, in that sense, Sorenson’s effort to disarm him (and them) is an important part of the ongoing struggle to secure a more propitious climate of ideas.

Third, the focus of that struggle for ideas may have shifted in light of the Supreme Court’s 1995 salvo in United States v. Lopez. The explosion of federal power under the expansive rubric of the Commerce Clause–-arguably more harmful than any aggrandizement traceable to the General Welfare Clause-–has at last been scrutinized by the Court. And if the Commerce Clause is ever restored to its rightful role–-that of ensuring the free flow of trade among the states-–the next campaign may indeed be waged against the Necessary and Proper Clause. Distended by the Court in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), that Clause now allows Congress to employ means in exercising its powers that are merely convenient--neither necessary nor proper. So, while welcoming Sorenson’s attack on the modernized General Welfare Clause, one should not be surprised if it is stalled by the allocation of scarce intellectual resources to more exigent projects. At a minimum, friends of liberty will surely find Sorenson's portrayal of Madison more congenial than Crosskey’s.

Proponents of a government constrained to exercise only its enumerated powers should not be discouraged if progress is gradual and halting. Sometimes, in order to effectuate radical change without rending the social fabric, we may have to content ourselves with incremental challenges to long-established doctrines. Sorenson has undeniably supplied more than his fair increment. By tracing to Madison a view less conducive to swollen government than the view embraced by the New Deal Court and its successors, Sorenson enrolls on the side of limited government. He is part of the crusade to circumscribe the reach of the feds–-even if his vision of Madison would not bind Congress as tightly to the original enumeration as old-line anti-federalists might desire.

Robert A. Levy
Potomac, Md.

Source: http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj16n1-11.html

Nice try though.

Dude, what in the hell is wrong with you? I did not rely on the general welfare clause and the necessary and proper clause - I never even mentioned the necessary and proper clause, and I only mentioned the general welfare clause in conjunction with the Commerce Clause. Somehow, you went off on some tangent, attacking me for an argument that I never made.

By what constitutional authority does the Congress presume to set wages?

It hasn't presume to "set wages," but it has presumed to set a minimum wage under the Commerce Clause.

I'm sorry, but setting a minimum wage is absolutely "setting wages."

I'm sorry, but you apparently ignored and deleted my entire argument wherein I discussed the Commerce Clause and then you pretended that I argued that the General Welfare Clause was an independent grant of authority - something I never said.

Also - setting a minimum wage is NOT "setting wages." Setting a wage is "you must by X to the employee" - a minimum wage sets a floor below which you can't go. Big difference.

And by what constitutional authority does Congress set the wages within a state? The private contract between employer and employee is not "interstate commerce," nor does "regulate" mean what you think it means.

That's your opinion. I don't share it. One - if you want to get nitpicky about terms, then recall that it doesn't say "interstate commerce" it says "commerce among the several states" and it is most certainly within the realm of "regulation" of "commerce" among the several states to set a floor on wages for companies engaged in commerce among the several states.

I know what the SCOTUS says "regulate" means, and I'm quite sure they have a better handle on Constitutional law than you do.

Where is it written that the Congress has such authority?

Article I, Section 8, U.S. Constitution.

Wrong, as shown above.

Do you even read what someone else writes, or do you just argue points not made all the time?

You're wrong.

Last I checked, "setting wages" was not included in Article II, Section 8 of the Constitution.

Check Article I, Section 1, "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States..." And, Section 8,"The Congress shall have power to ....provide for the ... general welfare of the United States; [and] ... To regulate commerce .... and among the several states...;"

Disposed of by James Madison himself.

Bull. You argued a point I never made.

The FLSA is based on the Commerce Clause.

No, it's based on a Progressive interpretation of the Commerce Clause that has no constitutional weight behind it.

O.k., Glenn Beck. It's actually based on a reasonable interpretation of the Clause with plenty of constitutional weight behind it.

So where, exactly, does Congress derive its power to set a national minimum wage?

The Commerce Clause, although there are employers and employees who are not covered by the FLSA. Those that aren't are covered by State law. http://www.dol.gov/elaws/esa/flsa/scope/screen10.asp

How is the wage paid by an employer to his employee within a state "commerce among the several states?"

I already explained that. go back and read what I wrote.

Is it better for people to be unemployed, and therefore a burden on the public purse, because they do not have sufficient skills to make them worthwhile employees, or is it better for them to hold some position and get paid for it, which allows them the opportunity to learn and make themselves more valuable to their employer, and to the market generally, so that they can advance themselves economically?

That's a matter of opinion and depends on policy goals. Maybe it is better for some people to be unemployed so that a great many people can be employed at a higher wage.

And should government get to decide this?

Why not?

Because it has no constitutional authority to do so.

Commerce Clause. Already disposed of your "no constitutional authority."

Anyway - if you're interested in banishing things that really have "no constitutional authority" why aren't you bitching about the Air Force and the Immigration Service? There's no Constitutional authority granted for the federal government to issue passports or visas, but it does it all the time.

[

[.Morticia.]

gees coito, do i have to put you on ignore too?

[Coito ergo sum]

Have I done something wrong?

[.Morticia.]

Have I done something wrong?

you keep quoting seth

[Coito ergo sum]

Have I done something wrong?

you keep quoting seth

Ah, gotcha. Sorry about that.

[.Morticia.]

it's ok

I can actually ignore you know

[Seth]

it's ok

I can actually ignore you know

No, you can't, but thanks for playing...

[Coito ergo sum]

it's ok

I can actually ignore you know

You're ignoring me? But, as I recall, I don't think we've ever locked horns....at least give me the chance to agitate you before you ignore me.

[egbert]

It's really the rare job that only pays minimum wage, and typically they are jobs that are filled by high school and college kids. That's the reality.

[egbert]

Capital gains ought not be taxed at all.
And don't get me started on capital gains on real estate, which shouldn't exist at all. I paid my property and income taxes on my ranch every year, so why should I pay capital gains tax on the appreciated value when I sell it? The land is my 401K retirement fund, and I should be able to sell it tax free.

Yeah, it's so unfair! Let's see, you start a dot.com company, let's call it Facepalm, and your clever Palestinian Lawyer advises to only take a $1 per annum salary so you pay no income tax. Company does incredibly well, and in a few years you sell, pocketing billions.
Of course, being all capital gains, you pay no income tax. So there you are, a billionaire, paid not a penny of tax. And why should you? As Leona Helmsley said, "Only the little people pay taxes."
Let the minimum wage workers pay for public infrastructure, airports, highways, sewers, defence, coast guard, police. Fuck em - why should YOU pay a nickel!

[Seth]

Capital gains ought not be taxed at all.
And don't get me started on capital gains on real estate, which shouldn't exist at all. I paid my property and income taxes on my ranch every year, so why should I pay capital gains tax on the appreciated value when I sell it? The land is my 401K retirement fund, and I should be able to sell it tax free.

Yeah, it's so unfair! Let's see, you start a dot.com company, let's call it Facepalm, and your clever Palestinian Lawyer advises to only take a $1 per annum salary so you pay no income tax. Company does incredibly well, and in a few years you sell, pocketing billions.

And in the process, the company pays income taxes, including income taxes on the money that would otherwise be an expense to the company if paid to me as a salary, and it employs people and generates wealth for the economy. Meanwhile, I pay for my daily expenses out of my own wealth, thus recirculating it in the economy, all of which I have paid income tax on when it was earned. In the process, I pay sales and use taxes, property taxes, and assessments of every kind. I get no annual benefit from my "salary" and instead the money is reinvested in the company, leading to its financial success and benefitting the economy and the workforce by providing not only services and goods of value, but jobs for my workers. When I sell, I'm realizing the fruits of my labors and the risk of my capital. Why should the government be entitled to take what I've already paid numerous taxes on over time?

Of course, being all capital gains, you pay no income tax. So there you are, a billionaire, paid not a penny of tax. And why should you? As Leona Helmsley said, "Only the little people pay taxes."

Wrong.

Let the minimum wage workers pay for public infrastructure, airports, highways, sewers, defence, coast guard, police. Fuck em - why should YOU pay a nickel!

Why should the indigent dependent class who use the public infrastructure get to use it for free? They pay no income tax either, and in fact they get paid by the government, which takes it out of my pocket first. Fuck 'em.